Mortars to malls

Analyzing the relationship between peacebuilding and urban regeneration through a comparative study of place

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Analyzing the relationship between peacebuilding and urban regeneration through a comparative study of place

By

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the relationship between peacebuilding and urban regeneration in three post-conflict cities: Belfast, Sarajevo, and Beirut. In doing so, the research aims to answer the following questions: what is peacebuilding, how does it relate to a peace agreement, and how are these implemented in the post-conflict context, especially on the urban scale? How does urban regeneration relate to notions of the legitimacy of the state, and in the post conflict context, to the stability of peace? What is urban regeneration and how is it manifest in the post-conflict city? What are the implications of these issues in regards to the role of consumption, capital, identity and legitimacy as defining forces in the post-conflict context city and general peacebuilding context?

In the first section, exploring the literature on peace and cities and linking them through the Habermasian concept of legitimation provides the theoretical basis. The next stage involves examining the theories in practice— peace as peacebuilding and cities through urban regeneration—thus establishing a framework for analysing the case studies. In a discussion of methods, ethnography and the use of case-study analysis are presented as best-suited for the aims of the research.

Following this is the second section. First, the historic and socio-cultural contexts of each city and conflict are explored with a particular emphasis on the urban experience throughout. This is followed by a critical examination of the peace negotiation processes and an in-depth analysis of the treaty documents, paying particular attention to the degree to which urban/built environment issues are addressed. Subsequent to this is an exploration of the implementation of the treaties and the events/issues that surrounded them, in addition to looking at the major regeneration and building projects that took place in each city following the peace agreement implementation to the present. This is followed by a presentation of the ethnographic data, including observations and analysis of visual evidence, and the drawing out of common themes.

In the third section, the data of the previous section (contextual analysis, peace agreement analysis, and ethnographic data) are analyzed further. The result of this is a discussion of consumption, capital, identity, and legitimacy as interrelated processes that are part of the evolving form of peacebuilding in post-conflict cities. This is concluded by an examination of research implications and potential avenues for further exploration.

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At the end of the day, I couldn't have done this without my mother and Dylan Lehrke. A million thank you's forever and ever.

DECLARATION

All work is author's own, including illustrations and photos, except where referenced otherwise.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

BCD	Beirut Central District
CAIN	Conflict Archive on the Internet
CDR	Council for Development and Reconstruction
DSD	Department for Social Development
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (*Türk İşbirliği ve Kalkınma İdaresi Başkanlığı*)
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IMC	Independent Monitoring Commission
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPTF	International Police Task Force
IRA	Irish Republican Army
ISIS	Identity Securing Interpretive System
JNA	Yugoslav People's Army (*Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija*)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PIRA	Provisional Irish Republican Army
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organisation
RIRA	Real Irish Republican Army
RUC	Royal Ulster Constabulary
SBH	Save Beirut Heritage
SFRY	Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
Solidere	The Lebanese Company for the Development and Reconstruction of Beirut (*Société libanaise pour le développement et la reconstruction de Beyrouth*)
TI	Transparency International
TIKA	Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency
UNDESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development

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CHAPTER ONE

(Re)Constructing Cities and Building Peace

1.1 Introduction

> The story of Beirut's destruction, particularly the repeated devastation and looting of its centre, remains riddled with anomalies. The fiercest battles, displaying the most barbarous cruelties, took place there, as if the historic hub of the old city was both the most coveted and maligned space. It had more than just logistical and economic value. To get hold of the centre clearly offered the historic opportunity to reclaim its contested identity and the prospects of redefining the outlines of its future and renewed national image (Khalaf 2006, 126).

The war in Lebanon began in 1975 and ended in 1989 with the signing and ratification of the Ta'if Accords (Fisk 1992). However, in the twenty-two years since the Accords were put in place, violence has been repeatedly renewed. In this time, the destruction, reconstruction, and continuing controversy over Beirut's city centre has illustrated the tensions that can arise, even in a place that is deemed 'post-conflict', as a result of the reconstruction of the urban built environment and the city centre. The rebuilding of Beirut's central district (BCD) has complicated the recovery from violent conflict, creating a new medium through which renewed conflict might occur (Khalaf 2006). Equally however its regeneration provides a new lens through which to view post-conflict reconstruction in which (neoliberal) capital replaces the state and high end consumption becomes the means for this urban reconfiguration.

Why might this be the case? What type of impact did the reconstruction of the BCD have on the city and its communities? More specifically, in a post-conflict society such as Lebanon, where supposedly the process of peacebuilding was ushered in with the signing of Ta'if Accords, how and why was it that the city and its central district bore the brunt of both renewed physical violence and social tension? How might these also relate to a future re-imagining of the relationship between the goals of peacebuilding and the built environment in Beirut? Answering such questions requires a close examination of the relationship between cities and peacebuilding and an understanding of what it is that links the two together – this dissertation suggests that the concept of legitimation plays a key role in the successful

outcome of peace treaty implementation and peacebuilding, as well as understanding how the changing nature and loci of capital and consumption in relation to the state shapes this process. It also involves looking critically at peacebuilding, understanding why the peace treaties designed to end the conflict have demonstrated mixed results, exploring the ways social and cultural legitimation are present within cities, and understanding how state-sponsored peacebuilding efforts have evolved in the post-cold war era to be something very different from what was originally intended. This thesis explores this possibility by means of an examination of post-conflict reconstruction through a study of three cities that have undergone the traumas of inter-communal conflict: Sarajevo, Beirut, and Belfast.

The nuanced relationship between quality of life and the built environment and the effect each can have on the other is widely illustrated by urban theorists (e.g. Lynch 1972; Canter 1977; Carmona , Heath et al. 2003). It is this broad-based reflexive relationship that illustrates how a place's physical quality can shape individuals and social groups. In a similar turn, post-war reconstruction and the process of peacebuilding have shown both in theory and practice that success is more likely when the peacebuilding processes are seen as legitimate and viable by the society in which they are to be operating (Boutros-Ghali 1995; Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Lund 2003; Hampson 1996). This means that if peacebuilding is to be successful, it should at least in part be grounded in legitimation as it is the element that will make it more likely to succeed. Issues relating to urban design and planning could be a viable way for this to happen as physical space impacts people's perceptions and actions. This suggests that peacebuilding, on some level, has to be viewed more closely to the specificities of place ('citiness'), and care taken to repair, nurture and support them as urban systems. Likewise, assessing the implications this has on the changing dynamic between sources of consumption and centres of capital is crucial to understanding how the relationship between peacebuilding and the urban is manifest. Concentrating on urban issues is a novel approach for achieving the legitimation of post-conflict peacebuilding policy as it allows conceptual and physical space for growth in the stability of peace and increases the likelihood that a society will be able to self-maintain this through a variety of mechanisms that are found in the built environment. For example the presence of a public square provides space for protest as well as activities such as markets and cultural events that aid in maintenance of communal stability and cohesion. In addition, by focusing on urban issues peacebuilding may prove to be more stable on a wider scale since cities can have broad-based effects on the nation-state in which they are located.

In the realm of theory, there has been phenomenal growth in the literature regarding the 'international' or 'global' city, making cities and the networks and resources they represent

an increasing subject of critical analysis in not only scholastic work[1], but also in terms of policy[2]. A small portion of this analysis has been dedicated to understanding how cities, and the way they have been rebuilt following war, impact the quality and durability of peace achieved[3]. This is often analyzed in conjunction with the concept that the built environment plays an integral role in how conflict and cooperation is manifest in contemporary society. These areas are a growing concern of researchers and practitioner groups[4]. Despite this, the evolving role of peacebuilding in post-conflict cities is still underdeveloped, as is the underlying role which economic liberalization and neoliberal-style urban regeneration play in this overall process. How then does this get addressed?

Research on post-conflict peacebuilding efforts in the post-Cold War era reveals that the success of such projects is limited at best (Doyle and Sambanis 2000). Peacebuilding practitioners, scholars, and members of the international community agree that policies designed to implement peacebuilding in post-conflict settings often suffer from lack of local cultural and social legitimation where they are working (Hampson 1996; Roberts 2011; Heathershaw 2008; Call and Cook 2003). Concurrent to this is the increase of urban populations globally[5], the tendency for cities to be strategic targets in warfare making those that live in them highly vulnerable (Graham 2004; Hills 2004; Graham 2006), the changing nature of relations between centres of capital, sources of consumption, and the degree to which this is manifest in the built environment (Black and Henderson 1999; Boyer 1988; Swyngedouw et al. 2002; Crewe 1998), and the oft problematized role neoliberal urban regeneration has in shaping place (Sassen 2002, Weber 2002)). For these reasons, cities are vital to overall post-conflict recovery, exemplified by the legacy of urban reconstruction in Germany after World War II (WWII) (Brakman, Garretsen, and Schramm 2004; Diefendorf 1990). This dynamic relationship suggests that the changing role played by cities in war might be used as means for exploring how the legitimacy of post-conflict peacebuilding practices can be strengthened.

The descriptor of 'neoliberal' is a cornerstone concept throughout this research and requires a brief discussion. In the ensuing argument, the label of neoliberal is used to describe not only the kind of regeneration that has occurred in Sarajevo, Beirut, and Belfast, but also the impact the economic liberalizing policies wrought through the peace agreements have had on the political and market structures in each place. What, then, is meant by the term? While it is related to the concept of 'liberalism', it is also distinct from it. Liberalism, in its most classic Lockean sense, sees the state as being minimally involved in the affairs of the public. In this argument, liberal is often used to denote the type of peace agreement usually crafted by Western agencies, where political democracy and the opening of markets have a normative

effect through their implementation (i.e. 'liberal peace') (Paris 1997). In relation to this is the idea of neoliberal. Thorsen and Lie (2000) make a point of distinguishing that 'neoliberalism' is not a new version of liberalism as it is understood in the above sense, but rather it is a more extreme version of the Lockean one: they define it as 'a loosely demarcated set of political beliefs which most prominently and prototypically include the conviction that the only legitimate purpose of the state is to safeguard individual, especially commercial, liberty, as well as strong private property rights' (Thorsen and Lie 2000, 14). Other definitions, such as Harvey's (2005), present neoliberalism as a system where 'the role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices' as a market economy and free trade and to ensure its functioning (2005, 2), while Blomgren sees neoliberalism in a much broader sense, where it can mean anything from a laissez-faire state to a more 'classically liberal' one (1997).

The concept of neoliberalism as it is understood broadly in the literature emerged from the work of Friedman and Hayek, who in turn were commenting on the overall effects of Keynesian economic policies (Hackworth and Moriah 2006; Hackworth 2007). These policies are what characterized social, political, and economic policy of the welfare state in the latter half of the 20th century, primarily in the U.S. and the U.K. The effect of such approaches was deeply interwoven with the development and changes that took place in cities— from the construction of social housing, the destruction of neighbourhoods, and the institution of policies relating to economic robustness. These were all elements that were all manifest vis-a-vis the physical infrastructure of the city and why urban regeneration as it is seen today is rooted in the overall effect of neoliberal policies (Robinson 2011; Lovering 2007).

In this research, neoliberal is not used in a negative light, but rather as a descriptor of what has happened as a result of the peace agreement implementation, which is a tendency for the state to minimally regulate the way trade and economic exchange is conducted, and to pursue policies that maintain that status (though, it will also be argued that this is not a choice of the governments in question, but rather a necessity due to the post-conflict context).Ultimately, this leads to the overall discussion regarding the relationship between neoliberal urban regeneration in the post-conflict context as an outcome of the aforementioned forces, which is examined in greater detail in chapters two, seven, and eight.

In the following section I discuss the different aspects of the above discussion and build the framework for the foundation of the overarching argument developed in the remainder of the thesis.

1.1.1 The Current State of Peacebuilding

Former United Nations' Secretary General (1992-1996) Boutros Boutros-Ghali's 1995 *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace* identified peacebuilding as the way forward for achieving sustainable peace in conflict afflicted regions, defining it as 'actions to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict' (Boutros-Ghali 1995, 11). First coined by sociologist Johan Galtung nearly two decades prior (Galtung 1976), the idea of peacebuilding was for many years the territory of theorists—not policy-makers[6]. For Galtung, the primary focus of peacebuilding was finding new approaches to conflict resolution that were integrated into and part of a social and cultural system and not simply a bandage for healing wounds. Galtung's general theories of peace and conflict supported this idea[7], as his peacebuilding approach demanded that conflict resolution take place within a given culture and not be merely applied as an outside mechanism:

> 'The mechanisms that peace is based on should be built into the structure and be present there as a reservoir for the system itself to draw upon, just as the healthy body has the ability to generate its own antibodies and does not need the ad hoc administration of medicine. More particularly, *structures must be found that remove causes of wars and offer alternatives to war in situations where wars might occur*' (Galtung 1976, 298).

Boutros-Ghali's definition of peacebuilding in *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace* stayed true to Galtung's original intent. The need for a new approach to stability in post-conflict regions, and thus the impetus for Boutros-Ghali's use of peacebuilding as a framework for policy, was spurred on by the devastating conflicts and changes in geo-political power that characterized the early 1990s. Finally, the time was ripe for Galtung's conception of peace as something to be built *within* a culture instead of just temporarily enforced from without was taking centre stage.

Boutros-Ghali was criticized for tending towards ambiguity when it came to describing what exactly the activities of peacebuilding might be (Llamazares 2005); however it was later widely agreed that specificity would have conceptually limited the scope of what activities peacebuilding could include (Chr. Michelson Institute 2007; Barnett 1997). As practitioners and theorists considered the nature of peacebuilding in ensuing years, it was generally agreed that peacebuilding measures are conflict and culture specific, and therefore cannot be predetermined, although general frameworks for action may be utilized (Paris 1997; Ricigliano 2003). In *Agenda for Peace,* Boutros-Ghali commented that peacebuilding 'has received wide recognition . . . [and] can be as valuable in preventing conflict as in healing the wounds after

conflict has occurred' (Boutros-Ghali 1995, III.C.47). He also recognized that 'post-conflict peacebuilding can be complicated. It requires integrated action and delicate dealings between the United Nations and the parties to the conflict in respect of which peacebuilding activities are to be undertaken' (Boutros-Ghali 1995, III.C.48). It is this increasing complexity that will be the focus of the following discussion.

Since *Agenda for Peace*, the practice of peacebuilding and its related activities of peacekeeping, peacemaking, and preventive diplomacy have been practiced, theorized, and scrutinized by practitioners and academics. The peacebuilding and peacekeeping operations the UN embarked on from the early 1990s to the present, including those in Cambodia, Mozambique, Rwanda, and the Balkans, have shown that the practice of peacebuilding is an imperfect art, with much room for improvement and growth (Cousens et al.2001; David 1999; Schnabel 2002). The establishment of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) in 2006 reflects this tenuous advancement, as its creation represents the need for greater coordination between donors and members states in the broad field of peace and security[8], an issue highlighted by the weaknesses of the peacebuilding missions in the aforementioned locations.

Ricigliano also recognizes this need for continued development of approaches to peacebuilding:

> 'we are currently in a critical moment in the development of the peacebuilding field. Organizations working to build sustainable peace and development must now think and act in more integrative ways that cut across traditional boundaries—such as between official and unofficial actors—and across such diverse fields as humanitarian relief, conflict resolution, development, human rights, and environmental protection' (Ricigliano 2003, 445).

Likewise, Hulme and Goodhand (1999) acknowledge that in the post-Cold War era the way conflict and peace are analyzed must change in order to reflect the new complexities that have emerged. For them, relying more on the analysis of social and cultural structures and processes has replaced the previous focus on military practices and strategies (which dominates the Realist school of international relations), meaning that

> 'new forms of analysis are emerging that are of a different form . . . they are more eclectic, [and] recognize the need to blend different conceptual elements together in a manner appropriate for specific CPE [complex political emergency]' (Hulme and Goodhand 1999, 14).

These opinions reflect a growing interest in how the international community handles post-conflict peacebuilding, as 'traditional separation between peacekeeping and humanitarian

mandates are being blurred as a result of the evolution of classical peacekeeping to modern-day peacebuilding' (CERI Program for Peace and Human Security 2006, 3).

Critics of peacebuilding have shown that, for all its altruistic motives, it can have negative consequences on unforeseen issues. Paris (1997) warned against the dangers of 'liberal internationalism' and found that much of the literature on peacebuilding did very little to unpack the assumptions that underlie its functioning. This, he claimed, has led to the use of peacebuilding as a guise for forcing liberal market economic structures on post-conflict countries as a means of ameliorating the conflict. This has led to a severe shortcoming in the ability for current peacebuilding practices to truly take hold and 'stick' (Paris 1997; Hampson 1996; Toft 2006). In addition, the accepted paradigm that conflict can be divided up into neat chronological phases[9] adds to this misuse of peacebuilding, as it is perceived as a static tool to be inserted at the proper point in time and space during a conflict (CERI Program for Peace and Human Security 2006).

The 'liberal peace', understood through Doyle's analysis as an expression of Kant's *Perpetual Peace* in which Kant asserts that 'democracies do not fight democracies'[10] (known today as 'democratic peace theory') is the focus of much critical analysis (Doyle 1983; Doyle 2005). An essential part of the 'liberal peace' is a coupling of democratic structures with liberal market economies. As illustrated above, Paris problematizes how liberal market economic structures inherent in many peacebuilding practices are used as a tool for post-conflict societies to help achieve or become part of the greater project of liberal peace. Peacebuilding has been further taken to task for not only potentially doing more harm than good, but also for enforcing cultural mechanisms that are similar to the colonialist agenda of 'mission civilisatrice' (Paris 2002). In this sense, pragmatic economic policies aimed at growing market economies, which focus on the development of consumer and capital, are at the helm of how the international community has tended to structure peace agreements and peacebuilding missions. This represents a wholly Western viewpoint that Paris is critical of, for it re-presents peacebuilding as a force of globalization.

Others agree with his analysis, and see the fact that Western models of how peacebuilding *should* work in theory, are in fact *not* working in the reality of a non-Western context, as an illustration of how ill-suited the liberal market model of peacebuilding can be (Englebert and Tull 2011; Kurtenbach 2007). Some fail to see the liberal agenda as entirely damaging, arguing that for all its apparent flaws, it still offers a model that has provided structure and seeds for future growth of democratic principals in a post-conflict society (Begby and Burgess 2009; Paris 2010). The link between economic liberalism and democracy is based on the growth of a middle class, among other things (Krugman 2005; Lipset 1959). This positive

view of the liberal peace fits well with contemporary discourse on the economic centrality of cities in global and local economic structures (Friedman 2002; Storper and Venables 2004; Sassen 2001) as the city is the locus of development. This is especially true in the post-conflict context, for it is in the city where private and public enterprise is manifest, illustrating Hackworth and Jessup's point above regarding how neoliberalism becomes visible and experienced on the urban level. In any case, and as this research shows, the effect that the liberal market agenda has wrought through peacebuilding in post-conflict societies is visible in a variety of perhaps unexpected ways, and, perhaps more importantly, where it is made visible in the way urban economies and liberal peacebuilding intersect.

How then should peacebuilding be approached and re-conceptualized if the liberal peace is not working? The United Nations is taking steps to address institutional shortcomings regarding the inter-agency cooperation of peacebuilding instruments through the establishment of the PBC and almost every non-government organization involved with peace initiatives has a mandate to contribute to peacebuilding[11]. While the presence of such activity is proof that the idea of peacebuilding is fundamental to the future functioning of such bodies and to how the international community perceives its role in global politics, it is not in this arena that its practice requires re-envisioning. As the above discussion regarding the development of liberal/neoliberal peacebuilding illustrates, it is about evolving context-sensitive approaches to peacebuilding and having a level of adaptability and fluidity.

How then does this re-envisioning of approaches occur? Ricigliano (2003) believes peacebuilding must be seen within the framework of network theory, calling for a network of effective action, where agencies and actors follow a proposed set of policies and collaborative exercises to streamline the development of peacebuilding activity both on the ground and theoretically.This is much in line with the general purpose of Hulme and Goodhand (1999), who see the introduction of non-traditional disciplines (such as cultural theory) as a tool for the analysis of conflict and a means for creating more innovative and creative approaches to the process of peacebuilding. Likewise, Call (2008) argues that the future transformation of peacebuilding missions must be based on a critical appraisal of the degree of success of past peacebuilding attempts rooted in the local context. These indicate that effective peacebuilding is something that involves many levels of society and culture, requiring fine-tuning for each individual scenario.

Urban theory already benefits from a wide-scope of approaches (Merrifield 2002). Within this, there is a growing literature regarding the concept of 'urbicide', defined by Coward as 'destruction of the built environment as a distinct form of political violence' (2006, 422). When urbicide occurs, it is not motivated solely by the desire to destroy the built environment

for strategic purposes, but to also destroy (or control) the spaces of political and social identity that the urban environment creates for its inhabitants (Fregonese 2009; Hewitt 2009). This is a fundamental notion underlying the connection of war and cities, and also offers a jumping off point for approaching how peacebuilding and cities might be conceived of together. In addition, accepting urbicide as a critical concept for understanding the effect extreme destruction of the built environment has as a strategic tool in warfare, than by analogy, it can also be accepted that neoliberal urban regeneration can have a transformative effect on not only the built environment but also on spaces of political and social identity.

In looking back at how peace theory can be alternatively conceived so that it is applicable to the nature of the 'urban' as a space of political and social identity, peace researcher A.B. Fetherston has introduced novel methods for approaching peacebuilding. By integrating Habermasian communicative action, which focuses on dialogue and argumentation between individuals that searches for mutual understanding and is free from coercion, along with Lederach's conflict transformation model[12], Fetherston views peacebuilding as transformative and not just resolving of conflict (Fetherston 2000, 206-212). Fetherston explores the idea that if 'creating spaces where intersubjectively produced mutual understandings' are possible then this would enable 'the reconstruction of communication networks' (2000, 212). All in all, the peacebuilding literature is growing in terms of questioning the basic assumptions of what comprises peacebuilding and how new and innovative approaches can make it more effective. However there remains room for increased analysis.

In particular, picking up on the critique of the liberal peace and its neoliberalizing effects on the economic structure of the society in which it is it is working intersects with the notion that cities are the setting through which networked and globalizing forces enhance the productive capacity and value of a place. Furthermore, drawing on Fetherston's stance allows for exploration of how and why cities, and city centres, are valuable aids in the peacebuilding process. This adds together to build an image of the city as not just a static place where things happen, but a dynamic space through which a spectrum of seemingly invisible processes, such as the ones discussed here, are made real.

This also means that if the re-envisioning of peacebuilding is to cleave with notions of the urban as a space of communication and capital and cultural production, cases of peacebuilding successes and failures must be analyzed, the fundamental purpose of peacebuilding must be understood, and approaches to it should draw on urban theory and practice. The proposal here is to take up the reins of this need to re-imagine approaches to peacebuilding in a novel way: through the integration of peacebuilding with cities and urban theory.

1.1.2 Peacebuilding and Cities: Integrating Disparate Concepts

The previous section explored the idea that while the field of peacebuilding is relatively new, it is also widely accepted as the most effective tool for addressing root causes of conflict and preventing future violence in post-conflict societies (Lederach and Jenner 2002; Zelizer and Rubinstein 2009).

In this section, integrating peacebuilding and urban theory is proposed as a means for exploring ways in which sustainable peace can be achieved in a post-conflict society. This requires a detailed comparison of relevant theories of the city/urban and peacebuilding. The following section will propose that urban issues are integral to the peacebuilding debate, suggesting ways in which peacebuilding and urban theory might be theoretically bridged.

There are two pressing, underlying reasons for needing to integrate urban issues with those of peacebuilding. First, the world population is rapidly growing and urbanizing, making urban issues a prescient matter[13]. Second, cities and urban centres are increasing in size and are the setting for a large proportion of violence in times of war (Graham 2004, 2010)[14]. Cities are fragile places but also have great capacity for resilience. They are centres of physical and social security for their inhabitants, and indeed this is the reason that they are targeted[15] (Human Security and Outreach Program 2006; Graham 2004).

The United Nations Department on Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), Population Division said that 'by the middle of 2009, the number of people living in urban areas (3.42 billion) had surpassed the number living in rural areas (3.41 billion) and since then the world has become more urban than rural' (UNDESA Population Division 2010, 2). The world population is projected to increase from 7 billion to 9.2 billion by 2050, with an estimated 6.4 billion of these people living in cities, over two-thirds of the global population (UNDESA Population Division 2010, 4). In addition, there is the pervasive issue of the increase of internally displaced people (IDPs)[16] who tend to migrate to urban centres when violent conflict is present throughout a region. The number of IDPs was estimated at 27.5 million worldwide at the close of 2010 with the majority of the displacement being due to war and violent conflict (Birkeland et al. 2011, 9). Recent research by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Committee (IDMC) also shows that a large proportion of IDPs migrate to urban centres, but disperse quickly within an urban population, highlighting the need to create new methods for studying urban populations and reconsider how conflict is dealt with in urban centres (Birkeland et al. 2011, 10).

Increased urbanization means that dealing with urban issues and their unique character will increasingly take centre-stage. It is this basic geographical fact—that more

humans now live in cities then not—which makes necessary that approaching peacebuilding through the framework of the city is needed to adequately address future problems. Because cities are vulnerable places due their centralization of goods and services, and because they are strategically targeted in warfare, the international community should be prepared and equipped to handle crises of all types in population dense urban areas, including a form of best practice for post-conflict reconstruction. While conflict can and will still occur outside of cities, cities are increasingly a core expression and actualization of contemporary conflict.

How then are the burgeoning urban population, the strategic role of cities as sources of strength and vulnerability in times of conflict, and peacebuilding connected? At this juncture, it is critical to bridge the concepts of peacebuilding and cities by exploring on the theoretical level how the two fields are connected. The first step is to take another look at how legitimacy of peacebuilding practices might be improved and how this can be incorporated into issues concerning the city and the built environment.

Peacebuilding has been shown to be lacking in terms of its overall goal of achieving sustainable peace, as has been illustrated by the mixed successes in places such as Cambodia, Lebanon, and Angola. According to Hampson (1996), the underlying failure for peacebuilding projects has been their inability to 'stick' and inspire long-term change and this can be attributed to the lack of institutional integration of third-party peacebuilding representatives into the conflict region in question. Likewise, he agrees that the ways peace treaties and hence peacebuilding policy is applied must be scrutinized due to the challenging nature of conflict environments in general: 'Given that negotiated settlements are often difficult to achieve, and obviously somewhat rare, the question of what determines success in restoring domestic order and civil violence is critical one' (Hampson 1996, 6). Call also sees the need to define and use peacebuilding as a context specific device, and measure its success in a similar manner: 'Although war recurrence lends itself to cross-national standards for participation and institutional strength, decision makers in post-war societies should be wary of letting standardized indicators of participation and state capacity drive them from context-specific strategies to institutionalize conflict-resolution mechanisms' (Call 2008, 174). This, in relation to Hampson's call for greater analysis of how peacebuilding is understood and critically applied, motivates this research into how the dynamics of peacebuilding can be shaped for more effective use.

How then might this be addressed? One underlying element that emerges from an analysis of peacebuilding literature is the notion of legitimacy and its importance in ensuring the staying power of any new policy, state authority, or peacebuilding venture in a post-conflict area (Hampson 1996; Crocker and Hampson 2006; Lake and Rothchild 1996).

Legitimacy is key to unlocking the support and approval of the society in which the peacebuilding is occurring, a fundamental factor in ensuring long-term success. Problematizing the root cause of the lack of success of peacebuilding measures means understanding how and why these measures were not accepted in the first place. This harkens back to the initial discussion of Galtung's metaphor for peacebuilding where 'the healthy body has the ability to generate its own antibodies and does not need the ad hoc administration of medicine'. Likewise, the body also has the ability to reject blood or organs that are not similar to it. To translate this metaphor, legitimacy, or lack of, can determine whether something as vital as new jobs, new leadership, or a new justice system (or other peacebuilding mechanisms) are absorbed and effective.

Legitimacy as a concept was explored thoroughly by Habermas in his work *Legitimation Crisis* (1976). By looking at debates surrounding the role of legitimation in international politics and relations, as well as Habermas's own dissection and exploration of the subject, he proffered a conception of legitimacy as something in a crisis as the reason behind state failure. It is through this lens that the role of the city can be seen as something that serves a legitimating function for the acceptance of peace processes. This will be discussed in more detail in chapter two, but at this stage it should be noted that legitimacy pertains to notions of perceptions of security, identity, systems, and structure, all of which are elements organic to the way in which Habermas structures political legitimation. Hansen (1997) also supports the notion that the acquisition of legitimacy is foundational to any peacebuilding work. According to her definition:

> '. . . the elements of political legitimacy are assessed with respect to whether they can fulfil the population's needs for effectiveness, stability, and security. These factors will determine the success of confidence-building measures and thus lasting peace' (Hansen 1997, 75).

Hansen's definition elicits a pragmatic approach insofar as political legitimacy is measured in how well it meets the needs of a society and these effects of legitimacy are measureable, observable, or tangible (i.e. the need for healthcare by a society is met by the creation of hospitals or an organized healthcare system which in turn elicits continued approval by the society of the government who provides it)[17]. This is instrumental in perceiving how legitimacy and peacebuilding should work in that it requires results that are measureable, felt, and grounded in the experience of the society in which it is to be working. Her concluding emphasis on fulfilling 'needs for effectiveness, stability, and security' especially in a post-conflict context, speak to an experience of peacebuilding that is grounded in everyday life

experience of a particular population. In this sense, it is argued that peacebuilding, and its legitimation, should be approached through the basic needs of individuals and communities to continue living in a place that is stable and secure. It is in this sense that cities become integral to the peacebuilding process and its legitimation—security of place, identity, and physicality are concepts elicited in discussions of urban theory and design[18], and are also vital to the establishment and maintenance of peace in any post-conflict society.

Cities are instrumental in how people who live in them shape their identities and give structure and meaning to the way the world seems to work. This is summarized by Bourdieu's concept of 'habitus' (1984; 1990). 'Habitus' is an important concept for understanding the generative role the city and the urban environment play in creating identity as it enables a more critical understanding of the complexities of 'place' and 'experience of place' that inevitably occur in examining the urban (Butler 2002; Bridge 2001). These qualities have the double effect of making the issue of post-conflict peacebuilding, legitimacy, and cities even more salient. As a lead up to discussing exactly how the legitimation of peacebuilding functions through the city, the notion of place needs to be explored in order to add context from urban theory.

The general sense of why cities are important is aptly characterized by Yi-Fu Tuan (1975), who in her goal to analyze 'place', looked at all levels of human interaction with 'place', from the fireplace and rocking chair up to the less tangible idea of the nation-state, basing her argument on the idea that the experience of place is what makes it important. She emphasizes the central role of cities, in opposition to identification with the nation, as the most vital place for experience. This is because cities have historically had, and will continue to have, a much greater life span than the nation-state, and thus people will have a greater identification with and experience of the city. She writes:

> 'The political state is an unstable identity compared with its own major cities. One reason is that, compared with the city, the nation-state's existence depends more on maintaining the potency of shared symbols and concepts, and less on direct experience with objects and people. Cities existed as places long before nation-states were conceived, and they remain long after nation-states have become anachronisms' (Tuan 1975, 160).

Tuan's analysis reflects Lynch's work, as he focuses on how experience of a place, especially the city, is vital to creating a shared history and for tying together seemingly disparate moments or phases in a city's, and a society's, history (Lynch 1973; Lynch 1972). The concepts proposed by Tuan and Lynch give a general sense of how this place called the 'city' is vital for

the maintenance and restoration of socially cohesive processes, and also provides the physical and psychological space for change to occur.

Cities are also the focus of the development, production, and maintenance of capital and culture, which are intimately bound to concepts of place, for example through the networks of social capital as evidenced in Blokland and Savage's (2008) work or via Knox's (1997) argument that a city's capacity to create an economic product is part of larger networked system of production. It is argued in chapter two that cities are becoming in some respects at least as important as states in shaping the world economy and exchange of knowledge and ideas[19]. In contemporary discourse, this has led to a debate as to whether the world is becoming 'borderless' as the state's capacity for creating and securing identity and gathering capital wanes with the role of the city waxing in relation (Ohmae 1991), which confirms the idea that the space a city occupies and the kind of place it is as even more integral to the globalizing world (Yeung 1998). In the post-conflict context, reconstruction and regeneration of a city means not only rebuilding buildings but also its ability to (re)produce and maintain capital and culture, the capability for which is usually crippled by the conflict (Addison et al. 2001; Kreimer and Dept 1998). This is even more vital when considering that cities, and not states, are what position place and identity in both global and local systems. In the post-conflict city, ensuring economic robustness is an imperative for national survival as well as the government's legitimation, and a city must be able to compete and contribute in some way to the global economy and thus to the more local economic dimension as well. In many ways, this competitive function is filled by the increase in consumer activities and spaces of consumption, especially in the urban and city centre context (Spierings 2006; Miles 1998).

Cities are places where things happen and where people create identity and culture. They are where capital and consumption shape its future form as well, and debates within urban theory reflect the on-going exploration of how physical place and perceived conditions of that place intermingle (e.g. Canter 1977; Carmona et al. 2003; Hayden 1997). When approaching the problem of peacebuilding strategy and effectiveness as a function of legitimation that can be influenced by the urban setting, the connection between what conflict afflicted places and people need and what international and third party peacebuilding proponents can provide can be made more tenable. The purpose of the theory examined in this thesis within the context of an exploration of three post-conflict case study cities (Sarajevo, Beirut, and Belfast), is to explore the fruitfulness of such a proposition.

1.1.3 Another Look at Beirut

Having reviewed the relationship between peacebuilding and the city through the role of legitimation and its expression of neoliberal processes, the example of Beirut's reconstruction illustrates this. The reconstruction of the BCD is a highly contentious project, and provides a clear example of Paris's previously mentioned criticism of 'liberal internationalism', or the dressing up of liberal market economy structures as a peacebuilding process (Paris 1997; Paris 2010). The design team leading the reconstruction is Solidere (**So**ciété **li**banaise pour le **dé**veloppement et la **re**construction de Beyrouth)[20], and was created by former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri at the end of the civil war for the sole purpose of carrying out this project. Solidere is seen by many critics as having failed to consider the potential effect of building and designing a new city centre in a war-ravaged area, especially when that design seemed to marginalize and distance the general Beiruti population and cater to classes drawn mainly from regional wealthy elite (Khalaf and Khoury 1993; Sawalha 2003; Khalaf 2006). Sawalha summarizes this opinion:

> 'Was there a danger in having one company monopolize the reconstruction effort, especially a globally oriented company whose New York-inspired vision meant obliterating many historic buildings and ignoring Beirut's Lebanese surroundings? Did the emphasis on the Central Business District presage neglect of the rest of the city? Would the downtown and waterfront evolve as a 'ghetto of prosperity' in the midst of a crumbling Third World city, perhaps even inaccessible without a private car? If so, the centre would cease to integrate people from varied walks of life. Many individuals and groups, drawn into critical discussions of the Solidere project, expressed concern for the future identity of their city. Given the tragedy of recent strife, an especially challenging question was how the future urban fabric would integrate the interests and honour the histories of its many ethnic, class and religious constituencies' (Sawalha 2003, 275).

Perhaps the most relevant point that this raises regards the nexus of several key issues. The reconstruction of the built environment, played out through shifting centres of production of capital and how it is manifest and consumed in the post-conflict city, and the ability for the people of Beirut to legitimize the larger peace process, are dynamics that draw in the previous discussion of legitimation, peacebuilding, and the city. Further elucidating themes such as accessibility, identity, ghettoization, and class, Sawalha connects these vital issues to the 'mis-reconstruction' of the BCD and the potential for future peace and stability. Thus, is it possible to extrapolate further from this example and analyze the connection between the reconstruction of a city following war and the potential influence this might have on the legitimation and chances of success of peacebuilding within its wider society.

The Beirut example illustrates how post-conflict reconstruction, if done without regard to the city, community as a whole, or sub-communities, can have mixed effects on the society's ability to emerge from conflict. In this sense, peacebuilding should be approached in the urban context as something that is for the city and the people who live there, not the interests of an exclusive group (whether they be private business or international stakeholders), though in other ways the Solidere project has also positively transformed the formerly war-torn landscape. Referring back to Boutros-Ghali's definition of peacebuilding as 'action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict' (1995), it is argued here that the 'identification and supporting of structures' is precisely why peacebuilding worked through the city is an acceptable approach. The question is though, is the primary goal of peacebuilding achieved? Is the healthy growth and development of structures within the society buttressed so that root causes of conflict are addressed and a durable peace attained? If so, then peacebuilding through the reconstruction process can be a viable option for implementing such policy. These are questions explored in greater detail through the case-study analysis.

In this thesis, the juncture between the role the built environment and city centre reconstruction can play in relation to peacebuilding practices is fundamental to the overall analysis and is central to a growing body of work (Weizman et al. 2003; Gaffikin and Morrissey 2006). Even though peacebuilding theory and practice continues to evolve (Fetherston 2000; Cousens and Kumar 2001; Jeong 2005; Barnett et al. 2007), it is not surprising that the tenuousness of peace settlements and peace treaties are often criticized as containing 'the seeds of their own destruction' (Hampson 1996, 1). Despite this, and perhaps because of it, measures for evaluating the success of peacebuilding policies are equally unclear, which further complicates the ability to refine and critique peacebuilding on the whole. Call argues that while measuring success of peacebuilding should be context specific, there are also generalizable measurements, such as relapse into conflict, that have value. He also argues that 'one of the important challenges in examining whether a society has institutions capable of resolving conflict peacefully is the prior assumption about which institutions are important for conflict resolution. In some societies, state judicial systems are the locus of non-violent conflict resolution, whereas in others, social norms and locally legitimate authorities play a crucial role' (Call 2008, 191). This suggests that multiple levels of social existence are valuable for their contribution to peacebuilding, as well as their ability to provide a measurement for gauging its success. This is something the built environment provides in the post-conflict city.

If the rebuilding of the Beirut city centre had been considered a potential tool for forging a more positive peace in the post-war context, there is a possibility the insipient

instability that continued after the peace negotiations of 1989 might have been mitigated. Since the city centre provides the basis for civic life, for interacting with members of the community, for accessing resources, and for a sense of safety and security offered by functioning public utilities and space to conduct public life (Shneider 2003; Gaffikin and Morrissey 2006; Yassin 2008), in Beirut, increased attention paid to it on these grounds may have helped lessen this instability. If this basic function of the city centre is not fulfilled, the potential may be that whatever greater peace negotiation or treaty was arrived at will quickly collapse or slowly crumble. If it does not, the peace process, and what it is attempting to construct, will not be as effective, or perhaps even have negative consequences.

1.2 Conclusion

This chapter has introduced the overarching argument that for peacebuilding to succeed, it has to secure a necessary sense of legitimacy amongst the various stakeholders (including those able and willing to put up the necessary capital), as well as the local community and greater society involved in the reconstruction of post-conflict urban society. In examining what peacebuilding is and understanding its underlying assumptions, the city is seen as a place where the built and human environment can enhance the effectiveness of socio-cultural and political processes. These will in turn also serve to strengthen the goals of peacebuilding. The key role that cities play in contextualizing the ability for people to survive and move forward by creating centres of identity and capital creation, even in the face of destruction, is fundamental to the thesis. This sentiment is summed up by photojournalist Don McCullen's reaction to the devastation that he witnessed in Beirut when the violence first broke out in 1975:

> 'When I go and I see a city like Beirut, one of the things I detest most is when people write stories saying 'The Death of a City' or something like that. Cities never die. You can bomb cities flat and they will still come back and live, because of the tenacity of the people and the basic will to survive. I saw some horrendous crimes against humanity in Beirut—bombing and shelling and killing. It just makes people more resilient' (McCullen 1983).

What factors lead to this claim that cities never die? Is it their capacity to attract a constant flow of migrants or their role as centres of production of capital? Is it the city's ability to shape individual and group identity through shared space? By examining these and other factors and coupling them with strategies for reconstruction, the process of peacebuilding as

an expression of these qualities has the potential for ensuring a sustainable form of urban regeneration. It is here that social and urban theory, in combination with a greater understanding of peace theory and legitimation, can help us understand how this happens, what needs to be done. These are the major themes developed throughout the thesis.

1.3 Aims of Thesis and Chapter Structure

Based on the above preliminary discussion, the aims of this research project are as follows: (1) to understand how theoretical concepts of peace and place can be linked through a Habermasian conception of legitimation and how this in turn is translated into practice; (2) to explore the implications of peacebuilding and its effect on the regeneration of the city centres in Sarajevo, Beirut, and Belfast through a contextual analysis and walking and observation of the cities and (3) to further analyze how such a relationship is manifest in a neoliberal account of peacebuilding-as-regeneration focusing on changing centres of capital and consumption.

The argument develops in the following manner: as was seen in this chapter (chapter one), the need to problematize the 'imperfect art' of peacebuilding, the growth of cities as the global population increases, and the targeting of cities in warfare, has produced a need to understand better how more successful peacebuilding can be achieved in contemporary examples (Sarajevo, Beirut, and Belfast). Chapter two presents a review of foundational literature on peace and cities. These are connected through a detailed exploration of Habermasian legitimation. Legitimation is then 'actualized' through a discussion of how it applies to peacebuilding and urban regeneration. The goal of this chapter is to understand how the narrative of urban regeneration in each case-study gives insight into the nature of peacebuilding in the longer-term.

Following from this chapter three discusses the methods and methodology used in creating the analysis. This relies on a critical realist approach where policy implementation, such as peacebuilding, has real and identifiable effects on the built environment, such as urban regeneration. Further, the usefulness of case-study analysis and ethnographic data collection are discussed as the mixed-methods chosen for the research, in addition to the framework used to analyze peace agreements in chapter four.

Part two aims to explore the empirical research and analysis. Beginning with chapter four, the historic, social, and cultural context of each city/state is explored with the goal of analyzing the role of the economy and the built environment highlighted within. Also, a

summary of each conflict is presented along with an analysis of the impact it had on the city's built environment. This chapter is 'scene-setting' in nature and serves to present a contextual analysis of each city and conflict that is nested in socio-cultural and economic change.

Chapter five accomplishes three sequential tasks. The first task involves understanding the nature of peace treaties, exploring the creation of the peace treaties applicable to each city (Sarajevo: Dayton Accords; Beirut: Ta'if Accords; Belfast: Belfast Agreement), and looking at the findings of the framework application (explained in chapters three and five) to each peace treaty, all the while focusing in on how these peace treaties did (or did not) include urban or built environment issues. This is followed by an exploration of the implementation of the peace treaties: how did they fare in the general socio-political sense, but also, depending on the degree of focus on urban matters present in each treaty, was the built environment impacted in the implementation phase. In looking at this, the literature regarding the nature of implementation is reviewed in order to pull out characteristics essential to evaluating and understanding peace agreement implementation, and the notion of when 'implementation' ends and 'peacebuilding' begins is also examined. Finally, the development of the built environment in each city from the peace treaty/end of conflict to the present day is assessed, connecting the patterns of reconstruction and regeneration to the degree of urban issues present in the peacebuilding policy (or even if it can be connected at all). The overall goal of this chapter to provide a link in examination of how cities are effected by peace treaties, and how the growth and regeneration of cities in the post-conflict phase is actually the product of the liberalization of economic structures, and how the changes this institutes in a society can in turn bolster the long-term effectiveness of peace.

Following from the findings of chapter five, the observational data gathered during field work conducted in each city are presented and analyzed in chapter six. Including interview material, photographs, and other visual documentation, the experience of place is conveyed through a narrative account of what it was like to walk and assess the quality and form of each city centre, especially as it related to the development of peace on the ground and the manifestation of neoliberal processes. This observation is then analyzed for overarching themes, drawing out elements of economic production and the role of consumption, the importance of city centre space in sectarian conflict, and the problematic aspect of privately driven regeneration.

Chapter seven draws on the concluding analysis of chapter six. Using interview material to further explore the thematic implications of the observational data, the individual characteristics of urban regeneration in each city and its associated processes are examined.

This is followed by a broadening of the discussion to more general themes drawn from the case comparisons. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the relational dynamic inherent in each urban regeneration and peacebuilding process.

Chapter eight builds on the relational dynamic explored in chapter seven. By further linking it with neoliberal models of development, the nature of the relationship between peacebuilding and urban regeneration is discussed. This is then connected back to the legitimation framework discussed in chapter two of the dissertation. The chapter concludes with a look at how approaches to peacebuilding policy should take on a stronger urban dimension.

CHAPTER TWO

Foes and Friends: Peace, Cities, and the Processes That Link Them

2.1 Introduction

> *Men of sense often learn from their enemies. It is from their foes, not their friends, that cities learn the lesson of building high walls and ships of war . . .*
> *('The Birds', Aristophanes)*

The relationship cities have to warfare is as ancient as the city itself. However, the relationship cities have to peace is relatively unexplored. Chapter one introduced some of the basic argumentation underlying how and why cities are vital to understanding processes of peace and peacebuilding in the post conflict context. In this chapter, I explore more thoroughly the theories underlying the proposed research; looking first at peace theory and its transformation into the more formalized process of peacebuilding, moving through to a discussion of legitimation, then applying legitimation to urban theory and ending with a discussion of (neoliberal) urban regeneration which provides the general foundation for the research presented in subsequent chapters.

In framing this exploration, the quote from Aristophanes above expresses a fundamental truth about the form and function of cities. However, while it might be the case that cities, much like defence mechanisms, are borne out of a relationship with enemies, it is also necessary to problematize this relationship. The existence of cities now, as well as in ancient Greece, is not merely to protect (though that is certainly a function), but also to aid mechanisms for growth and change in society.

The chapter begins by discussing the background and meaning of peace in section 2.2 covering issues such as structures of peace and violence, conflict management, and peacebuilding. Second, the concept of legitimation is covered in section 2.3. This is done by looking at Habermas and how he developed the concept of legitimation, how it is understood, and how it can be applied to the city. In section 2.4, the city as a space of legitimation is

further explored in greater detail. Next, peacebuilding and urban regeneration are discussed as the practicable versions of the theoretical dimensions explored earlier in the chapter. Section 2.6 concludes the chapter.

2.2 Peace: Background and Meaning

Peacebuilding as envisioned by Galtung (1975) is a practical expression of his earlier work on the structure, function, and meaning of peace and conflict within society. For Galtung, peacebuilding is a synthesis of earlier theories regarding structural and cultural violence and positive and negative peace that underlie of many debates in the field of peace theory. Peacebuilding, while in the broader context of the overall research is a contemporary concern and one that is being critically studied for weaknesses in its application, is situated within a more general tradition of thought within the fields of political philosophy and international relations.

Galtung first began to construct his theories regarding the structure of peace and conflict in the early 1960s. His analysis opened up an entirely new approach to understanding how peace and conflict are deep-set in all aspects of society and human culture, and not simply expressed in war. His work is considered foundational to the structure of the peace research field (Kemp 1985), which is integral to the greater debate on peacebuilding.

The following sections will explore the basic elements of Galtung's peace theory and the context of peacebuilding practice as located within conflict management.

2.2.1 Structures of Peace and Violence

Galtung's approaches for understanding peace and conflict fall into two categories: positive and negative peace, and structures of violence. Each aspect illustrates the dynamic and complex relationship peace and conflict have with a given culture or society in which they are observed.



Figure 2-1 Galtung's Positive and Negative Peace (Galtung 1969)

Positive and negative peace are complementary states of 'peace' (see figure 2-1), where the type of peace that exists in a given culture rests somewhere on a spectrum between the two. Galtung defines positive and negative peace in the following way: 'Peace can be interpreted as negative peace, which is the absence of violence, or as "positive peace", the capacity to deal with conflict non-violently and creatively. The more justice, the easier it is achieve and maintain peace' (Galtung 2001, 3). Galtung also asserts that 'violence' in a system exists when the capacity development of an individual or group is hindered by the system itself. Other researchers have slightly more nuanced renditions of what Galtung implies; Kriesberg describes negative peace as being the absence of war, which may 'connote order and security, but it may also connote suppression of struggles to redress justice', and that positive peace refers to 'at least a minimal level of equity in the conditions of the people in the same social system' (Kriesberg 2001, 48). Positive and negative peace also are important for understanding what kind of peace is achieved following the cessation of violent conflict. For example, just because the (direct) violence has ceased and a state of negative peace exists, there is often still movement to be made for positive peace to take hold. This is the realm of peacebuilding (Galtung 1964).



Figure 2-2 Galtung's Violence Triangle (source:http://www.engender.org.za/publications/engendering security.html)

Galtung's conception of the structures of violence illustrate the interrelationship between violence and society. Called the 'violence triangle' (see figure 2-2), it consists in the first instance of direct violence (immediate, physical or emotional violence inflicted on one person). Next is structural violence, which is how a given social structure or institution systematically harms and hinders the development of people by preventing them from meeting their basic needs. In Western culture, examples of structural violence include issues such as sexism, racism, or ageism. This categorization of violence was first articulated in 1969 and was completed 21 years later with the idea of

cultural violence (Galtung 1990). Cultural violence is the third leg of the triangle and is defined as any aspect of a culture that is used to legitimize direct or structural violence. Cultural violence is exemplified by 'religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal science' (1990, 1) things which can oppress human rights just as equally as they can serve to support them.

The above concepts provide the basis for understanding how and why peacebuilding can be an effective tool for mitigating and transforming covert and structural violence within a society into positive peace.

2.2.1.3 Peacebuilding

Looking back to the discussion on positive and negative peace and the structures of violence, peacebuilding aims to move from the state of negative peace that is attained once overt violence has ceased, and help reconstruct the aspects of a society that lead to a positive peace. One way this is done is by addressing issues concerned with structural and cultural violence, insofar as they can be effectively managed by an external peacebuilding policy.

Peacebuilding is defined by its goals: to transform conflict with the ultimate goal of obtaining some level of durable and sustainable peace. Boutros-Ghali defined peacebuilding as

> 'comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people. Through agreements ending civil strife, these may include disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation' (Boutros-Ghali 1995, VI.55).

What is striking about the above definition is the vast amount of responsibility that is heaped on to the notion of peacebuilding. Boutros-Ghali manages to apply it to distinctly different phases and aspects of conflict, something that has been criticized by scholars (Barash and Webel 2008; Fetherston 2000). The perceived broadness of peacebuilding is perhaps one reason why it has not found as much as success as hoped as well as why it often lacks legitimacy.

Peacebuilding since the early 1990s has been a well-intentioned but ill-fated project. As Doyle and Sambanis noted in their quantitative analysis of peacebuilding efforts:

> 'The collapse of state institutions in Somalia . . . civil wars in Bosnia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Guatemala, and other countries have marked the distinctive contours of civil strife in the past decade. The international community's responses to these emergencies have, despite sometimes major efforts, been mixed at best: occasional success in restoring a legitimate and effective government are matched by striking failures to do so' (Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 779).

Thus, Doyle and Sambanis, like many of the other authors discussed in this section, indicate that a peace process and its institutions must be legitimate in order to be effective. Roberts (2011) argues the legitimacy point even further, claiming that part of the problem of peacebuilding is not its acceptability by the international community, but its ability address a community's internal needs: 'Orthodox peacebuilding is legitimated from without by its emphasis on state-centric liberalism but, according to critics, delegitimized within because peacebuilding priorities are irrelevant to much of the population's imminent needs' (2011, 411). Both Doyle and Sambanis and Roberts further admit that despite its importance, peacebuilding praxis has had only episodic success in achieving legitimacy. Legitimation is recognized as vital to peacebuilding's success, though there is little agreement and much discussion over how this happens; therefore, the primary concern of this thesis is to explore one avenue for this.

Such broad statements tell us one thing – that legitimacy is considered important. Its importance is asserted again and again. Larry Diamond, a former senior advisor to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad now with the Hoover Institution claims 'the first lesson of America's experience in Iraq is that . . . any effort at administration and reconstruction of the post-conflict state must mobilize legitimacy, both internally in the post-conflict country as well as internationally' (Diamond 2006, 34). Yet, this is hardly a 'lesson' learned, as the dynamics behind legitimacy are so poorly understood. We only know it is important, at least within the literature.

Thus, while the peacebuilding literature is valuable, it fails to adequately answer the questions needed to move forward with this thesis because it does not offer potential solutions for how legitimation might practically be addressed on the ground in the post-conflict setting. In this research in particular, the question is, if peacebuilding praxis does not give proper consideration to legitimization from within, then how can this happen? Does peacebuilding consistently and effectively have as one of its goals its own legitimation and how does the extent and effectiveness of legitimation efforts impact the peace process?

2.3 Legitimation: a Theoretical Linkage

In the previous section, general theories for and the philosophical roots of peace were examined as a means of further exploring and problematizing post-conflict peacebuilding. As it ended with a conclusion of how peacebuilding efforts often fail due to lack of legitimation from the culture in which it is supposed to be working this following section further discusses the idea of legitimation[21]. Beginning with Habermas' conception of the 'legitimation crisis', this idea is used to explore how post-conflict peacebuilding can be linked to urban theory.

2.3.1Habermas and the Legitimation Crisis

Habermas is considered part of the Frankfurt School, a circle of Marxist-oriented critical German theorists whose thought and work were established in the early 1920s but that would continue on for several decades. Habermas is considered part of the second generation of theorists and his work was fundamentally concerned with analyzing the role of the individual in post-war Germany. He built and nurtured the ideas in his work with the School and restructured them to create his own philosophical position on governance, politics, power, and the public sphere, from this developing a philosophy of action and discourse as it related to the state and to the self (White 1995). One of his primary ideas concerning democracy, state authority, and capitalism founded in the earlier stages of his career was the *legitimation crisis*, published in a book of the same name[22]. The legitimation crisis, at its most rudimentary, is a failure on the part of an authority figure to meet the needs of its constituents. According to Habermas (1976) a legitimation crisis occurs 'if governmental crisis management fails', this is because 'it lags behind programmatic demands that it has placed on itself', the penalty for which is the 'withdrawal of legitimation' (Habermas 1976, 65). Likewise, 'missing legitimation must be offset by rewards conforming to the system. A legitimation crisis arises as soon as the demands for such rewards rise faster than the available quantity of value, or when expectations arise that cannot be satisfied with such rewards' (Habermas 1976, 66). Both statements indicate that there is a level of exchange present in the legitimation process, but this can be attributed to Habermas' position that contemporary Western society was 'advanced capitalist' making economic exchange fundamental to legitimation.

Habermas was greatly influenced by Weber specifically in terms of his analysis of the legitimation crisis. Weber's work regarding the typologies of legitimate authority (Weber 1962)

served as a precursor to Habermas's further development of the legitimation theme. As Habermas diagnosed the reasons why versions of power and authority succeed or fail, and brought forward the issue in terms of the advanced capitalist society, Weber's categories provide the impetus for Habermas's approach to legitimation. Weber saw legitimate authority as being traditional (meaning leadership is acquired out of a system of tradition), legal-rational (where authority is gained through legal proceedings), and charismatic (where leadership is obeyed as they present the possibility for transformation) (Weber 1962). In this sense, as Habermas developed his idea of the legitimation crisis, the underlying elements were to do with the conditions of late-capitalist society, the various ways obedience to leadership is secured, and the ability for that leadership to meet the needs of its populace.

Alway argues that in *Legitimation Crisis*, 'the focus . . . is on the crisis tendencies in advanced capitalist society that result from its failure to produce the 'requisite quantity' of goods, decisions, legitimation, and meaning necessary for its own maintenance and reproduction' (Alway 1995, 116). This is how the theory of the legitimation crisis sees the potential for democratic, yet capitalist government, to fail in meeting the socio-cultural reproductive needs of society. According to Habermas, a critical theory of society needs a concept of legitimation that allows for 'demarcation of the types of legitimate authority' (Shabani 2003, 81). In his view, 'Legitimacy means that there are good arguments for a political order's claim to be recognized as right and just, a legitimate order deserves recognition' (Habermas 1979, 178–179). This definition is normative in its claim, showing that there is a connection between the legitimacy of something and its rightful claim to power.

The crisis of legitimation is however not simply attributable to the breakdown in need-provision described above, as there are other elements of the legitimation process that lend to its form. The concepts integral to understanding how a legitimation crisis occurs, or in the case of this argument, how it might be prevented, are that of 'lifeworld' and 'identity-securing interpretive system' (ISIS)[23] (Habermas 1976). These elements underlie the process of legitimation and are foundational to it. Lifeworld is important as it forms the basis for much of Habermas's work, while the idea of the ISIS can provide the conceptual basis for applying the process of legitimation to a variety of structures. Both ideas are helpful for linking the workings of legitimation to urban processes.

Habermas uses the term 'lifeworld' to indicate the shared experience and understanding that develops through face to face contact and communication over time in various social groups, from families to communities, and in various settings, from personal to public (Baxter 1987). His version of the lifeworld was developed from the work of Edmund Husserl and Alfred Schutz, and in particular Schutz's work on phenomenology and the social

sciences (Fairtlough 1991, 547). The lifeworld is the foundation for Habermas's later work on communicative action, but is prevalent even in his early work on the public sphere and social legitimation. Within this framework, the act of communication within its structural components (society and culture), in combination with the reproduction of such elements through communication and identity production, create a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts as represented by the lifeworld (Baxter 1987; Mouzelis 1992). When this communication ceases to take place and the lifeworld visions are no longer met, a crisis in legitimation occurs (Shabani 2003).

Coupled with the above concept of the lifeworld is the ISIS. For Habermas, this is the aspect of a society that aids in establishment and securing of identity, which is integral to legitimation (Baxter 1987). These surrounding elements can be anything that lends to the identity-creation of the individual/group, and its presence has the power to strengthen the identity-legitimation process. Habermas states that 'traditions can retain legitimizing force only as long as they are not torn out interpretive systems that guarantee continuity and identity' (Habermas 1976, 70), calling to mind the idea that an interpretive system is some*thing* external, identifiable, and tangible. Therefore, the interpretive system is vital to the success of any project of socio-cultural legitimation, as it is the system that enables the 'continuity and identity' of the individuals and groups who are doing the legitimizing. In response to this, Bloom argues that

> 'In order to demonstrate the historical continuity of this interrelationship between identity, interpretive system, and social structure, Habermas paints an enormously broad canvas of its basic features through four social formations- 'primitive', traditional, capitalist and post-capitalist. His approach can be easily criticized as impressionistic, but his purpose is to delineate that, at the most diffuse level, identity-securing interpretive systems are analytically meaningful' (Bloom 1990, 48).

The centrality of the interpretive system to legitimation is a concern for that 'generalized identification which is made between an individual and the most diffuse culture of which s/he is a member' (Bloom 1990, 47). For Habermas, this generalized identification is with an 'identity-securing interpretive system', contending that 'humans and society seek actively to 'find'—both in terms of locating and creating—their 'proper' and 'true' identity' (*ibid*). It is when identity-securing fails between humans and their social structures that a 'legitimation crisis' occurs, which subsequently forces or demands change of the social structure (Habermas 1976, 3-4; Hite 1996, 308-309).

The ISIS, operating in the lifeworld, is the structure that aids in the achievement of legitimation for state/external authority in the advanced-capitalist democratic society. The

form that this system takes is typically attributed to forms of individual and group identification and association with nationalism, ethnicity, and mythology/religion (Bloom 1990, Shabani 2003). It is increasingly attributed to territory and space as well, as Wagstaff's argument surrounding identity and the European Union would indicate (Wagstaff 2007). In his view, the connection of the ISIS can be also related to issues of geography and space, which in turn 'contributes to an understanding of the ways people relate to the world around them. The social space they inhabit, their landscape, is more than a simple backdrop to their activity; like them, it is subject to an evolving, dynamic confrontation of state and citizen' (Wagstaff 2007, 165-166). The relationship between Habermas's legitimation and interpretive systems and space can then be theoretically connected, and as Bloom suggested, become an 'analytically meaningful' mode of analysis (Bloom 1990).

2.3.2 Origins, Usefulness, and How it Works

Habermas's theory of the legitimation crisis is seen as a transitional piece in his overall body of work. Most scholars agree that his ideas regarding the lifeworld, systems, legitimation and democracy were in a nascent form at the time, only to come to fruition nearly twenty years later when he published *A Theory of Communicative Action* (1987) (Bloom 1990; Hite 1996; Loewenstein and Stevens 2004). However, *Legitimation Crisis* (1976) was useful in the field of international relations, politics, and sociology as it provided a basis for understanding the dynamic relationship between humans, identity, power, and politics and has its origins in psychological and sociological theory. While Habermas applies his theory to 'advanced capitalism', other scholars, such as Mars (2001), use the legitimation crisis to explore the difficulties in post-colonial government transition (in Guyana, in Mars' case), while Jones and Ward (2002) use it to examine neoliberalism in British urban planning policy.

One aspect of the origins of *Legitimation Crisis* that proved its utility in advancing scholarly inquiry into motivation and human behaviour was Habermas's use of Talcott Parsons AGIL paradigm as a method for structuring the interrelated elements involved in power relationships[24]. The acronym stands for the following principals: Adaptation, Goal Attainment, Integration, and Latency Pattern Maintenance (Parsons 1970). Each step of the paradigm represents the pattern of behaviour any system must adopt in order to survive or maintain balance within its environment, and its formation is similar to how Habermas envisions legitimation occurring in a social structure. While Habermas did not openly critique and analyze Parsons' work until he wrote *A Theory of Communicative Action*, the presence of

Parsons' structural functionalism and the framework offered by the paradigm are echoed in the systems and structures Habermas evokes in *Legitimation Crisis*. The basis of the AGIL paradigm was a model for human behaviour, as individual and as a group, founded on a multi-layered social action system. This system of action is present in the variety of ways humans communicate and validate each other, from the individual to the level of society (Mayhew 1997). Despite the criticisms that have been levelled against Parsons and his over-ambitious attempt to create a general sociological theory and proposal of a model for human action that does not take into account unequal balances of power (Lockwood 1956, Blair 1969), the influence of such a model on Habermas's development of the role legitimation plays in the action-oriented framework for behaviour and socio-cultural and political development is immense.

In addition to the paradigmatic framework taken from Parsons, Habermas also drew on the work of both Schutz and Erik Erikson. His reliance on their work represents the breadth of his work in *Legitimation Crisis*, and also contributes to the analytical applicability of aspects of *Legitimation Crisis* to other disciplines. Schutz, as was mentioned previously, was integral in Habermas's development of the lifeworld, a concept that underscores much of his work. However, Erikson and his work on identity, crisis, and the life-cycle is also fundamental to the development of the ideas contained in *Legitimation Crisis* (Bloom 1990; Hite 1996; Stevens 2004).

Erikson's theories regarding human development and identity crisis helped to shape how Habermas conceived of legitimation and its potential crisis. Hite argues that Habermas's concern for 'generalized identification which is made between an individual and the most diffuse culture of which s/he is a member' parallels Erikson's interest in the 'dynamic process of individual identification' (Erikson 1968; Hite 1996, 308). The theories that Erikson posited argued that the cornerstone in psychological development or breakdown focuses on the constant efforts on the part of individuals to relate to the greater collective throughout their lifespan in an attempt to define their identity. Popularizing the term 'identity crisis', Erikson saw the process of relating inner drives to one's outer world as the development of the 'ego identity', writing that 'in the social jungle of human existence, there is no feeling of being alive without a sense of ego identity'. Identity formation is always influenced by the various levels on which an individual operates; for Erikson, 'the personal coherence of the individual and role integration in his group; his guiding images and the ideologies of his time; his life history—and the historical moment' (Erikson 1968). The result of this process is that individuals will find 'self-fulfilment and meaning in their abilities to identify with others, and individuals will hold fast to those identifications when their well-being is threatened' (Hite 1996, 308). The idea

that identity-formation is the basis for individual development can be applied in the same manner to legitimation and how it is achieved. If something external to a society, such as peacebuilding, requires the legitimation of the society, then that peacebuilding policy must adapt to and reflect the identity of the collective, or at least reflect those qualities that the society validates as appropriate for identity-formation. For instance, in cultures where Islamic faith is an important part of local identity, peacebuilding policy will have to engage with (not dismiss or counter) aspects of Muslim culture, such as Shariah law.

Understanding how and why a crisis in legitimation occurs is central to understanding legitimation itself. In its most basic form, legitimation is 'the act of making something legal'[25] but Habermas considered legitimation to be central to the proper functioning of any relationship. When a person (or a state) is considered legitimate by another party, it means that the actions of the person/state confirm the life-world of the other (Habermas 1976). More simply, if A and B are two people, say a manager (A) and employee (B), then A must meet the needs of the employee in order to be seen as legitimately holding power; likewise, B, the employee, must meet the needs of the manager in order to also be seen as a legitimate. For Habermas, the crisis in legitimation occurs when A fails in their role to meet the needs of B, or more appropriately, when the state fails to provide for the needs of the culture or society. This, in Habermas's terms, means that the state fails to meet the life-world expectations of the group and consequently must be dealt with (Habermas 1976, 72).

The contemporary use of the term 'legitimation' implies a much more subtle reading, where actions, value, and need-fulfilment are related to how one party sees the sincerity or validity of another. In an out of balance society, or one that is in a crisis, this relationship is not being fulfilled and legitimation is weakened. The state is not meeting the needs of the people (i.e. people are not getting adequate medical care, infrastructure is failing, corruption is rampant, inflation is on the rise) and once a critical point has been reached, the state will cease to be seen as legitimate and functioning. Society will lapse into a stage where the tensions between the power holder and legitimizers will be fraught with difficulty and may even lapse into violence as the society's role as consumer is threatened. This, as Habarmas articulates below, is based on a crisis of motivation as a precursor to a crisis of legitimation:

> 'A legitimation crisis can be predicted only if expectations that cannot be fulfilled either with the available quantity of value or, generally, with rewards conforming to the system are systematically produced. A legitimation crisis then, must be based on a motivation crisis—that is, a discrepancy between the need for motives declared by the state, the educational system and the occupational system on the one hand, and the motivation supplied by the socio-cultural system on the other' (Habermas 1976, 75).

The use of Habermas's theories regarding legitimation have influenced much political and social theory (White 1995). Legitimation as a key concept in understanding the validation of hierarchical structures of power has been demonstrated in sociological exercises concerning the importance of shared perceived tasks and responsibilities for group leaders and authorities (Ridgeway and Berger 1986). Studies such as this speak to the intrinsic nature legitimation plays in all forms of communication and individual/group definition.

2.3.3 Legitimation and the ISIS

Having explored the structure of Habermas's legitimation crisis, the task is to now look at how this can be applied within the context of the city. Despite its relatively exclusive use in political theory, legitimation theory has also demonstrated theoretical breadth in other disciplines[26]. How then can we apply Habermasian legitimation to urban theory and the city? Before moving on to this, the idea of the ISIS is broken down. This will then serve as a framing device to analyze concepts of the urban and cities.

Bloom sees the interpretive system as the cornerstone of securing legitimation in that 'it is the match between the identity securing interpretive system and the realities of social existence which legitimated the structure of any social system' (Bloom 1990, 48), which is what Habermas reasons is crucial to understanding and analyzing legitimation:

> 'Social systems too have identities and can lose them; historians are capable of differentiating between revolutionary changes of a state or the downfall of an empire, and mere structural alterations. In doing so, they refer to the interpretations that members of a system use in identifying one another as belonging to the same group, and through this group identity assert their own self-identity. In historiography, a rupture in tradition, through which the interpretive systems that guarantee identity lose their social integrative power, serves as an indicator of the collapse of social systems. From this perspective, a social system has lost its identity as soon as later generations no longer recognize themselves within the once-constitutive tradition' (Habermas 1976, 3–4).

Habermas is clear that the self, the group, and whatever social system is doing the organizing are essential for cultural stability. Habermas's use of the terms 'once-constitutive' and 'tradition' indicate that experience of a social system, or an interpretive system, are characterized by a group's ability to produce and reproduce them.

The interpretive system is about security—security of group identity and individual identity. The protection and maintenance of such a system is integral to the stability and sustainability of a society. It is essential that such an interpretive system be actively tended to and cared for. Like Erikson's ego, any threat to the well-being of the securing system will result in its active defence: 'It is part of the ideology of the nation-state, part of the nation-state's identity securing interpretive system, that citizens defend it, if necessary by force of arms' (Bloom 1990, 72). Whether it is figurative or literal, the defence of 'integrative power' that guarantees identity must be in continuous use if there is to be cultural continuity, or else risk losing its identity to external forces or 'later generations. If the system fails and is not adequately protected, then 'people will generally actively seek to make a new identification which will give them psychological security' Bloom argues, 'to find an identity-securing interpretive system for the new political experiences and realities' (Bloom 1990, 148).

The interpretive system may be what allows for security and identity, but it also can be used by external sources of authority or leadership that need a foothold to ensure the legitimacy of their efforts. Bloom explains how new ideas or ways of forming identity that may be introduced by an outside source can be secured: 'By communicating about this common experience of disadvantage, and by providing a suitable symbolic attitude, peripheral leaders create an identity-securing interpretive system based in ethnic or territorial community and culture which can mobilize the people or the ethnos' (Bloom 1990, 142). Habermas's original intention with *Legitimation Crisis* was to explore why states failed and how radical or discursive democracy[27] and democratic governance could be achieved if a crisis in legitimation occurred. If Bloom's analysis holds true, then one of the requirements of a successful authority figure in a democratic society is an ability to draw on systems and structures that support notions of identity. This formula can arguably be applied to any scenario where an outside source of power or authority is attempting to establish itself, regardless of whether it is a small group or in a post-conflict peacebuilding setting.

An interpretive system is vital to the legitimation of an authority figure as it provides a means of establishing identity and maintaining security through a greater system or structure. The ISIS is useful for this discussion as it provides a means of understanding what might be harnessed to secure legitimation. Taken in the context of the post-conflict city and peacebuilding, identifying the ISIS is important to our understanding of how the goal of peacebuilding legitimacy is obtained. In the next section, I begin to sketch out how the city might function in this role.

2.3.4 Legitimation, the ISIS, and the City

Habermas's concern was with democratic governance and social/cultural security and change in the advanced capitalist state. His position never directly addressed the city or urban issues. However, his focus on using the ISIS as a catalyst for legitimacy is a model that can be applied to the urban setting, as well as to post-conflict peacebuilding. How, then, can this interpretive system be found within the 'structures and systems' of the city and how these might these support the project of peacebuilding? Understanding exactly how the city can represent an ISIS through its ability to create and support identity, security and structure as described in the previous section needs to be explored via the literature on cities. Through this, the ISIS represented by the city is demonstrated.

The city, as it is viewed in the greater discussion of peacebuilding and legitimacy, can be equated to the state. In many ways, the literature on legitimacy and identity-securing interpretive systems is focused on looking at how the individual and group defines themselves against larger, diffuse notions such as the state or nation. In places that are emerging from conflict, the 'state' could potentially be rife with contradictions and represent a conflicted or biased source of authority; on the other hand, if cities are used as a means of fostering identity, security, structure, and hence legitimacy for the bolstering of peacebuilding activities, then the goal of sustainable peacebuilding might be achieved. At any rate, legitimacy is key to unlocking the potential for post-conflict peacebuilding to be successful, and the interpretive system is vital to this. This point is echoed in Bloom's query: 'What then is the future of the state? Is it possible to envisage it as a purely instrumental and functional entity? Is it possible to imagine it not being endowed with an identity-securing interpretive system and not to have it legitimated but concordant culture?' (Bloom 1990,162). In this sense, the interpretive system is endowed with the power to fundamentally underscore any attempt at instituting new or maintaining former power and authority. Likewise, the economic role the city plays in securing both the identity and structure of the state cannot be ignored, for it is through the generative function of production of capital that societies, post-conflict or otherwise, enable other forms of reproduction and stability.

The following section begins by exploring how cities can function as catalysts and creators of identity, security, and system/structures and thus as an ISIS that is essential to the establishment of legitimacy. Continuing to draw on Habermas's concepts of life-world and system, both theoretical debates and practical applications relevant to each subsection are presented.

2.4 The City as a Space of Legitimation

> 'The city is the one environment created exclusively for human use: it is kind to the thief as well as the burgher. By common consent, cities are places, worthy of proper names and prominent labelling in school atlases; whereas the neutral terms of space and area apply to emptier lands' (Tuan 1975, 157).

The previous section ended with a discussion of how the ISIS and the city can be linked; the goal here is to explore exactly how cities fulfil these requirements. As the quote above indicates, cities are not only appropriate for approaching legitimation as they can be likened in structure and function, but they represent something beyond an inert canvas which things happen 'on'. Rather, cities are an unfolding interplay of people, events, and social processes. In this context, peacebuilding and legitimation can play a dynamic shaping role. Due to their physical structure and the ability to impart security and identity, cities are places where the goal of legitimation can be achieved.

While the physical elements of a city (buildings, streets, etc.) are what define it in a direct sense, it is the processes and events that emerge in the urban environment that are the most essential features of what is considered a city. Cities are important because they are places where processes, events, and structures are legitimized and actualized. This is articulated through Arendt's idea of the *polis* as a 'space of appearance' where legitimate power has the potential for being exercised (Arendt 1958, 198). For example, Trafalgar Square in London (constructed during 1840-1844) demonstrates the triumph of the British Empire during the Napoleonic wars, and thus its moral and political legitimacy in the Victorian era through its neo-classical buildings, monument to Lord Nelson, and use of space; in the contemporary context it also is the setting for many highly-visible public displays of protestation as well as community cohesion (holiday celebrations being a prime example), also illustrating social processes and dialectics of power. In this sense, cities are crucial to the establishment of peacebuilding activities as it in this location that the goal of peacebuilding will be seen to be effective and accepted. Amin and Graham agree that cities can play an important role in affecting social and political change:

> 'Projects seeking unitary or solidarity across diverse fragments and complex relational webs of the contemporary city needs to do more than this. It has to be a project of restoring social justice in the city in such a way that it responds to genuine social needs and, at the same time, unlocks social capabilities through the empowerment of autonomous groups' (Amin and Graham 1997, 426).

The following discussion begins by exploring a broad definition of the city as it applies in the historic and contemporary sense. This is followed by a discussion of the foundational philosophical inquiries that guide much discourse in urban literature. Next, I analyze how the conditions required for the interpretive system to work are manifest in cities. The section concludes with a discussion of power and the landscape which provides another approach for understanding the role cities can play in the post-conflict peacebuilding process and legitimation.

2.4.1 Cities: A General Context

Cities have been central to human culture for millennia, and remain so today. The nature of the city has shifted, as Childe and Mumford illustrate with their analyses of ancient city culture (Childe 1950; Mumford 1961). The city provided the fertile soil, as Marx, Weber, and Durkheim would argue, in which the seeds of the industrial revolution would grow the fate of the contemporary condition of cities today. These concerns are discussed below.

The 'city' is a geographical space inhabited by people, ruled by a central authority, and providing the structure of life to those who inhabit it. In the ancient city, walls and fortifications and the security they provided were a driving force for their inhabitation (Mumford 1961). The 'first urban revolution' (Childe [1936] 1951) was the phase in human history where the transition from small kin-based villages of people to cities took place. It was then that the cultural transition that would come to characterize urban life and separate it from its rural counterpart took place.

Both Childe and Mumford appropriated Marxist methodological approaches to understanding the city (Green 2006; Giddens 1971), basing their concepts of city-formation on the rise of technological innovation as it related to human need, and the stratification and specialization of society as a result of the capital accrued in relation to the introduction of new technology into society. The result of this was the formation of centres of population density, usually seeking protection under a powerful ruler, living in the physical protection of a walled area. Also essential to achieving this security was the exchange of goods (Soja 2000; Weber 1958). The economy of the city provides security in part because of the division of labour and the production of surplus goods. It was through these mechanisms that the ancient city was itself legitimized and legitimizing of the practices that evolved within it.

The ancient city may have been the 'container' for life, as Mumford called it (1961), but it was the later transition from the medieval feudal system to the industrial era, and the alteration that a capitalist, market economy had on the fabric of city life, that provided the basis for understanding the contemporary city. This exploration led three pivotal figures to contribute to the development of modern urban theory: Marx, Weber, and Durkheim. While each has influenced ideas concerning sociology in individual ways, their overall approach to the city is similar: their fundamental concerns were with understanding capitalism first and the city second (Saunders 1986). Saunders argues that this was motivated by an underlying desire to understand the social processes of urban life:

> 'While cities could provide a vivid illustration of fundamental processes such as the disintegration of moral cohesion (Durkheim), the growth of calculative rationality (Weber), or the destructive forces unleashed by the development of capitalist production (Marx), they could in no way explain them. For all three writers, what was required was not a theory of the city but a theory of the changing basis of social relations brought about through the development of capitalism, and it was to the latter task that they addressed themselves' (Saunders 1986, 14).

All three figures saw the city as a condition of the changing nature of social relations and not the cause. This dissertation however recognizes that the city can be a contributing cause to altering social relations. They were more interested in examining how the feudal city changed over a few hundred years to the site of capitalist production. Weber famously relates this to the development of the protestant work ethic, while Marx sees it as the result of the growth of the merchant middle class and the eventual stratification of urban culture (Giddens 1971). Durkheim, on the other hand, offers a more general approach to understanding social causes and urban issues as he claims that 'the determining cause of a social fact should be sought among the social facts preceding it and not among the states of the individual consciousness' (Durkheim [1938] 1982, 110), in which case 'a given effect can maintain this relationship with only one cause, for it can express only one single nature' (Durkheim [1938] 1982, 127). All three indicate that the root cause for the evolution of capitalism and the social structures the capitalist city harbours are a result of the interplay between individual and group behaviour and the presence of a changing economy.

Addressing contemporary urban issues, while a concern of Marx, Engels, and Weber, was conducted as a result of their interest in understanding how capitalism had altered social relations as manifested in the city (Saunders 1986, 14). Saunders argues 'that the central concern . . . was with the social, economic and political implications of the development of capitalism in the West at the time they were writing' and while the rapid growth of cities and

their attendant problems were significant, they shared the view that 'in modern capitalist societies, the urban question seemed to be subsumed under a broader analysis of factors operating in society as a whole' (Saunders 1986, 14). Durkheim developed a more sociological approach to investigating social problems and was especially concerned with the effects of the division of labour in society, which resulted in his studying urban phenomena. In either case, the fundamental concern was with explaining capitalism and society while the city itself did not 'constitute a theoretically significant area of study' (Saunders 1986, 15).

The exploration of the work of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim provides a basic framework for furthering the discussion of the principals of legitimation and their relevance to cities as well as further extending their concern with the role of capitalism in shaping the city so as to apply it to neoliberal regeneration. Much like Kant contributed to an underlying direction in peace research that regarded individual rights and the moral behaviour of states and individuals as primary, the critical analysis of capitalism, its manifestation in the urban setting, and the results of such a relationship, have also shaped the discourse surrounding the role of identity, structure, and the built environment in contemporary thought (Saunders 1986), a dynamic that is at the core of the research conducted here. Additionally, the evolving function of the city throughout human history is indicative that its organic nature and relevance in contemporary debate supports the argument that cities are places where the conditions for legitimation are present.

In contemporary discourse, the role of the city is often related to the process of globalization and the variety of ways it is manifest on the physical and non-physical aspects of urban life (Robinson 2006; Knox and Taylor 1995), (from the creation of a 'borderless' world (Ohmae 1991) to whether globalization is 'little more than hype' (Dicken et al. 2001, 90)). While still related at the core to a Marxist focus on production and maintenance of capital and centres of consumption, theories relating to globalization also draw on information technology, knowledge transfer, and concentration of robust sectors (for instance, the creative classes) in cities as a means of establishing a global niche. The idea of globalization is important in the overall analysis as it ties the idea that the city is linked, networked, and part of a global dynamic relationship, to the ideal effect of liberal peacebuilding having a 'globalizing' benefit to the society in which it is working. These globalizing and liberalizing forces also lead to dramatic shifts in the way the production of capital and its consummate consumption are at work in the post-conflict city, all of which serve to legitimize the state and are representative of neoliberal processes (Yeung 1998). These concepts are analyzed in greater detail later in the thesis as an outcome of the field research.

2.4.2 Engaging Legitimation Principals with Urban Theory

In the previous sections the elements that ensure the ISIS functions in support of legitimation were identified as system/structure, security, and identity. Additionally, the role of the city within this framework was explored along with the significance of globalization in relation to cities in the contemporary literature. However, in order to fully develop how the city is an ISIS, then the manner in which these three elements are present in cities and the cities literature must be explored. Thus far, the role of the city has been looked at in term of historical context, contemporary definitions, and the philosophical foundations for the development of current discourse on the subject, providing a platform for further exploration. At this point, the discussion will turn to develop further the elements of legitimation as present in the literature on cities. Figure 2-4 below illustrates the relationship between the aspects of legitimation and how it is manifest in the city and is referred to throughout the next section.

2.4.2.1 City as System and Structure

Referring to figure 2-4, the nested circles represent elements of the ISIS as it relates to the city. The first outer layer is 'system and structure'[28]. The use of 'system and structure' is used to identify the dual nature of this first layer, and that is the physical and the theoretical. Both equally important, the physical is meant to include anything in the built and natural environment, and infrastructural systems including utilities, transportation, and communication technology, which is the structure. Next is the 'system' or the more intangible plane cities occupy in the discourse regarding globalization and networks. Each aspect provides a necessary component integral to the functioning of the city as an ISIS. In the following, the theoretical discourse surrounding the role of the city will be looked at in greater detail.

Insofar as the theoretical debates surrounding the city are concerned, it is the emphasis of cities and globalization and cities within networks that are relevant here. Both concepts are interrelated and reflect a contemporary occupation with understanding not just the effects the generic idea of globalization has on cities, but also the effect that cities have on globalization. Friedmann and Wolff (1982) were the original proponents of the idea of the global city, presenting the idea that urban development and the growth of cities were indicative of their 'integration into the world economy' (1982, 309) and thus global and



Figure 2-4 Habermasian Legitimation and the City
Diagram showing the basic relationship between lifeworld, identity, security, system/structure, and the city, which is both physical and experiential.

globalizing in nature. Further to this, the argument presented by Sassen (2001) was critical of what she saw a tendency to cast globalization in a negative light. In her view, cities were informational, virtual networks with actual geographic proximity, indicating that globalization was not destroying our cities, but rather changing the way cities were structured: 'indeed, we may even be able to understand the global order only by analyzing why key structures of the world economy are necessarily situated in cities' (Sassen 2001, 1991, 4).

Globalization and the global city are made possible by the existence of information flows and processes. Castells' vision of the network society and the Information Age, where the 'space of flows' is the spatial-temporal realm, which in turn is the way global cities are connected, is what aids the process of globalization: **'**The global city is not a city, it is a new spatial form, the space of flows, characterizing the Information Age' (Castells 2002, 372). Network theory goes beyond the scope of the globalization debate though; it is important as a means of understanding the meta-processes that make cities global, but it is also a means of understanding how cities work, from within and without, at the level of communication and exchange of politics, creative movements, and individual and community interconnectedness. 'The global city is not New York or London. It is a transterritorial city, a space built by the linkage of many different spaces in one network of quasi-simultaneous interaction that brings together processes, people, buildings, and bits and pieces of local areas, in a global space interaction . . . with their relative nodal weight in the network varying depending on time and issues' (Castells 2002, 372)[29].

Globalization, the 'global city' and the city as a node or a hub in a network are themes that indicate why a city should be a place where peacebuilding is focused and hence legitimacy harnessed, as the development of the global city is altering the relationship between the city and the nation-state. Petrella, summarized in Beaverstock et al. (2000), sees this changing relationship as due in part to the comparative weight cities have in relation to other states: 'world cities are not eliminating the power of states, they are part of a global restructuring which is 'rescaling' power relations' (2000, 132). It is from this perspective that the role of the city as global and networked will build from.

From the globalization perspective, world-cities, and even more 'ordinary' cities that share in this network, 'perform a transnational function' that 'materially challenge states and their territories' (Beaverstock et al. 2000, 123). Beaverstock et al. consider this conception of world cities and their glowing 'pinpricks of light' as an alternative geography rather than a mosaic of states. Therefore, if cities are seen to contribute to the creation of a new paradigm of power-sharing and politics, then their role in the post-conflict setting can be only more integral to the goal of peacebuilding. In assessing the state of the globalization and cities

literature, Sheppard sees the field as generally 'pessimistic', with the exception of those who look approvingly at the role of the global city in global politics:

> 'They demonstrate how places can stem destructive tendencies of globalization through territorial governance structures that assemble local capabilities for holding down the global . . . They argue that contemporary globalization is shifting the geographic scales at which territorial regulation is most effective, challenging that of the nation-state. They also point to the annihilation of space by time, arguing that although globalization does not mean the end of geography, it is being restructured into networked spaces . . .' (Sheppard 2002, 308).

This would indicate that cities can potentially play an important role in harnessing legitimation in the post-conflict context. This role works two ways: as indicated in the statement above, stemming 'destructive tendencies of globalization through territorial governance structures that assemble local capabilities for holding down the global' indicates that the global nature of cities can work towards internal stabilization of conflict through various forms of governance. On the other hand, the globalizing city can have the external effect of 'shifting the geographic scales at which territorial regulation is most effective, challenging that of the nation-state'. What this means is that city governance can have the capacity to aid in the restabilization of the rule of law and centralized authority—key components for obtaining peacebuilding legitimation. It also means that cities, as places in the global network, can act as conduits for attracting international assistance and investment.

In discussing the role of the global city, it is also important to acknowledge that of course not all cities are alike; not all are major global hubs, and not all are powerhouses of creative and economic influence. However, many cities possess such qualities on a smaller scale; they are not the 'centre' of the finance world, but they have an industry presence; they may not be where computing technology is based, but they have a population that is connected to world wide web. This is the realm that post-conflict cities are more likely to inhabit, and in this capacity they represent what is called the 'ordinary city' (Amin and Graham 1997; Robinson 2006). Amin and Graham make the argument that in general, the city and urban life is 'multiplexing'[30] a wide-range of 'economic, social, and cultural assets which may not come all together in the city' (1997, 412), and in this sense, the 'ordinary city', and arguably the 'post-conflict city' must draw from outside sources in order to meet the needs of society. It might even be argued that the conceptualization of a post-conflict city as 'ordinary' as opposed to 'global' might facilitate the legitimation of peacebuilding, in that the 'ordinary' city would appear to offer more opportunity for engagement with a variety of actors at the local level that are external to the city itself. However, contrary to this, is the fact that post-

conflict cities *cannot* be ordinary cities either (similar to the way they aren't necessarily global cities). Because of their conflicted past and somewhat 'engineered' development (due to peace agreement policy implementation), they inhabit a category of their own. By focusing part of the legitimation of the peacebuilding process on the regeneration of the city, these cities in turn become 'extra'ordinary spaces as they represent a kind of hyper-liberalized environment where the manipulation and restructuration of government and authority is the setting for the development of economic structures and regeneration. This is because unlike other cities whose 'globalness' or 'ordinariness' is a result of largely organic processes, the post-conflict city is nested within a nation-state that is undergoing hyper-planning and manipulation. As large-scale governmental, economic, and social changes are being mechanically altered through the implementation of a peace process, local-level structures and practices are often left behind. As changes to the city occur, they happen in a context of economic liberalization and immense social and political restructuration.

Amin and Graham argue that the trend for urban policy to focus on consumption as a desired outcome does little to actually foster real dynamic growth, and that 'efforts to embellish public spaces conceal a design to reclaim them for social groups possessing economic value as consumers or producers and to exclude the less well-off and the hawkers of street life' (1997, 421). In terms of the post-conflict city, this has implications that go beyond Amin and Graham's reading and is discussed in greater detail in chapter seven. However, their emphasis on the importance of the 'ordinary city' highlights ways in which the 'consumption-based turn' can be made less threatening. Seeing the idea of 'multiplexing' as an economically democratizing force, it opens up within 'ordinary cities' the space for social justice to take shape. It is their belief that this kind of approach sees the city as place where the tools to mediate conflict are more inherent in a culture. In this way, peacebuilding is a process that is more likely to succeed in such an environment.

Despite the value the globalization debate places on the role of cities, Petrella warns against the imminent dangers of world-city domination, cautioning that what would emerge would be a 'wealthy archipelago of city regions . . . surrounded by an impoverished *lumpenplanet*' (Petrella 2006, 195). He also predicted that the 30 most powerful city-regions (the CR-30) will replace the G7 democracies, presiding over a new global governance by 2025[31]. Petrella's fear speaks more to a dystopic vision of the future, where market-driven, neoliberal economic policies unhinge the balance of national authority and city-centric power. The reality is that the democratization that Amin and Graham have predicted and the idea of 'space of flows' indicates that cities will challenge state-authority, but will not overrun it. This appears to be evident as well in the case for legitimation and peacebuilding, as the economic

and socio-cultural impact it can have on a city, a nation, and its inhabitants is valuable for both the post-conflict society and the global community.

Perhaps most salient to the overall discussion of the city in the post-conflict context is the recognition that it is 'within cosmopolitan cities that cultural tensions can be best managed and creatively developed' (Beaverstock 2000, 132). It is within this framework, where the concept that cities as networked nodes in a globalized world also contain the seeds of their conflict resolution through their structure and place in the network, that the importance of their role within the legitimation debate is posed. In fostering not only the contested role of cities as centres of consumption but also for greater capacity to handle conflict creatively, this clearly defines how and why cities are both the theoretical 'system' and the physical 'structure' through which legitimation occurs.

2.4.2.2 City as Security

The concept of security within the discussion of the principals underlying the ISIS is meant to provide a theoretical link between the layers above and below it. In figure 2-4, 'security' is the middle layer between 'system and structure' and 'identity'. The parallel manifestation of this in the city is represented by 'psychological and physical security' which falls between the 'physical and theoretical' and the 'group and individual identity' levels.

The concept of 'security' is perhaps the most transparent of the three levels within the ISIS. It is both physical and psychological, the conditions of which are interrelated. It is the psychological security that is most vital in the context of legitimation—as it is perceived security, as opposed to actual physical security, that can help guarantee that more complex future processes, such as participation in civil society, voting, and or continuing to work, are possible. Furthermore, security that is derived from both and physical and psychological well-being contributes to the group and the individual's capacity to contribute to society:

> 'An environment that facilitates recalling and learning is a way of linking the living moment to a wide span of time. Being alive is being awake in the present, secure in our ability to continue to be alert to new things that come streaming by. We feel our own rhythm, and feel also that it is part of the rhythm of the world. It is when local time, local place, and our selves are secure that we are ready to face challenge, complexity, vast space, and enormous future' (Lynch 1972, 89).

As Lynch's statement communicates, 'security'—psychological, perceived security—is something made more intact by the stability and permanence of one's surroundings. Lynch touches on the fundamental nature of the effect that the health of one's physical environment has on the ability to move forward and 'face the vast, enormous future', an aspect which is directly connected to the system and structure of the city. In the post-conflict context, when peacebuilding policy is put into action, it is the perceived security of place that will be what is first seen and experienced. Thus, it is the formative layer of the process of coping with in the post-conflict context. From the security derived from the presence of peacekeeping forces following a cease-fire, to the security provided by the presence of new industry or elections, it is evident that the middle layer of the legitimation paradigm is manifest in a wide-variety of ways in the city, both post-conflict or otherwise.

2.4.2.3 City as Identity

The final aspect of the ISIS is that of identity, which is the central nested circle on figure 2-4. Identity is the core of the matter, as it is the basis upon which legitimation rests. Identity is also a key feature of how the city can provide the setting through which legitimation is to occur. While debates surrounding the nature of identity abound in urban theory literature (Proshansky 1978; Relph 1976), in this instance the focus will be looking at how identity is formed at least in part in relation to place.

That individual identity is formed in relation to the external world is something that has already been reviewed in reference to Habermas's work with Erikson's theory of the identity crisis. It is this foundation that guides the reason why cities are integral to the maintenance and strengthening of identity in the post-conflict setting. Looking at Tuan's (1975) analysis of place, she recognized that city is the most viable level for individual and communal identification: greater than one's self or neighbourhood, but less abstract than the nation. Heidegger also argues that experience of a physical place necessarily shapes identity, where individuals define themselves through the sociospatial environment (Heidegger 1971). Knox also shares this view, agreeing that 'through repeated experience and complex associations, our capacity for dwelling allows us to construct places, to give them meanings that are deepened and qualified over time with multiple nuances' (Knox 2005, 2).

Cities are vital for identity formation not only because individual experience helps shape it, but because the physical environment is also the reflection of a collective experience, where places and things are not exclusive, but rather able to be experienced by all. Proshanky

argues that because much of the everyday experience of the city dweller is spent crossing through and experiencing shared space, understanding it is vital to also understanding human behaviour and decision-making in the urban context: 'Given their accessibility and changeability, it should be evident that our emphasis on strategic co-present social interactions in these settings has implications not only for how people use such space, but how they gain control of it' (Proshansky 1978, 167). The effect of this is what makes the city an invaluable place for harnessing legitimation: 'Because places are important loci of collective memory, then social identity and the capacity to mobilize that identity into configurations of political solidarity are highly dependent upon processes of place construction and sustenance' (Routledge 2003, 336). It is the ability to move from and between the individual experience and the collective identity that gives cities the prominent role in the post-conflict setting. It is in cities where discontent is fomented, but it is also in cities where new alliances can be forged, all underscored by the shared backdrop of the urban environment.

Because the formation of identity is situated within the context of place, the attendant notions relating to shared historic identity is an aspect that is as vital to identity as it is for peacebuilding itself. On one side of the debate there is the use of memorials and monuments to commemorate people, places, and events where tragedy struck or where recognition was needed (Benton-Short 2008), a process which can be integral to post-conflict peacebuilding. On the other side, shared history based on place can galvanize a heterogeneous community, as competing levels of identity can share in the similar experience of a place. Oakes, paraphrasing Massey (1992; 1995), sees the place-based identity as a combination of 'the interactions between the extra-local forces of political economy and the historical layers of local social relations' (Oakes 1997, 509), a perspective that combines the forces of individual and group identity and the city.

In his discussion of personal and national identity, Bloom argues that 'identity is as tangible a factor as territory or property in situations of conflict; in fact, it can be well argued that territory is only a blatant symbol of national identity' (Bloom 1990, 114). This statement makes the point that identity is central to how and why conflict occurs, but also to how it can be addressed. In the post-conflict setting, anything that helps to bolster or form an identity that is both secure and accepting of plurality is a necessary step in assuring that peacebuilding is effective and sustainable peace can be achieved (Gillard 2001; Ryan 1996). In the case of the ISIS, something that secures identity must be outside and greater than the individual or the group. This can be represented by the city and the role it plays in fostering group and individual identity by providing the structure through which communication networks and social capital are built, a point articulated by Wirth (1938):

> 'the influences which cities exert upon the social life of man are greater than the ratio of the urban population would indicate, for the city is not only in ever larger degrees the dwelling-place and the workshop of modern man, but it is the initiating and controlling centre of economic, political, and cultural life that has drawn the most remote parts of the world into its orbit and woven disperse areas, people, and activities in a cosmos' (1938, 2).

2.5 Theory in Practice: Peacebuilding and Urban Regeneration

Up to this point, the emphasis has been on understanding on a theoretical level how peace, peacebuilding, legitimation, and urban theory interact. It is important however to understand how these theories are practiced. While the remainder of this research effectively explores how this happens, it is necessary to present a brief synopsis of how each is performed in the practical realm, what its goals are, and how it is achieved. This helps to understand contextually what is being examined in the field research.

2.5.1 Peacebuilding

Many aspects of what peacebuilding aims to achieve were discussed above. Referring back to Boutros-Ghali's definition, he advances the agenda of peacebuilding as firstly occurring through 'agreements ending civil strife' which 'may include disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation' (Boutros-Ghali 1995). Most of these activities are often written into framework agreements (the aforementioned 'agreement ending civil strife', which will be explored in greater detail in chapter five), though some aspects of peacebuilding are less policy-oriented and more about strengthening civil society and empowering social and cultural growth and identity through the post-war reconstruction process. It is this non-policy orientation that is of greater relevance to this research and is explored below.

Another definition of peacebuilding that more adequately addresses its multi-faceted nature (even its 'multiplexed' nature, to draw in the discussion on urban theory) is from the Alliance for Peacebuilding[32]:

> 'Peacebuilding is the set of initiatives by diverse actors in government and civil society to address the root causes of violence and protect civilians before, during, and after violent conflict . . . Effective peacebuilding is multi-faceted and adapted to each conflict environment. There is no one path to peace, but pathways are available in every conflict environment . . . The ultimate objective of peacebuilding is to reduce and eliminate the frequency and severity of violent conflict' (Alliance for Peacebuilding).

In terms of practising peacebuilding then, through this definition one can see that peacebuilding is not limited to the work of the United Nations or some other incarnation of a third-party government intervention; while often necessary to initiate peace agreements, there are many actors, agents, and avenues for building peace in the post-conflict context.

Peacebuilding in the UN sense is vague enough to not suggest a structure to how these measures are instituted, though the tendency has been to enshrine such measures in the initial peace agreement. What the UN definition does not make clear is there is often a dynamic that occurs between multiple streams of actors, processes, and funding bodies, both within and external to the society in which it is working, that are all required to build peace not only immediately after conflict, but for many years following. Many examples of peacebuilding begin with a peace agreement (such as the case studies examined in this research) and use the agreement to forge the initial groundwork for peace and stability, leaving space for other actors and agencies to work in the post-conflict context (this usually occurs when physical security can be assured to a certain degree by the removal and disarmament of troops and the establishment of interim policing and government bodies). This reading of peacebuilding as a practice makes room conceptually for understanding how, in a practical sense, urban regeneration can be viewed as a process that is aligned with the aims of peacebuilding.

2.5.2 Urban Regeneration

Urban Regeneration, broadly, aims to not only rebuild and where possible refurbish existing structures, but add new elements that will enhance the lives and experiences of those using the space. In Carmona et al.'s (2003) discussion, regeneration is seen as occupying multiple levels of import in the overall management and design of cities. Through 'land reclamation, place promotion, direct investment (i.e. in infrastructure) and provision of subsidies or starting capital for evolving funds' (2003, 259) many agencies are required to move forward on regeneration schemes, usually resulting in some form of partnership or

coalition between private, public, and voluntary sectors (*ibid*). In the post-conflict context, this often includes rebuilding war-damaged buildings, sites, and monuments, or demolishing them altogether and putting something new in their stead. It also means redesigning the purpose, look, and feel of a place so that it encourages new use and economic and social robustness. Urban regeneration in a post-conflict context thus aims to generate new concepts of identity for the city and the culture that is part of, but beyond, the associated conflict past, thus bringing its previously conflicting citizens together.

As an example, urban regeneration plans in the UK context are often spearheaded by local councils who want to improve on certain aspects of an area, such as an estate or abandoned industrial site. They will publish tenders for project ideas based on the needs of the site and independent agencies will bid on the project, presenting a full project plan. Regeneration has a wide remit and while it primarily concerns the built environment, it also draws on related issues such as employment, accessibility, transportation, telecommunications, availability of goods and services, and/or the creation of themed quarters or districts (Imrie 2003). These kinds of regeneration 'growth' projects further enable a city to 'engage in place marketing, diversify local labour and housing markets, and capture flows of global investment' (Imrie, Lees, and Raco 2009, 6).

The UK model is highly structured with the level of public and private interaction quite high and illustrates how local authorities can proactively work with the public and private sectors to create (hopefully) positive change. But urban regeneration does not have to occur within such a structured context and the UK is one of the few nations with explicit urban policies for urban regeneration. As this research shows—it can also be the product of a liberalized economy and a cash-strapped government that leads to a neoliberal tendency for foreign investment to drive the regenerating of a city. Like peacebuilding, urban regeneration is also a product of the kind of governance regime in power. Just as peacebuilding in the post-conflict context requires multiple streams of input and output from a variety of actors, urban regeneration in the post-conflict context is determined not just by the government, but by the multitude of other avenues of input, a main contributor of which is the private sector.

Ultimately, the regeneration of city centres is about redefining relationships between the civil society, capital holders, and the state. Consumption helps therefore to pattern social interaction of local populaces in the context of an altered built environment. In this way, the urban regeneration of post-conflict cities serves to illustrate fundamental concepts about the peace that has been built and the nature and role of consumption, capital, the state, and identity in society. It is recognized that urban regeneration is often indistinguishable from gentrification and thus serves to include new dimensions of social, economic and cultural

exclusion – for example by substituting class divisions for those of religion. While these issues are not within the scope of this research, what they represent is: the discourse surrounding neoliberal urbanization and regeneration.

As is illustrated later in greater detail in chapters six, seven, and eight, neoliberal processes have contributed to making the regeneration of city centres in post-conflict contexts—to a degree and on their own terms—successful. This position emerges from the research, but is also based on evidence in the literature. Discussed below is how the (mis)use of 'neoliberal' leads to further misguided approaches to understanding urban regeneration as a manifestation of the concept and some of the core concerns surrounding this.

Urban regeneration in any context (be it post-conflict or not) can be seen as representative of the hegemony exerted by (neoliberal) economic factors. The resulting changes to the urban landscape and the social knock-on effects of such processes are often seen as potentially harmful but can also be seen as helpful. There is often a perception that what might be called 'neoliberal urban regeneration' is simply a bad policy choice[33], however inappropriate use of the term 'neoliberal' shrouds the core of the matter. This position is outlined by Hackworth (2007) who argues that use of the term 'neoliberal' has become increasingly misused—whereas in actuality the word represents a very rich intellectual tradition (see the discussion in chapter one), it has developed a more negative sense that seemingly ignores this: 'neoliberalism is rooted in a very specific set of ideas, so the diffusion of the label as though it were new, uncontested, or unrooted to a long line of scholarship is... problematic (Hackworth 2007, xii). Jessop (2002) argues in similar vein noting that neoliberalism's roots in the liberal tradition mean that it harkens to fundamental issues of individual freedom and government intervention.

Neoliberalism's theoretical antecedents point to another facet of its complex nature: that it is reflective of a complex process and is not simply an accepted formula for the way governments do business that is picked out of an instruction manual: Hackworth argues that 'neoliberalism is not so much a thing as it is a process—one that occurs alongside and in combination with many other processes that affect urbanization' (Hackworth 2007, 11). Others present similar stances on the issue: Kingfisher and Maskovsky (2008) 'treat neoliberalism as a process rather than a *fait accompli'* (115) with a variety others also claiming a similar position (Peck and Tickell 2002, Chatterjee 2009, Birch and Mynkhenko 2009, Ward and England 2007).

Following from this notion that neoliberalism is a process reflective of a complex system of economic, political, and social relationships and not a simply a 'thing' is the way the process is manifest. Brenner and Theodore (2002) discuss the concept of 'actually existing neoliberalism' as a short-hand reference for talking about how this occurs: for them, it is

everyday urban experience where one can observe the process of neoliberalism. 'Urban regeneration' (and by extension, gentrification) as we know it is by definition expressive of a neoliberal process and therefore the emphasis should not be on taking the neoliberal out of it, but understanding how to manage the regeneration of an area so that it meets the needs of local population, improves space, increases economic robustness, and contributes to society. Commentators such as Hackworth (2007), Brenner and Theodore (2002), and Swyngedouw et al. (2002) have argued as much, pointing out that there is more to the argument that negatively-viewed examples of urban regeneration being explained away as neoliberal kind of misses the point: that what needs to be critically addressed is how to manage work within and around it and not just against it. This approach to urban regeneration and neoliberalism provides the basis for analyzing the case studies in later chapters. Arguments regarding the fundamentally negative effects of neoliberalism present some very coherent challenges to it (as it is expressed in the urban form): in particular, the marginalizing and segregating effects of the obsession with aesthetic value have presented significant room for critique. From Pow's (2009) discussion of the exclusionary tactics that have resulted from urban regeneration policies in Shanghai to Swanson's (2007) analysis of urban renewal policies in Ecuador, criticisms abound regarding how stealthily policies aimed at improving areas can actually create greater divisions in society. Be this as it may, it is not a counter-argument to the above discussion on neoliberal urban regeneration but rather supports the claim that neoliberal policies have to be worked through and around. The danger of marginalization is a real threat however, that will be revealed as part of the critique of regeneration in the case study cities.

How might the Habermasian legitimation approach apply to urban regeneration? In the UK context described above, and in the wider argument regarding neoliberal urban regeneration in general, urban regeneration performs two main functions: it serves to offer proof that the government is meeting the needs of its people by providing a built environment that addresses and strengthens identity and security, as well as reifying the lifeworld and interpretive system through the creation and maintenance of spaces and symbols, which in return can strengthen the government via legitimacy being granted to their own authority. In Sarajevo, Beirut, and Belfast, the kind of regeneration that has taken place, because it is in a less structured context, means that what is being legitimated is not only the government, but also the approach to peacebuilding nested within the implementation of the peace agreement and the new identity that is being created through these changes.

In the cases explored below, what urban regeneration means in each context varies, a point developed throughout the analysis. However, whether that urban regeneration is 'from above' (administered by the government), 'from below' (voluntary and grass-roots), or 'from

the side' (a result of third party and private sector investment), the effect is generally the same: the shaping of urban space, and its purpose, use and role in a city, with the goal of creating an improved urban environment.

2.6 Conclusion

> 'Those who have the power to command and produce space possess a vital instrumentality for the reproduction and enhancement of their own power. Any project to transform society must, therefore, grasp the complex nettle of transformation of spatial species' (Harvey 1990a, 256).

Looking back at the exploration of system and structure, security, and identity as it applies to the role of the city as an ISIS integral for the legitimation of peacebuilding, there is one aspect of the urban theory literature that provides a counter-balance to the discussion—the role of power and dominance communicated through the city. As Harvey's statement above indicates, there is a strong element of power and hierarchy that is manifested in the control or alteration of any physical environment, the post-conflict city being no exception. In this role as well peacebuilding policy, if it is to be applied through the city, must also be steered by the knowledge that there is potential aggravation caused by the application of outside power regardless of its source.

This relationship is illustrated by the example of Solidere and the design and construction of the Beirut city centre. Made knowingly or not, the impact such decisions had on the city as a whole were manifest in a weakened infrastructure and lack of control in the more vulnerable, shelled parts of the city (Khalaf 1996). This power dynamic is also illustrated by Kong and Law's (2002) analysis of power and its relation to the built environment: 'one of the ways in which power can be expressed, maintained, and enhanced, is through the control and manipulation of landscapes', which is central to understanding the critical role of the city in the post-conflict environment (2002, 1505). They understand the city as the focus of power, where it is held but also created. The city inhabits the tripartite role of creating, being created by, and being a medium for socio-cultural and historical movements. Therefore the concept that power is expressed in this relationship is also valid, as 'landscapes, including cities, are simultaneously medium and outcome of power . . . in both real and symbolic terms, they enable the exercise of power and are also an expression of resistance' (Kong and Law 2002, 1505).

Cities are places where culture, society, power, politics, technology, consumption, capital, and people come together to create a dynamic environment that inhabits many locations and experiences. As a physical place, cities are the backdrop against which definitions of the individual/self and the group/community are formed; as a psychological space, cities connect to a global scale of operation and allow for new forms of communication and economic exchange to form. Cities are also places where the legitimation of peacebuilding can take hold as it imparts a sense of security and identity through the foundation of the physical and experiential and where urban regeneration as the expression of neoliberal processes unfold and take effect

In revisiting the original research question regarding the relationship between cities and peacebuilding, the above discussion has elucidated the foundational theory to understanding peace and cities, how they are related through the Habermasian understanding of legitimation, and what legitimation means in the context of peacebuilding in the post-conflict city as it relates to production of capital and creating centres of consumption. What remains, however, is an understanding of what the theory and praxis means on the ground. What shape does the legitimation take in the post-conflict city? Can looking closely at cases of conflict, peace negotiation, and reconstruction of Sarajevo, Beirut, and Belfast help bring clarity to the implications of such a proposed relationship? In the following chapter, the framework and methodology for approaching such a task is explored.

CHAPTER THREE

Researching Place and Peace: A Mixed Method Approach

3.1 Introduction

In the previous chapters, the underlying research question regarding the relationship between peacebuilding and the post-conflict city was explored on a theoretical level. By looking at peace and urban theory as related through Habermasian legitimation, it was established that the processes at play in the act of legitimation are based on the ISIS and the lifeworld, and that one way the legitimation of peacebuilding policies happens is through the structure and function of urban life. In other words, what peacebuilding is missing is something the city can provide. Drawing on Wirth's (1938) conception of the city as the soursce and product of human action is a means of making the ISIS and lifeworld as processes present in the urban context.

The task now remains to demonstrate how these theoretical concepts play out, and what the implications are, in the real world. By using a mixed-method approach, the theoretical concepts outlined above are applied in several ways to both the cities and conflict in question: Sarajevo/Bosnian War; Beirut/Lebanese Civil War; and Belfast/The Troubles. In doing this, a nuanced understanding of what the legitimation of peacebuilding in the post-conflict city means is articulated through a combination of analytical approaches. These findings are further interrogated to uncover an even deeper understanding of the central role capital and consumption play in the creation of these post-conflict city centre spaces.

In this chapter, several aspects of approaching and using methodology are discussed. First, an examination of methods commonly used in the area of peace studies and urban research are reviewed with the goal of situating the methodological choices for this project. Second, a discussion of the research process and an examination of the methods employed in this study, as well as the original analytical tools created, is covered. This is concluded by an examination of analytical issues and ethical considerations.

3.2 The State of Methodological Approaches in Peace Studies and Urban Geography

In looking to formulate a research design for this project, several considerations influenced the decisions made. At the forefront was the intriguing and stimulating, though often complex, issue of bringing together two disparate academic disciplines not only in terms of theory, but also in methodological approach. Second was choosing approaches that sought to highlight the interdisciplinary nature of the research in a way that offered the possibility of insightful and robust findings applicable to both disciplines.

Peace studies is a highly interdisciplinary subject in and of itself. On one end, it is a matter of philosophic scope and ethical debate; on the other, it consists of quantifiable statistical analysis of relating to various typologies of conflict. Galtung took the idea of 'peace' as a subject of religion and ethics and created a space for it within a sociological framework (see chapter two), and it is from this point that other uses and applications evolved. Most commonly, studies of peace, from an academic perspective, involve the study of conflicts and their associated effects and processes. These are often conducted through a study of policy material; data regarding time, actors, and involvement level of various parties; and by looking for indicators of successes or failures (Doyle and Sambanis 2000). However, these studies are approached from a social sciences perspective where interpretation of data, either statistical or qualitative, informs the analysis and outcome of the research project.

Due to peace studies' interdisciplinary nature as well as its relative newness, it 'represents an amalgam of different academic approaches applied to its core problems of war and armed conflict' (Atack 2009, 46). As such, peace studies is valued for its dynamic relationship between theory and action, and often includes a hybridization with other disciplines 'drawn primarily, but by no means exclusively, from the social sciences and the humanities . . . [however] peace studies does not have its own distinctive methodology, but relies on methodologies derived from other disciplines . . . such as international relations, political science, sociology, philosophy and theology' (*ibid*). In this case, the use of a peace studies framework does not imply a standard methodological approach, but rather a basic philosophic guide for analyzing the role and structure of peace and violence in society (as was described in chapter two and referring to conceptions of positive and negative peace).

In light of the philosophic framework offered by peace studies, how then does this apply to urban theory? The idea that peace and violence possess structure in and of itself aids in the application of peace theory to cities, for cities are manifestations of both physical and social structure. In this sense, the structure of cities can be likened to the structures of peace

and violence, wherein cities have the capacity to allow humans to flourish and prosper through their structure and function as well to harm and repress human development. In a Weberian sense, cities are places where power is located and centralized, though the 'power' in question is a neutral force and can have either positive or negative effects. It is the way in which this power is utilized that is the main cause for positive and/or negative phenomenon. In this research project, cities are seen as centres of power that can be harnessed to promote positive growth or negative effect. In the case of applying cities to peacebuilding, it is this capacity that can either help or hinder its success. This research aims to address how cities can help the peacebuilding process, and looks to case-study examples to explore how this relationship is manifest.

How does this then fit in with sociological research methods? Here is where the notion of critical realism comes into play when considering the study and implications of this research project. In looking to situate the objects of study, 'cities' and 'peacebuilding', it is clear that not only are they related in the structural sense discussed above, but they are also products of social interaction and power dynamics on a human scale. Not only that, but the way they are observed and seen is a reading of one onto the other: cities read into peacebuilding and vice versa. What this tells us is that the reflexivity of the relationship is observable because on the one hand, its manifestation is visible and physical (in the city) and on the other, it is felt and experienced. In both cases, a rendering of how this relationship works and why it is important is evaluated through the methods described below.

In approaching empirical data collection for this research project it was necessary to employ methods that allowed for the manifestation of the relationship between peacebuilding and the built environment to be critically examined. In doing this, a comparison of case studies was determined to be the most suitable approach as it would allow for broad findings to be made. Due to their scope, these findings contribute to the advancement of the understanding of how peacebuilding works and can function better, in addition to an understanding urban economic forces and their relationship to regeneration in post-conflict cities.

3.2.1 Approaching the Case-study

Yin defines the case study research method as 'an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used' (Yin 2008, 23). Case studies are defended by George and Bennet (2005) as a

preferred method as the 'comparative advantages of case study methods' ability to contribute to the development of theories that can accommodate various forms of complex causality' (2005, 5). This is certainly the sought-after effect in this research: by using a comparative case study format, and a variety of approaches in examining each case, a range of comparative findings are possible that contribute to robust and full account of how peacebuilding and the built environment interact, and further can contribute a greater understanding of these processes.

Here the case studies selected are listed according to place, conflict, and peace agreement title, as it is the interrogation of each level of the cases that frames the overall analysis. The case studies are organized in the below order throughout the research according to overall length of conflict, as the longer the conflict, the greater complexity of the data available and overall timeline of events, making it pragmatically more manageable to approach the smaller amount of data in relation to the larger cases.

City	Conflict	Peace Agreement
Sarajevo, Bosnia & Herzegovina	Bosnian War (1992-1995)	Dayton Accords
Beirut, Lebanon	Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990)	Ta'if Accords
Belfast, Northern Ireland	The Troubles (1968-1998)	The Belfast Agreement

Table 3-1 Case-study selections

3.2.2 Case-study Selection

The overall objective of the dissertation is to examine how peacebuilding policy could be made more successful. How then were these particular case-studies chosen? In terms of case-study selection, the international context of the conflict and the involvement of the international community in the resolution are fundamental to selection. When evaluating probable case-study conflicts and locations, the critical criterion was that the chosen conflicts reflected an intra-state, inter-communal situation that was concurrently a vital issue in the greater international context. This provided the motivation necessary to produce an international peace framework for conflict resolution and was a major underlying criterion for the field research—that the chosen case-studies reflect how internal conflict can play a major role in international relations and politics.

In order to construct a set of criteria that can be used to select appropriate case-study locations/conflicts, the above rationale regarding the international context and the theoretical basis are synthesized. The result of this is the production of three principal criteria that

determine the selection of case-studies: nature and typology of conflict, location of conflict, and use of an international peace agreement to address its resolution (see box 3-1 for a description of each criterion). Shown on table 3-2 below, a sampling of potential conflicts

Box 3-1 Explanation and Defence of Case-study Selection Criteria

Type of conflict: Each case study location is associated with a war that was characterized by intra-state conflict. In addition, each war is an expression of a long-history of tension that was transmuted into open violence by a contemporary event. The conflict is also sectarian (where communities that have distinct identities and that have at times have coexisted but came to war).

a. In general, it is more useful and meaningful to compare similar types of conflict and intra-state conflict is just as prominent as inter-state, making it a relevant area of inquiry[1].
b. Intra-state conflict can be broken down into two types: civil war and inter-communal[2]. Civil war is expressed generally as conflict over central control or local issues. Inter-communal conflict is sectarian in nature, where opposing forces live in geographic and demographic proximity. The case studies were chosen because they expressed the latter characteristics of intra-state conflict: that of inter-communal violence.
c. Type of conflict also feeds into the requirement that the conflict be urban-centric as opposed to more diffuse and regionalized; inter-communal, sectarian conflict is based partially on demographic proximity (thus linking b and c).
d. Type and nature of conflict also determines the mechanisms and function of any international framework or treaty created to address it.
e. Understanding the typology and nature of a conflict is absolutely necessary for understanding how and why the conflict occurred, why the city was instrumental to the conflict, and how peacebuilding policy was formed.

Location of conflict: the city was the setting for a vital portion of the conflict, whether through symbolic action or physical violence and destruction. The urban nature of the violence is also related to the nature of the conflict, as sectarian, communal conflicts tend to have great demographic proximity.

a. As indicated in point c above, the type of conflict has a direct relation to where the fighting and conflict took place: regional versus urban. The conflicts being studied must have had a very direct presence in an urban setting, which may be linked to the inter-communal nature of the violence.
b. Location is important because one of the main aims of the research is to examine how urban processes specifically can be used to approach the legitimation of peacebuilding. Therefore, finding examples that have the urban setting as integral to the strategy of the conflict as well as having these same settings being a platform for observing and studying how peacebuilding efforts were played out was important.

Conflict resolution: the resolution of the conflict was addressed through an international framework agreement, whether initiated by the UN or other third party actors.

a. This is important because one of the main aims of the research question is to understand how peacebuilding practice can be improved, therefore it is vital that there be an international framework that was validated and agreed upon by the conflicting and third parties.
b. Also, an international framework implies that there is a high level of documentation, both official and peripheral, that can be accessed, analysed, and examined for effectiveness and usefulness.

[1] See Correlates of War website for detailed statistical information on all conflicts since 1816 at http://www.correlatesofwar.org/ (accessed 13/10/2009).
[2] The differences between civil war and inter-communal war are not strict divisions but broad categories; as such, many intra-state conflicts can express varying degrees of each. See Sarkees S. and Schaffer R. (2000). The Correlates of War Data on War: and Update to 1997. *Conflict Management and Peace Science.* 18 (1).

	Bosnia (1992-1995)	Cambodia (1975-1991)	Cyprus (1974-present)	El Salvador (1980-1992)	First Gulf War (1980-1988)	Lebanon (1975-1990)	Nagorno-Karabakh (1988-1994)	Northern Ireland (1966-1998)	Rwanda (1990-1994)
Nature of Conflict									
Inter-state					X		X		
Intra-state	X	X	X	X		X		X	X
Sectarian	X		X			X	X	X	X
Location of Conflict									
Vital urban Component?	X		X			X		X	
City	Sarajevo		Nicosia		'The war of the cities'	Beirut		Belfast	
Type of Resolution									
Peace Framework?	X	X		X		X		X	X
	Dayton Accord	Paris Peace Agreement		Chapulte-pec Agree-ment		Ta'if Agree-ment		Belfast Agreement	Arusha Accords

Table 3-2 Matrix of case-study selection criteria and potential conflicts with case-study selection highlighted

that have occurred in the last fifty years are listed[34], along with the three selection criteria. The purpose of the matrix is to illustrate how such conflicts are analyzed for usefulness in terms of the research aims. Highlighted on the matrix are the case-study selections that emerged from the list, with the criteria being met for each.

In addition to the primary selection criteria, other more pragmatic factors played a part in the selection dynamic (although are secondary in consideration), namely expense, time, and research feasibility. Being based out London, reaching Belfast, Beirut, and Sarajevo incurred a moderate and reasonable expense; the locations are far enough apart and of differing cultural background that comparison would be challenging and fruitful, but not so far as to make travel cost-prohibitive (in comparison to an African, Asian, or Latin American site). In addition, as I was limited by time and resources, more than three case-studies would be unreasonable and result in too broad of an analysis. Finally, the amount of data available in English regarding each conflict and agreement is readily abundant and available, and is of great depth and substance, making research feasible.

3.3 Analytical Framework

Before moving forward to a discussion of empirical data collection through case-study selection and methodological approaches, the transition from the theory presented in chapter two to a researchable and observable process is in order. Below is a look at how the theoretical concept of legitimation can be interpreted in observable phenomenon in the urban context, or in other words, establishing how legitimation is 'operationalized'.

3.3.1 Operationalization

The aim of operationalization is to figure how to measure concepts which by nature are sometimes 'fuzzy'. In this case, the goal is to understand how and why the concept of legitimation might be measured in an urban context. The first task in operationalizing legitimation is to break it down in to dimensions, the extensions of which will provide the measureable phenomenon.

Drawing on the discussion in chapter two, the overarching task of the structure of legitimation is 'need provision' in the form of system/structure interactions, security

(human, physical and environment), and identity (including social, psycho-social, political and religious) through the ISIS. In a corresponding manner, these aspects can be transposed into the following dimensions found in the urban experience: social, cultural, psychological, political, economic, environmental, and spatial.

These dimensions are arrived at by looking at the above needs and framing them in the context of cities. Cities can be seen as the 'containers' for these dimensions[35], meaning that social, cultural, psychological, political, and economic processes, in addition to environmental and spatial aspects, share a reflexive relationship with the city. This is important because it is these broad dimensions of legitimation that are used to map out its measureable expressions on the ground. These expressions are listed in figure 3-1, which illustrates the conceptual framework of legitimation, the dimensions of legitimation in the urban context, and the measureable expressions of legitimation as mapped through the dimensions.

The expressions of legitimation are diverse; multiple dimensions can be assigned to each expression, making their analysis complex and rich. Also, the expressions listed in the diagram are not exhaustive but representative of the variety of things that could emerge as vital to legitimation. Using these elements as a guide, the expressions help to draw out other forms it might take on as the research commences. In devising how such an analytical framework can be used to effectively examine the level and occurrence of legitimation that results from focusing on these expressions, it is evident that its strength lies in its capacity to create multi-faceted linkages between events, phenomenon, things, and places. In this research project, the goal is to take this operationalized framework and use it as a guide for examining the examples of international peacebuilding frameworks and the post-conflict city in each of the chosen case study cities.

This is supported by the concepts embodied by nonrepresentational theory (NRT) (Thrift 2008)[36]. NRT is a helpful tool for approaching the intersection of phenomenon, events, and occurrences observed in urban life as an observer and using this information in a way that takes the everyday, mundane world and sees it in terms of how it reflexively shapes itself and its user (Cadman 2009, Vannini 2009). As is discussed later in this thesis, NRT and the operationalization of the aforementioned expressions come to bear on methodological choices made for data collection.



Figure 3-1 Operationalizing Legitimation

In this diagram, the key task of operationalizing legitimation works through the context of the city. This produces a 'roof' composed of the dimensions of legitimation; the dimensions in turn filter down into the expressions of legitimation, which are the measureable and observable elements of legitimation in the city. The aim of this representation is to show that the dimensions do not individually make up each expression; rather the dimensions overlap and form an integrated backdrop to the expressions. It must also be noted that the placement of terms in the expressions box are not to be affiliated with the coloured area they are over or the dimension they are under. The relationship of the dimensions to the expressions is to be illustrated as multi-faceted and multi-dimensional.

While the analysis of the operationalization of legitimation in the city had many potential opportunities for study, its scope had to be narrowed so it would be a manageable and feasible undertaking. Despite the fluidity NRT offers for observation of such urban phenomenon, it was not feasible that all expressions could be measured in total for each city in the scope of the dissertation. Therefore, defining which part of the city to study was necessary. In looking at the cases, it was apparent that in each one, the city centre was in some way, shape or form, the object and centre of the conflict and the reconstruction in the post-conflict context and therefore presented the best physical space around which to circumscribe the location of study.

In using the operational framework, key questions emerged. The list below shows examples of some of the analytical tools used to generate and interrogate data obtained.

While these were not exhaustive, they formed an analytical base for furthering the walking and observational field research (discussed in greater detail below):

- How and to what degree is each expression valued or relevant to the culture in which it is operating?
- How does the precise nature of the conflict influence the valuing of some expressions over others?
- Are the expressions shared? (If the community was once in conflict, this would be very important)
- Or is the use and access to the expressions separate but equal?
- Who uses these expressions? When, why and how?
- Are there some expressions that remain constant throughout differing conflicts, or is there always a substantive difference?

3.4 Examining the Case-studies: Empirical Research Structure

Having specified an analytical framework which serves to operationalize the key concept of legitimation the next step is to link it to the actual research process. Below is a description of the three phases of research undertaken, where each phase built upon the knowledge gained in the previous phase, as well as in-depth discussions of specific methods chosen within each phase.

3.4.1 Phase One

This initial phase consisted of a contextual analysis of the case-study cities and conflicts, where historic, socio-cultural, political, and economic developments were examined. The majority of this analysis is found in chapter four, though the knowledge acquired underscored the phases that followed. In addition to the perusal of secondary sources related to these topics, statistical and visual analysis and interpretation of both archival and contemporary sources provided ample material, as well as government and NGO policy documents. The aim of this phase was not only to understand the greater historical context in which each city and conflict developed, but to also draw out thematic threads regarding spaces of individual and group identity, sources of capital and consumption, and the individual nature of the built environment in each city as an expression of the particular forces at work.

3.4.2 Phase Two

Here, the goal was to analyze the peace agreements connected to each conflict and city/country then look at their subsequent implementation and how this in turn effected the development of the built environment. In the first instance, approaching the peace agreements was a continuation of the historical context of the previous chapter in terms of looking at major actors, agents, and events in shaping the cessation of conflict and the negotiation and drafting of each agreement. This was followed by a comprehensive codification of the peace agreement texts with the goal of uncovering the type and purpose of the provisions contained in them. This was done with a specific aim of interrogating the text for evidence of consideration of the built environment. The framework developed for this analysis is presented in the next section.

Next was a consideration of the implementation of each treaty. While looking generally at what is meant by implementation and problems typically associated with its success, a general approach to understanding what happened after the treaties went into effect is formulated. This was followed by an analysis of each implementation period, specifically addressing how the implementation of the treaties effected the built environment.

The implementation analysis is followed by an exploration of what has happened in regards to built environment of the city centres in each case. Using the analytical tools presented in the previous sections, such as factors determining success of implementation and the degree to which the treaties addressed built environment concerns, the process of what developed on the ground is assessed.

The purpose of the overall analysis of this phase was to further the scope of understanding regarding each conflict, post-conflict context, and city, as well as link the discussion back into how the built environment can legitimate peacebuilding, even if the treaty did not contain elements that considered the built environment.

3.4.3 Phase Three

This phase consisted of presenting and analyzing data relating to the walking and observation of place. In each case, the data collected consisted of field research and observation and interviews with local participants and key informants (see Appendix I for an interview schedule and Appendix III for walking routes). Below is a discussion on the role and importance of ethnography generally in urban geographic research as well as a discussion of how walking and observation through the framework of NRT informed the analysis, in addition to the approach taken to locating and conducting interviews.

3.4.3.1 From an Ethnography of Place to Walking Observation

Jacobs' seminal work *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* [1961] (1992) is a highly personalized account of urban life that is critically analyzed so as to present a larger critique of urban planning decisions and policy that impact life on a localized and everyday scale. While the book was not intended to be a classical ethnographic study, its unique perspective offers fertile ground for understanding the importance of urban ethnography in examining the intersection of policy and people in the urban setting. Ethnography is a cornerstone in the study of urban life for the Chicago School (Lees 2003) and informs many approaches to urban studies. However, 'ethnography' in its most classic sense is the study of people and the social and cultural processes they produce and are engaged in and how they understand them (Wilson and Chaddha 2009). Cities are fecund spaces for this type of

investigation. The intellectual turn addressed through the ethnographic approach taken in this research project has to do with an understanding of a specific 'place' (the post-conflict city centre) in terms of social processes (conflict, reconstruction, and regeneration). By categorizing the sum total of the methodological parts as ethnographical in nature, the claim is made that cities are human constructs and are thus eligible for investigation in similar terms to human experience, such as with more classic representations of ethnography. In simple terms, it means asking questions of the city, observing it, and engaging with it the same way one would a person.

In continuing to engage with the idea of the city as a subject of ethnographic exploration and hence fitting for a varied exploratory approaches, Mayne and Lawrence (1999) utilized an ethnography of place approach in examining the historical built environment changes in the urban slum of 'Little Lon' in Melbourne, Australia. In doing so, they advocated that 'by relating data to the particular contexts of their production and use, and thereby to thought and action in the urban past, one can tease out the dynamic complexities of vanished social worlds' (1999, 325). Inasmuch as their research was examining historic perspectives of an urban space, the same approach could be translated to the exploration of political and social phenomenon and its effect on urban space, such as with this research. Mayne and Lawrence's position also highlights the underlying theme in the analysis of urban space, and that is its 'production and use', two vital elements in approaching urban regeneration in the post-conflict city.

But is ethnography an appropriate source of data for understanding places? Herbert (2000) shows us that 'ethnography is a uniquely useful method for uncovering the processes and meanings that undergird sociospatial life' (2000, 550) arguing for its increased use in geography. While he presents its potential pitfalls, he also sees it as unique in that it allows the research to sharpen theory with further application to both micro- and macro- conceptions of geography. Additionally, Lees 'advocates ethnographic research to investigate on-going social practices through which space is continually shaped and inhabited' (Lees 2003, 111; Lees 2001), adding to the validity of ethnography as a method for approaching the relationship of city centre regeneration and peacebuilding.

The approach adopted towards observation in this research involved a systematicmethod of walking transects in and across the case study cities to gather data which are subsequently evaluated in relation to the structures of peace and violence. Observations are thus broadly examined through the idea that urban space either aids or hinders in the development of human potential. This provided a framework for

engagement with city space where the perspective used was driven by an overall goal to understand how peacebuilding and cities, both as expressions of human processes, relate. In doing so, the emphasis on understanding the researcher's experience of place as a valid contribution to the aims of the research itself permitted a sensitive but informed analysis of place.

I suggest that this is a form of ethnography best described as 'ethnography-lite' which when taken with the other methods adopted in the research contributes to a coherent mixed methods research strategy. In this undertaking, walking, observation, and interviewing are the chosen methods. In the preceding discussion, the usefulness of ethnography in studying urban issues was presented as a legitimate means for conducting research in general. In this project, a full ethnography was not possible, and, in practice, not really useful for the broader, comparative nature of it. However, it is a useful approach for conceptualizing the relational dynamic between observer/user of space and the space itself, a concept further explored in the literature on walking examined in chapter six.

NRT is useful here in understanding the applicability of walking and observation as part of ethnographically driven urban research. Cadman (2009) argues that NRT is 'concerned with the practices of everyday life . . . the mundane, oft routinized, humdrum of everyday living (such as listening to music, dancing, gardening, walking, and shopping). These activities manifest as habits which allow us to cope and go on in the world' (2009, 6). The research methods were initially driven by a desire to operationalize legitimation through various dimensions (see figure 3-1) – dimensions which are in turn physically manifest but that also inhabit a relational realm with the city and its users (for instance, to take a rather simplistic example, a hospital is a building but is also something imbues the local community with a sense of bodily security, something that can have multiple levels of effect on society). In order to work with such a premise, a framework such as NRT applied to a data gathering approach of walking, observation, and interviewing, allows for a viable reading of legitimation, peacebuilding, and city centre regeneration.

While the literature on walking as a method is explored more fully in chapter six, NRT provides a conceptual framework for the walking, or peripatetic, experience of the case study cities. Initially proposed as a theoretical framework by Thrift (2008), NRT has found fruitfulness as a theory aimed at understanding 'the geography of what happens' (Thrift 2008, 2) and as something that aims to look at what Cadman (2009) calls 'the embodied and performative nature of practice' (2007, 1). Key to this approach is the relationship 'in-the-moment' (to borrow from Heiddeggererian phraseology, a

philosophical antecedent to NRT according to Cadman 2009, Vannini 2009, Lorimer 2008, and Thrift 2008) between the human observer and the non-human aspect and what takes place as a result, as opposed to what the non-human element means (or represents) in terms of what the human observer is searching for. In NRT, there is analytical import in what happens as it is happening just as much as what results from an interaction (Cadman 2009) and focuses much on performativity in everyday life (Vannini 2009, Lorimer 2008).

The discussion of NRT here addresses only the parts most useful for approaching the methods chosen for this research. It is a highly complex network of ideas that would in and of themselves make for a full dissertation, but it is valuable as a starting point for looking at how walking and observation researches are conducted. On the one hand, there is a strong link to the role of the urban in human life through the work of Bourdieu (1977) and the concept of habitus, as well as to the importance of walking through the writings of de Certeau (1984) and his idea of tactics, which make it an appropriate link to the research conducted here (Cadman 2009, Vannini 2009, Anderson and Harrison 2010). On the other hand, it also takes a position where the role of the researcher in the data gathering process is taken as an equally valid part of the process, just as much as the city itself it as the processes and places observed.In this study, data collection was conducted through my own interactions and assessments of the city centre space and usage as a walker and observer. As a geographer, my position was informed by an orientation towards understanding how space has evolved and developed as well as how people use it. I was similarly guided by knowledge as a peace researcher, which allowed me to consider the structure of peace and violence as something that has multiple levels. My critical reflection on the city centres, guided by interviews and observation of everyday life, has made way for a unique contribution not only to the subject matter, but also to approaches for researching it. I also drew upon my conceptions of the operationalization of legitimation (presented above) as means for drawing out elements of the data collection that were pertinent.

In conducting interviews, initial participants were approached via email with times and locations determined before arrival at the location. Participants were contacted as potential ‘elite’ subjects, whose professional expertise contributed to a more nuanced understanding of the city, but also whose personal experience as living in the city added another layer of meaning to responses. In this case, individuals affiliated with private property development, local government, community representation, urban planners and designers, and regeneration experts were selected.

The process of obtaining interview subjects to supplement the research proved to be a complicated matter. I visited Belfast first, followed by Sarajevo, and ended with Beirut and organized obtaining my interviews in the same order. In each case, I used the same approach: conduct internet based research on new property developments with the goal of uncovering who was behind them, search for other local development firms, approach local academics or architecture offices for interviews or recommendations, local government and municipal planning offices, and finally seek out community advocacy groups with an interest in matters relating to redevelopment and regeneration, all the while remaining open for new avenues of exploration.

In seeking out interview participants, it was both encouraging and falsely promising that Belfast was first. By emailing and arranging appointments before arrival, I identified 11 research participants from a broad range of perspectives. Moving on to Sarajevo, I secured three prior to arrival which was boosted to six by the end. Part of the problem was one of language and I was over optimistic about the degree to which English would be spoken. In all cases individuals were identified and written to before visiting the cities' Whilst it was possible to arrange a number of appointments in advance of my arrival, inevitably others were not available whilst other people were contacted during my fieldwork and interviewed during the time I was there. Given the relative shortness of the time in the field particularly in Beirut and Sarajevo this meant that it was not always possible to talk to people and in some cases contact was made subsequently usually by email. Details of the actual interviews undertaken are given in Appendix I.

At this point, I realized that there were more subtle cultural communication differences I was not attuned to because I did not have the capacity to be in the field for very long. This was confirmed by the fact that in Beirut, I could get no one to respond to me, not even more well-known academics at the American University or the media and public relations desk at Solidere. During my time there, I was able to make contact with two people who provided usable data, but was disheartened at the lack of success. In one discussion with a Beiruti interviewee, he confirmed what I had been suspicious of all along: in Beirut (and Sarajevo, I was able to confirm later) to get an interview, you knock on someone's door or ring them the day you want to talk to them, and they will either arrange a time then or perhaps a day or two later. This is problematic if time is short on the ground and if there is very little sense of a network of referrals to work within.

The interview material that resulted, whilst not as extensive as hoped for, nevertheless provided sufficient data to enable me to contextualize and analyze the city

walking observations. In fact, I was able to read into and through the problems my supposed 'weak' interview acquisition presented me with: it actually said a lot about how each culture communicates and conducts business, and even helped to make inferences about and why each peace agreement was implemented the way it was and the challenges it faced. In the end, it provided me not with a gaping hole in my data, but rather an unforeseen and fruitful key to better understanding my overall research.

In problematizing the ethnographically-led perspective, it is this same unique position as ethnographic researcher that must be addressed. Due to the nature of the research being short-term, the time spent in each location required a more intensive research schedule. One problem with this is the tendency for outsiders in new and culturally 'foreign' places is to be clouded by the 'tourist gaze '(Urry 2002) which is problematic when approaching a place as a researcher. In conducting the research, care was taken to 'examine the examinations' and assess observations for their potential analytical usefulness and remain engaged in the urban experience as a critical user and not a passive sightseer, a perspective that fits well with the theory surrounding NRT. There was also the additional complexity of how the cities were navigated: for purposes of greater detail and experience of place, all cities were walked through and experienced on foot (occasionally on public transportation). While this greatly enhanced my ability to comprehend the critiques of the spaces that emerged, it also was apparent that one great flaw was the fact that this was not how these cities were experienced by the people who lived there.

In Sarajevo, Beirut, and Belfast, people engaged in walking in much the same ways described above. However, the space people did not tend to navigate on foot were the margins in between areas of the city, specifically between the city centre and the neighbourhood spaces people lived in or near. It was in these margins that some of the more problematic aspects of the built environment in these post-conflict cities were manifest, but also probably the least observed by those who lived there. In my perambulations of each city and city centre, these liminal spaces were a counterpoint to the great achievements that had been made in regenerating the city centres, but also of the symbolic importance of seeing what has been left out, and what that might represent. By approaching my perambulations as a means of exploring dynamic human and non-human interactions I was able to reflect on the city as it was used, how it shaped my decisions on where to walk, and how I saw it shaping others' choices: for instance, the presence of hills, of walled off or derelict areas, quality of pedestrian space, or presence of

certain types of commercial and retail business or signage, all intercede at every moment to alter decisions made about where I went and how it made me feel as a user.

In walking, then, my interaction and understanding of the city and how it was used exceeded the general experience of those that lived there. In the process of 'exploring, excavating, and mapping hidden spaces and paths in the city' (to paraphrase Pinder 2001) I was able to approach an understanding of the city as a 'multiplicity of experience achieved in urban everyday practices' and thus look deeper into 'the multiplicity of spaitalities and temporalities involved in these practices (Simonsen 2004, 47). My analysis of the city centre space and its degree of success was influenced by these interpretations though they also allowed for a unique analytical perspective in that my critique of the future of these city centre spaces was shaped by what was excluded as much as by what was kept in, as I observed in my walking of different times and spaces in each city.

3.4.3.2 A Framework for Peace Treaty Analysis

As was indicated in the description of phase two above, the framework created for analyzing the peace treaties is presented below.

Constructing a framework for analyzing the peace agreements was necessary in order to systematically explore the language and intention of the peace treaties as they potentially related to the built environment. At the start of the research, it was thought that the treaties might provide a direct link to what kind of reconstruction and development had occurred in the city centres and thus serve as a straightforward tool for analysis. If they did not contain any directives of this nature, it was also vital to determine this as there could potentially be other aspects of the peace treaties that indirectly effected the post-conflict built environment. If this was to be measured at all, then exhaustive exploration of the treaty language was needed. The research aim was to explore the relationship between peacebuilding and the built environment; if peacebuilding is seen as the long-term effect of an implemented peace treaty, then the roots of its structure are connected the peace treaty itself, as it is through the peace treaty that Boutros-Ghali's definition of peacebuilding (see page 3) is found.

The framework analysis also provided a greater depth in understanding how and why these particular agreements were written the way they were. It was helpful in

understanding the underlying tensions and general values that the drafters held when creating the peace agreement and for the quality and type of peace obtained.

3.4.3.3 Creating Analytical Categories

Constructing a framework for analyzing the Dayton Accords, Ta'if Accords, and Belfast Agreement required an understanding of general treaty form and function. Alongside this, I drew on the explanation of the major elements of peace treaties as defined on the UN Peacemaker website, an official resource for approaching the UN model of peace treaty creation. The main elements presented in Peacemaker were deconstructed then combined with the research aims of establishing the degree to which the built environment was part of the treaty language. Box 3-2 summarizes how the research questions were transformed into units of analysis suitable for the framework background.

Box 3-2 From Research Question to Analytical Category

In the Chapter 1, the following research questions were presented:

> *What is peacebuilding? What is legitimacy? How might it be supported by urban theory? Can cities be viable places for helping to secure the legitimacy of peacebuilding? And, how would this research inform approaches to future post-conflict peacebuilding policy?*

In order to operationalize these questions, especially in light of the analysis of Chapter 2, the following categories emerge as central to addressing the three components most vital to the research as a whole. These components are:

Conflict resolution
Peacebuilding
Urban regeneration/the built environment

In order to apply these to an analysis of the peace treaties, and in light of the Peacemaker categories that are used to organize the various parts of the treaties, the three operational components based on the themes that emerge from the research questions are:

Root Causes of Conflict (RC)
Peacebuilding (PB)
Urban Regeneration/Built Environment (URBE)

The assignations of RC, PB, and URBE is used in the matrix and is colour coded and applied to each individual part of the treaty as it categorized according the Peacemaker components.

As box 3-2 shows, the research questions were transformed into three main issues: conflict resolution, peacebuilding, urban regeneration/built environment. These were then changed to reflect analytical categories that could be applied to the peace agreements:

root causes of conflict, peacebuilding, urban regeneration/built environment. The only issue that was altered to create the analytical category was changing 'conflict resolution' to 'root causes of conflict'. This is because conflict resolution was shown to emerge from the discussion on peace theory in chapter two. Addressing root causes of conflict is one of the elements within the conflict resolution framework and is also fundamental to writing a peace agreement (Collier 2006; Barbieri and Schneider 1999; Stewart, Holdstock, Jarquin 2002, and Peacemaker). Additionally, the historic context (to be explored in chapter four), and the reasons why the conflict occurred can be read into the language of the peace agreement, thus being identified as root causes.

The other categories, peacebuilding and urban regeneration/built environment, were developed and explored in chapter two and their usefulness as analytical categories emerged from the discussion. Both are the practical/practicable versions of peace and urban theories, with key components that help to identify them. These components serve to identify the parts of the peace agreements that apply to the categories.

3.4.3.4 Framework Design

The framework design was based on the National Centre for Social Research's Framework Analysis method[37], also articulated by Ritchie and Lewis (2003). A similar approach was also used by the Chr. Michelson Institute in their report to the World Bank and UNDP entitled *Peace Processes and Statebuilding: Economic and Institutional Provisions of Peace Agreements* (2007). This method, 'is a matrix based analytic method which facilitates rigorous and transparent data management such that all the stages involved in the 'analytical hierarchy' can be systematically conducted' (Ritchie and Lewis 2003, 220). It is designed specifically for qualitative research where a variety of data gathering methods were used (i.e. interviews, field observation, focus groups, etc.). Themes or hierarchies are used to initially categorize the data with the correlated data then grouped into columns underneath. Columns are then analyzed for emerging themes, and the themes are then reanalyzed and re-grouped accordingly. The goal is for the information to fit into multiple categories, and have multiple assignations, so that previously unseen relationships within the text are revealed, especially as they relate to the research focus (Ritchie and Lewis 2003).



Figure 3-2 Framework Analysis Components and Categories



Figure 3-3 Possible Permutations for Application of Framework Coding

Using the peace agreement components articulated by UN Peacemaker[38] (Procedural, Substantive, and Institutional) and assigning them each a number for ease of use (Procedural=2, Substantive=3, and Institutional=4), each part of the treaty (numbered line or section) is assigned a component number of 2, 3, or 4 (see figures 3-2 and 3-3 below). Each line is then assigned a category: root cause, peacebuilding, and urban regeneration/built environment (represented as RC, PB, and URBE). Each treaty section can only have one component (number assignment), but can have two categories (RC, PB, URBE, RC/PB, URBE/PB).What emerges is a code for each line consisting of a component and a category (i.e. 3RC/PB). This system helps to quantify and visually represent the most vital aspects of a peace agreement that in turn are important for comparing and contrasting each treaty and their eventual implementation success and their degree of urban inclusiveness.

3.5 Analytical Issues and Ethical Considerations

In approaching the research, several considerations regarding any problematic analytical and/or ethical issues arose:

The reflexive role of the researcher. Discussed earlier in the context of the ethnography, one of these weaknesses of such a method is the potential 'muddying' of data with personal values and beliefs. While true objectivity is unobtainable, methodological steps were taken to avoid this through the consideration of what was achieved by a given observation. Observations needed to bring clarity to theoretical elements of the research, and the understanding of my role as geographical researcher informed the way in which observation and analysis were constructed.

Issues relating to personal safety in the contexts. Each field setting had the potential for personal harm, though in all cases it was quite diffuse. In Sarajevo, there was a proliferation of structurally unsound buildings and mine-littered countryside and steps were taken to avoid these areas. Sarajevo otherwise has been politically and socially stable insofar as physically violence against the public, both foreign and local. Beirut had to some degree of the risk of violent confrontation with Israel igniting again, as well as continued tensions regarding Syrian sympathizers in light of the spate of assassinations in recent years, though the renewal of violent outbreaks was marginal. In addition, Hezbollah and other extremist militias are still present in Beirut, though they tend to not populate the city centre. In all cities, precautions were taken regarding situational awareness.

The discussion of emotionally or political sensitive information in interviews. In interviewing people, there was a minor risk that the subject may have been caused harm or stress in being asked questions related to the conflict. However, I made the subjects aware of the nature of my research prior to the meeting, and also made the point of not directly discussing the conflict but rather referring to the change and development of life and in the city since the war, as well as their impressions of the success of the peace agreement.

The potential for problems relating to language and cultural barriers. An unforeseen but certainly predictable element was the difficulty that arose in procuring interviews. Due to the time-limited nature of the research, acquiring the social capital needed to get a strong line-up of interview candidates was weak. In addition, approaches on cultural level to conducting business and research communication differed greatly in the Sarajevan and Beiruti contexts compared to Belfast. This was worked around by initiating

dialogue with people that were not selected for their expertise on urban issues, but rather by virtue of being local. Conversations were casual and not treated as official research, though the information obtained aided in the analysis of the data.

Emotional involvement in research subject. In analyzing the cases, especially in the post-field work analysis phase, it became increasingly apparent that the photos and narratives of the conflicts studied deeply affected me on an emotional level. While this did not cloud my ability to critically analyze and engage with the data, it did however constantly remind me of the visceral connection these places have with the death, chaos, and destruction of lives and livelihoods that occurred in war. I have become increasingly cognizant of the impact war and conflict and the destruction of place and identity have on the ability for individuals and groups to redefine themselves and move forward to from such trauma.

3.6 Conclusion

In the preceding section, the methodological choices, approaches, concerns, and frameworks utilized were presented as a means of exploring how research into the relationship between post-conflict peacebuilding and the built environment works. In the following section, the empirical and contextual data of the case studies is explored. The next chapter, chapter four, inaugurates the analysis by exploring the historical, social and conflict contexts of Sarajevo, Beirut, and Belfast.

CHAPTER FOUR

Considering Context and Conflict: Sarajevo, Beirut, and Belfast

4.1 Introduction

Not houses finely roofed or the stones of walls well builded [sic],
nay nor canals and dockyards make the city, but men able to use
their opportunity.
-Alcaeus

Chapters one and two explored the theoretical background and underlying argumentation regarding the relationship between peace and the built environment in the post-conflict city. Legitimation was proposed as a theoretical framework that underscores how peacebuilding and urban regeneration are connected. Through this, cities provide the system, structure, and identity-creating context that allows peace and peacebuilding to take hold in the post-conflict city. Looking then at how this process becomes visible and 'operationlized' in the real world, chapter three presented case-study analysis using a variety of data-gathering techniques as a method for understand how this happens.

This chapter analyzes the historic and social context of Sarajevo, Beirut, and Belfast. Looking at cities as places where system, structure, and identity-creation of groups and individuals occurs, it is first vital to understand how and why cities perform this function. Cities are obviously places composed of various physical structures, landscaping, and transportation and are used by people to conduct and organize life. However, the context of how such structure was arrived at, and how the people who conduct their lives within the physical framework define themselves, is ultimately a product of a historical narrative and social context that includes the recent conflict but also a more general history. The larger abstract spheres of social, economic, political, and cultural creation, reproduction, and change are products of a network of events throughout history. In order to analyze the peace agreements that came out of each conflict (the Dayton Accords, the Ta'if Accords, and the Belfast Agreement), their conception and writing must be placed

within the greater socio-political narrative. Additionally, analyzing the present condition of the city and the patterns of urban regeneration as they relate to peacebuilding requires they be placed in a historic and social context.

In the following sections, the history of each city and the conflict that occurred is examined. Sarajevo, Beirut, and Belfast are of course part of a larger national context, and in all three cases, the history of the city's development is bound to the political and social development of the country as a whole. Broader narratives that examine ethnic, political, and economic developments in each place are highlighted as a means of drawing out the evolution of the cities individually. The city's development on both a physical and demographic level is discussed in terms of the political and economic conditions of the time. Generally, the seeds of the conflict are also bound together with the growth and development of the city and the society, and so in explaining the city, the explanation of the conflict naturally follows.

The citations from Alcaeus and Baudelaire above speak of two dynamic forces at work in examining the role of a city's history in creating the identity, and in turn the legitimation, of the processes that govern it. The passage from Alcaeus reminds us that it is the way cities are used, or even 'operationalized', that make the people who live in them who they are. The same could be said for the economic, social, and political forces that stem from those same 'roofs, walls, and canals' he speaks of—in being created, they are in turn creating something else. Scarry (1988) tells us that in creating objects, the objects then recreate us. This is true whether the created object is as profane as a chair or large as a nation-state using a chair as an example (1988, 310). In this same sense, we create the city, but in turn the city recreates us. In light of the research here, as we will come to see, Sarajevo, Beirut, and Belfast shapes the people as much as the people shape(d) it.

In this chapter, the focus is on examining the historic, social, and economic context, as well as the conflict, of each city. It is also about creating a foundation for understanding subsequent discussions on how the conflicts, peace agreements, and the post-conflict period become manifest in the built environment, and how the built environment in turn relates to the way history is interpreted and peace is made visible, then goes on to shape people. Admittedly, each city possesses a 'deep history' (Laibman 2007) that is fascinating and worthy of study in its own right. Here however, the emphasis is on understanding the social events and conditions that have given rise to the conflicts, the peace, and the contemporary society seen today. In each city, there were significant social and economic changes in the 19th and 20th centuries which had a dramatic impact on the conflicts that

developed later. The impacts of these changes are shown through a discussion of the major points around which such shifts occurred. The conflicts themselves, as well as well as analysis of how each city fits into the larger social-economic and political narrative, are discussed in separate sections so as to highlight their importance in pulling through key ideas.

Sections 4.2 through 4.4 discuss the context of each city and conflict. Sections 4.5 through 4.6 offer comparative analysis and concluding remarks.

4.2 Bosnia and Herzegovina to Sarajevo: Situating the City[39]

The Sarajevo area has been continuously inhabited since approximately 2600-2400 BCE[40]. The source of the Bosna River helped to make the area fertile and the surrounding hillsides were a natural fortress. Waves of raiders and varying periods of domination swept through the region leaving traces of cultures and practices on the landscape and the people. During the Ottoman Empire, the city of Sarajevo came into its own and was adopted as the administrative centre for Bosnia by the Turks as it was prized for its resources and strategic location. As a result, Sarajevo developed a thriving urban economy that was based around the presence of the Ottoman administration, reflected in the Baščaršija, the historic central market that survives to this day. Along with metallurgy and other traditional crafts, the Baščaršija also hosted inns, restaurants, as well as the temples and churches that reflected the plurality of religions practiced in the area. The prosperousness of the economy was also aided by its presence along a route that led to Istanbul.

Throughout the medieval Ottoman period up until Austro-Hungarian domination in the late 19th century, the physical nature of the city was relatively unchanged, though part of the Baščaršija had caught fire and the damaged portion was never reconstructed. The housing to the north and south of the city slowly grew outside the original medieval walls that surrounded the central core, but changes to the built environment were done to accommodate shifts in population rather than display dominance or hierarchy. It was the arrival of the Austro-Hungarians that altered the look and feel of Sarajevo, adopting a unique pattern of development that would come to characterize the city. Instead of clearing out older Ottoman structures and street layouts, the Austro-Hungarians instead built around the central core and worked the placement of the newer, classical European-

style architecture into the existing fabric of the city. This has resulted in a layout that preserves and records both periods (Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian) in the built environment.

Socially and culturally, by the end of the Ottoman period in the late 19th century, Bosnia (and Sarajevo) was characterized by a legacy of feudalism and religious and ethnic pluralism, although there was a dominant Muslim class as a result of centuries of preferential treatment under the Ottomans. The decline of the Ottoman Empire meant that European powers were in a race to establish dominance in the region, while ethno-religious and economic tensions in Bosnia were fomenting. Replacing the Ottomans, the Austro-Hungarians administered Bosnia from 1878 until 1918. During this period, several political and social policies regarding ethno-religious identity were implemented in order to manage the growing division caused by ethno-political factioning between Croat, Serb, and Muslim groups. Additionally, the feudal system of land-ownership was continuing to divide Bosnian society into a Serb/Croat peasant class and a Muslim elite land-owning class; Muslims tended to be urban and the Serbs/Croats rural. Despite this, Sarajevo was notable for its ethnic and religious mixing, represented by the multitude of Jewish temples, Islamic mosques, and Orthodox and Roman-Catholic cathedrals throughout the city.

The Austro-Hungarian period also ushered in an era of industrialization and development of new communication and transportation infrastructure. The first railway system was laid and steel mills and other forms of heavy industry were established in the resource-rich Bosnian countryside, leading to the development and increased prosperity of many villages. Urban transportation systems, as well as modernized building techniques, were brought into major cities in Bosnia such as Sarajevo and Banja Luka. Sarajevo boasted the first electric tram line built in Europe, opening in 1885. Generally, the Austro-Hungarians modernized Sarajevo in terms of adding a variety of public utilities as well as contributing to the legacy of civic institutions such as the National Library, National Museum, and the National Theatre.

By 1914, Sarajevo and the surrounding countryside had been dramatically altered with the economic and industrial advancements, though there was also a legacy of ethno-political division borne alongside this. The Serbian community in particular had developed grievances with the Austro-Hungarian administration and had created the Black Hand, an underground military organization whose aim was to unite all Serbs in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This culminated in the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife by Gavrilo Princip in Sarajevo in 1914, sparking World War One (WWI).

Following WWI and the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Bosnia, alongside its neighbours, formed the South Slav Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. It was at this time that the Croat Ustashas, who were also ethnic separatists, emerged and who ultimately served to bring Nazi domination and genocidal tactics to the region. One of the main opponents to the Ustasha aggression was the group of partisans led by Josip Tito, who rallied other Yugoslavs to resist Ustashan and Nazi domination. Having been the leader of the Yugoslav Communist movement since 1939, Tito became the Prime Minister and then President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). The Democratic Republic of Yugoslavia was formed immediately after the end of World War II (later to become the SFRY after a split with Josef Stalin who dominated Eastern Bloc alliances following the war), and Bosnia became one of the six official republics in the Federation, alongside Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia. Tito ruled the Federation from 1945 to 1980, providing a controversial and heavily criticized political legacy. He introduced the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961 through which the term 'third-world' was coined to refer to states who were not party to either side of the Cold War division, thus enabling Yugoslav ability to appeal to both Western and Communist governments throughout the Cold War.

During the post-war years, the Muslim question in Bosnia was a contentious issue for the Yugoslav administration. While Serbs and Croats could officially identify themselves as such on various forms and documents, Muslims could not, as it was a religious identification and not ethnic. This limited the freedom the Muslims were able to exercise within the political system, which was aggravated by the constant ethnic-nationalist tensions present in the subterfuge of Yugoslav politics. Alongside this however were the Land Reforms of 1953 that redistributed land evenly amongst peasants (Dyker 1990, 39; Vogelnik et al. 1974); this virtually erased the legacy of the Muslim land-owning elite. It also meant that the newly-devolved working class in Bosnia would later provide ammunition and manpower for the Bosnian war in the 1990s, as extremist groups were recruited from the countryside. The land reforms represented an important moment in establishing the idealism of socialism in the real world and because of Tito's contentious relationship with Stalin was another method for further defining Yugoslav socialism versus Stalinist communism.

Throughout the lifespan of the SFRY, Bosnia also enjoyed the lion's share of government funding and investment in industry. The increased development in heavy industry and reinvestment in transportation and communication meant that Bosnia housed

a large part of the exportable and manufactured goods. Due to the nature of the organization of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA)[41] throughout the SFRYs existence, Bosnia possessed a high number of small arms and light weapons. These were stockpiled in Sarajevo and other key locations throughout the country and facilitated Serb aggression in 1992. Generally, Bosnia enjoyed a period of intensive industrialization that was followed by a decline into a post-industrial period in the 70s and 80s.

Throughout the Yugoslav era, approaches to urban design and planning in Sarajevo mirrored previous approaches, yet followed a distinctly socialist pattern. Again, instead of demolishing buildings and making all of Sarajevo a testament to socialist architecture, the new apartment tower blocks and other administrative buildings added an additional layer to city, this time continuing to expand westward along the river valley. By the late 1970s, Sarajevo was characterized by the Ottoman medieval core surrounded by a neo-classical Austro-Hungarian layer, and then a long trail of socialist tower blocks and buildings trailing westward. This was augmented once more in the preparation for the 1984 Winter Olympics, a period of building that was to be the last influx of new construction until after the civil war. Dotted throughout the city, several concrete modernist buildings were inserted within and around the central old town, many painted in loud garish colours. By the close of the 20th century and the fall of Yugoslavia, Sarajevo illustrated a syncretized and pluralist culture and history reflected in its concentric growth of architectural styles and the presence of a variety of religious buildings throughout the city.

Sarajevo, and Bosnia, had been part of a highly-developed socialist society. This philosophy towards economic and social organization had a profound effect on the people and the built environment. Weakening currency and global recession in the 1970s made for a lacklustre economy and multiple International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans further exacerbated issues that emerged following Tito's death in 1980. This can be seen in tracing the appearance of the built environment in Sarajevo, as many of its newest buildings can be dated to early 1980s (the Olympic sites) indicating this was the last injection of money into the local economy. The legacy of Titoist socialism also meant that generations of people in Sarajevo had a certain expectation and understanding of what job security meant and what the government was to provide. In the context of Sarajevo, this meant that much of the city was reliant on the central organization of Yugoslavia to provide the bulk of the planning and administration of urban and social affairs.

Yugoslavia's collapse was due to a mixture of local and global events and several key factors contributed to the decline (McNally 1993, 193). One was the position of SFRY as

being non-aligned, which meant it had loans from both sides of Cold War divide and thus was greatly in debt. Second was the structure of the Yugoslav government after Tito's death, though Tito had set up a power-sharing cabinet between the members of the Federation, this weakened the status quo of the Communist Party as well as gave rise to increased nationalistic tendencies. Finally, increased instability in other Communist states signalled a rapid decline within the SFRY. Robinson et al. (2001) articulates this further: 'continuing economic crisis throughout the Federation, the intensifying struggle for power between the republics, and the ultimate loss of legitimacy of the federal state' (962), where loss of legitimacy played an underscored but important role in the dissolution, contributed to the downfall. All of these factors, coupled with poor economic performance in the 1980s culminated in the break-up of Yugoslavia in 1990.

During the war and the siege of Sarajevo, the urban fabric was manipulated and used by all sides for protection. Every single aspect of Sarajevo's built environment was effected—from the tram cars and busses that were overturned and used as barricades against sniper fire, to the majority of the trees that were cut down to supply the population with warmth during the winter. The destruction of several key buildings—the Oslobjenje newspaper office, the Parliament, the UNIS towers, and the Holiday Inn—were the visual focal points representing the chaos and destruction. Homes could not be lit at night as it would make them visible to snipers, it was a luxury to have cooked food, and water was scarce. Seemingly random shelling occurred frequently, evidenced by the still-existing mortar blasts all over the city. The hillsides surrounding the city were peppered with mines so escape on foot was not feasible and the only way out was through a tunnel that lead under the UN-controlled airport runway.

Upon Sarajevo's release from the siege in 1995 and just after the signing of the Dayton Accords, Richard Holbrooke, former US Ambassador who was the lead figure in their negotiation, reported seeing pedestrians on the streets for the first time in months, but in the context of shattered buildings and overturned cars (Holbrooke 1998). The pathway Sarajevo took to recover from the war damage is explored in subsequent chapters.

4.2.1 The Bosnian War (1992-1995)

During the Cold War, there was a saying that Yugoslavia was nation of 'six republics, five nations, four languages, three religions, two alphabets and one party' (Holbrooke 1998, 26). This was accomplished through the strong hand of Tito (West 1996), a balanced system of socio-economic rights and shared sovereignty, and the relative stability of the Cold War standoff[42]. Yugoslavia also played an odd role as both a rogue communist state that partially broke with Moscow and one of the founders of the Third World movement. The death of Tito and the end of the Cold War thus contributed to the start of the Balkan wars, but they are not sufficient in themselves. The economy of Yugoslavia had reached a point of crisis by the late 1980s with recession and post-industrial decline characterizing the situation. Additionally, the Communist Party had become a substitute for class and worked hard to suppress any nationalistic tendencies that arose within the population. This drove such forces underground and as such provided an untapped source of power that was utilized to ill-effect by Slobodan Milosevic. Ultimately, the war was a result of a multitude of factors that led to a breakdown of economic and civil order that reached a critical mass in the early 1990s as various parts of the SFRY began to break away and declare independence following events in Poland in 1989.

Understanding the cause of the conflict means most importantly appreciating that it was not ancient ethnic hatred and tribal blood feud which led to the violence and cannot be reduced to simple summarization. This is not to say that the perception of these didn't play a role— the 'ancient ethnic hatreds' thesis was tempting for a variety of reasons. Warren Christopher, US Secretary of State during the Clinton administration, after touring Bosnia early during the civil war, described the situation as 'an intractable 'problem from hell' that no one can be expected to solve . . . a tribal feud that no outsider could hope to settle' (Woodward 1995, 307). This notion is highly contested by most scholars of Bosnian and Balkan society (Mahmutcehajic 2000; Sokolović and Bieber 2001; Malcolm 1994). Despite Christopher's grim prognostication, in 1995 it was the outsider – NATO – that brought the war to an end[43]. At the core of Christopher's misanalysis was a poor reading of Balkan history.

The rise of Serbian nationalism which first arose in Kosovo, metastasized quickly as minority ethnic groups responded with their own solidarity movements. After Slovenia successfully seceded, Croatia followed but it was not as swift or successful at gaining independence. With the rump state of Yugoslavia now dominated by Milosevic and the

Serbian nationalists (as head of the remainder of the SFRY administration), Bosnian Muslims found themselves in a vulnerable and impotent minority position. As a result, Bosnia declared its independence from Yugoslavia in March 1992 and the Bosnian Serbs, who would have been a minority in the new Bosnia, responded by declaring their independence from Sarajevo, forming the Republika Srpska. What ensued was an escalation of violence on the part of Serbian military leadership, the upper echelons of which initiated the use of ethnic cleansing. The international community ignored the growing evidence of atrocities but as they increased in intensity, so did calls for international action.

In the course of these events, the siege of Sarajevo began almost concurrently with the start of the war. While in reality the build-up to a full entrapment of the city occurred more gradually throughout the spring and summer of 1992, it was evident that Serb and JNA forces had surrounded the city beginning in April. The most aggressive shelling and sniper action was seen in the first year of the siege. Sarajevo was a prime target as the majority Sarajevans were Bosnian Muslim, so when Republika Srpska forces wanted to overturn the Bosnian claim for independence, Sarajevo became the natural target.

The international community was divided between two courses of action, each with simplified historical analogies to serve as the basis of their logic. Talk of mission creep and quagmires were thinly veiled references to Vietnam[44], yet Serbian actions were compared to Nazi aggression with the motto of 'never again' being voiced (Bert 1997, 150, 237). In an effort to make movements towards peace, the UN finally deployed peacekeepers to Bosnia in June 1992 mandated to protect the Sarajevo Airport (UNSCR 758), later to protect aid deliveries (UNSCR 770); and, by 1993, to protect cities declared 'safe areas' (UNSCR 836). These missions were mixed successes and forces were highly limited in their possible scope of action[45]. The largest failure occurred in mid-July 1995 when the Serbian military seized the 'safe area' of Srebrenica, killing an estimated 4,000-7,500 men and expelling the women and children (UN General Assembly 54th session 1999).

The situation degraded, and the spectre of UN withdrawal was threatening to pull in the United States, as President Clinton had pledged American troops would be used to support this (Holbrooke 1998, 67). The fate of the conflict came altered due to policy changes instituted by the June 1995 London Conference at which point the US was assuming the leadership role. NATO was given sole authority to manage any military response to Serb aggression. This, combined with the repositioning of the United Nations

Protection Force (UNPROFOR) so they would not be spread so thin, meant that tactical airstrikes were more viable (Cousens, Kumar, and Wermester 2001, 147; Engelberg 1995). The London Resolution, which had been formed ultimately as a response to the massacre at Srebenica earlier in 1995, has been identified as the turning point in international involvement in Bosnia as it gave NATO commanders full capacity to bomb targets without permission from UN leadership, which in turn enabled the international community greater ability to act decisively (Chollet 2005, 20–21).

In trying to get the belligerents (the Serbs in particular) to the negotiation table, Holbrooke was appointed the lead negotiator in dealing with the leadership of the conflicting parties (Slobodan Milosevic, Serbia; Franjo Tudjman, Croatia; and Alija Izetbegovic, Bosnia). He relied heavily upon diplomacy backed by force. This approach was put to the test on 28 August 1995, when Sarajevo's Markale marketplace was shelled, killing 37 and wounding 90 (Peace Pledge Union 2000). The Serbs were quickly assessed as responsible and NATO began *Operation Deliberate Force* days later (Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik 2004). Holbrooke observed that, 'After all these years of minimal steps, the historic decision to 'hit them hard' had been made suddenly' (Holbrooke 1998, 103). Over the next two weeks, NATO flew 3,515 sorties and dropped 1,026 bombs[46]. During that same time, the long sought breakthrough was achieved. The bombing campaign had the desired coercive effects. This would give rise to the Dayton peace process.

Holbrooke and his team soon emerged triumphant: military airpower employed to leverage diplomacy convinced the Serbs to sign the negotiations and terminate all offensive operations, including lifting of the siege of Sarajevo. The events that made up the peace process and the drafting of the Dayton Accords are discussed further in the following chapter.

4.3 Lebanon to Beirut: Situating the City[47]

Beirut as a settlement has continuously existed for thousands of years. Along with the other cities of Sidon and Tyre, Beirut has maintained dominance in the region since Phoenician times. Numerous battles and natural disasters have meant the record of the built environment of the city is buried in layers beneath the modern city. Beirut was important during the Roman period (illustrated by the presence of the law school that was destroyed, along with much of the city, in an earthquake in 551 CE), though it declined in

prominence during successive empires. Throughout Byzantine, Arab, Mamluk, and Ottoman rule, the city was changed to suit the purposes and needs of the powers that be. Many references to these periods have been lost in the built environment, although today every time a new building project is started, archaeological sites are invariably unearthed.

Lebanon was historically part of Syria up until independence in 1943 and is often referred to as 'Mount Lebanon' or the Levant. Several key moments in its various phases of domination are important in defining Beirut today: these are the establishment of the Maronite Christians during the Byzantine era and the introduction of Islam under Arab rule in the 7th century CE, which would fragment into the Shia and Sunni groups, as well as give rise to the Druze. All groups, in addition to the presence of the Jewish community, would be instrumental in shaping modern Lebanon, aided in no small part by the legacy of Ottoman administration which recognized and made room for non-Muslim political and ethnic groups to be recognized in the public sphere and possess the right to participate in civic life.

The Ottoman Empire's grip on its territory generally began to weaken in the mid-19th century. In Lebanon, this was signalled by dissention among the various ethno-religious groups as well as the eventual decay of the feudal system of land-ownership, aided by the lending of money from wealthy urbanites (mainly Beiruti) to peasants, the effect of which was a strengthening of interdependence between the urban and rural. Historically, the Druze had been the favoured party in region, with Maronite Christians typically populating the peasant class. However, the rise of the Maronites as power-brokers in Lebanese politics and society threatened the power position of the Druze; foreign interests were also complicating the mix, as France supported the Maronites and Britain the Druze. This culminated in a massacre in 1860 wherein nearly 10,000 Maronites were killed as well as Greek Orthodox and Catholics by the Druze.

As a result of WWI, the League of Nations partitioned the Ottoman Empire, with modern Iraq going to Britain and Syria (with Lebanon) to France as a result of the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, beginning the period of the French Mandate, and the genesis of Lebanon's modern role as the intersection between Middle Eastern and European culture. On September 1, 1920, the French officially declared the borders of Lebanon and made Beirut its capital. Imparting a tradition of a unicameral parliament consisting of a Chamber of Deputies and a Council of Ministers, the first Lebanese constitution was signed in 1926. After the first census in 1932 it was decided that the heads of the government should represent the main religious constituents of Lebanon, guaranteeing that the president was

to be a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim, and the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies a Shia Muslim. The government functioned and grew until the outbreak of World War II.

By 1941, the Vichy government was in control of Syria. In July, Free French and British troops invaded in the Syria-Lebanon Campaign with the intention of taking the territory from the Vichy. The Vichy forces were unable to hold them off which ultimately led to the Acre armistice. Upon General Charles Degaull's visit, talks of Lebanon gaining independence were initiated. In 1943, a new Lebanese government was elected which abolished the articles in the constitution that permitted the French Mandate. The French government responded by arresting the new leaders and imprisoning them in the Castle of Rashayya, causing much upset in Beirut. Under pressure from Britain, the US, and other Arab nations, the French finally released the prisoners on November 22, 1943, effectively admitting defeat; this is now the Lebanese Independence Day. In an effort to enshrine confessional cooperation in the administration of the political sphere, the National Pact was written laying down four principals that religious relations in Lebanon in the public sphere must adhere to. Each part of the pact mediated the needs and tensions of both Muslim and Christian groups, and called upon them to balance faith with tolerance (see box 4-1 below). This would represent both the glue and the solvent of Lebanese society later in the century.

Box 4-1 The 1943 Lebanese National Pact: A Summary

The National Pact laid down four principles. First, Lebanon was to be a completely independent state. The Christian communities were to cease identifying with the West; in return, the Muslim communities were to protect the independence of Lebanon and prevent its merger with any Arab state. Second, although Lebanon is an Arab country with Arabic as its official language, it could not cut off its spiritual and intellectual ties with the West, which had helped it attain such a notable degree of progress. Third, Lebanon, as a member of the family of Arab states, should cooperate with the other Arab states, and in case of conflict among them, it should not side with one state against another. Fourth, public offices should be distributed proportionally among the recognized religious groups, but in technical positions preference should be given to competence without regard to confessional considerations. Moreover, the three top government positions should be distributed as follows: the president of the republic should be a Maronite; the prime minister, a Sunni Muslim; and the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, a Shia Muslim. The ratio of deputies was to be six Christians to five Muslims.

From the beginning, the balance provided for in the National Pact was fragile. Many observers believed that any serious internal or external pressure might threaten the stability of the Lebanese political system, as was to happen in 1975 (Rolland 2003, 47).

When the newly independent Lebanese state was formed, the built environment of Beirut reflected the late Ottoman and French Mandate periods, seen mostly in the architectural heritage of private houses and governmental offices (Saliba 2000). Some of the medieval heritage of the city survived the reworking of the roads during the French Mandate though most of the medieval city structure was lost during gradual rebuilding campaigns by the French. According to Saliba (2000), it was typical at the time for French colonial planning in North Africa to build around medieval town centres, but this convention was overruled in Beirut. The result was a dramatically re-imagined city that espoused more modern city-layout conventions, a tactic typical of colonial city re-design. Wright argues likewise: 'The process of conceiving and implementing plans for colonial cities reveals European notions about how a good environment—including their own—should look and function. This projected ideal has been a dominant aspect of colonial urbanism throughout history' (Wright 1991, 1–2).

Modern Lebanon was not only shaped by the historical events recounted here, but also by the movement of peoples and the existence of class-mobility in later Ottoman, French, and Lebanese society. At the end of the 19th century many peasants emigrated from Lebanon to North America for economic reasons. Khater (2001) argues that while research on Lebanese migration experiences is common, the story of those who returned and the impact they had on Lebanese society is overlooked. He sees the return of migrants as an important part in growing the Lebanese middle-class, aiding in the reformation of what had been a feudal society only decades before, and in the creation of what 'modernity' would look like in Lebanon.

Today, as well as at the turn of the 19th century, the Lebanese diaspora[48] is an important driver in maintaining the Lebanese economy and keeping capital in the hands of the local population. It is estimated that nearly a fifth of the Lebanese economy in 2008 was produced by remittances from family members living abroad and sending money back[49]. The legacy of remittances is entrenched in Lebanon and it is important to see the value that the money has had is not limited to spending capacity; its source also shapes the habits and predilections of those who use it. In terms of the transition from a feudal and hierarchical social and economic system to a class-based capitalist society, the autonomy offered by in- and out-fluxes of the population cannot be ignored.

The development of the new middle-class that Khuri (2001) speaks of is underscored by Lebanese industry and economic production. At the end of the 19th century, Lebanon, and especially Beirut was home to growing merchant class whose

business was trade of foreign and local goods. Lebanon was famous for its silk production, and the production of the textile was vital to the economy (Gates 1998). When the trade began to slacken, it had an immediate effect on the peasant class, typically Maronite who tended to work the factories, in the form of mass migration out of the country. As Lebanon adapted to changing economic structures, it began to increasingly play the role of intermediary between the Middle East and Europe in terms of commercial industries. Banking and finance would eventually take the helm as the major focus of business.

Class structure as it relates to religion and economics is vital to capturing Lebanese group identity as well as state identity by the time of the civil war. Liberalizing structures of governance from the French mandate period (and after independence) combined with the accrual of wealth, the ability for formerly impoverished groups to concentrate capital because of migration, and increasing urban-rural interdependence, hastened the transition to the modern Lebanese state. Class in Lebanon as it has developed in the modern-day context is illustrative of its religiously heterogeneous population that has co-existed for hundreds of years as a result of centuries of rule that enshrined such pluralistic values in civil society (Arabic and Ottoman). According to Khuri (1969) 'family and sect interests, not class interests, dictate the course of political rivalry' (1969, 29) and while Christians tend(ed) to be wealthier than Muslims, and rural populations poorer than urban ones in Lebanese society, there exists a more complex stratification within groups themselves. Khuri suggests that 'where ethnic-religious and rural-urban differences produce class, they do so only in conjunction with differences in income, occupation, education and social power' (*ibid*), meaning that there is further social stratification beyond the confines of what is typically considered 'class'. Class in this instance illustrates a phenomenon that is beyond the purely economic and is expressive of the legacy of pluralism and heterogeneity in the Lebanese region for centuries.

Branded as the 'Paris of the Middle East', Beirut was famed for its artistic and intellectual scene, as well as its distinct version of Western cosmopolitanism through the 1950s to the early 70s. Wealthy Arabs from around the Middle East as well as Westerners could comfortably meet and do business in the city. This era is often called the 'golden age' of Beirut. The city offered opulent hotels and a place where sophisticated lifestyles could be bought, displayed, and admired: a liminal zone for both cultures, where the other could be experienced. Stewart (1996) describes Lebanon as possessing 'cultural and economic vigour' and adds that 'low inflation, high levels of economic growth, and a large balance-of-payments surplus, made it one of the region's strongest nations' (1996, 489). While there

was a new middle-class growing out of the finance sector, there was also a growing service and hospitality industry that aided in developing the social mobility of Beirutis and Lebanese. However, financial and consumer power was still maintained by a small portion of the population, while many still lived in working class conditions, often quite impoverished in the urban context.

Throughout the existence of Lebanon as an independent state and up to the civil war, two main areas were becoming increasingly problematic and potentially harmful. One was the rise of political parties based on confessional affiliation which became increasingly vocal in the public sphere. In 1958 fighting broke out between Christian and Muslim groups presaging future violence. The other issue was that of Syria. As Lebanon had historically been part of greater Syria for many hundreds of years, Damascus did not recognize France's division of Lebanon from Syria in 1920, nor did it recognize Lebanon's independence. This led to Syria being a manipulative and ominous force on the border of Lebanon, and future events would be muddied by their presence.

In the intervening years between independence and the civil war, built environment alterations were reflected in gradual modernizing of residential housing and public space. Interspersed with Ottoman and French Mandate era architecture, the mid-rise apartment building came to dominate the urban landscape outside the city centre high rise developments. Features such as street furniture, paving and tiling of sidewalks, and use of concrete reflect the modernist aesthetic of the 1960s and early 1970s. The density of Beirut also grew as apartment blocks allowed for a population increase. The city also grew to reflect the dominance of the financial sector with an increase in high-rise buildings dedicated to trade and commerce. The majority of these buildings were based around the Minet el Hosn area of the city, just adjacent to the historic city centre.

The civil war had a devastating effect on the city: 'It looks like Beirut' is a catch-phrase used to describe any environment that exhibits chaos and destruction[50]. Beirut was at the heart of the fighting with most of it located in the city centre around Martyr's Square (Stewart 1996). During the war, the coastline north of the central district was used as a dumping ground for the city's refuse and had become and environmental hazard. Most of the city's infrastructure, such as telecommunications, water, and other utilities, were in a state of disrepair following the war. While neighbourhoods throughout the city remained intact, the impact of the lost city centre and minimally functional infrastructure was felt by all who lived in the city[51].

4.3.1 The Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990)

The civil war in Beirut was lengthy (fifteen years) and intensely damaging. According to Barak, '144,240 people died during the war, 197,506 were wounded, and 17,415 disappeared. In addition, hundreds of thousands were displaced, and a third of the population emigrated' (Barak 2007, 52). It almost goes without saying that causes and sustenance of the war were complex and interdependent, and that it defies simple explanation. The war did not start in a vacuum—the lead up to it is deeply entrenched in the modern Lebanese state and the patterns of economic, social, and political development that had formed. The previous discussion of history illustrates some degree of what was happening in Lebanon prior to the war that influenced its genesis, and the following section explores some of the major periods of the war and what they meant to the outcome of the conflict.

The civil war lasted from 1975 to 1990 and is commonly divided into phases. Simplifying Wenger and Denney's (1990) detailed timeline in conjunction with Kalyvas's phases (2005, 97), this dissertation has broken down the war into four major periods[52].

4.3.1.1 First Phase: Roots of Conflict

DeRouen and Heo (2007) see the war as a resumption of a previous conflict in 1958, while others regard its development a result of fractious ethno-religious political parties throughout the 1950s and 60s. Though the war 'officially' started in April 1975 within the span of one day, when a Christian church was fired on by unidentified gunmen and in retaliation a group of Phalangists ambushed and shot a bus of Palestinians, the actions were the result of mounting tensions within Lebanese society. Writing in 1968, Khalaf displayed prescience of the issues at hand:

> 'By the admission of many dispassionate observers—indigenous and foreign alike—the political system in Lebanon stands as a curious but happy phenomenon. A pluralistic confessional society, it enjoys a parliamentary system of government with a freely elected Chamber of Deputies. Outwardly the country appears to be bolstered liberal and democratic traditions, yet Lebanon hardly possess any of the political

> instruments of a civil polity. A National Pact, a sort of Christian-Moslem [sic] entente, sustains its so-called national entity—*al-kayan*, yet this sense of identity is neither national nor civic. Its politicians, masterminds at the art of flexibility and compromise, are local *za'ims* not national heroes. The few parties that do exist are so closely identified with sectarian groups and so unconcerned with a larger national identity that they can easily engender political disintegration. Likewise, its political blocs and fronts are so absorbed with parochial and personal rivalries that they fail to serve the larger national purpose of mobilizing the population for the broader aims of society. Politicians and pressure groups alike have not been able to transcend their petty personal feuds to grapple effectively with the public issues of the country' (Khalaf 1968, 243).

Khalaf's rendering of the deepening socio-political crisis in the late 1960s speaks to fact that there was already an unsettling awareness amongst many Lebanese that war might be inevitable. Despite this, it was unpreventable perhaps because the causes discussed above had already gained a momentum of their own. In addition, Nasr (1978) highlighted as well the important but subverted role the development of capitalism and a liberalizing economy had on the manifest social crisis in deepening divisions between Christian and Muslim groups.

The first phase of the war lasted from 1975-1976 and involved heavy fighting. It is often called 'the war of the hotels' as the majority of the fighting was conducted within and between several hotels that had been taken over by the opposing forces in Minet el Hosn district. The crisis was exacerbated by the presence of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) bases and headquarters in Beirut and in southern Lebanon, in addition to a large Palestinian refugee population living in the southern reaches of the city. This situation undermined the sovereignty of the Lebanese government, exacerbated tensions between Christians and Muslims, and led to Israeli involvement (Rabinovich 1985, 42). The violence of this first phase was primarily between the Christian Phalange and Muslim militias and there was a series of large massacres. Fighting was eventually brought to an end by a pro-Christian Syrian intervention, though this would serve to further complicate matters. By 1977, Beirut had been divided along the 'green line' running from the harbour through Martyr's Square and then south, a demarcation that would balkanize the city into Christian (west) and Muslim (east) territories.

4.3.1.2 Second Phase: Escalation and Invasion

The ensuing phase of the war lasted from 1977-1982 and consisted of lower intensity fighting between militias. The number of militias and political parties and movements increased as did the subterfuge created by Syrian, Israeli, and Palestinian interests. The mounting instability brought increased international attention to the matter. In a bid to realign themselves with Palestine and oppose the Israeli presence, Syria had to do an about face of its support of the Christian militias given during the first phase of the war. Due to aggression from Palestinians living in southern Lebanon against Israel, they too attacked Palestinians living there and in Beirut. In retaliation, Syria continued to supply and support Palestinian interests in Lebanon.

In 1978, United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFL) was established to help provide peacekeeping after Israeli attacks in southern Lebanon; UNIFIL forces have remained in place to this day. Despite the UN presence, fighting continued to slowly escalate, and on July 17, 1981 Israeli jets bombed suspected PLO headquarters in Beirut, injuring 800 and killing 300 (Journal of Palestine Studies 1981, 225). As a result, UN Security Council Resolution 490 was passed three days later calling for Israel to cease in its attacks of Lebanon. The PLO reportedly attacked Israeli settlements during the ceasefire, which aggravated Israel, though the cease-fire held for several months. It wasn't until 1982 that activity began to escalate again.

This phase of the war was characterized by uneasy and shifting international alliances, which in the end would come to define part of the intractability of the conflict. Lebanon's neighbours increasingly saw it and its capital city as the focal point for working out their grievances and rivalries, and the marginalized ethno-political groups within Lebanon harnessed the support of external actors for their causes. Both Christian and Muslim militias found they could finance their efforts by using outside sources, which in turn made conflict more persistent.

4.3.1.3 Third Phase: Exacerbated and Sustained Conflict

In this phase, lasting from 1982-1985, the main parties in conflict—Israel, Syria, the PLO, and the Christian militias—would further increase hostilities. The ceasefire established by Resolution 490 would rapidly disintegrate due to a reactive sequence of events: on June

3, 1982 Ariel Sharon called for an attack on PLO bases in Beirut; in retaliation, two days later the PLO attacked Israel from Lebanon. As a result, the UN Security Council Resolution 508 was passed on June 6, calling for an immediate cessation of all hostilities. However, Israeli forces maintained their presence in Lebanon and aggression between the PLO and Israeli continued. One day later, when the fighting had not ceased, UN Security Council Resolution 509 reiterated the immediate call for ceasefire.

During the period of fighting in 1982, Beirut was severely damaged and laid siege to for 68 days. The United States sent Marines in to intervene, who, along with French, British, and Italian forces, ended the siege. The unsettling and infamous Shatila and Sabra massacres occurred in September 1982, instigated by the Christian Kataeb party. It is estimated that roughly 3500 Palestinian refugees living in the two camps on the southern outskirts of Beirut were murdered in only two days. The event caused global outrage with calls once again to stabilize Lebanon. In 1983, the remaining Lebanese troops defected to militia-allegiance, the Marine barracks housing US and French soldiers were bombed, and Hezbollah was formed. This created a highly volatile situation that resulted in continued sectarian violence and assassinations.

Like the previous phase, international attention was present, though international public attention was waning as well. The massacres at the refugee camps and the barracks' bombings prompted renewed interest in the matter, as did the long-standing Lebanese hostage crisis that began in 1982, adding a new level of coercive force to the matter. While these made the situation on the ground more urgent, it also continued to prevent any attempt at peace negotiations.

4.3.1.4 Fourth Phase: Civil Strife to Peace

The internecine violence continued from 1985 up through, and even beyond, the ending of the war through the Ta'if Accords in 1989. This period is affiliated mostly with the 'War of the Camps' that ensued between Muslim factions in Lebanon and the rise to prominence of General Michel Aoun. The wars of the camps all but destroyed the refugee camps of Sabra, Shatila, and Bourj al-Barajneh within one year (1985-1986). In 1987, there was a violent flare-up in violence between Hezbollah and Amal with fighting taking place mainly on the streets of Beirut.

Later in 1987, General Aoun claimed the position of Prime Minister based on the National Pact of 1943. As he was a Maronite, his claim to leadership was not acceptable by

the militant Muslim groups, and they established their own Prime Minister, Selim al-Hoss. This essentially divided Lebanon into two halves. General Aoun proceeded with a campaign to drive away Syrian and Syrian-backed forces from Lebanon in a 'war of liberation' from 1989 to 1990. This caused considerable damage to Beirut.

In the midst of Aoun's campaign, the Ta'if Agreement was created in 1989. While fighting continued after its approval, in 1991 hostilities finally ceased as Aoun was ousted from power. It is generally agreed that the Lebanese were war weary, and even militia leaders were willing to leave behind their legacy of violent leadership (in exchange for other forms) (Kisirwani 1997; Schmid). The Agreement was able to be fully enforced and voted into power by the last Lebanese Parliament that had been voted into power in 1973. The creation and drafting of the Agreement, as well as its implementation, is covered in the following chapter.

4.4 Ireland to Belfast: Situating the City[53]

Ireland was an isolated enclave on the margins of the European continent for millennia, and as such, has a vast history of relative stability. Celtic and Gaelic migrants from the mainland crossed over a land bridge during the end of the last ice age, giving rise to the inhabitants and culture present when Roman missionaries set foot on the shores of Hibernia (as it was known then) 10,000 years later. The provinces of Ireland (Connacht, Leinster, Munster, Meath, and Ulster), still present today, are an ancient artefact of tribal territorialization that characterized the human and political landscape of the island for centuries. The leadership of these provinces waged territorial battles amongst themselves, aiding in the eventual colonization by the Normans and English.

The history of Northern Ireland as an entity which can be considered distinct from Ireland as a whole, can be traced to the rise of English involvement in Irish affairs beginning during the reign of Henry VIII. In a bid to expand English territory, he instigated a campaign of colonization of the island and its peoples which never was fully accomplished in his lifetime. When Elizabeth I was in power, she was able to further her father's plan by creating what are known as the Ulster Plantations (in the province of Ulster), beginning early in the 17th century. This policy is cited as the root of animosity between the traditionally Catholic Irish and Protestant English (Cunningham 1998).

The Plantations saw a period of great blood-shed and also growing political, ethnic, and religious discrimination of the Catholic Irish, as well as other religious groups not part of the Protestant mainstream. As a result, the Irish were often justifiably rebellious, and both sides were ticking up grievances against the other. By the mid-17th century, the unrest in Ireland piqued the interest of William Cromwell who in a brief four-year period subjugated the Irish dissidents. The actions of Cromwell, whether real, perceived, or somewhere in between, have been the rallying cry of both sides of the sectarian divide (Siochrú 2008). He is hailed by Unionists and demonized by Republicans as Cromwell effectively killed or exiled a third of the Irish population by the end of his campaign (1653), thus sealing his fate as both the reviled and the revered.

Belfast began to come into its own during the Plantation period (beginning in the 17th century). During this time, Sir Arthur Chichester was granted ownership of the castle that stood on the hills surrounding the flat sandy ford (this is now Belfast Castle located on the hillsides and the sandy ford is where central Belfast is located), and an organized town began to grow as a result of its presence. Throughout this time, Belfast was slowly increasing in its importance as wool, hides, grain, butter, and salted beef were exported (Jones 1960). This developed a thriving merchant class who were responsible for electing leadership. The merchants were Scottish and English Protestants. French Huguenots, escaping persecution in France, brought their knowledge of linen weaving to the area which would become instrumental in the city's industrial development. The city itself was still dominated by the River Farset. Along its banks merchant housing developed and small industrial sites were built as the flow of the water provided the energy needed to run machinery as well as provide fresh water. Irish antagonism grew during the 18th century; the growing merchant, middle class in Belfast was dominated almost entirely by Protestant figures, whilst the Irish Catholics laboured in agriculture and less industry related professions.

During this time, the Industrial Revolution would inexorably shape the future of England and Ireland. In Belfast, this meant the city's role as a centre of industry and production for Ulster would quickly heighten. It also meant a shift from the typical land-owner/peasant (land worker) dichotomy. Anglo Protestants and Irish Catholics began living in much closer quarters in Belfast, as the Irish would take on the role of factory workers and provide other service oriented work aiding the in the daily life of the wealthier members of urban society. The main industries that developed during this time were linen production, hemp and rope production, tobacco manufacturing, and of course, ship

building, the most important industry in the city. Each industry was dominated more or less by either Irish or Anglo workers at various levels, with the majority of upper-management positions being held by Protestants. The ship-building industry in particular employed a large Protestant work force due to the facility's proximity to Protestant East Belfast. At the turn of the 20th century, Belfast had the largest population and was the most important commercial centre of all of Ireland. This is also when the city itself gained most of its (now) historic character, in the form of Victorian architecture and design. The city also expanded to house the factory employees in numerous terraced row-houses. Meanwhile, the wealthier strata of Belfast society also built stately homes to match the increased wealth, mainly in the southern part of the city.

Concurrent to this, there was growing discontent amongst both the Irish and Anglo-Irish regarding political authority in Ulster. Members of the Irish Catholic community rallied for greater political representation and some Protestant members of society desired home rule, or in other words, governmental authority from within Ulster yet under the aegis of the British monarchy (Darby 1995). Groups continued to splinter over desire for home rule or independence. Some groups wanted all of Ireland independent, and others saw the separation of Ulster from Ireland as being a feasible option to keep some level of home rule. There were several incarnations at introducing home rule legislation in Westminster, with the last attempt in 1898 instigating the most divisiveness and further separating the already emerging Irish Catholic agrarian/working class population and an elite, Protestant, Anglo-Irish population in the north east. It was this attempt at home rule that led to the division of society into Irish Loyalist and Irish Nationalists, as well as the creation of the Orange Order.

During WWI, tensions in Ireland culminated with the 1916 Easter Rising in which Irish separatists used violence to protest against the British government. The subsequent execution of the leaders of the Rising served to bring more attention to the matter and bolstered support from within the Irish community for Sinn Fein (the predominant Republican political party in both Ireland and Northern Ireland) and well as strengthen the Irish Volunteer Army, the group who was responsible for uprising, and who would later become the Irish Republican Army (IRA).

The partitioning of Ireland as a result of the Anglo-Irish Treaty in 1921 drew the official borderline between British territory in the north and the Republic of Ireland in the south. This period of time was marked by great sectarian conflict in Belfast, though other parts of Ireland were engaged in a civil war (between pro- and anti-treaty groups). Within

Northern Ireland, much of the Catholic community continued to be desirous of union with the Republic of Ireland, while the Protestant community was generally satisfied with the division. This meant that Belfast became increasingly divided as a result, with sectors of the city dominated by one religiously-affiliated community or another. Belfast became the administrative centre of the new Northern Ireland, matching its economic production with political importance. The new government in Stormont was dominated from the start by Unionists, which is linked directly to the worsening conditions of the urban Irish Catholic population in Belfast (Gallagher and O'Connell 1983). The Great Depression slowed the city's bustling economy, and subsequent targeting by German Luftwaffe bombers during World War II ('Belfast Blitz'), which destroyed over half of the housing stock of the city. This stoked already existing sectarian tensions, adding the additional grievance of economic and built environment destruction (Barton 1990).

At the heart of the conflict were differing visions of what the identity of Ireland and later Northern Ireland should be. On the one side, there were those who wanted all of Ireland to be united and independent. On the other side were those who held that either England rule all of Ireland or at the very least retain the Ulster province in order to 'protect' the Protestant population there. In addition, the Anglo-Irish, or English-born who were raised in Ireland, came to see Ireland as their home, and in turn desired to form a more autonomous region while still maintaining relations with the monarchy. The above desires fuelled a debate within Irish society that exists to this day and is also an underlying cause for 20th century tensions. The monarchy resisted the idea of self-rule, due in part to the rebelliousness of the Irish. The fact that this rebellion was justified was of course not recognized. Thus, a cycle of oppression and rebellion began; the Irish lacked power and so rebelled and the British faced rebellion and so tightened their grip on power through structural and direct violence. In its more recent manifestation, this would be a cycle of IRA militia activity and British Emergency Provisions (Donohue 2000). Throughout this time (from the 17th century to the Troubles) cultural violence on both sides became entrenched.

4.4.1 The Troubles (1968-1998)

The following analysis of the Troubles is based on the Conflict and Politics in Northern Ireland website (CAIN) run through the University of Ulster and is modelled after their chronology of events. As the Troubles elapsed over thirty years, the timeline of events

is long. Below, the key turning points in the conflict are covered in detail, while broad descriptions of other events are grouped together.

The violence associated with the Troubles is generally seen as having been borne out of the civil rights movement in the late 1960s (Bew and Gillespie 1999). In October 1968, Catholics in Derry marched for equality, better housing, and fairer access to jobs and services, and were eventually met by Protestant violence with events escalating to involve the police, who apparently sided with the Protestants, many of whom by this point had become rioters[54]. The riots gained in intensity throughout 1969 until British troops arrived, bringing a momentary lull. The army was at first welcomed by all sides and was seen as a potentially neutral entity. However, the violence had already militated elements of the Irish Catholic community and led to the resurgence of the IRA[55]. By the end of 1970, the sectarian riots had given way primarily to violence between the Provisional IRA (PIRA) and the army, with occasional violence by loyalist paramilitaries (Darby 1995)[56].

From 1971-1975, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and the British Army, following the directives of Stormont, instigated a period called 'internment' (otherwise known as 'Operation Demetrius') where any person suspected of membership to an illegal paramilitary organization could be arrested and imprisoned without an investigation. The Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) called on people to protest the policy with civil disobedience and a 'rent and rates strike' by those who lived in public sector housing (Melaugh 2011). Of their many demonstrations, the march held on January 30, 1972 in Derry is most well-known. Known as 'Bloody Sunday', the event resulted in thirteen persons being shot and killed in the span of thirty minutes by the members of the British Army. According to BBC NI political editor Mark Devenport commenting on the 2010 release of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry (Saville, Hoyt, and Toohey 2010) while it may not have been the bloodiest day in the history of the Troubles, 'the significance of that day in shaping the course of the conflict cannot be overstated', the result being that sympathy towards the Republican cause grew, with increased numbers joining the paramilitary ranks: 'the actions of the Parachute Regiment in shooting dead 13 unarmed civil rights protesters immeasurably strengthened Irish republicans' arguments within their own community and provided the Provisional IRA with a flood of fresh recruits for its long war,' he said[57].

In response to the continuing escalation of tensions, on 30 March 1972 the British government imposed a temporary period of direct rule—rule from Westminster—of Northern Ireland until a degree of stability was regained. This would 'temporarily' be in place until 1999 when the Good Friday Agreement would go into effect. After this,

paramilitary violence would dramatically increase. Bloody Friday was one such incident in 1972 where 22 PIRA bombs were detonated within minutes of each other in Belfast city centre causing wide-spread damage; this was generally condemned swaying public opinion of the group to the negative. This signified the beginning of a long reign of terror tactics aimed not only at Northern Irish communities, but also British and Irish in the Republic.

An attempt to broker peace through a power-sharing arrangement was held in late 1973: the Sunningdale Agreement. For five months elected parties from within Northern Ireland met to discuss issues concerning the administration of Northern Ireland. However it was finally dismantled due to dissention caused by the Ulster Workers Strike Council who opposed the presence of Nationalists on the council created by the agreement.

After the break-down of the Sunningdale Agreement, the next turning point in the Troubles is the Hunger Strike that took place in 1981. A hunger strike had occurred the previous year but had ended with demands being agreed to. However, by early 1981, they had not been honoured and at Maze Prison, a group of incarcerated Nationalist men, led by in-house IRA leader Bobby Sands, rejected all food until the previously agreed-to demands were met. As a result, international attention to the Troubles as well as the Nationalist cause increased. Membership to Sinn Fein increased making it a mainstream political party as well as increased its affiliation with the IRA. In the end, Bobby Sands, as well as the ten others who joined, died as a result of starvation, with Thatcher never giving in to the demands. The result, however, was a groundswell of sympathy for the cause and an increasingly muddy situation politically.

In 1985, the Anglo-Irish Agreement attempted to end the conflict. While it was ultimately unsuccessful, it was notable for opening up channels of communication between the British and Irish governments. This attempt to bring peace was thwarted by the refusal of Unionist leaders to permit the Republic of Ireland to have any say in the governance of Northern Ireland; likewise, Republicans saw the non-withdrawal of British troops entirely from Northern Ireland as non-negotiable. In the end, the Agreement saw that the only way Northern Ireland would even come close to ending the conflict would be through a public vote on home rule, thereby creating a separate government, with the added possibility that further elections for a united Ireland could result if desired. Though the terms on offer were not suitable at the time, it would provide lessons learned for the peace process to occur in the late 1990s.

From this time until the peace talks began in 1996, there were three levels of the conflict operating: one was the activity of the paramilitaries on both sides as they

continued their coercive and violent tactics; the second was on a political level, where parties in Northern Ireland would attempt to dialogue over matters; and the third was the international, where Irish and British governments both attempted to steer an objective course between the Northern Irish Catholic disempowerment and Protestant fears. In all three cases, the community of Northern Ireland bore the brunt of the political stalemates that defined relations during this time. Violence continued, and Belfast (as other places in Northern Ireland) continued to degrade as segregation and no-go areas of the city became entrenched in its geography. The legacy of the Troubles into the 1990s, and up until the referendum approving the Belfast Agreement in 1999, constituted varying levels of paramilitary violence and political manoeuvring, but also increasing support and investment from private sources that aided in the eventual transition to 'post-conflict'. These events are covered in greater detail in the following chapter.

Two major legacies impacted the built environment as well as people's relation to it throughout the Troubles. The first was the impact of bombings and other similar tactics. According to Sutton, 3,529 people were killed as a result of violence during the Troubles[58] with over two-thirds being civilian. There are over 16,000 recorded bombings attempts, both diffused and exploded[59]. Bombings were a major part of maintaining tension within communities and attempting to coerce governmental bodies to act in a certain way. In general terms, the Irish Catholic community as well as world public opinion was at first sympathetic to the cause of the Nationalists, but as terror incidents increased that were connected to paramilitaries, it declined. Nationalist paramilitaries were often the instigators of the bombings, though Unionist (Protestant) paramilitaries, such as the Red Hand, were responsible for nearly 30%[60]. In addition to the paramilitaries, the RUC and the B Specials also contributed to the violence. In the end, the damage to property and to the victims, as well as the communities, as a result of decades of guerrilla-style tactics and state violence is one of the overarching legacies of the Troubles.

In the context of increased bombings and the splintering of paramilitary organizations, there were several attempts at cease-fires. However these were difficult to maintain as the PIRA was decreasingly responsible for the bombings, which were being undertaken hard-line splinter groups such as the Real IRA (RIRA). Throughout the conflict, seven cease-fires were announced at various times, and were oft broken as a result of violence from minority factions on both sides. By the end of the Troubles, the bombing at Omagh by the RIRA in 1998 was the final straw that finalized the peace process.

The second enduring legacy of the conflict, one which was implemented almost as soon as the Troubles began and that remains up until this day, are the 'peace lines'. Constructed of concrete and metal fencing, the first one was constructed in 1969; over the years, more went up, and ironically have kept going up even after the Good Friday Agreement (Pogatchnik 2008). The peace lines in Belfast (and other Northern Irish towns) have also been a silent participant of the Troubles and represent the extent to which the conflict, and the peace, has been a balancing act of perceived safety and threat in a climate where one's enemies live literally a stone's throw away. The peace lines have helped people feel safer, but also have entrenched certain ideologies and values. In terms of the built environment in Belfast, the existence of the peace lines are an issue of the built environment but also imbued with political and psychological meaning. Dealing with the peace walls is an uncomfortable fact that underscores the post-conflict context, perhaps more than it even did during the conflict itself. The peace walls mean that throughout the city, space belongs to either one side of the conflict or the other, making areas such as the city centre one of the few locations where space is not politicized and could be potentially be shared.

4.5 Analysis: Comparing and Contrasting Historical Narratives

Contrasting and comparing the above histories serves to pull out the greater elements common to all three places, while at the same time highlighting how they are different in detail. In doing so, preparation for further analysis and comparison of the peace processes and ensuing urban regeneration is placed firmly within a critically appraised historic and social narrative.

Ophir argues through an analysis of Plato's *Republic* that civic space is created by man who is 'not self-sufficient but in need of much' (Plato in Ophir 1991). In turn, this need necessitates the development of the city, and from within its walls, or the city limits today, the further articulation of economic exchange, such as that found in mercantile classes (in Plato's time). These merchants, travelling to other cities and exchanging ideas added to the complexity of invisible opportunity in the city by aiding in the transfer and transport of knowledge (Ophir 1991). These invisible ideas are what have created the texture and nuance of socio-economic history.

4.5.1 Historical Legacies and National Character

One of the more obvious similar attributes of Sarajevo and Beirut are their time under auspices of the Ottoman Empire and subsequent administration by Western European powers before developing into the capitals of sovereign modern 20th century nation-states. Both cities also share a common history in the extent to which they were dominated and developed by a variety of rulers, empires, or tribal grouping prior to the Ottoman period. The contribution of the legacy of occupation and invasion by multiple forces has been a highly heterogeneous population that, under the Ottomans, was preserved in their administrative system. It also bred a tendency towards greater inclusion of a variety of beliefs and backgrounds within society, despite the history of ethno-confessional conflict in the contemporary era. In other words, these places were generally easier to dominate as there was a legacy of adaptation and change as new forms of authority developed.

While it is true that Muslims under the Ottomans held a privileged place in society, there was also a tradition of religious tolerance. It would appear that the trade-off of free religious practice for a non-privileged place in Ottoman society was a fair one, though this did eventually have the effect of creating class divisions in Ottoman and post-Ottoman society that were based on ethno-religious identity. In the decline of the Ottoman Empire, the feudal system that had been enshrined in the religiously tolerant but ethnically based society began to fall apart, and dissention and rebellion amongst groups in both Lebanon and Bosnia were able to create new identities for themselves as the rise of industrial production, the introduction of increasingly liberalized markets, and the fundamentally different forms of government under the French and Austro-Hungarians gave form to previously unidentified grievances.

The Ottoman period was, for the most part, a successful symbiosis of ethnicities and belief systems in both Bosnian and Lebanese cultures. The relative stability enjoyed during this period was also recreated in a different form in their subsequent Western European period of occupation. While both French and Austro-Hungarian administrations were indeed plagued with problems in terms socio-political factioning and complexities that arose from changing class-structures, they did manage to carry forth the historic stability of the Ottoman era in a more modernized and centralized version of government. If these new governments were unable to adequately quell social and political tensions,

they were able to invest in the infrastructure and liberalize the economies, making each place more competitive on a global scale in later years. In Sarajevo and Beirut, this meant that the developments of each city were separate from the ethnic and political character the countries (and conflict) would come to embody. As places, they were dynamic and changing as a result of external factors shaping the state, culture and society in general.

Belfast provides a stark contrast to this. If Bosnia and Lebanon share a legacy of invasion and rule, a long period of relatively stable administration prior to the modern era, and the development of Sarajevo and Beirut as reflecting greater historic and social change, then Belfast is the opposite. Ireland was a geographical and cultural enclave for all of its pre-history. Even as Celtic and Gaels changed the cultural and genetic landscape of the island, it was a gradual process, a slow and steady infiltration and migration of cultures. Aggressive and successive invasions did not characterize its history. Even the conversion of the Irish to Christianity was a relatively peaceful transition that syncretized well with local belief systems. When the Plantation period began, the Irish were still closely connected, in both time and space, to the waning legacy of the 'old' Ireland—the Ireland of kingdoms and dynastic family leadership. Having this identity under such an immediate and coercive threat was reacted to defensively. As time passed by and the legacy of Anglo-Irish relations became characterized by domination and hierarchy, the connection to the 'old' Irish identity became lost. What developed in its stead was a steady tradition of subjugation and rebellion and a cultural tendency to use whatever means necessary to contend with those in power, though only solely defined through the history of relations to English authority.

Within this cultural development, the city of Belfast is completely intertwined with the development of the English and Irish tensions. While the city existed as a relatively small outpost of the island, its favourable position at the protected mouth of a lough with access to Irish Sea within the Ulster province made it destined to become an important location. Belfast as it is known today developed out of the legacy of the Plantation period, as presented above. This meant that from the moment the town grew outside the castle walls, it was characterized by the division of Protestant Scottish and English land-owning and merchant classes and Irish peasantry. This was the reality of Belfast—as it continued to grow, the legacy of separation was ingrained in the differentiation of neighbourhoods, businesses, and space and ultimately became part of re-emphasizing the unfavourable status of the Irish Catholic in the north of Ireland.

Belfast was always under the same governmental administration with a large part of the city constantly at odds with the rulers. Unlike Sarajevo and Beirut, Belfast did not

have the cohesive trauma of the fall of one empire and the domination by another to instigate change in policy and practices. In Ireland, the struggle over questions of home-rule or independence were as much at the core of tensions in the 18th century as they were in the 20th and while the United Kingdom continued to expand and prosper as an empire in its own right throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, Ireland was not a traditional part of this legacy. Belfast did however benefit from being part of a rapidly industrializing nation, one that was at the forefront of the global socio-cultural and economic shift brought on by the Industrial Revolution. As opposed to Sarajevo and Beirut whose transitions to industrialized and liberalized market economies were rough and fraught with challenges, Belfast was in a position to excel. Though its role as an industrial hub grew, separation of the Protestant and Catholic populations did too. Despite increased prosperity in general, it also served to magnify the current of sectarian tensions due to increasing inequalities in the distribution of wealth.

4.5.2 Identity, the State, and Economic Production

The transitions in governance to 20th century (pre-conflict) status occurred in each city at relatively similar periods. While Belfast became part of Northern Ireland at the time of Partition in 1921, Beirut and Sarajevo came under their more contemporary forms of governance during and after WWII (1943 and 1945, respectively). Generally speaking, this fits in with more global trend towards colonial independence that began to occur around this time. It also signals the shifting dynamic in power relations and economic production in newly emergent and independent states. This meant that burgeoning notions of national identity were borne out of a period of general upheaval.

In Belfast and Beirut, this helped to create a vocal, but divisive, subjugated class. As both states had some form of representative and democratic governance, the conflict was inherent in the system (as political parties served to 'officially' separate groups along sectarian and ethnopolitical lines), but also allowed marginal (if not verging on symbolic) representation. Sarajevo on the other hand transitioned into socialist government as part of a Federation which in many ways subsumed the identities of its ethnic groups. It is no surprise that in Yugoslavia, following Tito's death, the dissolution of the Communist Party brought with it the fierce nationalist tendencies and ideologies that gave rise to the Bosnian war. In Beirut and Belfast, the conflicts that did happen were in many ways no

surprise: prior uprisings and the dissention and openness regarding their grievances meant that it was well-known in their respective cultures (for instance the 1958 Lebanese conflict and the War of Independence from 1919-1921 in Northern Ireland were strong indicators of a dissatisfied social contingent). Likewise, the conflicts were also drawn-out, ranged in intensity, and engaged a variety of states and actors in their attempted cessation or support. In Bosnia, the war while also similarly engaging the international community was intensive and short in comparison.

There is also the matter of the failed state, which Bosnia and Lebanon both fit the criteria for. A 'failed state' is one where there is a loss of territoriality and government sovereignty, including its ability to provide for the needs of the people, which results in a breakdown of order and potential upsurge in violence[61]. It is not coincidental that these conditions also reflect the underlying tensions present in what causes a 'crisis' in legitimation. For both Sarajevo and Beirut, this meant that the vacuum created by state failure left ample room for alternative forces to emerge during the conflict, and following, as well as for the tendency for cultural and national identity to be radically restructured. Alternative forces, in the cases here, are not only militia leadership, but also wealthy individuals, multinational corporations, and other third party non-government affiliated sources of power. In the case of Belfast, while the state may not have 'failed' in the above sense, there was certainly a crisis in legitimacy in the sense that the government of Northern Ireland never adequately addressed the needs of the whole population whether it was from Stormont or Westminster. The sectarian tension represented by paramilitary violence is contrapuntal in relation to this failure of the state to provide solutions for adequate representation in government and provisions of needs and infrastructure whose absence of was at the root of the violence.

Looking at economics, Sarajevo and Belfast both shared a predominantly industrial history that gave rise to increases in wealth for the general population from the mid-to-late 19th century. While Beirut too had its share of industry in mineral extraction and silk production at the same time, its wealth was generally more defined by the production of capital through the merchant classes which in turn promulgated a financial and intellectual centre of gravity for the economic production of the city. In Belfast and Sarajevo, there too was a stark decline in economic productivity in the mid- to late 20th century placing them in the murky post-industrial context. This dramatically affected the livelihoods and quality of life for the residents: in Belfast this was manifest in the civil rights movements of the 1960s and in Sarajevo was illustrated by the struggle faced by Bosnia, and other Yugoslav

succession states, to deal with their burgeoning new identities in the post-Cold War world. Beirut meanwhile was experiencing deepening divisions between Christian, Muslim, and Druze communities due to the favoured position of Christians in the upper-sectors of finance and commerce and the de facto non representation of non-Muslim groups in politics.

These divides lead into a comparison of the changing notions of class in each society. For Sarajevo and Beirut, where Ottoman (and Arabic) civil-political organization contained a high-level of pluralism and stratification, the idea of 'class' existed not so much as an economic indicator but more so as an ethno-religious one. Though ones ethno-religious identity might typically label an individual as a peasant, labourer, or merchant, this was not a primary motive for identification. During the decline of the Ottoman Empire, this imperfect system began to show its weaknesses as socio-economic conditions and opportunities began to change the status-quo of power relations in each society (for example, the agrarian reforms under the Austro-Hungarians in Bosnia and peasant uprisings in late 19th century Lebanon). In both the Yugoslav and post-French mandate periods, groups in each nation underwent a restructuring of notions of class-identity as they were redefined based on the growing middle class in Beirut and the urbanization of Muslims in Bosnia.

Comparatively, class has been at the forefront of understanding culture and society in Northern Ireland, especially in terms of the Troubles. Ruane and Todd articulate the complicated role class and religious identity played in Northern Ireland and how that shifted somewhat as economic vitality enabled mobility in the lower classes:

> 'The conflict of Protestant and Catholic in Ireland had a clear theological base; but it derived further intensity from its relationship to social structural and political differences. Anglicans covered the entire social range from aristocracy and gentry to day labourers, but had an upwardly biased class profile compared to Catholics, while Presbyterians were particularly prominent in the intermediate classes. Class differences among Catholics were also considerable but the distinctive feature of Catholicism was its predominance among the poorest social groups. The Catholic social profile improved during the nineteenth century but due as much to the destruction of the poorer classes as to increased mobility' (Ruane and Todd 1996, 23).

In Northern Ireland and in Belfast, this feature of class structure enabled political grievances to have great longevity, especially post-1921. It also became increasingly part of what one's Irish identity was and what side one was on, for example to be a Republican

increasingly meant that one was also a Socialist or Communist and Sinn Fein's platform reflected this.

Finally, the question that arises from this comparison regards the comparative length and duration of each conflict and what that represents. In contrast to the other two conflicts, the relative briefness of the Bosnian war can be attributed to its placement in global history: while Belfast and Beirut both occurred during the Cold War and at the beginning and height of the arms race, by the time the Bosnian war came around, public and political attitudes towards war and social upheaval had changed dramatically.

The conflicts in Beirut and Belfast had almost proven intractable; by the time the Bosnian war had begun, the conflict in Lebanon had eased, but the Troubles were still simmering. However, the track record of other conflicts, such as those in Guatemala (1960-1996), El Salvador (1990-1992), and Sri Lanka (1983-2009) added to the sense that conflict should be prevented from becoming entrenched. The Bosnian War's brevity in comparison with the other two conflicts has to do with its sequence and placement in global events. During the 1990s there was a sense that when atrocities were occurring 'something must be done'. On the other hand, Beirut and Belfast were conflicts taken up under unique circumstances though at a time when policies shaped around Cold War objectives in turn shaped international attitudes to the wars themselves. The Lebanese Civil War was a bedfellow of the continuing controversy between Israel and Palestine, and the Troubles were seemingly an internal British and Irish problem that didn't impact global interests.

4.6 Conclusion and Analysis

Each of the conflicts—the Bosnian War, the Lebanese Civil War, and the Troubles, bore multiple levels of historic meaning and significance. And while it is true that conflicts *are* usually, on many levels, expressions of unequal power distribution, greed, or grievance, or a multitude of other factors that are reflected in the social, political, and historic context, there are other levels to consider. The use of paramilitary, militia, and siege tactics that greatly characterized each conflict were in themselves a product of systems that offered no other alternative for expressing dissension in society. This is not to excuse violent behaviour, but rather to highlight the systematic nature and relationship that exists between overt violence and political systems that are not supportive of human rights[62]. From an urban perspective, there was no Ardentian 'space of appearance' for minority or

aggrieved groups to assert their rights. In the event they would appear in a public space, the government would ensure that they disappeared, either literally or through control of media.

This is extremely evident in how these wars began and/or escalated. In Bosnia, the very first event of the war that occurred within Sarajevo was an attempt to disperse the multi-cultural identity of the city. This was done by snipers from the top of the Holiday Inn firing upon a multi-cultural peace protest outside the Parliament building (April 22, 1992). In essence, they were trying to eliminate the space of appearance for other groups, a task that was continued by the siege of Sarajevo. In Beirut, the destruction of the city centre, in addition to Martyr's Square, and its subsequent requisitioning as a border zone between east and west also eliminated a vital space of appearance. A similar dynamic can be seen in regards to Bloody Sunday. In regards to Belfast, the peace walls themselves are messages to the other community that 'you will not appear in my space' and the Protestant marches are attempts to counter this message by forcibly appearing in the other person's space.

The use of the built environment as the means and material of war also expresses another level. Through its siege, Sarajevo, a representation of a multi-ethnic state administrated by an elite Muslim class, was subjugated by the Serbs for three years. The Serb campaign against the city was an attempt to extinguish a Muslim and multi-ethnic state identity, and the bombardment of the built environment was an effort at erasure on a most basic level. The destruction of the Austro-Hungarian/Ottoman style National Library and the Parliament building, events covered in greater detail later, were examples of this. That the city remained alive and active, ultimately surviving its own 'concentration', made real the notion that Bosnian identity would continue to exist. In this sense, Sarajevo's role during the war was as a 'victim' under assault from something external.

In Beirut, the city was used as device for those living within it. Throughout its phases, the city centre was the source of liminality and dead space for it was the most destroyed, though other parts of the city were also under attack. The interesting aspect of Beirut's use in the war was that even though it was the home of the belligerents, it was also the home of its enemy. For all militias, enemies were inside as well as outside, leading to an internal destructiveness that struck a fine balance between complete obliteration (most closely seen in the city centre) and allowing for a subsistence existence elsewhere in the city. In Beirut, the war treated the built environment as a 'host' and the conflict the virus.

Belfast succumbed not to a rapid and aggressive bombardment of the physical city space, but rather was slow and insipient in its treatment. The city centre gradually became

less and less of a place people wanted to be, or felt safe going to. This was not simply because of fear of bombs, but because fear of not being in 'your neighbourhood' and thus being vulnerable. But again, 'fear' in this case, was inculcated into the cultural psyche, and the built environment became the medium through which identity and protection were measured and sought. The city centre therefore was a no-man's land, a space that was not a centre but dead zone as well. It was walled and policed, and while it still functioned, it was also paralyzed by disuse.

The questions remain then: to what end did peace treaties formulated to bring the end to the conflicts treat the built environment as a vital issue? Can and should peace treaties do this? How does the historic and socio-cultural context in turn impact how the cities are rebuilt? In what ways does identity, economic structure, and state power impact the built environment? These ideas are addressed in the following chapters.

CHAPTER FIVE

From Peace to Post-Conflict: Treaty Making, Implementation, and Urban Change

5.1 Introduction

> *They who observe the words that are in the silver tablet the great gods of the country of Egypt and the great gods of the country of Hatti shall allow them to live and prosper in their houses, their country and with their servants. They who do not observe the words that are in this silver tablet, the great gods of the country of Egypt as well as the great gods of the country of Hatti will exterminate their houses, their country and their servants.*
>
> *-Ramses-Hattusili Treaty, 1258 BCE*

The Ramses-Hattusili Treaty was the first of its kind[63]. Marking the end of nearly two centuries of conflict between Egypt and the Hittites over land in the Eastern Mediterranean, its creation set precedence for the recording and guaranteeing of peace treaties. The above passage emphasizes how prosperousness and improvement of living conditions are linked directly to the upholding of the treaty. Likewise, great suffering would occur if the conditions of the treaty were not followed. This passage speaks to the intention of the chapter: to what extent are the 'houses, country, and servants' addressed in the peace treaties under examination in this research?

Ancient civilization saw a connection between the ability for the gods to guarantee the administration of reward or retribution if a peace treaty was not followed, but in the contemporary world, the gods have been replaced by international agencies. Nowadays, the success of peace treaties, measured in the economic and political stability of a state, results from their adherence. In this chapter, an attempt to link what was contained in the Dayton Accords, the Ta'if Accords, and the Belfast Agreement in terms of the built environment is examined through an analysis of the treaties, their implementation, and their effect on the development of the city centres.

In this examination, the goal is to show not only the connection between peace treaties and urban regeneration in the post-conflict context, but also to link this relationship back to the theoretical discussion of legitimation as well as the discussion in the previous chapter regarding the development and context of the cities and the conflicts in question. This particular analysis provides primary data in terms of analyzing and understanding the peace agreements according to the framework presented in chapter three to further the goal of considering the extent to which urban matters were considered during the peace treaty drafting (if at all) and the implications this has on how the city continued to develop in the post-conflict context. In addition, it facilitates the overall engagement with the legitimation framework, in which cities are the structure and function through which legitimation of peace agreements and peacebuilding can occur.

In terms of legitimation, the peace treaty is the source of the eventual movement towards peacebuilding. In looking at how and to what extent the peace treaties examined here address the built environment, the question being asked is, if the treaty contains provisions for the built environment, and the built environment is successful, then is the peacebuilding process perceived of as stable and consequently legitimized by the society in which it is working? From this, we can build further problematizations of how the degree of language concerning the built environment, in conjunction with the degree of success of the implementation and eventual regeneration and reconstruction of the city, can also, in turn, infer the relative degree to which the overall process of peacebuilding is legitimized.

Further linking the theoretical analysis of how peace treaty language and scope interacts with levels of legitimation is the matter of context and background to the conflicts. In the previous chapter, the economic and socio-political dimensions of the conflicts and the development of the cities within that same sphere were explored. The conclusion was that there was a strong element of economic shift and development and deepening of economic inequalities that were a probable cause for the conflicts in question and that represent early signs of a legitimation crisis. This is also related to a growing need to seek out new forms of identity in the post-industrial city (or in the case of Bosnia, the post-Tito state) through which the resort to violent expression appeared to many as the only viable alternative, given that those who held the power and authority in the state were unwilling to concede or give credence to the marginalized or disempowered group's grievances.

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section aims to further develop the comparative analysis of the three cities and conflicts by individually analyzing how the

peace treaties associated with them were created. In section 5.2, the treaty framework is explained. This is followed by an application of the framework to each treaty in sections 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5. In doing this, the task is to take the above themes, as well as the ones explored in the following analysis, and see how they are manifest in the built environment, and how, in turn, these manifestations are altered through the development and regeneration of the city. As the literature explored in chapters one and two suggests, cities are the loci of economic structure and development of identity, making their place in the post-conflict state doubly important as they provide a medium through which regeneration and investment can help make these very elements, which are usually proven to be lacking, stronger.

Section 5.6 summarizes the treaty analysis and draws out comparisons. Following this, section two begins: section 5.7 looks broadly at the literature on treaty implementation and elicits some of the major issues that can emerge and section 5.8 then looks at the specific treaty implementation phases for each city and conflict, with the goal of narrowing the discussion to the urban level. This is integrated in the third section with an analysis of the reconstruction and urban regeneration that has taken place in each city, looking at specific sites and building projects and their general impact, and where applicable, connecting these developments to provisions in the peace treaties in section 5.9.

5.2 A Review of Framework Coding and Application

5.2.1 Peace Treaty Components and Categories

The most basic aspects of a peace treaty[64] are used here to create part of the framework for analyzing the peace treaty text. These parts are the essential *components* of a treaty, which are *procedural, substantive,* and *institutional*. Peace agreements are called such because they aim to address root causes of conflict and seek to remedy the greater social-cultural and political imbalances that led to the conflict to begin with. Therefore, each component aims to address issues that the negotiating parties have agreed are vital to resolution of a conflict. All components can be found in the main text of the treaty, though they could also be found in appendices and annexes. These components are foundational to establishing a framework for analysis of the three peace agreements:

1. **Procedural components** lay out how the peace process will work by establishing the various parts and processes necessary to maintain peace.
2. **Substantive components** help to define what exactly is going to be changing after an agreement is implemented.
3. **Institutional components** are those that address who will be making sure the peace agreement is implemented. Also known as 'implementation mechanisms', this is a role often taken on by the UN or a neutral third party: 'they monitor and steer implementation as well as provide a political forum for dispute resolution. Ultimately, they are the peacebuilding mechanism' (Peacemaker).

Looking at the above descriptions, there are two key points which underlie it that are important for building a framework for analyzing the peace agreements. The first is that addressing root causes of conflict is crucial to writing a comprehensive agreement. The second is the implementation mechanism. This is perhaps the most vital aspect of a peace process, where active peacebuilding measures are put into practice. It is long-term in its duration and has an immense impact on the sustainability and durability of a peace agreement. These components are assigned numerical codes, illustrated in figure 3-2.

The second part of the developing the framework are the categories. How these categories were developed was discussed in greater detail in chapter three. These categories are root cause (RC), peacebuilding (PB), and urban regeneration and the built environment (URBE). They are the main themes that the peace agreements are being analyzed in accordance to, with URBE being of the most critical importance. Refer to figures 3-2 and 3-3 in chapter three.

5.2.2 The Framework

Applying the framework to each peace agreement involved inputting each numbered section of the text into a separate line, and next to it, assigning a 2, 3, or 4, and a single or combination of RC, PB, or URBE. This allowed for a quantification of tendencies for one category or component to appear over another. The results allow for the conclusions to be drawn about the relative value of certain aspects of the peace agreement in relation to the context of the conflict and the drafting of the agreement. Each section covers an individual peace agreement, and looks at how the framework was applied and why, what this says about the peace agreement in general, and what the implications are for implementation and urban regeneration and built environment issues.

In critically assessing the validity of this framework, there are possible alternative readings of the treaty intention, language, and scope. However, as the framework is designed to intentionally look at the built environment in conjunction with the other issues commonly found in the treaty language, this is unproblematic. Potentially, the built environment category could be substituted for another element that needed to be addressed. For example, if one wanted to know the frequency with which refugees were considered in the treaty, the category could in turn be used.

5.2.3 Approaching Application

Applying the components and categories required a systematic method for looking at the text. In general, the following criteria applied to each segment of the text to determine what number and code applied to it:

1. Procedural
    a. Does it **facilitate** peacebuilding, meaning, does it set up, outline, or define something that is necessary to maintain and implement peace.

These items can also fall into the substantive category (discussed below), depending on the nature and cause of conflict. However, they are commonly procedural.

2. Substantive
    a. Does addressing the issue **help to bring about peace**: does it serve to either address a root cause of conflict, put systems in place that will provide future stability, or show what will be changing?
3. Implementative
    a. Anything that sets up **a certain system, division, group, or individual role responsible for carrying out and delivering new, or redefined, activities**. These groups are responsible for the implementation of parts of the peace agreement.

Additionally, the assignment of categories also required a certain criteria to be met. Each segment could have one or two categories, as it could have more than one purpose:

- RC: Root Cause
    - Addresses a specific aspect of the root cause of the conflict
- PB: Peacebuilding
    - Defines or addresses phenomenon that are important for peacebuilding
- URBE: Urban regeneration and built environment
    - Addresses the any issue that could potentially touch on the area

In the cases where more than one category is used, that logically represents a segment whose purpose is applicable in both senses. These are:

- RC/PB
- RC/URBE
- PB/URBE

While not all permutations were found in all peace treaties, the full list of permutations is shown in figure 3-3.

The following sections describe the creation of each peace treaty and an analysis of the findings for each framework coding application.

5.2.4 Applying the Framework

The framework described above was arrived at as a result of having first read, multiple times, each peace treaty, in an attempt to glean overarching meaning from the documents. In many ways, the peace treaties were hard cases to crack and involved more than a little imagination to try and see through the tidy policy language. Especially when considering that the goal was to look for and read urban concerns through the language of the treaties, it became evident that a structured and more rigorous method of doing so was required.

Conducting research on how treaties were written in general and the stories of the treaty writing in these particular cases, helped to gain an understanding of the delicate balance that is sought in bringing together conflicting parties on paper in a way that is both ameliorating but also potentially transformative. The ultimate challenge of this exercise is that what is essentially a dynamic process (peace negotiation) has to be transformed into something static (the peace treaty). The ideal result is something that can help facilitate the change necessary to create space for stable peacebuilding to occur.

Given these broad strictures, the Peacemaker tool (described above) was revealed to be a pragmatic and helpful resource for understanding the elements that go into making a peace treaty work. Creating a method for turning the components and categories into something that could be applied in a consistent and useful way to all the peace treaties was inspired by software systems such NVivo but was also based on fairly simple approaches to

interview coding, such as that proposed by Gordon (1992). These concepts were transferred into the system described above.

Applying the categories and components was a low-tech process: with highlighters, pen, and printed versions of each treaty, each numbered section was assigned a letter and a number. On top of this however, there was the issue of deciding why and how each of these sections received the coding they did: this was done by looking critically at the wording of each section and its placement in the treaty, and asking if it answered or could be defined according to the definitions listed above for procedural, substantive, and implementative purposes. This process in itself required a great deal of focus; the end result was that I was not only deeply embedded in understanding each peace treaty, but the nuances of the conflict, the compromises that were made, and the issues that were at the centre of the negotiation process. These decisions, and the reading that was done of the treaties whilst applying the coding, was also influenced greatly by the narratives of each peace treaty drafting process, as well as the greater conflict context described in chapter 4. The unique set of circumstances that brought the conflicting parties and negotiators of Ta'if, Dayton, and the Belfast Agreement together are indelibly part of what was put in the treaties, what was omitted, and why.

After the coding was complete, the resulting data was put into a spread sheet format that could then be used to create meaningful representation of that data, which are presented in the following sections, as well as in Appendix II. While sections 5.3 to 5.5 analyze the results of the coding, they also speak to a larger 'learning curve' that was overcome as a result of this exercise: that peace treaties, like works of fiction, interview material, newspaper articles, etc., are expressions of set the socio-culture and political conditions and contexts in which they were written. Therefore, care must be taken not only to see the documents holistically but also as, ultimately, tools that require interpretation for all who use or consume them, something which is both a blessing and curse to the usefulness and success of a peace treaty.

5.3 The Dayton Accords: Context to Composition

The Dayton Accords are a lengthy testament to a complex conflict. With 649 separate segments ranging over 75 pages of printed text, Dayton attempted to put down

on paper every single issue and element that would help form the new Bosnian state, as well as bring about peace and an end to conflict.

Dayton was drafted over a period of twenty-one days. The main participants were the presidents of the three conflicting groups: Alija Izetbegovic (Bosnian-Muslim), Franjo Tudjeman (Croatia), Slobodan Milosevic (acting on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs though he was president at the time of remainder of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), along with their staff; the European Contact Group (a group of European nation representatives offering consultation throughout the negotiations); and the US negotiation team lead by Holbrooke. Taking place at the US Airforce Base in Dayton, Ohio, November 1-21, 1995, the Dayton negotiations were the culmination of several months of 'shuttle diplomacy' that Holbrooke and his team undertook.

The Dayton Accords were not the only attempt at brokering a peace agreement during the war. However, its particular success can be attributed to the 'ripeness' of the situation (Hampson 1996). Effective NATO bombing strikes, continuing sanctions against Serbia, and the Merkale Market bombing[65] in Sarajevo all helped to bring the three leaders to a bargaining point. Holbrooke and his team sought to bring the groups together for a comprehensive negotiation, with Holbrooke employing his characteristic tactic of never taking 'no' for an answer which eventually each leader to commit[66]. The situation was also greatly aided by the role of Milosevic as the representative for Republika Srpska, who until that point had been allowed to negotiate for themselves. Holbrooke felt that as their leaders (Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic) were indicted war criminals, it would only legitimize the Bosnian-Serbs tactics by negotiating with them and so were disallowed from the negotiations at Dayton.

The immediate, proximate cause of the war was the creation of an independent Bosnian state and the role of Republika Srpska within it. This is at the heart of the Dayton Accords and is reflected in the massive amount of material dedicated to spelling out the constitution, borders, legal system, and other agencies necessary to run a properly functioning democratic state. However, Dayton not only had to address root causes of conflict, but also the deep divisions exacerbated by the violence of the war itself. Addressing war crimes, refugee status and return, human rights abuses, and the withdrawal of troops, and the lifting of the siege of Sarajevo were fundamental as well. In addition, provisions for future peace had to be considered. Thus, economic security, refugee and IDP property rights, policing, and mechanisms for enforcing the peace treaty were also part of Dayton's remit.

Dayton is designed to address a wide swath of issues in as much detail as possible. For this reason, it is called a 'framework agreement' because it broadly agrees 'on the principles and agenda upon which the substantive issues will be negotiated' (Peacemaker). According to Peacemaker, framework agreements 'are usually accompanied by protracted negotiations that result in separate Annexes, protocols or sub-agreements, which contain the negotiated details on substantive issues'. In addition, Dayton also contains elements of an implementation agreement as it sets out schedules for certain things to happen and assigns responsibility for them, though the extent of this limited.

Dayton's structure is unique in that the first section, 'The General Framework for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina' appears to be the core document and everything else secondary (though this is not the case). Though it is a relatively short section, it outlines seven articles relating to what each party is committed to through the signing of the Accords. The remainder of the document, about 73 pages, are committed to the expansion of thirteen annexes as well as additional legal material. These annexes are the meat of the Accords as it is where the specific provisions and guidelines are spelled out. The structure is as follows:

- General Framework Agreement for Peace
- Annex 1A: Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement
- Appendices to Annex 1A
- Letters to Annex 1A
- Annex 1B: Regional Stabilization
- Annex 2: Inter-Entity Boundary Line and Related Issues
- Annex 3: Elections
- Annex 4: Constitution
- Annex 5: Arbitration
- Annex 6: Human Rights
- Annex 7: Refugees and Displaced Persons
- Annex 8: Commission To Preserve National Monuments
- Annex 9: Establishment of Bosnia and Herzegovina Public Corporations
- Annex 10: Civilian Implementation of Peace Settlement
- Annex 11: International Police Task Force
- Agreement on Initialling
- Side-Letters
- Concluding Statement

In seeking to explore the Dayton Accords through the framework, the emphasis is upon uncovering elements pertaining to the 'urban' in the text. As the following analysis shows, urban elements, as well as many others, are not discrete and easily identifiable but are often associated with ideas and provisions that may not on the surface appear to be directly related.

5.3.1 Applying the Framework[67,68]

The analysis of the Dayton Accords is based on coding framework explained earlier. While the full coding results applied to the Accords can be seen in Appendix II, below is a discussion of the main findings using a series of pie charts (figures 5-1, 5-2, and 5-3) to illustrate the frequency of each element of the framework. The overall aim of the analysis was to uncover how much and to what degree the built environment was addressed in the Accords. In doing so, other aspects were also addressed, including root cause of conflict and peacebuilding measures.

Figure 5-1 shows the application of components alone to the Dayton Accords. A vast proportion of the agreement—85% —is dedicated to procedural issues. Substantive issues address 10% and implementative make up the remaining 5%. Holbrooke felt it was vital to the success of the negotiations that as much procedural detail as possible be hammered out while the three leaders were in close contact (Holbrooke 1998, 353). He felt that whatever was left out of Dayton would never get resolved as the moment the three leaders parted ways, their general animosity towards one another would continue to keep relations tense. The peace treaty was the only mechanism for ensuring that they continued to cooperate on some level.

Some examples of sections that were completely substantive include Article II, sections 1-5 that detailed the obligations and responsibilities of all parties regarding honouring the cessation of hostilities. However, Appendix B to Annex 1-A is also substantive detailing the relationship and responsibilities between NATO and Bosnia; sections 1-23 of this are all procedural in nature, naming obligations and responsibilities. Additionally, Annex 9, Article II 1-5 regarding the establishment of a Transportation Corporation are also procedural in that they detail the remit of the new Transportation Corporation and how it will conduct business.

While this is not an exhaustive list, it does show the scope of what the procedural components address.

Figure 5-2 shows the distribution of the categories. A large majority of the agreement (63%) could be categorized as pertaining solely to peacebuilding (PB), meaning they were future-looking and were intended to help put in place things necessary for creating sustainable peace. Following this is root cause/peacebuilding (RC/PB) at 23%, indicating that nearly a quarter of the agreement could be categorized as addressing both categories in the same piece of text; 9% addressed root causes (RC) only; and interestingly,

5% were in support of urban regeneration and built environment (URBE) issues. Each major category was represented in some form (RC, PB, and URBE), with only one category, root cause and urban regeneration/built environment (RC/URBE) not emerging. Its absence is fitting as the built environment and urban regeneration were not part of the root causes of conflict and therefore would not be addressed in conjunction.

Finally, Figure 5-3 shows the combined coding for Dayton. Just over half (53%) of the agreement was a 2PB meaning it was of a procedural component (2) and a peacebuilding category (PB). This is fitting as both procedural and peacebuilding were the strongest in each data set; it also indicates that most of the agreement basically instructs relationships, systems, activities, and obligations, which also fits with the detailed nature of the agreement. In an agreement of this size, most of it would necessarily be 'administrative', putting in place instructions for what to do to build peaceful relations and generally stable conditions.

The next largest set, 2RC/PB, (procedural root cause/peacebuilding) occurred 21% of the time. This one is closely related to 2PB, however, these segments address to an extent a root cause of conflict. An example of this is found in Article IV, Annex I, 1-15, which looks at 'Additional human rights to be applied in Bosnia and Herzegovina'; within this, all fifteen of the segments are labelled both as RC and PB and are procedural in nature. This is because they are instructive in that they are advising on the responsibilities of the new constitutional court in to be set up in Bosnia, but the fact that human rights protection is a consideration that is separate (it is an annex and not an article), indicates that it was seen as necessary for future protection. This might imply that human rights provisions were not explicitly part of the Yugoslav Federation court system, which is the pre-existing model for the Bosnian court. It might also indicate there was a level of human rights abuses in the Bosnian (Yugoslav) legal system in general.

2RC (procedural root cause) and 3PB (substantive peacebuilding) are 7% each of the agreement. These could be considered derivatives of the above two codes, as they are procedural, though the presence of substantive components indicates that these are addressing larger issues important to attaining peace. The other non-URBE related codes take up 7% of the text. These include 3RC, 3RC/PB, 4RC, 4PB, and 4RC/PB. Component numbers 3 and 4, relating to substantive issues and implementative issues, are fewer in number, but no less significant. Substantive issues, though important, do not require as



Figure 5-1 Dayton Accords Components



Figure 5-2 Dayton Accords Categories



Figure 5-3 Dayton Accords Combined Coding

much instruction in the agreement, yet their presence is necessary as a reminder for why certain articles and annexes are written. Implementative segments also do not require as much text; most of the time, sections of the agreement that pertained to the function of implementation required only one entry to indicate who will be responsible for what. All that followed after that would be procedural in nature as it would describe and instruct what the responsibilities and obligations are to be of the post. An example of this in the text is Annex 10: 'Agreement of Civilian Implementation of the Peace Settlement', Articles I sections 1 and 2 describe the need for a body to implement the non-military aspects of the peace agreement, and what their obligations and responsibilities are. The following Article (II), sections 1-3, details the 'Mandate and Methods of Coordination and Liaison' for the High Representative. These segments of the text are interpreted as procedural, even though they describe the work of the implementing body.

Finally, drawing out the proportion of the peace agreement that relates to built environment and urban regeneration issues is vital. In the box 5-1 below, the text from the Accords that received an URBE coding are listed, along with the pertinent language highlighted that justifies the code it received.

Of these, 2URBE occurred 5% of the time (in the total document), showing that there is degree of concern with issues that directly affect the urban regeneration/built environment. Since they are procedural, they are instructive in scope, explaining how and why such issues should be addressed. The remaining codes that emerged were 4URBE (Annex 8, Commission to Preserve National Monuments, Article I (1)) and 4URBE/PB (Annex 10 Agreement on Civilian Implementation, Article I (1)). As they were 4s, this meant they were implementative, instructing how and whom should carry out the task in addition to the latter one also having a peacebuilding element, that aimed to institute a degree of positive change in the structures it was addressing.

The vast majority of the text relating to URBE has to do with refugee and displaced persons' right to return to their homes of origin. It also deals heavily with property rights, making claims for personal property that may have been lost or damaged, and that the 'parties' (the leadership) work to make conditions in their territory suitable for return: conditions to be improved concern economic, social, and political issues, which can be linked to urban regeneration and development. The parties are to contribute to reconstruction of infrastructure, housing, and businesses. Another important aspect to the URBE code is the creation and protection of national monuments. This is also vital to examining the built environment in Sarajevo, as the protection of heritage sites is

important for protecting identity and history in a region where it was, and remains, a contentious issue. In sum, URBE issues in Dayton relate most specifically to refugee property rights and the procedures and obligations related to that, as well historic preservation.

Within these areas are implied elements of urban regeneration, especially as it relates to property rights, funds for property improvement, and the creation of national monuments as shared public space. These issues are in the end categorized as 'urban' in nature because they effect to some degree the built environment in general, which will inevitably be felt on the local city scale. The effect of these provisions were not a major factor determining the way Sarajevo's city centre was regenerated, however the effect of the provisions for refugee housing and national monuments has an indirect impact on how certain building projects are chosen and where they are located, for they clearly cannot disturb a national monument (and must build around one) or infringe on the property rights of potential returnees.

That urban regeneration is not explicitly mentioned does not mean it was not affected by the general provisions in the Accords. There is a strong correlation, as will be revealed in greater detail later, between the opening up of the Bosnian economy, which was mentioned in the Accords, and the eventual foreign investment that would materialize in central Sarajevo. As Paris (2004) asserts, part of Dayton's success was the promotion of a market economy, the strengthening the currency, and the creation of a centralized banking system, all which made Bosnia, and Sarajevo, a more stable place to invest in, something that ultimately shaped the built environment of the city-centre.

Summary. The Dayton Accords were designed to structure the new Bosnian state as well as define how hostilities between the parties were to cease. The Accords themselves were focused on setting up the government and through that inserting additional protocols or provisions for more specific needs, such as dealing with refugee return, the formation of public utility works, or the creation of borders. Second to that, ensuring that the manner in which the hostile parties would withdraw was agreed upon was an important matter. In all, there was a strong element of addressing root causes of conflict (through the creation of a Bosnian state and the Republika Srpska within it) and building peace (through the creation of measures designed to enshrine a multi-ethnic state). The urban dimension that emerged did so within the context of other built environment issues, and thus was not directly impacted as such, though it was shaped through the economic policies.

Box 5-1 Dayton Accords: URBE Coded Sections

Annex 7 Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons, Chapter 1, Article I (1) 2URBE

All refugees and displaced persons have the right freely to return to their homes of origin. They shall have the right to have restored to them property of which they were deprived in the course of hostilities since 1991 and to be compensated for any property that cannot be restored to them. The early return of refugees and displaced persons is an important objective of the settlement of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Parties confirm that they will accept the return of such persons who have left their territory, including those who have been accorded temporary protection by third countries.

Annex 7, Chapter 1, Article II (1) 2URBE

The Parties undertake to create in their territories **the political, economic, and social conditions conducive to the voluntary return and harmonious reintegration of refugees and displaced persons, without preference for any particular group**. The Parties shall provide all possible assistance to refugees and displaced persons and work to facilitate their voluntary return in a peaceful, orderly and phased manner, in accordance with the UNHCR repatriation plan.

Annex 7, Chapter 2, Article XI, Mandate (1) 2URBE

The Commission shall receive and decide **any claims for real property** in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where **the property has not voluntarily been sold or otherwise transferred** since April 1, 1992, and where the **claimant does not now enjoy possession of that property**. Claims may be for return of the property or for just compensation in lieu of return

Article XII Proceedings Before the Commission (1-8) 2URBE (all)

(1) Upon receipt of a claim, the Commission shall determine **the lawful owner of the property** with respect to which the claim is made **and the value of that property**. The Commission, through its staff or a duly designated international or nongovernmental organization, shall be entitled to have access to any and all property records in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to any and all real property located in Bosnia and Herzegovina for purposes of inspection, evaluation and assessment related to consideration of a claim.

(2) Any person **requesting the return of property** who is found by the Commission to be the lawful owner of that property shall be awarded its return. Any person requesting compensation in lieu of return who is found by the Commission to be the lawful owner of that property shall be awarded just compensation as determined by the Commission. The Commission shall make decisions by a majority of its members.

(3) In **determining the lawful owner of any property**, the Commission shall not recognize as valid any illegal property transaction, including any transfer that was made under duress, in exchange for exit permission or documents, or that was otherwise in connection with ethnic cleansing. **Any person who is awarded return of property may accept a satisfactory lease arrangement rather than retake possession**.

(4) The Commission **shall establish fixed rates that may be applied to determine the value of all real property** in Bosnia and Herzegovina that is the subject of a claim before the Commission. The rates shall be based on an assessment or survey of properties in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina undertaken prior to April 1, 1992, if available, or may be based on other reasonable criteria as determined by the Commission.

(5) The Commission shall have **the power to effect any transactions necessary to transfer or assign title, mortgage, lease, or otherwise dispose of property with respect to which a claim is made, or which is determined to be abandoned**. In particular, the Commission may lawfully sell, mortgage, or lease real property to any resident or citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or to either Party, where the lawful owner has sought and received compensation in lieu of return, or where the property is determined to be abandoned in accordance with local law. **The Commission may also lease property pending consideration and final determination of ownership**.

(6) In cases in which the claimant is awarded **compensation in lieu of return of the property**, the Commission may award **a monetary grant or a compensation bond for the future purchase of real property. The Parties welcome the willingness of the international community assisting in the construction and financing of housing in Bosnia and Herzegovina to accept compensation bonds awarded by the Commission as payment**, and to award persons holding such compensation bonds priority in obtaining that housing.

(7) **Commission decisions shall be final**, and any title, deed, mortgage, or other legal instrument created or awarded by the Commission shall be **recognized as lawful** throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.

(8) Failure of any Party or individual to cooperate with the Commission shall not prevent the Commission from making its decision.

Article XIII: Use of Vacant Property (1) 2URBE

The Parties, after notification to the Commission and in coordination with UNHCR and other international and nongovernmental organizations contributing to relief and reconstruction, **may temporarily house refugees and displaced persons in vacant property**, subject to final determination of ownership by the Commission and to such temporary lease provisions as it may require.

Article XIV: Refugees and Displaced Persons Property Fund (1) 2URBE

Refugees and Displaced Persons Property Fund (the "Fund") shall be established in the Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina to be administered by the Commission. The Fund shall be **replenished through the purchase, sale, lease and mortgage of real property which is the subject of claims before the Commission**. It may also be replenished by direct payments from the Parties, or from contributions by States or international or nongovernmental organizations. Compensation bonds issued pursuant to Article XII(6) shall create future liabilities on the Fund under terms and conditions to be defined by the Commission.

Box 5-1 Dayton Accords: URBE Coded Sections (Continued)

Article XV: Rules and Regulations (1) 2URBE

The Commission shall promulgate such rules and regulations, consistent with this Agreement, as may be necessary to carry out its functions. In developing these rules and regulations, the Commission shall **consider domestic laws on property rights**.

Annex 8 Commission to Preserve National Monuments, Article I (1) 4URBE

The Parties hereby establish an **independent Commission to Preserve National Monuments** (the "Commission"). The Commission shall have its headquarters in Sarajevo and may have offices at other locations as it deems appropriate.

Annex 8, Article IV (1) 2URBE

The Commission shall receive and decide on petitions for the designation of property having cultural, historic, religious or ethnic importance as National Monuments.

Annex 8, Article V (1-5) 2URBE (all)

(1) **Any Party, or any concerned person in Bosnia and Herzegovina, may submit to the Commission a petition for the designation of property as a National Monument.** Each such petition shall set forth all relevant information concerning the property, including:

a) the specific location of the property;
b) its current owner and condition;
c) the cost and source of funds for any necessary repairs to the property;
d) any known proposed use; and
e) the basis for designation as a National Monument.

(2)In deciding upon the petition, the Commission shall afford an opportunity for **the owners of the proposed National Monument**, as well as other interested persons or entities, to present their views.

(3)**For a period of one year** after such a petition has been submitted to the Commission, or until a decision is rendered in accordance with this Annex, whichever occurs first, **all Parties shall refrain from taking any deliberate measures that might damage the property.**

(4)**The Commission shall issue, in each case, a written decision** containing any findings of fact it deems appropriate and a detailed explanation of the basis for its decision. The Commission shall make decisions by a majority of its members. Decisions of the Commission shall be final and enforceable in accordance with domestic law.

(4)In any case in which the Commission issues a decision designating property as a National Monument, **the Entity in whose territory the property is situated (a) shall make every effort to take appropriate legal, scientific, technical, administrative and financial measures necessary for the protection, conservation, presentation and rehabilitation of the property, and (b) shall refrain from taking any deliberate measures that might damage the property.**

Annex 8, Article VI: Eligibility (1) 2URBE

The following shall be **eligible for designation** as National Monuments: movable or immovable property of great importance to a group of people with common cultural, historic, religious or ethnic heritage, such as monuments of architecture, art or history; archaeological sites; groups of buildings; as well as cemeteries.

Annex 8, Article VII: Rules and Regulations (1) 2URBE

The Commission shall promulgate such rules and regulations, consistent with this Agreement, as may be necessary to carry out its functions.

Annex 8, Article VIII: Cooperation (1) 2URBE

Officials and organs of the Parties and their Cantons and Municipalities, and any individual acting under the authority of such official or organ, **shall fully cooperate with the Commission**, including by providing requested information and other assistance.

Annex 8, Article IX: Transfer (1) 2URBE

Five years after this Agreement enters into force, the responsibility for the continued operation of the Commission shall transfer from the Parties to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, unless the Parties otherwise agree. In the latter case, the Commission shall continue to operate as provided above.

Annex 9, Article X: Notice (1) 2URBE

The Parties shall **give effective notice of the terms of this Agreement** throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Annex 10 Agreement on Civilian Implementation, Article I (1) 4URBE/PB

The Parties agree that the implementation of the civilian aspects of the peace settlement will entail a wide range of activities including continuation of the humanitarian aid effort for as long as necessary; **rehabilitation of infrastructure and economic reconstruction**; the establishment of political and constitutional institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina; promotion of respect for human rights and the return of displaced persons and refugees; and the holding of free and fair elections according to the timetable in Annex 3 to the General Framework Agreement. A considerable number of international organizations and agencies will be called upon to assist.

5.4 The Ta'if Accords: Context and Composition

Applying the framework to the Ta'if Accords was similar to Dayton. Bearing in mind root causes of conflict and thinking critically about the purpose, intention, and function of each segment of the agreement, application of the components and categories resulted in graphs 5-4, 5-5, and 5-6. Following is a discussion of the results and implications of each of the data sets as well as treaty context and creation.

The Ta'if Accords were written in 1989 to put an end to the Lebanese Civil War that had been active since 1975. While conflicts of such time and scale inevitably involve the grievances of a myriad of groups and issues, it is commonly agreed that the original, underlying conflict centred on the imbalance of power institutionalized by the 1943 National Pact. It was meant to be a temporary solution, yet it was permanently retained, and based distribution of power on religious confession, which became known as confessionalism or a confessional system when talking about how religious identity plays an important role in political identity. Christian Maronites, according to the Pact, held the presidency and the majority of other offices because they were the majority at the time of the 1932 census. Other groups, namely Sunni and Shia Muslims, were given less prominence and power. According to Krayem, 'the constitution gave the Maronite president ultimate executive authority while not providing a mechanism for presidential accountability, especially since parliament could question the cabinet, but not the president' (Krayem 1993). It's widely acknowledged that a demographic shift occurred soon after the Pact was written making non-Maronites the majority in the country, though this change was never reflected in the power structure. Thus, while the events of April 1975 are considered what ignited the civil war, it represented deeper conflict over issues of power and governance as mentioned as well as endemic societal and economic issues that favoured the Christians and marginalized the rest (Fisk 1992).

In 1989, after mounting international pressures representing a potential escalation in conflict (Iraq, fresh out a conflict with Iran, intended to support General Aoun and his forces), the 'Arab states, led by Saudi Arabia, held a summit meeting in Casablanca and formed a Tripartite Committee composed of King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, King Hassan of Morocco, and President Shadli Ben Jedid of Algeria to deal with the Lebanese crisis' (Krayem 1993). The committee was formed specifically to discuss the future of peace in Lebanon, and three leaders were selected from the Arab League Committee on Lebanon (Deeb 2003, 162). The document was approved of by the remaining sixty-two Lebanese Parliamentary members who had been voted in the last election held in Lebanon in 1972

(Prados 2006). It was formally called the 'Document of National Accord' but referred to more popularly by its drafting location: Ta'if, Saudi Arabia.

The Ta'if Accords aimed to address the basic constitutional imbalances that were the source of the conflict. It is considered to be comprehensive in that it seeks to strike a 'common ground between the interests and needs of the parties to the conflict' and aims to 'resolve the substantive issues in dispute and provide the necessary arrangements for implementing the agreement' (UN Peacemaker). It is rather brief (in comparison with the other agreements in this study), consisting of 122 segments over 8 pages of text, though it seeks to achieve its aims through broad changes in approach to governance and social and cultural issues, rather than set forth highly specific aims and procedures.

It is worth noting that peace agreements can and do vary in how they approach the peacebuilding process, whereas some are extremely detailed, others set more general guidelines for future activity. This illustrates aspects of how the agreement was drafted. In the case of Ta'if, non-Lebanese actors came together to address the issue as the war had great potential for escalation. Primary issues at stake were power balances and constitutionality, Lebanon's political break-down, and de facto control by warring militias. Therefore, it was important that non-internal persons coordinate the effort. One can conclude that it was simplest to address root causes of conflict and implementation mechanisms in as broad a way as possible to allow fine-tuning and greater legal, social, and cultural integration.

The majority of the Accords re-phrases and changes the text of the Lebanese constitution, which at that point was derived from the National Pact of 1943, though it also presented a measure of social and cultural changes. Part I of the Agreement lists the 'General Principals' which reflect the general intentions for establishing a representative democracy, reconciliation, and future political, economic, and social security. Part II details the political reforms that are to take place, redefining the role of the chamber of deputies, the Presidency, the Prime Minister, and outlining other issues regarding resignation, dismissal, and retiring of ministers and other officials. Part III looks at 'other reforms' and proposed changes to 'administrative decentralism', the courts, the constitutional council, and election law. Also in this section were reforms regarding education, access and curriculum, as well as a generic statement regarding the status of information and media as being 'protected under the canopy of the law . . . that serve[s] the . . . objective of ending the state of war'. The following section of the Accords details the disarmament and withdrawal of foreign (Syrian) troops and the raising of a voluntary security force. It

mandates that the military is to serve the needs of the Lebanese state only. Finally, Ta'if addresses the issue of Israeli occupation, and looks at how and why Lebanon should deal with their presence.

Paragraph D in Section Two of the agreement is quite lengthy and appears to tackle a number of complex issues, looking much like a 'rider' on a US congressional bill. In this, there are mentions of efforts for reconstruction, return of refugees (as well as members of the Lebanese diaspora), borders and relations with Syria, and the pledge of assistance from the Arab Tripartite Committee. All in all, this paragraph offers some tantalizing promises, yet it is oddly out of place with the rest of the document though it raises issues integral to reconstruction and peacebuilding.

5.4.1 Applying the Framework

Figure 5-4 shows that the vast majority of the segments (69%) of Ta'if are rated a 3, meaning they address substantive components; procedural components (2) represent 21% of the segments, while implementative components (4) make up the remainder. The reason for the high rate of substantive components is connected to the approach of the agreement and how the drafters chose to address the root causes of conflict. By making Ta'if a document that ultimately sought to alter the constitution so that it reflected an equitable and balanced distribution of powers within the government all segments that suggested an alteration in the language of the constitution therefore were labelled with a 3. As was discussed earlier, the majority of Ta'if addressed government posts and other related issues; following onto this were other segments that addressed social and cultural issues, as well as those relating to disarmament, borders, and cultural identity, which in the context of the conflict, represent changes that are more procedural in nature.

Figure 5-5 shows the percentage of categories. For Ta'if, the category to occur the most frequently was RC/PB (root cause and peacebuilding) at 69%. The next was root cause (RC) alone at 25%, urban regeneration and built environment (URBE) at 4%, followed by both peacebuilding alone and a combination of all three[69] (root cause, peacebuilding, and urban regeneration/built environment) at 1%. The assignation of RC/PB to the majority of these segments addressed issues concerning a specific root cause and future peacebuilding. Looking at the constitutional changes that were to take place as a result of the implementation of the agreement and considering that the balance of power was a



Figure 5-4 Ta'if Accords Components



Figure 5-5 Ta'if Accords Categories



Figure 5-6 Ta'if Accords Combined Coding

foundational cause of the war, it is logical that the majority of the agreement dually addresses root cause of conflict and peacebuilding. Since all suggested changes to the constitution are both conflict and future oriented, they are both coded as peacebuilding and root cause. The 25% peacebuilding (PB) categories indicate that there is a sizeable majority of the agreement that addresses solely root causes of conflict; this is different from the majority category of RC/PB in that the language of these segments appears to address solely issues of root cause of conflict and does not indicate a measure of peacebuilding, making more of an issue of apologizing for past unfair treatment. The remainder of the categories indicate that these issues were less prominent, but as is discussed later in the chapter, this does not diminish their importance.

Referring to Figure 5-6, it shows a comprehensive comparison of the full codes applied to the document. For Ta'if, 62% of the segments of the text were 3RC/PB. This means that the majority of the document was substantive in nature and addressed both root causes of conflict and peacebuilding. Building on the discussions from the previous graphs, one can see that the main intention of Ta'if was to change the constitution as it was the poor balance of power put in place by the National Pact that was a root cause of conflict. Therefore, changes to the constitution address conflict but then also positively increase the likelihood of stable peace through their reforms.

Of the other codes, the next most frequent the most are 2PB at 12% and 4PB at 9%, and 2RC/PB at 7%. This indicates that procedural peacebuilding, implementative peacebuilding, and procedural root cause and peacebuilding are also addressed. The priorities after substantive issues were addressed involved setting up the structures and guidelines to facilitate and implement the recommended reforms.

The next significant data set emerging from the graph are those that include URBE. Of the 122 segments in Ta'if, 6 relate to URBE issues. The parts of the Ta'if Accords that pertained to this coding are listed in the box below with the relevant wording highlighted and the exact coding listed next to its title. What was found was 3URBE/PB at 3%, 4URBE/PB at 1%, and 2URBE/PB at 1%. The reason for dual categorization is because URBE elements never emerged exclusively as a single category (meaning that no section was explicitly just about this issue); however, it was possible to see how URBE issues would be an adjunct to or effected by certain provisions. These are highlighted below. This means that anything to do with URBE issues, such as housing, infrastructure, national monuments, environmental pollution, or other built environment concerns, were never considered

part of defining the terms of the peace. Though they were incorporated into other issues in an indirect way, meaning the drafters saw them as potentially helpful, they were not singularly vital. The reasoning for this is discussed in greater detail later in the chapter.

Looking at the below sections in box 5-2, it is apparent that the scope and nature of these 'URBE/PB' sections were selected because in some broad way their fulfilment might have an impact on the urban environment. For example, Section III, A (3) 'emphasizes natural fusion within the framework of preserving common coexistence and unity of the soil people, and institutions'. This language is quite typical of Ta'if in that it is broad and not very detailed, however one could argue that in this case the 'preservation of common coexistence' could be taken to mean the preservation of places of common and shared experience, such as the city centre, would be of great concern. On the other hand, the most explicit mention of anything relating to built environment and urban issues is Section D (1) 'Second, spreading the sovereignty of the State of Lebanon over all Lebanese territories'. This articulates the right of 'every Lebanese evicted since 1975 to return to the place from which he was evicted'. While this doesn't say anything about the way the government shall handle the return of housing to the person who had left it, or what the provisions for this might be, it establishes a right, aimed at all migrants who left the country

Box 5-2 Ta'if Accords: URBE Coded Sections

Section III, A (3) **3URBE/PB**

The administrative division shall be recognized in a manner **that emphasizes national fusion within the framework of preserving common coexistence and unity of the soil, people, and institutions**.

Section III, A (4) **3URBE/PB**

Expanded administrative decentralization shall be adopted at the level of smaller administrative units district and smaller units through the election of a council, headed by a district officer, in every district, **to ensure local participation.**

Section III, A (5) **3URBE/PB**

A comprehensive and unified development plan capable of developing the provinces economically and socially shall be adopted and the resources of the municipalities, unified municipalities, and municipal unions shall be reinforced with the necessary financial resources.

Section III, E (1) **4URBE/PB**

Creation of a socio-economic council for development: a socio-economic council shall be created to insure that representatives of the various sectors participate in a drafting of the state's socioeconomic policy and providing advice and proposals.

Section III, F (4) **2URBE/PB**

Official, vocational, and technological education shall be reformed, strengthened, and developed in a manner that meets the country's development and reconstruction needs. The conditions of the Lebanese University shall be reformed and aid shall be provided to the university, especially to its technical colleges.

Section 'Second, spreading the sovereignty of the State of Lebanon over all Lebanese territories', D (1) **3URBE/PB**

The problem of the Lebanese evacuees shall be solved fundamentally, **and the right of every Lebanese evicted since 1975 to return to the place from which he was evicted shall be established.** Legislation to guarantee this right and to ensure mean of reconstruction shall be issued . . .

since 1975, to reclaim their property. This has proven, as shall be examined later, to have a profound impact on how Beirut has been reconstructed.

Summary. The Ta'if Accords were broad-based measures aimed at instituting changes in government structure (and confessional representation) that had been at the heart of the conflict. It was ultimately about addressing root causes of conflict, but also enshrining the intention of 'good will' for a prosperous and harmonious future. Aside from the provisions that detailed how the Lebanese constitution would change in terms of outlining the responsibility of various government offices, other parts of the Accords used broad and sweeping language to indicate that the country's leaders were committed to a fairer, representative, and equitable future. However, this was all said without actually laying out plans in the Accords for their implementation, which leads one to believe that it would happed naturally in the post-conflict context.

5.5 The Belfast Agreement: Context to Composition

Nearly two years elapsed from when former US Senator George Mitchell was appointed chair of the negotiating team in June 1996 to when the Belfast Agreement was signed in April 1998—a role he was told would last about six months (Mitchell 2000). It was not expected that a peace agreement would be achieved—especially since the negotiation period was plagued by infighting, press leaks, continued political violence and breaking of ceasefires. But, like any successful peace negotiation, the Belfast Agreement benefitted from having the right confluence of conditions that allowed all parties involved to make appropriate decisions and concessions, along with a little diplomatic force from the negotiating team.

While the Belfast Agreement was met with some opposition, particularly from the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), it was well-received by most political parties (McAuley 2005). The Agreement was put into force on December 2, 1999 as a result of a referendum. The main purpose of the Agreement was to create a devolved power-sharing form of central government in Northern Ireland, also known as consociational due to its bringing together of antagonistic parties to a point of political cooperation (Horowitz 2002).

The negotiations that took place resulted in a peace agreement that consisted of 269 separate points over a modest 26 pages. The document is concerned mainly with two key issues: (1) establishing the constitutionality of Northern Ireland as well as inter-governmental bodies and conferences for opening and maintaining communication on

policy and other matters, and (2) with decommissioning. All participants to the negotiations had to agree to the 'Mitchell Principals'[70] which effectively committed each party to non-violence. The Agreement also provided for other reforms and the creation of new agencies to implement the changes necessary to improve the social, political, and economic welfare of Northern Ireland, as well as provide officially for human rights protection.

The Agreement is divided into eleven main sections and each articulates a different dimension in the formation of the new Northern Ireland Executive. Broadly, it sets up the legal framework for relations between Northern Ireland and Great Britain, and between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. In addition, it lays out the basic elements that the new Northern Ireland Executive, and by extension the eight political parties represented during its drafting, would use to create a functioning government. The Agreement also formed the basis for setting up the offices that were to be responsible for the protection of rights and equality in access to services, for policing, for decommissioning, and security and justice. It also makes clear that the people of Northern Ireland can decide in a vote if they want to become united with the Republic of Ireland.

What the Belfast Agreement points to, and what is at the heart of what might be called the root cause of the conflict, is the constitutional status of Northern Ireland. While it may appear a simplistic rendition to say that the Nationalist/Unionist divide is what drives the conflict, it relates not so much to the fact that there was a conflict over to whom Northern Ireland should belong, but how it had been, and was continuing to be, handled. Essentially, constitutionality of Northern Ireland belonged in union with the United Kingdom and yet a swath of Nationalists would argue that they were given no choice in the matter. Hence, what the Belfast Agreement does is *not* solve the problem of who Northern Ireland belongs to, but mandates that it will always be a matter to be decided by the people of Northern Ireland in democratic free elections. Only in this way will any union or non-union be legitimate.

While the constitutional status, and all provisions relating to establishing this can be coded as a root cause, the other main issue is that of decommissioning. While not part of the root cause, it was a continuing reason that the conflicting parties would not meet one another. Therefore, the commitment to non-violence and removal of weapons was integral for the success of the Agreement. In addition, the promise of equal treatment and access to social, cultural, and political benefits is a core concern. Part of the unrest was evident in the 1960s, as unequal treatment and access to services gave rise to the Civil Rights movement, which largely gave rise to the Troubles. Throughout the agreement,

there are many segments dedicated to ensuring that all services in Northern Ireland should be equal in their distribution, and that all communities will have their identities recognized and validated by the local government. An additional layer of the Agreement also pertained to addressing not only the root cause of conflict, but also mitigating the effects of the war itself. As a great deal of psycho-social trauma had occurred, there was a strong sub-narrative indicating that the task of addressing this was also part of the Belfast Agreement.

5.5.1 Applying the Framework

Figure 5-7 shows the distribution of components for the Agreement, with procedural components taking the majority of the document at 63%. Substantive components are 30% and implementative are 7%. This indicates that much of the document is taken up with details regarding how things are being set up and arranged, especially regarding the new institutions that are to help to bring autonomy to Northern Ireland. With substantive at 30%, a third of the document is dedicated to issues that need to be addressed in order to help achieve peace, meaning they address future-looking issues that will help bring about reconciliation and social stability, and 7% of it puts in place the bodies and roles that will be responsible for implementing the new governmental institutions as well as the specific agencies for handling peacebuilding activities.

Figure 5-8 shows the distribution of categories, with peacebuilding taking in a large majority of Belfast at 80%. Root cause/peacebuilding (RC/PB), and root cause (RC) alone make up 17%, while urban regeneration/built environment and peacebuilding (URBE/PB), and urban regeneration and built environment (URBE) alone amount to the last 3%. These figures indicate that much of document, almost every aspect, drew in issues that were important to peacebuilding, meaning that their treatment was necessary to provide valuable parts of the Northern Ireland's future peace. Although most of the document, as indicated above, was procedural and dealing with the arrangement of the new government agencies and parameters, these are considered peacebuilding as it was the location of Northern Ireland's administration, in addition to their capacity to be able to vote in the future for a united Ireland or not, that underscored the conflict. Thus, in addressing the Northern Ireland's constitutionality, peacebuilding is also addressed as this change also represented a move towards future stability.



Figure 5-7 Belfast Agreement Components



Figure 5-8 Belfast Agreement Categories



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Figure 5-9 Belfast Agreement Combined Coding

Figure 5-9 shows the combined codes. Procedural peacebuilding (2PB) takes precedence at 57%, while substantive peacebuilding (3PB) at 17% and implementative peacebuilding (4PB) are at 7%. These combined make up for 81% of the agreement, showing that the way it was written ensured that peacebuilding concepts were incorporated into all components of the agreement. Substantive root cause (3RC) make up 8%, while the next section is made up of procedural root cause/peacebuilding (2RC/PB) at 4%, and substantive root cause/peacebuilding (3RC/PB) at 4%. Again we see here a great emphasis on peacebuilding in procedural, substantive, and implementative forms throughout the document, showing the extreme degree to which the creation of the new governmental agencies and other affiliated bodies can be seen as directly relating to the future-looking goal of peacebuilding.

The remaining figures represent the URBE category/component. Of the 269 segments, only 6 relate to URBE issues; within that, the variation of what their components are is marginal. The 6 segments, while brief, do set up a significant precedence for the creation of future urban regeneration policy as it relates to the built environment, economic, and social issues, as well as issues of equality in distribution of state and municipal services. Below the parts of the Agreement that were coded URBE are listed in box 5-3.

The idea of urban regeneration is actually given attention in the Belfast Agreement, as seen in Strand 3 (2i), where 'tackling the problems of a divided society and social cohesion in urban . . . areas' and 'rejuvenating major urban centres' are mentioned as key strategies to aiding in the safeguarding of equality of rights and opportunity. This is vital because it means that there was a definite appreciation of the value and effect that addressing built environment issues can bring to the overall project of protecting and supporting social justice and human rights as it relates to quality of the life and access to opportunity. While there are no other organizational imperatives added to this, it is important nonetheless.

In addition to this, there is a strong message in the below passages suggesting that establishing new and robust economic policies is key to the future of Northern Ireland (Strand One (34), and Strand Three Rights (1) and (2ii)).This is important because this is how and why the built environment of Belfast city centre was able to be regenerated at the pace it was, and it remains a key strategy in regeneration policy in general in Northern Ireland.

Other URBE issues below address fairness, equality, integration, and access to housing and education, and directives to give due attention to the health of the natural environment, transportation, and physical infrastructure. These impact the built environment of the city centre both directly and indirectly in a variety of ways. Further on in this chapter, how these elements combined to create the regeneration environment seen today are discussed.

Box 5-3 Belfast Agreement: URBE Coded Sections

Strand One (34) 4URBE/PB

A consultative **Civic Forum will be established**. It will comprise **representatives of the business, trade union and voluntary sectors**, and such other sectors as agreed by the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister. It will act as a **consultative mechanism on social, economic and cultural issues**. The First Minister and the Deputy First Minister will by agreement provide administrative support for the Civic Forum and establish guidelines for the selection of representatives to the Civic Forum.

Strand Two North/South Ministerial Council, Annex 2URBE (all)

(3) **Transport** - strategic transport planning
(4) **Environment** - environmental protection, pollution, water quality, and waste management
(12) **Rural and urban development**

Strand Three British Irish Council, Rights, Safeguards, and Equality of Opportunity; Human Rights (13) 3URBE/PB

The participants recognise and value the work being done by many organisations to develop reconciliation and mutual understanding and respect between and within communities and traditions, in Northern Ireland and between North and South, and they see such work as having a vital role in consolidating peace and political agreement. Accordingly, they pledge their continuing support to such organisations and will positively examine the case for enhanced financial assistance for the work of reconciliation. **An essential aspect of the reconciliation process is the promotion of a culture of tolerance at every level of society, including initiatives to facilitate and encourage integrated education and mixed housing.**

Strand Three Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity; Economic, Social and Cultural Issues

(1) **3URBE/PB** Pending the devolution of powers to a new Northern Ireland Assembly, the British Government will **pursue broad policies for sustained economic growth and stability** in Northern Ireland and for promoting social inclusion, including in particular community development and the advancement of women in public life.

(2i) **3URBE A new regional development strategy for Northern Ireland**, for consideration in due course by the Assembly, **tackling the problems of a divided society and social cohesion in urban, rural and border areas, protecting and enhancing the environment, producing new approaches to transport issues, strengthening the physical infrastructure of the region, developing the advantages and resources of rural areas and rejuvenating major urban centres.**

(2ii) **3URBE A new economic development strategy for Northern Ireland,** for consideration in due course by a the Assembly, which would **provide for short and medium term economic planning linked as appropriate to the regional development strategy.**

Summary. The Belfast Agreement was designed to bring autonomy to the people of Northern Ireland through the creation of the Northern Ireland Executive and through that also set up the structures necessary to address social, political, and cultural inequalities that had been part of the root cause of the conflict. The Agreement was also focused on the decommissioning of weapons on the part of paramilitaries. In all, it was focused on setting up the agencies that would be responsible for carrying out the more specific plans dedicated to bringing about delivery the promise of a more equitable society. In addition, the urban element was directly, if only briefly, addressed as part of creating

space for increased social justice. Economic vitality was a driving factor as well in underscoring many of the provisions in the treaty.

5.6 Comparing Peace Treaties: Emergent Issues

The three peace agreements provide substantial matter for comparison. Each one seems to reflect similar yet distinctly different approaches to the same issue of constitutionality: of the balance of power, existence of a state, or right to choose affiliated government. In terms of the assignment of categories and components, all three agreements are heavily weighted to being mostly procedural and peacebuilding oriented, indicating that in general the purpose of a peace agreement is to set out the rules and procedures for how future peace and stability can be achieved through the establishment of new governmental and administrative mechanisms.

Except for the references to urban rejuvenation in the Belfast Agreement, the presence of the built environment in the treaties overall was negligible. There were provisions for aspects of it in an adjunct manner, such as with refugee housing, monuments, or other more general directives for common unity and shared identity. In addition, references to equitable development and reconstruction in Dayton and Ta'if could be read as referring to the urban environment. However, just because it was not there does not mean the that it wasn't part of the plan: in the case of Ta'if, as later analysis reveals, there was a sense that issues such as the built environment in general and city centre specifically would naturally be addressed in the post-conflict context, as the priority to regain the favourable, pre-war economic position Lebanon once had was a vital concern. As a result of Dayton, the economic liberalization policies opened up the market to foreign investment, though the focus on housing and national monuments, while important, created a void in the commercial sector. In the Belfast Agreement, it was more a matter of taking a general directive to improve upon urban conditions, in conjunction with an emphasis on economic development that spearheaded future regeneration.

In these cases, there is still an obvious and direct link to the peace treaties, even though the built environment is generally disregarded. This has meant however that there is little to no possible way to make a direct measurement or observation of how specific peace treaty provisions changed or influenced the urban environment. This finding also influenced decisions of how the relationship between the peace treaties and the

regeneration would be observed in the ground, leading to the decision to take an ethnographic approach as most relevant to the kind of observations required.

There are two larger, and perhaps even more vital, levels of analysis in the comparison of the treaties beyond the urban component. That the creation, redefining, or moving of a new government was the underlying motivation of all three treaties means that what potentially would be the case, and what is proven through further analysis, is that there were very few resources available for the post-conflict government to spend on urban regeneration or economic regulation. In conjunction with this is the emphasis, either in the treaty or as a result of its absence, on creating a liberalized market economy. In spite of the existence of a government whose time and resources are allayed by other matters such as legal reforms, taxation, and other post-conflict issues, the general 'laissez faire' approach to economic matters is what made the pattern of urban regeneration take the shape it did. Further to this, and also indirectly a result of the peace treaties, was the increased emphasis on consumption and a shift in the centre of capital and production as being handled by private sector agencies as opposed to government regulation.

How the above analysis developed on the ground in each city is the subject of the next section. First, the implementation of each of the peace treaties and how events played out the above dynamics is discussed. This is followed by an exploration of urban development and regeneration from the end of the war to the present day.

5.7 Implementing Peace and Reconstructing the City

5.7.1 The Dayton Accords: From Paper to Practice

The length and complexity of the Dayton Accords foreshadowed the challenging nature of its implementation. While it contained many specific provisions for the establishment of a variety of mechanisms designed to stabilize the war-torn country and lay the foundations for peace, it also contained many weaknesses that would prove a thorn in the side of all bodies slated to implement the Accords. Understanding how the built environment's contemporary context developed out of the peace implementation period must be situation in the fact that in Sarajevo, many problems arose in the quest for political and cultural stabilization. Perhaps what was missing, as was shown above, were provisions dedicated to the built environment, though this absence was complemented by an

emphasis on economic liberalization. What follows is a discussion of the implementation, reception, and assessment of the Accords in terms of urban issues and related matter.

The actors and agents responsible for the administration of various parts of the Dayton Accords included the Office of the High Representative, who was tasked with the non-military aspects of the Accords, and four other organizations (this is in addition to the responsibility of the belligerents themselves). These were NATO, The Peace Implementation Council, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the UN Security Council, which was responsible for the International Police Task Force (IPTF). Other activities were designated to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Court of Human Rights. The European Union has also played a large role in reconstruction efforts (although the EU is not specifically mentioned in the annexes).

The High Representative, a role initially filled by Carl Bildt (one of the key negotiators at Dayton), was responsible for the implementation of the Dayton Annexes and possessed 'final authority' to interpret the civilian aspects of the agreement. This position was ill-fated at the start, as it had virtually no budget and was plagued by administrative and logistical issues. Holbrooke recounts that Bildt 'had so little money and support that he was forced to operate without an office or telephones, and use his personal cellular telephone as his primary means of communication. After appeals to the European Union, he received enough funding to open his offices in Sarajevo, where he presided like an elegant squatter over a building filled with wrecked rooms, broken toilets, shattered windows, and almost no staff' (Holbrooke 1998, 324). In short, even though the High Representative was given a wide swath of powers he had to contend with the realities of a war-ravaged city.

Early assessments of the implementation of the Dayton Accords were decidedly negative (Dempsey 1998; Shapiro 1998; Schake 1999), with a 1999 International Crisis Group (ICG) report concluding 'The only unqualified success has been the four-year absence of armed conflict' and warning that 'ethnic cleansers are winning the battle to shape post-war Bosnia' (International Crisis Group 1999). In more recent critical examinations, Stewart (2011; Stewart and Knaus 2011) argues that it was this extended state of negative peace, and lack of involvement in civil society by the international community that has made peace and stability in Bosnia a reality, if imperfect. Of course, any assessment of the Dayton implementation depends on one's view of what the Accords actually set out to accomplish. In reality, such goals are broad and measurement of them is entirely dependent on also comprehending the challenge of the implementation

environment. In the case of Dayton, all assessment must bear in mind the multitude of factions and competing interests at stake in the process.

Within the built environment, the primary concern in the implementation period was the reconstruction of infrastructure and utilities, in addition to ensuring that damaged housing stock that was salvageable was repaired, and that any refugees or IDPs that claimed their abandoned homes were able to do repairs. In Sarajevo, this meant that the myriad of apartment towers and other residences were patched up. The same with main buildings in the city—many were still habitable, but required clean up and repair. Until the early 2000s, much of the city was simply undergoing to changes necessary to regain a sense of normalcy. On the other hand, changes were being wrought by the new Bosnian government that were also lending new identity to the city: streets were renamed and public space and other places of importance were re-identified with titles that harkened to a more shared and neutral past, one that was further away from the Yugoslav and Socialist ideals that had been ingrained into the city fabric. One of the only remainders of the Yugoslav past is the name of one of the main streets of city—Maršala Tito street.

During the implementation phase, the stage was being set for private sector development to begin making a mark on the city. As the banking and finance centre was recreated and centralized in Sarajevo and the currency was stabilized, the investing in Bosnia became more of a possibility. The environment was still a risky one, as tensions between Republika Srpska continued to threaten stability, and the economy still lagging. However, the opportunity to develop property was becoming more of a reality and Bosnians, as well as foreign investors, began to look for ways to start business in the country.

5.7.2 The Ta'if Accords: From Paper to Practice

The Ta'if Accords are, unlike the other cases, relatively simple in their form. Though the Accords were designed to amend the constitution and redistribute power along confessional lines, many commentators agree that Ta'if's strongest asset was that it did so with the underlying goal being eventual dissolution of such a system (Maila 1994; Krayem 1997). The Accords' language is such that all people and all confessions are equal in the republic, and that the interests of all groups should be accordingly protected. Najjar echoes

this sentiment in his argument that Ta'if is an excellent example of a Lockean-style social contract, and as such brings many benefits:

> The main advantage of the Ta'if Agreement, then, is that it recognizes the depth of the political conflict and rifts in Lebanon and the need for drastic political measures to deal with them. Treating the conflict in Lebanon as a serious political conflict among equal and free people, the Document envisages and proposes a solution that is up to the task (Najjar 1997, 449–450).

But emanating from a context of fifteen years of divisive conflict, the long-term of goal of eliminating political offices based on confession has proven problematic, if not entirely impossible (Maila 1994). Section G of Ta'if explicitly states that 'the council's task will be to examine and propose the means capable of abolishing sectarianism' as well as removing sectarian identification from national elections and identity cards. However clear this is, this has not been done, though it was the promise of Ta'if that was most salient in aiming to solve the root causes of conflict. This issue is still contentious today, as is examined later.

The effects of the civil war on Lebanese society run deep. The Ta'if Accords and its summary implementation initiated the changes in the constitution, the balance of power in the government, and other larger issues relating to equality of all peoples and asserted Lebanese sovereignty. However, it did not alter the internalized effects of fifteen years of division and warfare, what Khalaf has termed a 'geography of fear', which is characterized by 'retribalization' and 'collective amnesia' (Khalaf 2002; Khalaf 2002, 312). These are issues that, according to Khalaf's analysis, are being worked out to this day in Lebanon and which never could have been addressed in Ta'if. These are also key ideas in approaching the division and controversy caused by the reconstruction of central Beirut.

Positive growth and change has unfolded in ways that challenge popular and established conceptions of the path state stabilization should take. The reconstruction of Beirut, as well as outlying regions of Lebanon, was considered integral to overcoming the devastation of the war, however not part of Ta'if. The Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR), which was initially set up in 1977 to address the effects of the initial phase of the war, was reconstituted in order to aid in Lebanon's rebuilding. This, alongside the establishment of Solidere in 1994 played an integral part in re-affirming the stability of post-conflict Lebanon. As such, the reconstruction and rebuilding of Beirut and greater Lebanon could not have happened without the stabilizing effects of the Ta'if Accords, yet

the effort was not based on any provisions in the document. In this sense, the implementation of Ta'if was vital for laying the foundations for a society and a state that was liberalized, open for investment, and protective of individual and groups rights.

While the content of Ta'if managed to provide a foundation for political stability, it did not explicitly provide direction for economic and built environment reconstruction. These issues are an important counterpoint to the implementation of the Accords, as these 'missing' parts were as vital to the successful implementation of the Accords as the items contained in it. According to Denouxe and Springborg (1998), provisions for physical and economic reconstruction were left out of the Accords for two primary reasons. The promises of Hariri and the assumption that Lebanon would work to achieve the liberal and globalized economy it had prior to the civil war were elements that underscored, and yet remained a silent partner throughout the creation of the Accords:

> 'Most of the critics of the current political and economic situation argue that the Ta'if accord spelled out what should be done, and that Lebanon's problems stem from the non-implementation of several of this agreement's key provisions. Revealingly, however, the compromise reached at Ta'if was very detailed as far as the polity is concerned, but it said virtually nothing about the economy - suggesting that the nature of the economy was not seen as a contentious matter and that most of the key actors agreed that it should and would more or less naturally be reestablished in its prewar form' (Denoeux and Springborg 1998, 159).

Hariri had been the first public figure in Lebanese politics without a wartime affiliation and his 'deep pockets' and tendency towards humanitarian causes emboldened his supporters. In the early days of the war and beyond, he transported his construction machinery from his company headquarters in Saudi Arabia to the streets of Beirut, free of charge, to move aside rubble and help to clear the streets[71].

The reconstruction of the economy as well as of the city was what Hariri was 'hired' to do when he was elected into office. As Prime Minister of Lebanon, he was able to establish mechanisms for restructuring the economy, which for him involved improving the value of the currency, as well as laying out plans for the reconstruction of the city centre. Hariri served as Lebanon's Prime Minister from 1992-1998, then again from 2000-2004. He went into his first term in office with the intention of rebuilding Beirut, and as a result of his efforts in addition to the creation of legislation aimed at legalizing the reconstruction of the city centre by a private corporation, Solidere was formed. He remained a 10% shareholder in the company until his assassination.

Ta'if achieved what it was designed to do—recast the National Pact, restructure the parliament, and enshrine democratic ideals in the organization of Lebanese society. It asked the militias to agree to a ceasefire and for Syria and Israel to remove their military forces. This was only partially followed—militias did cease fighting eventually, though the foreign presence was still problematic. But Ta'if was not an exhaustive and detailed document—perhaps because the job of creating peace, which in the case of Lebanon meant breathing new life into economy as well as rebuilding its capital city, was a venture taken on by the wealthy private sector, those able to risk opportunistic measures.

It is the presence of reconstruction activities that, beyond the continued violence and political assassination, are at the heart of what has come to characterize post-war Lebanon and Beirut. The role of urban regeneration has (and continues to) highlight what kind of peace has been achieved, as illustrated by the CDR and Solidere. The creation and reaffirmation of a stable economy and society was provided through the regeneration of the city centre. However, the question remains whether this has created a false sense of security or is illustrative of actual progress, as well as if the nature of the post-conflict regeneration of Beirut represents a fulfilment of a 'liberal peace'.

5.7.3 The Belfast Agreement: From Paper to Practice

The Belfast Agreement was signed on April 10, 1998 and was approved in a referendum held on May 22, 1998 when 71% of the voters[72] approved its implementation. Epitomized by the creation of a devolved, consociational government, the decommissioning of paramilitaries, the creation of inter-Island and North-South councils, and the integration of human rights into the policies and procedures of the new institutions, the future of the Belfast Agreement was set to be a path fraught with many complications, but also many victories. In the years following, implementation of the Agreement was fraught with a variety of challenges, especially as they related to the decommissioning, power-sharing, and policing.

Despite the fact that the implementation of the Belfast Agreement has also come with the dubious distinction of 'being one of the longest-running processes both in the time required to reach an agreement and in the time required for implementation of that agreement' (Hancock 2008, 202), it has also remained legitimated by public, governmental, and international support, despite continued outbreaks of sectarian violence.

Assessments of the Agreement's implementation are mixed and consist of a spectrum of critiques. There are also several persistently problematic key issues through the implementation phase, though they have not taken away from the Agreements' successes. Graham and Nash argue that 'the ongoing implementation of the Northern Ireland Act of 1998 exemplifies the combination of intractably opposed political positions and the push towards alternatives that characterizes all political and cultural debate in Northern Ireland' (2006, 254), which in a way can be seen as progress towards reconciliation and adherence to principals of non-violence in conflict resolution. Despite a general consensus that implementation of the Agreement has been successfully realized over the last thirteen years, other sources counter that the implementation has been problematic due to several key issues that have dominated the process (Archick 2010; Maney et al. 2006; Hancock 2008).

For Lynch**,** the partial success of the Agreement can be attributed to managing the intra-party factionalism that both complicates and characterizes the stalling that has occurred in the process, but has also defined how communication occurs within the political landscape (Lynch 2005). She argues that 'the design of the implementation process—the rules and procedures for sequencing and timing implementation—is critical to overcoming the obstacles presented by intra-group factionalism and to determining the successes and failures of implementation' a lesson that can be taken from the Northern Ireland context and applied elsewhere. This structure allows for an implementation environment that is adaptive to changes in the political landscape. The Independent Monitoring Commission (IMC) in its most recent assessment of the Agreement's implementation (Independent Monitoring Commission 2010) viewed it in a positive light, saying that all problems may not be solved, but they are being handled by a truly devolved government with open channels of communication.

Decommissioning was, and continues to be, a contentious issue despite the peace that has been achieved. While all political parties involved had to commit to decommissioning and use of non-violence when signing the 'Mitchell Principles' before the negotiations began, this did not mean that paramilitaries would follow suit. This has meant, as Belloni comments, 'the foremost problem for implementing the GFA [Good Friday Agreement] has been the issue of paramilitary weapons . . . This has amplified the role of politically relevant elites and the way in which they interpret their situation' (Belloni 2010, 171). The issue of decommissioning also exemplified the almost intractable role of spoilers[73] in the peace process, for at any moment paramilitaries could, and continue to,

upset the balance, something characterized by 'armalite and the ballot box' maxim of the Irish Republican movement.

In the contemporary context, Northern Ireland's continued experience of the implementation of the Agreement has been thwarted by the economic recession. While economic development was part of the provisions of the original Agreement, it is more vital now than ever in realizing an aggressive policy of economic development, especially as it relates to long-term peacebuilding and sustained livelihoods and prosperity. This sentiment was echoed by First Minister Robinson when he commented that 'the economy of Northern Ireland is critical to the overall process in which we're engaged. We want to be able to show people that having local control can make a difference. And it only makes a difference to them if they feel it themselves. And therefore, it has to be able to – raise everybody hopes, it has to get into every section of our community. And the economy is the one way that you can do that, you can make people feel better, you can make people feel that this is working' (Robinson and McGuinness 2009).

If economic vitality drives the concerns of Northern Ireland's leaders today, it is also true that it was at the core of what Mitchell saw when he initially visited Northern Ireland as special economic envoy in 1995. In countless meetings various groups from both Nationalist and Unionist communities, who, he was told, had little or no contact or communication with each other, yet, to his surprise 'both essentially conveyed the same message. With charts, graphs, and slides in persuasive presentations, they told me that in Belfast there is a high correlation between unemployment and violence; that unless jobs become available to the young men of the inner city, there cannot be a durable peace' (Mitchell 2000, 11).

The urban dimension of Belfast changed radically after the treaty was implemented, though it was also on its way to extreme changes before the Belfast Agreement was signed due to pre-existing regeneration projects such as Laganside. As was mentioned earlier, the Agreement actually contained a degree of built and urban environment provision, as well as instructing that attention be paid to strengthening the economy. After the Agreement came into force, it was the centre of Belfast that began to manifest the greatest changes in the city. The Belfast Regeneration office, part of the Department of Social Development (DSD), was established in 1999 as part of the new government. They were responsible for guiding some of the regeneration that took place in the city, although other private agencies also spearheaded efforts.

Housing was another contentious issue that was part of the initial grievances that led to the Troubles. In the implementation phase, special efforts were made to ensure that anti-discriminatory practices, whether perceived or real, were structurally addressed in the new Northern Ireland Executive. This meant that post-Agreement, more funding was given to analyzing and understanding housing statistics, as well as to improving the existing structures. However, housing continued to be problematic as there continued to be an impression that more and better social housing should be built, though it was not. This was compounded by a tendency for private developers to build higher-rent developments in traditionally sectarian areas, which caused unrest.

5.8 Reconstruction and Regeneration: Events, Obstacles, and Development

Reconstruction of the post-conflict state begins almost immediately following the signing of a peace agreement and can be part of the implementation of the agreement, but not always. In the cases examined here, it is clear that peace agreements may include exhaustive directives for certain reconstruction activities (as in the case of Bosnia), be very vague (such as with Lebanon), or somewhere in the middle (as with Belfast). In any case, reconstruction activities are quite varied in scope and according to the *Task Framework for Post-Conflict Reconstruction* (Center for Strategic and International Studies and Association of the United States Army 2002), the ultimate goal is the normalization of a society. This is done through four thematic areas: security, justice and reconciliation, social and economic well-being, and governance and participation (ibid).. The reconstruction also occurs generally through three phases: initial response, transformation or transition, and sustainability. Reconstruction activities are often spearheaded and funded by international third-party donors, though the role of local groups in legitimizing and maintaining the success of these projects is also crucial (International Alert and Women Waging Peace 2004).

Within the *Task Framework's* list of thematic areas, the built environment plays a marginal role. This is not to diminish the importance of built environment reconstruction. However, it does lead to some interesting questions as to why buildings related to commerce, public space, and retail and business opportunities are underplayed. It would appear that the reconstruction and creation of new buildings is not something that is to happen in its own right, but is rather a 'natural' part of addressing infrastructure,

transportation, economic, and civil-society issues: i.e., if you liberalize markets and allow foreign investors to 'open shop' they will build the new buildings that are needed. The only stand-alone mention the built environment gets in the *Task Framework* is the need to rebuild housing for refugees and IDPs. In light of the work of Architects Without Frontiers (Architects Sans Frontièrs), Architects/Designers/Planners for Social Responsibility, and Architects without Borders[74], urban planning and architectural/built environment issues are vital to ensuring the social, economic, and political rights of the people who live in a post-conflict setting are articulated through sensitive planning and design. This idea also resonates with earlier discussions about how the city, as a locus of power, structure, and agency, can impact the lives of people in the same manner as the structure of violence. This means the city, like the structure of violence, can thwart an individual or group's potential for development. The inattention to these matters can result in these needs remaining unmet on the physical scale, and thus entrench systems and approaches to public and civic life that are not protective of human rights.

The three cases examined here illustrate the effect that reconstruction and creation of public space (both in terms of civic, outdoor, retail/commerce, and gentrified housing) has on post-conflict city centres. In all three cases, the cities themselves were instruments in the conflicts, and yet their physical reconstruction and regeneration was not addressed in the peace agreements. This has meant that in the reconstruction phase, the process of addressing city centre reconstruction has largely been left to ineffective government offices and a wealthy and influential private sector. While other elements of reconstruction have been vital to the progress towards a state of normalization (rule of law, elections, strengthening currency, etc.), the built environment serves as a reminder, and hence a tool, for communicating important messages about the progress of peace on the ground.

Revisiting the idea of 'geography of fear' previously mentioned in relation to Beirut (p161) also adds insight to the challenge of rebuilding post-war spaces in both Sarajevo and Belfast. In the course of a war, certain areas of a city more than others are the actual, physical target of aggression (in these cases, the city centres are such spaces). As a result, they also become in the minds of the local community the space where destruction and chaos stem from and are in turn attached to a negative emotions and memories. This means that reconstruction embodies multiple levels of meaning in the post-conflict city: it not only is attempting to transform the denigrated space, but also in transforming the emotional and psychological currency of its users.

This is difficult, and as Khalaf (2002) argues, along with the geography of fear in Beirut (and by proxy other post-conflict cities) there is even more at risk. Potentially, such spaces will entrench tribalization of conflicting factions if the space is not successfully redefined. However, he argues, there is also much to lose in the 'collective amnesia' that can result from the extreme eradication of war-memory from such spaces. In the Beirut example, the city centre illustrates this as it no longer retains any challenging reminders of the war, in essence encouraging people to exist as if fifteen years of civil was not the reason the city centre was entirely reconstructed. The potential consequence of this is a relapse into conflict.

This same analysis can be applied to the potential successful reconstruction of city centre space in Sarajevo and Belfast. In Sarajevo, the nature of the siege meant that all outdoor space, and even the windows of homes that faced Serb sniper fire to the south, were vulnerable. In addition, the tendency to not remove entirely war-damaged buildings (discussed in greater detail in chapter six) means that there is always a reminder of the war lurking about, maintaining a constant connection to the 'fear' of the war through the geography of the city. The threat of tribalization is particularly pertinent here, as the redistribution of housing and ethnic groupings in the city (i.e. the expulsion/migration of Bosnian-Serbs and the occupation of their housing by Bosniaks) is another reading of the geography of fear.

In Belfast, there are two examples of this: the first is how the city centre, once an economically depressed and militarized area, is now a safe, usable, and accessible space. One could argue that it might encourage collective amnesia in its transformation, but this is counterbalanced by the sectarian division that still characterizes the rest of the city making the reality, and the memory, of conflict still close at hand. In this case, the 'geography of fear' in Belfast continues to be defined much as it was even during the Troubles: through the roads, peace walls, and empty spaces that create the borders between sectarian neighbourhoods. The number of peace walls in the city has actually increased since the Belfast Agreement was put into effect: even since 2006, nine more have been built[75]. There are many layers of irony to the existence of Northern Ireland's peace walls (they also stand in Londonderry and Portadown): as the Belfast Agreement did successfully lower the rate of violence in Northern Ireland, it said nothing about the peace walls. That they have increased in years since speaks volumes about the crucial role perceptions of safety, experienced through the built environment, shape the geography of a city[76].

The ‘geography of fear’ is a helpful concept which is capable of pithily c explaining the way in which negative experiences (whether it is communal/collective or individual) dictate, and shape, how space is used (or not) and perceived. Any manipulation of a place/space that has negative emotionality tied to it, in theory, should also change (ideally for the better) how the space is used and perceived in the future. In the case study cities, the geography of fear referenced in this research refers to how the ‘fear’ associated with the past conflict in reference to certain areas of the city have been transformed. These new associations have the positive effect of renewing the functionality and purpose of urban space, but also run the risk of losing an attachment to the lessons of the past. Therefore, the discussion of the ‘geography of fear’ is a way of understanding and problematizing the complex nature of post-conflict urban reconstruction.

Earlier in the chapter, it was revealed through the framework analysis of the peace treaties that relatively little material was dedicated to addressing the built environment and urban issues. However, what has developed in each case is, to varying degrees, the role and power of the private sector in shaping and changing the city centres. The question is then, how did this happen? In each case, the liberalization and opening of the economy aided in the ability for private agencies, with varying degrees of freedom, to invest in the cities. The following section seeks to show how the private sector was able to gain a foothold and what changes were wrought as a result, and the degree to which the government and local community were involved in what investment choices were made. Is it possible that in liberalizing the economies and allowing a greater degree of privatization of economic and property development, the city centres became the canvas on which neoliberal approaches to peacebuilding could be painted? If so, then it is also important to recognize that the government, via the peace agreements, as well as a result of their own weakness of laissez faire approach to economic development, allowed and encouraged such a power shift to occur in these cities. However, it must also be noted that this opening up of foreign and private investment occurred not only because of a liberalized economy, but also because the governments actually lacked the resources to make this kind of change happen.

In the following discussion the major events that have defined the reconstruction and eventual regeneration of each city is explored. Showing how the liberalization of economic structures, both for neoliberal policy rationales in addition to the more pragmatic reasons that the governments couldn’t afford to make the changes themselves, the redevelopment and regeneration of each city centre is explored. The aim is to contextualize

the state of urban destruction that existed at the wars' end and convey a narrative of change that occurred to bring about the contemporary context. Bearing in mind that 'reconstruction' writ large included a variety of mechanisms in each place, and that urban, especially city-centre, issues were relatively unaddressed, the reconstruction story that is told here is underscored by the concurrent development and/or evolution of a liberalized market economy. Arising from this narrative is also the further development of how the liberalization of the economy in the context of a government vacuum gave rise to a more neoliberal type of regeneration, where investment, building, and impact on the built environment were relatively unchecked.

5.8.1 Sarajevo

Following the war, Sarajevo was left devastated. It is estimated that nearly 60% of the housing stock was destroyed (Black 2001, 178). Serbs blocked or severely limited access to utilities such as water, gas, and electricity, which meant that miles of pipe work and infrastructure lay dormant and decayed as well as physically harmed by the siege[77]. Buildings in the old city centre were targeted and destroyed for their cultural value and significance (Coward 2006; Herscher 2008). Trees and other landscaping were almost completely clear cut to provide fuel and food[78]. Certain parts of the city, such as Sniper Alley, were more visible to Serbs hidden in the surrounding hillsides, and hence more vulnerable, to gun fire and shelling. What was previously undisturbed green space on the hillsides became overfilled graveyards. The Olympic sites, such as the stadium and other structures, were also targeted[79].

At the time, Sarajevo's urban planning offices are limited in what they can do in regards to both structural and funding issues. Additionally, the legacy of corruption and cronyism makes for an inefficient system where planning applications can be processed quickly or slowly depending on who you are and how much one is willing to pay in bribes. As interview subject SJ1 commented 'the conflict created a lot of these open windows for people to take advantage of situations so a lot of these politicians use their you know influence to line their own pockets, and it makes for a very difficult place to do business because these are the guys that are keeping you from getting permits, these are the guys that keeping from working on it...' which directly harkens back to the way things used to be done in the Yugoslav era (SJ1) which was also supported by SJ5s comment that corruption

was one of this largest problems plaguing the country.For Sarajevo, this has meant that foreign, Western interests have a more difficult time gaining planning permission, while local, regional, or Muslim-sponsored projects can move ahead more quickly. On the other hand, it was the foreign, often-times Western presence that initially inflated the Bosnian Mark through daily spending by aid workers, resulting, even 20 years later, in what SJ1 called 'the American discount', or rather the increase of prices for foreigners, which has also contributed to uneven economic development[80]That said, the post-conflict economy was supported by the backing of the World Bank as well as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development on a vast majority of projects that drove many levels of the reconstruction process[81]

As all aspects of the built environment were damaged, it was a slow process of just cleaning up. Foreign agencies concentrated on different things as well; for some, to aid the reconstruction of historic buildings or bridges was vital while for others it went to roads and transportation[82]. Revitalization of the city took many forms though there was little centralized planning taking place to regulate the regeneration, location, and sponsorship of projects led by private developers[83].

Reconstruction and regeneration in Sarajevo has been small-scale and consumption driven, supported by interviewee SJ2's comment that there 'is so much shopping now'[84]. That is not to say the city does benefit from a series and policies and strategies aimed at urban planning and development[85]: according to Fetahagic (2010), these plans involve mainly guidance regarding infrastructural and technical matters, as well as economic and cultural development. These documents tackle issues that any urban planning framework does, but they do not appear to discuss any kind of regeneration framework. Sarajevo is equipped administratively to handle property development projects, real estate transfers, and legal matters pertaining to this like any other city, but with the lack of design guidance, projects are chosen for suitability of economic and other planning needs, as opposed to suitability for location or cultural and social necessity.

The race to develop open space in the city centre left over after the rubble of the siege was cleaned up happened against the backdrop of the city (and country) developing a Western, liberalized market economy for the first time since dissolution of Yugoslavia (set out in the Dayton Accords). By the early 2000s, developers and investors began to make their mark on the landscape of Sarajevo in the form of small-scale privately driven developments[86]. Alongside this was the reconstruction of important buildings that had been targeted in the war, whose rebuilding were financed by foreign aid agencies and

governments. These included the Parliament building, the UNITIC Towers, the Holiday Inn, and other historic neo-classical and Ottoman buildings. It was the combination of sponsored reconstruction projects such as these that perhaps gave confidence for smaller-scale projects to emerge. There was also another level at work: Islamic investors saw the majority-Muslim Bosnian state as an ideal location to invest. Not only was the country in dire need of a rejuvenated infrastructure that investment would bring, but Islamic banking and lending principals would be welcomed. Their interest was aided by the transition to a liberalized market economy that freed up space for private investment[87].

The advent of reconstruction and regeneration in Sarajevo was not only enabled by provisions in the Dayton Accords that opened up economic structures, but also by the fact that the Bosnian government and the Sarajevo municipal government were very short on resources to guide such processes. Lack of funding was a pervasive theme in the interview responses, with SJ1 summarizing this sentiment: 'the state itself is doing a lot to try and combat a plethora of problems so I mean in terms of real estate, I don't think they've gotten to that segment where they can say 'let's invest a significant amount of money into make a drastic change'.In looking back at the elements of Dayton that addressed the built environment at all, the emphasis was on refugee housing and property rights and the restoration of historical and cultural monuments. In the city centre, these aspects did not play a major role, save for the restoration of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman parts of the Stari Grad (Old City Center).

In the small-scale regeneration of the city centre, the majority of the new buildings and projects concentrated on the creation of shopping centres and commercial property[88]. Sites are also mixed-use in that they also offer residential housing and are service oriented in the development of hotels and restaurants. However, new buildings projects have not created new jobs or industry in the classic sense—there is not a new factory or centre or production for a good or service. This idea was iterated by interview subject SJ3:

> The shopping is a new thing, a new concept, and all generations, not just young, are still struggling to integrate into the system. Some people say 'why are they building shopping centres? Why are they not building factories? We are not producing anything, so it's difficult you know, you just bring in private companies, they are selling their own products and people are spending money, but no one is producing anything.

In this case, the creation of new ways to spend money has occurred in an environment that has continued to suffer from economic underproductivity in other ways.

Many property development firms in Sarajevo are, or once were, construction companies. As SJ1 indicated, 'the local real estate development companies are basically local construction companies—there's no real estate development company in Bosnia . . . ' Transparency International (TI) reports that in the construction industry is the biggest source of global corruption and is especially problematic in post-conflict locations (Transparency International 2005). The suggested connection is that these construction and property development companies are led by individuals whose fortunes were based on more clandestine activities during the war that were translated into more acceptable operations post-Dayton. This represents an important social shift in the city:

> 'In Sarajevo, for example, the city's social structure has been turned upside down: at the same time as many of the most educated professional technocrats have fled abroad, many who were previously on the margins of society have experienced rapid upward mobility thanks to their wartime roles and political connections. The daily Sarajevo newspaper, Oslobodjenje, lamented during the siege that 'before our eyes, the new class is being born in this war, the class of those who got rich overnight, all former 'marginals''' (Andreas 2004, 44).

In Sarajevo, this has meant that not only has the location of capital and power in society shifted post-war, but so has the conception of free-enterprise and liberalized economies been shaped by the changing dimensions of human capital in the city.

This all has been enabled by the liberalization of the economy where there is less restriction on who can invest. In addition, the post-conflict context is often a period of time when people and groups who may have profited from clandestine war-time activity can legitimately transfer into a more acceptable public role. In many cases, they are the ones who have the capital to sponsor investment and development activities, as the profits from previous illicit activities are easily invested in more socially beneficial development projects. It has also meant that in post-Dayton Sarajevo, the built environment is a prime area of investment for all kinds of foreign investors with enough capital and risk-taking ethos to develop, as it is through this that other forms of profit are rendered and controlled, such as shopping malls and mixed use sites.

The regeneration of Sarajevo's city centre has represented a huge shift in the Bosnian culture and identity, as notions of a consumer society are being fostered through the type of investment taking place. However, it is problematic in that while the space for consumption is changing the way Sarajevan's use their city, it is also potentially eliminating other more robust forms of economic development. In the liberalized economic context

however, whose responsibility is it to ensure that Sarajevo is receiving a mix of investment projects? Is it the responsibility of the developers, or is it also representative a larger problem plaguing Bosnia's post-conflict development in general? Pamela Hariton, the US Special Representative for Commercial and Business Affairs stated at the April 2011 Sarajevo Business Forum: 'New jobs and private-sector-led growth will depend on investors putting their faith in the future of this country and this region, and that will depend on leaders making the visionary choices necessary to create a stable, transparent business environment that allows the free market to flourish' (Hariton 2011). In this case, it is appears that the jobs that people seek, and the replacement of the factories that used to keep Sarajevo afloat (in whatever form), will only come if the local market is more open. And this will only happen if the private property development of Sarajevo, as well as the planning offices that regulate them, are to do an about-face in their approach to development.

5.8.2 Beirut

When the Ta'if Accords were put into effect in 1990, the city centre was in ruins. Other parts of Beirut too had been damaged by the war with evidence of pock marks from bullet holes common throughout. However, nowhere was the destruction as well-evidenced as in the BCD[89]. When it came time to clean up and repair the city, Hariri's assistance, through his control of Solidere, was crucial to getting rubble and other remnants of the war swept up and pushed away (Stewart 1996). While other parts of the city also struggled to regain a sense of normality in terms of lack of threat of violence, functioning utilities, and the complication of refugee return, the question of what to do with the centre was an entirely different matter that became Hariri's central focus (Sawalha 2010; Zacks 2006). Through his leadership powers, he was able to create legislation amending the original law that had created the CDR in 1977 (Makdisi 1997, 672). This made the CDR so that it could legally aid a private construction and development company using public funds. In this way, Solidere was able to work with a foot in both the private and public sectors.

Reconstruction in Beirut was handled by both the private and public sectors: essentially the CDR and Solidere. The CDR was tasked with repairing the roads, communication networks, and other public utilities, while Solidere began the long-term

task of rebuilding and redesigning the city centre, which included the Souks (the historic market core of the city), Nejme Square, and Martyrs Square. Aside from Solidere's funding of the city centre area, this project, as well as other reconstruction projects throughout the city, were funded primarily by the World Bank, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, and the European Investment Bank (Eken and Helbling 1999, 9).

From the beginning, the Solidere-led reconstruction project was scrutinized by local media and intelligentsia, and the project has had a very high profile in discourse concerning post-war issues even to the present day (Schmidt 2006)[90]. Its potential impact on the surrounding city as well as on the economy has been critically examined from a variety of angles. Despite the consternation over property ownership or historic identity, the underlying message is that Solidere never stopped what they were doing despite public criticism, which supported the growing notion that they were greedier and profit driven then even previously thought. Being privately owned, so were their interests. Ultimately, they could do almost whatever they wanted (Nagel 2002). On the other hand, the development was also welcome and a strong indicator of some kind of financial and economic faith that the city would continue to thrive despite the debilitating effects of the civil war (Addison, Le Billon, and Murshed 2001).

Hariri's role in effecting the level of development and reconstruction of Beirut city centre cannot be underestimated, though it was also a unique confluence of a ripe post-Ta'if political context and charismatic personality that enabled him to conduct the reconstruction of a large portion of public space in the war-torn city centre (Krayem 1997). There was a general desire in the Arab world to do 'something' about Lebanon[91], and Hariri was the catalyst. His personal wealth, coupled with his construction and engineering industry background and as well as his ambition and political savvy enabled his rather swift transition from business leader, to Prime Minister, then core share-holder of Solidere (Krijnen and Fawaz, 2010). The Ta'if Accords, in this case, were directly, but unintentionally, the reason Hariri was able to do what he did. It is true that the Accords did not include language that strongly or directly indicated that the built environment was a concern in the post-conflict context. What it did do, however, was alter the conditions of the presidency and prime minister and re-establish a drive to regain the economic centrality in the Arab region as a link between the West and Middle East.

In reviewing the evolution of Beirut's reconstruction and regeneration, the emphasis on Solidere is without question a vital component in this. While parts of the city were qualitatively improved and regenerated in the classic sense, they are more ad-hoc in

the development of the post-war city though are still vital to a strong degree in what they offer outside the Solidere-controlled centre. Following is a brief description of the two spheres or reconstruction and regeneration: Solidere and the rest of the city.

Inside Solidere[92]. As the central figure in the reconstruction of the BCD, Solidere has reshaped the look, feel, and use of the city centre. Working completely independently of government and public input, the private development company has put into practice and context the 'vision of the future' for Beirut. Attempting to allay the devastating effects of the war both economically and on the built environment, the re-designed city centre has focused on bringing high-end luxury goods and products, as well as commercial, business, and residential space, to the historic central core. Solidere's remit has also included environmental mitigation in the form of the marina, which during the war was the city dumping ground for rubbish. It has since been treated and has expanded the shoreline of the city. In the mid-nineties, the years following Ta'if, much of the work concentrated on this building project as well as clearing away totally or partially ruined buildings in the city centre. Construction on the souks was completed in 2009, and other parts of city centre around the Nejme Square had been gradually opened through the previous decade.

Outside Solidere[93]. In the rest of the city, two primary forms of reconstruction and regeneration have occurred: small-scale residential properties and apartment blocks and retail centres, whether in the form of free-standing shops or shopping malls. Generally, the built environment of the city reflects a pre-war design aesthetic. There are numerous buildings that are either completely derelict, riddled with bullet-holes, or simply war damaged but habitable. Because traditional Lebanese property law requires the owner of a property to sign it over to a new owner before it can be developed, many derelict sites reflect the fact that the owner has not claimed the property, presumably having migrated during the war. Shopping malls and other of retail outlets have changed the fabric of the city. For the most part, outside Solidere, building projects are small-scale. They are selected due to availability of legally owned land and hence are peppered throughout the city. There is evidence of locally-driven regeneration in the form of a spruced-up section of bars, restaurants, and cafes that appeal to young Beirutis and tourists, which also provides for variety in the feel of the city.

In looking at the overall influence the Ta'if Accords had on the way the built environment in central Beirut developed, it was the broad nature of the treaty and the desire to recapture the wealth of the pre-civil war city that drove the creation of Solidere and the pattern of urban regeneration it engaged.

5.8.3 Belfast

The regeneration of Belfast began long before the Belfast Agreement was even conceived as a possibility. In 1988 the city of Belfast created the 'Making Belfast Work' campaign and in 1990 the Urban Area Plan was published, from which the public-private agency called the Laganside Development Corporation emerged (Pl ö ger 2007) [94]. The initial goal was to regenerate land adjacent to the river Lagan through environmental remediation and development of property. The river itself, being tidal, was also the subject of intensive clean up and engineering works. The project expanded to include parts of the city centre in 1996, through which the Cathedral Quarter was developed[95]. It is important to note that the work of the Laganside Development Corporation occurred during the general economic prosperity of the 1990s and would not likely have had the same results had a project its kind been undertaken in the 1960s or 1970s (Neill 2007; Plöger 2007; Sterrett et al. 2005).

Because of this, the pattern of urban regeneration in Belfast in many ways predates its peace agreement. In this case, the successful and ongoing nature of the regeneration of Belfast through Laganside could be said to have aided in building confidence in the peace agreement which was approved in a 1999 referendum[96]. Laganside also had a knock-on effect of encouraging other sources of private investment in the city centre that was not initialized by the local government. For instance, one representative of a property development company explained to me how the remediation of the brownfield site where the Gasworks was located was a big confidence-building move early on (BF10). In the post Belfast Agreement context, the fact that increased political stability was achieved and that cease fires were committed to meant an increasing amount of investors saw Belfast as potential territory for property development and investment, especially in the city centre which had previously been largely ignored.

The Belfast Agreement contained a moderate amount of language related to the built environment, as was revealed earlier in the chapter. The sections it was included in called for the creation of agencies to address urban and economic vitality, though other more specific considerations were lacking. What the Belfast Agreement did was create an official space for confident investment. Belfast benefitted from already being part of an organized, stable, and economically viable state and thus investment in the city was a natural progression in the continued development of peace in Northern Ireland and in

Belfast, meaning that it was able to benefit from similar regeneration strategies and models as other UK cities.

Belfast did not suffer from the typical 'war wounds' that are found in other contexts: where cities such as Sarajevo and Beirut suffered intensive structural damage, Belfast did not suffer in the same way. In many ways, the effect of the conflict was more deeply ingrained in the social organization and orientation of the city. The separation of the city into largely Catholic or Protestant areas, as well as spaces of the city that were typically more middle class and desired to abstain from the conflict, meant that territorial and spatial identification was part of understanding and navigating the city. In this context, the city centre was not anyone's territory and was the location of bombings and paramilitary activity throughout the Troubles. The city centre was not a place that one hung out in or frequented on a casual basis, something illustrated by many interviewees of a younger generation who were not allowed to go to the city centre for any reason when they were younger (BF1, BF9). Despite its political and geographic centrality, it was avoided. In addition, the presence of the various peace walls running through the city, as well as the more subtle reading of city centre building fronts (where more modern building fronts where there should be Victorian-era ones indicate that it had been partially or mostly destroyed by a car or street bomb)[97], are ways in which the conflict is manifest in the built environment.

In this context, the regeneration of Belfast through Laganside and the subsequent effect of private developers investing in the city centre was spurred on by the fact that the space was not in the remit of a particular group's territory[98] (BF3 indicated it was a 'neutral space', BF13 claimed that the city centre was 'mostly neutral but almost more a Catholic space', and BF6 also admitted that 'working outside the city centre is too complicated'). What this means is that in the city centre, one does not have to work within the political and social strictures of a local (and often highly vocal community. This means that getting projects started and completed takes less time and resources, illustrated by interviewee BF11s work on housing outside the city centre, which takes a lot longer while the work of others (BF1, BF2, BF6, BF9, and BF10) is faster—or at least only has to deal with bureaucracy and not local politics. A telling example of what a developer thought of building housing outside the city centre indicated the resistance to it: 'it's no good getting us involved in the community issues cause we're not really that interested. . .' (BF10). While on the other hand, another housing development company that builds many projects in sectarian and interface areas, doesn't really claim to do it for any particular reason: 'we

mainly concentrate in the Belfast area . . . you look at it from—white divides good to bad. . . you look at it and its white, white, white, grey, and then black— we have built what would consider grey, dark grey, and black areas as well as the white areas'. However, one could read into that and see that because there is a real need for improved housing stock outside the city centre, it is worth the procedural risk. This has meant that in Belfast, much regeneration and property development is almost exclusively limited to the city centre, as the effort involved in order to successfully develop outside of it in the territorialized parts of the city is often too great.

The Laganside Corporation represented a successful hybridization of public and private investment in a long-term regeneration scheme. Other projects have also made an impact on the city centre, notably the development of the Castle Court Shopping mall, which added another level of confidence in city centre investment in mid-1990s (Plöger 22). Other private investor driven projects have been completed, such as St. Anne's Square, the high-rise Obel Tower and other small-scale schemes[99].

However, it is the continued interest by the Belfast municipal government in partnering with private corporations for larger-scale developments that illustrates the continued post-Agreement regeneration context. The consolidation of capital through private investment in development schemes centring on retail and commercial property, such as what is happening with the Royal Exchange[100], illustrate the unique state of post-conflict regeneration in Belfast. In addition, the creation of the Titanic Quarter presents a counter-balance to the consumer-driven development of the city centre[101]. Here, the long-range plan (20-30 years) for the former shipbuilding quarter involves not only the development of residential, service, retail, and commercial opportunities, but also a future vision of Belfast. As Neill (2007) eloquently declared, the Titanic Quarter was

> The idea to create a new precinct for Belfast and. . . dates from the aftermath of the Belfast Agreement. . .The project concept and brand launched in 1999 and based on the salvage of *Titanic* heritage has been embraced with gusto by all official place promotion agencies in Belfast. . . That a city should promote its heritage for profit is, of course, unremarkable. . . what is remarkable in 'post-conflict Belfast' is that the city, in less than a decade, has gone from leaving the memory of Titanic 'on a sunken plain of the psyche', not wishing to draw as much attention to its 'ambiguous pride and and embarrassment', to active celebration in representing the post-conflict city through association with the greatest of all twentieth-century symbols of human hubris, the lost confidence of modernity and the existential self-comprehensions, to use Heidegger's phrase, of the self as a 'being-towards-the-end' (315-316).

Focusing on the development of new economic sectors, such as science and technology research and development centres as well as a financial district, it is hoped these efforts will bolster the economy of the city in the long-term, an idea supported by a Titanic Quarter representative explaining that 'when people are fighting in conflict, no one leaves their space and nothing to be proud of, nothing interesting. We want to bring people back in, redraw people, as the city centre was decimated once everything was blown up and people left. Getting people back is so important. . . the notion of city centre living in last seven years in changing now people live here' (BF2).

In addition, while the Belfast Metropolitan University and the Northern Ireland Public Records office have made the newly opened sections of the Titanic Quarter home, the company's agenda extends beyond this, as mentioned above, all of which is reflected in its masterplan[102].

5.9 Conclusion

The preceding analysis looked at how peace treaties did, or did not, impact on the regeneration of the built environment in each city. It also demonstrated the broadly similar yet contextually different ways economic liberalization and the incidental and unplanned investment by the private sector in the reconstruction and regeneration of each city has aided in establishing social and economic stability in the state, or at least has been supportive of it. Space that is privately developed yet publicly utilized presents a variety of issues in the cases. Newly-developed shared space increases and promotes consumer-driven values which inspire further problematization of the relationship that has developed between private sector investment and the state. These are issues that require greater attention.

Legitimation is also a key point that needs to be addressed: in looking to link the content of this chapter to the overall discussion, it is the issue of legitimation that offers a way for understanding the ability of the built environment to be as successful as it was in each place. That the built environment made concrete the expectations of a post-Ta'if success can be attributed to the way the reconstruction of the city centre was used as a focal point, both literally and symbolically, for getting Lebanon back on its feet. In Belfast as well, the regeneration of the city centre and increasing its accessibility also helped bring the divided communities together, at least in some space. This too helped to make the

Belfast Agreement look like it was working. In Sarajevo, the built environment story still helped to legitimize the peace, but in a way that also helped redefine Bosnian identity in the post-Yugoslav state.

In the following chapter, these issues, in addition to matters of state, group, and local identity; the quality and accessibility of regenerated city centre space; the observable role of the private sector in defining that space; and the role of the city centres in expressing additional insights into the relationship between the city, the people, and the post-conflict context are explored through an ethnographic analysis of place. The goal here has to been not only to show the relationship that exists between the peace treaty and the development of each city, but also set the stage for seeing each city as it is in the present so as to round out the analysis of themes and implications in subsequent chapters.

CHAPTER SIX

Walking Outside the Line: Reflections on the Contemporary Post-Conflict Urban Form and the Spaces In-between

6.1 Introduction

> *True enough, we need an environment which is not simply well organized, but poetic and symbolic as well. It should speak of the individuals and their complex society, of their aspirations and historical tradition, of the natural setting, and of the complicated functions and movements of the city world. But clarity of structure and vividness of identity are first steps to development of strong symbols. By appearing as a remarkable and well-knit place, the city could provide a ground for the clustering and organization of these meanings and associations. Such a sense of place in itself enhances every human activity that occurs there, and encourages the deposit of a memory trace (Lynch 1973, 119).*

Drawing on Lynch's description above, the idea that cities are fundamental to the development of identity and meaning for individuals and groups helps understand how cities are vital to post-conflict peacebuilding. In drawing out the earlier theoretical themes of legitimation as the process and relationship shared between peacebuilding and cities, Lynch's message also links up with this. By viewing the ISIS and lifeworld as the 'clustering and organization of meaning and association', their provision can be understood as essential to successful legitimation. It is also apparent that if the reconstruction of these cities can be called neoliberal urban regeneration, then Lynch's definition becomes even more important, for these 'meanings and associations' will always remain to a degree, despite the changes that occur on the surface.

In this chapter, the focus shifts to exploring each city by observing its patterns of use and unseen territory and spaces, thus exploring its potential for contributing to or detracting from peacebuilding. NRT provided a framework for my approach, as presented in chapter three, in which it was argued that walking observation was a form of ethnographic analysis which could be used as a tool in studying urban phenomenon, developing a more nuanced sense of 'place', in addition to making primary observations.

In general, it is acknowledged that 'ethnography enables social scientists to uncover relationships that have not been explicitly spelled out in theoretical formulations' (Wilson and Chaddha 2009, 550) and when applied to place, the emphasis is then focused on the human and non-human interactions (myself in relation to the city-objects around me). In this research the relationship between the built environment and peacebuilding was sought. However in exploring this it was clear that more was at stake as additional relationships and manifestations emerged, which are discussed in detail at the end of this chapter and in chapter seven. Through the process of historical and contextual analysis, themes regarding economics, changing notions of class and identity, as well as the stabilization of government and politics emerged as pivotal in understanding the culture and the conflict in each city as well as how they are manifest in physical form in the city. In examining the peace agreements, it was found that these elements did factor strongly into the peace treaty language, however it was the urban dimension that was lacking. Seeing as these aspects had not been part of the initial research formulation, Wilson and Chaddha's statement points to the practicality of ethnography, and thus the use of walking and observation, as a means of attempting to observe and understand more subtle processes that make the theoretical relationship in question work.

The following accounts attempt to draw out the observations of city life and urban regeneration. The purpose of the analysis is to offer a narrative account of place but also focus on observations of the city that illustrate how the emergent themes are found in the regeneration of the city centres. How people use the space, how I used it in comparison to others, as well as what the quality of space said about the general state of peacebuilding as a function of the peace treaty objectives was part of the observation process.

In walking through these cities, I chose to take advantage of my newness to exploit the experience of letting the observable footfall of pedestrians and other readable elements in the built environment guide my initial forays. By doing this, I was able to gain a fundamental sense of where natural urban pathways lead. In successive walks, alternative routes were taken with the goal of understanding why certain pathways were preferred over others, as well as again what they exposed the walker to. In this approach, I was able to base observations of the city centre and its regeneration (and the emergent themes) on how it was accessed and what elements differed along the route, and what these differences meant. Observing what was used, and why, was essential to assessing the perceived success of the city. There was also a sense that penetration of the city centre was guided by finding a variety of ways into it, through it, and around it. In this way, I was able to observe both the

used and unused routes of the city, exposing me to aspects of city centre regeneration and the built environment left unseen by many. The maps in located in Appendix III show the walking routes taken through the case study cities.

Walking is a valid means for gathering data as it allows one to see the world and make observations in the dual role of user/observer in the active state of physical movement. This position was first introduced in chapter three by exploring the use of NRT supporting the idea that walking is an important way of viewing the city and that the researcher plays an important role within that process. The literature on walking as it has developed has many fascinating facets, however discussed here are the elements of it that are most applicable to the research at hand.

Walking is an important way of knowing a city and is a classic approach to seeking out patterns, systems, relationships, and problems in urban life. During the 1920s the faculty of the Chicago School of Sociology would send students out on the streets of the city to take advantage of this perspective (Jayne et al. 2009). In fact, walking a practice of observation is perhaps most famously embodied by the concept of the *flâneur*: someone who wanders and ambles through an urban setting 'linking space, language and subjectivity' that allows them 'to read cities' (Amin and Thrift 2002, 11). These early instances of urban perambulation take walking from an activity done to get somewhere, or simply as transportation, to something that causes dialogue and interaction with city itself and involves observing, and even pushing, social and class boundaries, conceptions of safety, and views of the other. This perspective informed the way walking was performed in the case study cities, as a means of engaging and questioning urban life.

In looking at the literature on walking, the work of de Certeau has been central to the emergent discourse on the act of walking as a methodology and an act of performativity and part of understanding everyday life (de Certeau 1984). For de Certeau, walking and the city represented a way of exploring the spatial and temporal dimensions of urban life in one movement. He was particularly eloquent in 'reading' the maps of streets and pathways that were either imposed upon or naturally developed through activity of the city:

> It is true that the operations of walking on can be traced in city maps in such as way to as to transcribe their paths (here well-trodden, there very faint) and their trajectories (going this way and not that). But these thick or thin curves only refer, like words, to the absence of what has passed by. Surveys of routes muss what was: the act itself of passing by. The operation of walking, wandering, or 'window shopping', that is the activity of passers-by,

> is transformed into points that draw a totalizing and reversible line on the map. They allow us to grasp only a relic set in the nowhen of surface projection. Itself visible, it has the effect of making invisible the operation that made it possible. These fixations constitute procedures for forgetting. The trace left behind is substituted for the practice, it exhibits the (voracious) property that the geographical system has of being able to transform action into legibility, but in doing so causes a way of being the world to be forgotten. (de Certeau 1984, 131).

When walking, there is a constant duality when it comes to it that always inhabits the physical/spatial and temporal/emotional (Simonsen 2004). These interact in a way that opens up new understandings of urban space. De Certeau's passage above also resonates with NRT (as it should) and opens up an analytical turn as a walker to the possibility of seeing what might not normally be perceived in the invisible lines and routes of a city.

Walking helps to order and situate the individual in the urban, but it also urges one to confront fear that is often part of experiencing unknown urban environments. Pain (2001) looked at reasons why the idea of 'fear' and the city commonly focused on strangers in public spaces when in fact spaces in and of themselves can have a variety of meanings for people. This idea is further challenged by Solnit's (2001) argument that interactions with strangers in public space adds an 'emancipatory' level of engagement with the city (Solnit 2001, Middleton 2008). Baumann (1994) refers to how fear embodied by pedestrians causes them to rush as quickly as possible from place to place, an idea that also intersects with an earlier discussion of 'geography of fear' wherein city spaces because avoided or disregarded because of the feeling of personal or social fear they provoke, something evident in all three case study cities.

In my experience of walking in each city, there was nothing exceptional about what I encountered. I went out every day with different goals in mind: sometimes there was a building I wanted to visit, or part of the city that I could see from a distance that I wanted to explore up close, or a route that I hadn't taken yet I wanted to see. In all cases, I navigated both by map, but also by choosing pathways that were at times well-trodden, other times less so. It was an exercise in curiosity, to see how far I could get on my own without getting stuck and needing a map or to retrace my steps. In many cases, I ended up walking in places that made no sense: large highways with no sidewalks or crossings, sidewalk that dropped off into nothing, or expanses of abandoned city or brownfield sites. In all three cities, I was impressed by how little of the cities was truly accessible and navigable on foot, and often times I felt that there was no room for the pedestrian in such

places. What this often spelled was a sense of loneliness and isolation even in the midst of urban density.

In the above quote from de Certeau, mapping a city erases the processes that made that very space possible: walking and observation of the spaces that are otherwise 'thick or thin curves' on a map help to reawaken the meaning and narrative of time and place that is part of using and seeing places not normally seen. In my experience, the overall sense that I was taking in and acquiring an additional level of story and experience of a city that is normally ignored was present in my experience of these places. I purposely wanted to encounter such forgotten or unexperienced aspects of city so that I could better understand the city as a whole.

In examining the case study cities through peripatetic, experiential, and observational lenses, an ethnographically-oriented analysis of each city resulted. This is articulated through my explorations of Sarajevo in section 6.2, Beirut in section 6.3, and Belfast in section 6.5 below. Each city is followed by a brief analysis of the routes taken and observed elements that are picked up in greater detail in chapter seven. Section 6.6 looks at some of the major themes that emerged from the analysis, and 6.7 concludes the chapter. As part of showing the observational data and evidence that resulted from the walks which informed later analysis, there are corresponding photographs that illustrate the observed, used, and walked territories of the cities. These photo groups follow each page it is mentioned on.

6.2 Sarajevo: An Urban Palimpsest

Sarajevo has experienced five major transitions of power in the last 125 years. Throughout that time it has expanded, adapted, and adopted the architectural vernacular of those in power, creating a stark shift from one historical epoch to the next as one travels through the city. Looking around, the evidence of the war as well as the juxtaposition of architectural styles masks the underlying meaning of what has happened in term of regeneration in the city in the post-conflict context. Images of decay and destruction are immediately visible on surface of the city, distracting and 'othering' the viewer. In spite of that, the experience of Sarajevo revealed complex relations between the local population, municipal and national governance, and the notion of a future Sarajevan, and Bosnian,

identity. Commenting on the conflict in Bosnia and the theory that it was driven by 'ethnic hatreds', Malcolm (1994) states that

> 'the main basis of hostility was not ethnic or religious but economic: the resentment felt by the members of a mainly (but not exclusively) Christian peasantry towards Muslim landowners. This hostility was not some absolute or irreconcilable force: it varied as economic circumstances changed, and was also subject to political pressures. . .' (Malcolm 1994, xxi).

Likewise, the relationship the built environment shares with peacebuilding is not limited to the conflict that scarred the city starting nearly two decades ago; rather it extends to notions of an identity that is at once post-Yugoslav as well as post-conflict and doing so in an economic climate that is as volatile as it was prior to war itself.

Sarajevo is a city of contrasts. Buildings that are crumbling or just common are situated next to large blue-glass real estate ventures; people use and live in the city like any other place, and yet all around are ever present reminders of the war. Though commanding vistas of the Dinaric Alps bring depth and distance to the city, it also feels quickly stifling in its lack of accessibility and challenging terrain. In looking at ways post-conflict regeneration and reconstruction are manifestations of the peace treaty, these contradictions illustrated one overarching observation: that change and adaptation does not mean erasure of the past and that the past is unapologetically a necessary component of moving forward. There is a wealth of visual information regarding both the siege and the other periods of Sarajevo's past; none of it covered up or despised, but all part of the landscape, just as 'Sarajevo Roses', where evidence of mortar blasts that resulted in a casualty were filled with red resin, are dotted throughout the city (see image 6-1, page 189). What then do these newest developments in Sarajevo mean in terms of acknowledging the past but moving forward? How are issues addressed in Dayton made visible in the built environment, and how does it appear to be working and successful?

6.2.1 Divergent yet Unitary: Walking Sarajevo

Sarajevo is in a general state of gradual and melancholic aging. Pavements are cracked and uneven and buildings often are reminiscent of some former glory, albeit not that of Bosnia but of its rulers. In a general sense, the most striking thing about Sarajevo is

the presence of five radically different phases in the city's history. In Stari Grad (Old City), the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian architecture represent vastly different yet seamlessly integrated epochs and building style. As the city extends westward, the old world grandeur of the Austro-Hungarian buildings are seriously decayed being at the margins of the next historic phase as well as having been in full view of Serb forces and hence artillery fire. The vastness and reach of the Yugoslav tower blocks dominate the central artery of the city, the main thoroughfare where both the tramline and the vehicular traffic runs; this avenue was also called 'sniper alley' during the siege for the view the Serbs had of the street from the surrounding hills . Further west, the expansion of the suburbs of Ilidza reaches out to foothills of the Dinaric Alps where the source of river Bosna is found. Back in the city centre, near where the margins of the Austro-Hungarian period buildings meet their Yugoslav comrades, the newest historic epoch of the city is growing in Marindvor (see map in Appendix III, figure AIII-1).

Moving from outside the city into the centre was first done via automobile on the way in from the airport (image set I, page 189). Here the initial sense of moving into the city and penetrating the outer layers began. The outskirts of the city reminded me of cities such as San Salvador and more remote towns in Guatemala, where dirt, dust, and conflict damage contrast heavily with lacy curtained windows, drying laundry, children's toys, and corner shops. The reminder is simple: life always goes on, despite whatever damage war brings. But there was more beyond that—these contrasts exist because of a greater narrative of scarce resources and complex political and social instability following the war. Representing an unequal distribution of capital and resources, the visual evidence of the lack of war-damage repair, as well as general upkeep, to residential homes speak to an uneven balance. It would appear here (and perhaps in other places too) money spent on the built environment in the post-conflict city is focused on the city centre, but at a loss to the surrounding residential areas. It also added to the sense that in penetrating the city one has to first understand that poverty and dereliction are a necessary part of what defines Sarajevo. One cannot experience the more appealing city centre without seeing the less-than-perfect parts first.

Journeys into the city always began and ended from the chartreuse cinder block building called the 'Papaguy' (the parrot) I stayed in (image set II, page 190). Located in an area called 'Bistrik', part of Stari Grad, and on the southern bank of the Miljacka across from the Baščaršija (the traditional market place), the building was part of the most recent pre-siege regeneration that took place just prior to the 1984 Olympics. Surrounded by older

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Image 6-1 Sarajevo Roses
The red resin, now faded, is where a mortar blast claimed a victim. These are all over the city.

Image 6-2 Example of war damage and decay juxtaposed with new developments at city outskirts

Image 6-3 Examples of newer, restored neighbourhoods

Image 6-4 Example of the damage that exists alongside the renewed sections

Image 6-5 Further into the city, looming tower blocks appear



Image 6-6 Another example of tower blocks

II

Image 6-7 The Papaguy building exterior

Image 6-8 The Papaguy building exterior

Image 6-9 The Papaguy building interior

Image 6-10 The Papaguy building interior with bullet holes

Image 6-11 Austro-Hungarian building immediately east of the Papaguy building

Image 6-11 Austro-Hungarian building immediately south of the Papaguy building

Austro-Hungarian buildings, it was also an important location for refugee and IDP families during the siege for its thick walls provided shelter from roaming sniper fire that would come from the Serb encampments on the southern hills. Leaving the building every day I was reminded of the vulnerability of the place despite its seeming impermeability as the interior arcades were sprayed with bullet pockmarks. The story of the Papaguy building was a common one throughout the war, as the movement of IDPs meant that abandoned living space was overtaken by those seeking shelter. The built environment in Sarajevo was, in many ways, the neutral fabric through which the activity of the war was played out; it provided material for survival, as well as for destruction, of human lives and livelihoods.

Leaving Papaguy (image set III, page 192), one is immediately drawn into the knotty and meandering pathways of the Baščaršija. The evenly spaced and numerous bridges spanning the modest Miljacka are also the places where the clandestine selling of sandals, socks, detergent, and other random goods take place, but also where entrance into the old centre of the city is accessed from the south. Entering the Baščaršija it is evident that the place is freshly refurbished and scrubbed clean, which is in stark contrast to most of the city. This is representative of that fact that Bosnian identity in many ways is centred on the medieval market as evidence of a pluralistic and peaceful past, providing a gauge for forming new associations with what it means to be Bosnian in the post-war and post-Yugoslav context.

The Baščaršija, being at the eastern-most end of the sinuous city, is cradled by the hills steeply ascending to the north and south up to the surrounding crown of the valley (image set IV, page 193). While the Baščaršija draws one in, the wedding-cake appearance of the houses and mosques draws the gaze out and up. The hillsides have every square meter of space accounted for, with private residences, mosques, small shops, and cemeteries. From a distance, the cemeteries look like slowly melting patches of snow; however it is the glistening of the white granite gravestones in the sun that are the actual groundcover. The vast majority of the gravestones are deaths that occurred during the siege; the risk that was taken in burying the dead on such visible hillsides increases the importance these burials had. Houses also still bear the marks of the siege; many are sprayed with bullets or evidence of mortar blasts, while the occasional site contains only the rotting remains of a more seriously damaged home, reiterating the sense that reconstruction of residential areas is not, or cannot be, a priority in the regeneration of the city.

III



Image 6-12 Miljacka River with bridges, western view

Image 6-13 Miljacka River with bridges at night, eastern view

Image 6-14 The streets of the Baščaršija

Image 6-15 The streets of the Baščaršija

Image 6-16 The streets of the Baščaršija

Image 6-17 The streets of the Baščaršija

IV



Image 6-18 Looking over the Baščaršija; note 'snowy patch' on hill in background

Image 6-19 View from inside Baščaršija looking up towards the hillsides

Image 6-20 Looking down into Stari Grad from north

Image 6-21 Looking down into Stari Grad from south

Image 6-22 Close up of the 'snowy patch' on hillside in image 6-18

Image 6-23 Example of housing decay due to abandonment/war damage

Image 6-24 Example of bullet hole sprays common in neighbourhoods

Image 6-25 Another perspective on terrain with degrading housing

Stari Grad contains most of the marketed and conveyed projections of the city's identity, the buildings cultural icons used in touristic media about Sarajevo (image set V, page 195). It is an appropriate place to situate ones journey into and through the city as it is also the beginning of the city's history where all other aspects of the built environment radiate from. The area houses many foreign and government offices, the majority of the banking sector, as well as a good mix of other goods and services, in addition to the core of the city's nightlife. Thus it is busy and traversed at all hours of the night and day. It is at once every day but also the heart of the tourist industry for the city, and so it inhabits both the commonplace and exceptional experiences for the foreigner and the local. In terms of the 'tourist gaze', this is an anathema to what is normally sought and yet also in line with it—the combination of commuters, business people, street hawkers, and tourists is a familiar sight in any large city.

In the Baščaršija, the smell of the charcoal smoke from the grilling ćevapi fills the air and there is a strong sense of historicity, save for the mobile sim card shops and tourist merchandise[103] which are sold side-by-side hardware shops, coppersmiths, and greengrocers who also fill the stalls. The shopping and consumption experiences on offer are geared equally at locals as well as tourists. There is however a possible threat to this dual use as a result of the rapid development of several new shopping malls. Unlike other parts of the city that feel imbued with a sense of alienation and vulnerability, this space, as well as Ferhadijah street, works as an 'authentic' experience of the city, despite the fact that it is no longer at its geographical heart.

Moving through the streets and public squares of the Stari Grad and following the flow of the pedestrian traffic, the proximity of the religious structures is also a message that Bosnia desires to maintain: that religious plurality continues to be a defining characteristic of Bosnian culture (image set VI, page 196). Merged in with the Ottoman architecture and Austro-Hungarian grandeur are the Orthodox and Catholic churches, Muslim mosques, and Jewish temples. However, while Sarajevo was once called 'The Jerusalem of Europe', it is no longer a reality as the Bosnian Muslim population is the majority. However, it is the image of Sarajevo as a tolerant and multi-ethnic city rests mainly on the continued presence of these places. It is notable however that only the Orthodox Church, the Cathedral Church of the Nativity of the Theotokos, seemed lacking in an active congregation. The Catholic Church where the Archdiocese of Vrhbosna is located had a large handful of worshippers on a Sunday morning; it is however, the daily call to

V

Image 6-26 Iconic Sarajevo: Sebilj Fountain

Image 6-27 Iconic Sarajevo: Sebilj Fountain

Image 6-28 Iconic Sarajevo: Street in the Baščaršija with mosque in background

Image 6-29 Iconic Sarajevo: street where copper is still forged; many antiques

Image 6-30 Iconic Sarajevo: man plays with dog in Sebilj Square

Image 6-31 Iconic Sarajevo: popular ćevapi restuarant

VI

Image 6-32 Roman Catholic church on Ferhadijah Street

Image 6-33 Congregation of Roman Catholic church



Image 6-34 Nativity of the Theotokos, (exterior) .
Source: http://www.michaeltotten.com/archives/2008/06/a-dark-corner-o-1.php

Image 6-35 Nativity of the Theotokos (interior)

Image 6-36 Ashkenazi Synagogue (with Papaguy in the background)
Source: http://gd.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Sarajevo_jewish_synagogue.JPG

Image 6-37 Examples of some of the many small mosques around the city

prayer can be heard on almost every corner of the city that creates the defining background rhythm of the city.

The experience of walking through the Baščaršija and past the religious centres is dominated by the central pedestrianized zone known as Ferhadijah Street (formerly known as 'Vase Miskina') (image set VII, page 198). The moderately wide passageway is towered over by medium-height buildings that echo the steep valley hills on either side of the old centre. Most are still dirty and pockmarked, and some are abandoned while others are refurbished. If the Baščaršija is the heart of the city, this is its main artery. This is where insights into the preferences and predilections of Bosnian culture persist; where the cultural obsession with coffee and cakes both artifacts of Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian rule, but also something that speaks to the Muslim identity of the population. While tourists also flock to the area, it has not become a faceless tourist destination, and manages to robustly maintain a distinctly Bosnian atmosphere while playing host to increasing visitors. This is a favoured space in the city, a message gathered not only from guide books but from local use. It is one of the few open space in the city that is freely walkable and is used intergenerationally as well as interculturally.

In getting a complete sense of the Stari Grad, one additional site added to the mix of cultural and social centrality of the area, presenting an additional layer to the relevance of siege destruction and historic identity being located in the built environment (image set VIII, page 199). Just at the eastern perimeter of the Baščaršija is the pseudo-Moorish style Austro-Hungarian town hall built in 1894. Later converted to the National and University Library for Bosnia and Herzegovina, it was the central collection point for Bosnia's most valuable and significant documents. Now, it is boarded up and awaiting renewal pending the collection of enough funding, having been mercilessly attacked during the siege, when most of its contents were damaged or destroyed using incendiary munitions, which makes clear the intention to burn the archival material (Regional Programme for Cultural and Natural Heritage in South-East Europe 2009). It seems much of the imagery and literature that has been written and produced of the siege centered on the destruction of this library, usually featuring the 'cellist of Sarajevo', much like the bridge in Mostar was also symbolic of the broken unity of Bosnia. It is the presence of this ruin that is what instructs the outsider to appreciate the weight of the conflict, and where it is safe to contemplate that meaning of the war. Though it appears to have an air of forcedness, as if telling the visitor what one should think and feel, it also is admittedly en effective reminder of the destruction of the war. One can enter the building, though encased in scaffolding both

VII

Image 6-38 Cafe seating along Ferhadijah Street

Image 6-39 Ferhadijah Street



Image 6-40 Ferhadijah Street

Image 6-41 Oslobedjeje Square off Ferhadijah Street

Image 6-42 Street performers on Ferhadijah Street

Image 6-43 Ferhadijah Street with shops and outdoor vendors

Image 6-44 National Library exterior

Image 6-45 National Library exterior

Image 6-46 National Library: restricted access?

Image 6-47 Entering National Library; photo display in centre

Image 6-48 Vacant stairwell and boarded up stained glass

Image 6-49 Looking up

Image 6-50 The 'Cellist of Sarajevo'
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Evstafiev-bosnia-cello.jpg

Image 6-51 The National Library during the Yugoslav era
Source: http://www.britains-smallwars.com/Museum/Bosnia/Ruins.html

inside and out, and view the hollow shell that remains. Inside a photo display depicting locals from the surrounding countryside as well as images of war and conflict in other countries, suggests the visitor contemplate such issues. In spite of these reminders, and perhaps because of it, the building is struggling to gain enough funding for reconstruction. In light of the expansion and reconstruction of Sarajevo that will continue, it would seem appropriate to allow the building to remain in its ruined state a reminder of the war, much like Frauenkirche in Dresden. While it might be questionable to direct how people create ideas about the conflict past, it also seems important to retain reminders of the conflict in a city where the risk of erasure seems inevitable in the long run.

Moving westward through Stari Grad, the natural route takes one past the newest construct in the old town, the shopping mall BBI Centar and through to a massive intersection of grand boulevards, lined on one side by Sarajevan municipality offices and boarded up abandoned buildings, all Austro-Hungarian (image set IX, page 201). The tram line that links the east and western sides of the city weaves through the automobile traffic. A clear sightline of the Skenderija Centar, an Olympic building that became a shopping mall, turns ones attention across the river, however, it is the route that continues eastward that takes one through a graveyard of neo-baroque building facades to emerge facing the confluence of tall blue-glass buildings, older constructs, and a vastly wider expanse of sky as the valley opens up.

Here, in an area called Marindvor (image set X, page 202), five major buildings dominate the setting. These buildings are all visible to each other, and each has a connection to the reconstruction and regeneration that Sarajevo has undergone. The recently rebuilt Parliament Building and the UNITIC Towers were both largely destroyed during the war, but were in the pre-war years symbols of Yugoslavia's modernity. The Holiday Inn, another Olympic project, was the epicenter of foreign activity during the siege, as well as home to refugee families, and is now also fully restored. The Avaz Twist Tower, the Alta Shopping Mall, and Importanne are all post-conflict private development projects that are adding to the definition a future Sarajevo that is centred on newness and optimism, or consumer culture and media, depending on how you read into it. There is also a sixth major site that at the time of research was a massive hole in the ground (and is nearing completion now) that is to be 'Sarajevo City Centar', a large mixed-use site.

The various periods of Bosnia's governance are visible in its buildings, and the new city center growing in Marindvor is no exception. Here is where the post-war development

IX

Image 6-52 View of the BBI Centar from Velik Park

Image 6-53 View of the intersection of Marshall Tito Street; large Austro Hungarian and Yugoslav buildings in background

Image 6-54 Same intersection; note the yellow tram, pedestrian and automobile traffic, and Skenderija Centar in back centre

Image 6-55 Aging Yugoslav facade that faces onto the area

Image 6-56 Aging Austro-Hungarian building now home to a photocopy shop

Image 6-57 The liminal zone of derelict Austro-Hungarian buildings

Image 6-58 The liminal zone of derelict Austro-Hungarian buildings

X

Image 6-59 The Bosnian Parliament

Image 6-60 The Holiday Inn

Image 6-61 Alta Shopping Centar

Image 6-62 The UNITIC Towers

Image 6-63 The Avaz Twist Tower

Image 6-64 Sarajevo City Centar
Source: http://
www.sarajevocitycenter.com/gallery.php

Image 6-65 The Importanne Centar

focuses on creation of a new urban identity. The look and feel of the area is one that is attempting to move forward from the war and also form an identity separate from its Yugoslav past. Here, buildings destroyed during or central to the war have been reconstructed, and more new buildings have gone up on sites that were too far-gone or not significant enough to save. The concentration of this rapid new development in this area is not surprising—it was also the focus of new commerce and civic building projects prior to the war (building construction dates indicate this), and so it is logical that it should continue here. However, other characteristics of Marindvor are also telling: it is close to the old city centre, but is also at the cross-roads of two major roads that lead out of the city. Both highways lead further into Bosnia, but just south of this main road, though not directly connected, is the invisible border of Republika Srpska only one mile away (see figure 6-1, page 204). The buildings, on the other hand, are in line with the other organic design evolution of the city—new buildings interspersed with reconstructed pre-war Yugoslav ones, supporting the idea that development of the built environment keeps the old while building the new, although distinctly lacking the rhetoric of 'preservation' as an urban planning motive.

Walking through Marindvor, one is drawn continually westward, as the shape of the city demands this (image set XI, page 205). The hillsides surrounding the area are still flanked with housing, though the vast majority of the city from here out to the suburbs is dominated by large looming tower block of Yugoslav apartments. While the population density of the area is obviously great, the numbers of people out on the streets is low. From Marindvor, the numbers drop dramatically, as people rely on the trams, busses, and personal automobiles to get into the city centre. However, there are also well-maintained riverside pathways that provide an alternative outdoor space, especially since in the non-developed land surrounding the city there are still many active mines that pose a continued threat.

While walking outside the newer city centre is tempting, it is dangerous owing to poor pavement conditions and fast-moving traffic, as well as distances being deceptively long. There is a sense that an invisible border pens in the people and experiences of Sarajevo to certain parts of the city. Outside this invisible border, there is a strong sense of alienation due to the towering buildings and lack of people out. It appeared car ownership dominated the city too, and like many places, and since the streets and infrastructure weren't designed for this, issues such as traffic and poor parking mar the pedestrian (and driving) experience.



Figure 6-2 Proximity of the Republika Srpska Border to Sarajevo

Image 6-66 View of the city looking east; note the vast range of tower blocks throughout

Image 6-67 Tower blocks

Image 6-68 Tower blocks, tram

Image 6-69 Looking up into hills from the extending tower-block lined city spine; note graveyard in background

Image 6-70 Well cared for riverside pathways

Image 6-71 Well-worn riverside pathway

From the contrasting spackle-filled pock marked buildings to the emphasis on only putting up things that are shiny, new, and big, there was an overwhelming sense that the margins and periphery of the city were an anachronism compared to the lively central old town and glittery developments of Marindvor (image set XII, page 207). In another contrasting scenario, the journey on foot along the non-walkable highway, dominated by rushing traffic and large tower blocks, parking structures, and other massive box-like retail and commercial outlets, was the presence of small makeshift shacks with white plastic carrier bags filled with some powdery substance labeled 'kreč' clearly for sale. Later I found out it was lime, typically used in mixing concrete and making other building materials. Fascinating too as it seemed to indicate that the ingredients necessary to rebuild the city were also part of sustaining this aspect of the informal economy here.

Walking back through Sarajevo to the Papaguy one is naturally led along the north bank of the river, or through the centre of Stari Grad. Accessing the southern banks of the river is a lot less appealing on foot as pavements are narrow and infrequent. Though walking is not impossible, it belies another sense of impermeability outside of Stari Grad and Marindvor.

Overall, the location of accessible and usable space is highly limited to the city centre but even in the centre the usable space took on very limited forms. In terms of observing how space was used and engaging in it myself, it was in the Baščaršija and Ferhadijah areas, as well as the growing new areas in Marindvor, that provided the best examples of this. Interestingly, the space that is most usable is that which is attached to commercial space (image set XIII, page 208). For example, the BBI has a large square in front which was heavily used by the public. Other squares off Ferhadijah and the Baščaršija are similarly utilized. Lastly, the space outside Skenderija too serves as a replacement for a public square, even being used by the fire brigade for unit formations.

Looking at the users of the city space, identity and class were not readily apparent. Except for the presence of women in headscarves belying a Muslim identification, both genders and different age groups generally seemed of a similar class. This is something that I was given the impression is changing—that before the war, there were almost no headscarves to be seen, indicating that there is in fact not just a rise in the Muslim demographic, but that one's expression of it also more acceptable. Does this mean though the Bosnia is a de facto secular Muslim state, or is it that people feel freer in this regard in the post-Dayton context?

XII

Image 6-72 the long walk home

Image 6-73 The long walk home with no pavements

Image 6-74 Lime for sale

Image 6-75 An Olympic building that sustained heavy war damage

Image 6-76 Massive shopping outlets and parking

Image 6-77 The Avaz business centar, previously and headquarters of the Olsobbedjenje newspaper, now owned by Avaz

Image 6-78 The same building as image 6-77 having sustained heavy war damage

Image 6-79 Reflection of surrounding hills in Avaz windows

XIII

Image 6-80 The open space in front of the Skenderija Centar

Image 6-81 The front of the Skenderija Centar used for a charity race staging
Source: http://www.kln.gov.my/web/bih_sarajevo/home/-/asset_publisher/BpPT/blog/team-malaysia-the-largest-contingent-for-walk-for-life-2009-walkathon-in-sarajevo?redirect=%2Fweb%2Fbih_sarajevo%2Fhome

Image 6-82 Front of the BBI Centar

Image 6-83 Front of BBI Centar used for public event

Image 6-84 Front of the Alta Shopping Centar used for a public event
Source: http://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=10150133764316355&set=a.10150133762111355.331023.169997671354&type=3&theater

Demographically speaking, the city has in fact changed since the war: the siege of Sarajevo and the forced expulsion of Serbs from the city following the war (by Serb 'authorities') certainly added to this. In one sense, the presence of headscarves is the only indication things have perhaps changed: other than that, the mixed population is still evident in the number of discotheques and late-night bars catering to a young and liberal crowd. On the other, this also implies the other narrative that impacts the built environment concerning the housing and property issue that was created by the IDP population during the war. Today, people still live in houses they perhaps did not originally own, and while owners have every right to reclaim their original property, often times they do not as the neighbourhood they once lived in is no longer welcoming as the demographics have altered significantly.

Journeying into and through Sarajevo revealed the extent to which plurality and dualism define the city and its people. Despite evidence that Sarajevo is predominantly a Muslim city, there is still a strong tendency towards more neutral and democratic usages of space and messages of identity. The city is protective of its two centres which is expressed by the difficulty in both entering and leaving them. The war is also another phase that is left mingling with the other historic phases of the city's development, and the regeneration that has occurred implies a sense of someone clunkily plunking down ideas rather than focusing on transitions in the design and layout of the city, meaning that perhaps the source of the capital for such ventures is not an internal one. These ideas are addressed in more detail below.

6.2.2 Analyzing Sarajevo: Two Centres, Multiple Identities

Sarajevo has two centers: Stari Grad, as the physical and intellectual centre of Bosnian heritage which is vital to the city's character (and the favoured city space by all interview respondents), and Marindvor, the area of intensive new building and reconstruction with its confluence of new money, foreign investment, iconic buildings and relatively unchecked development. The events that started the Bosnian war unfolded in Marindvor as did most the most visually arresting destruction of the built environment. This is symbolic of the fact that not only was the war about conflicting ethnopolitical identities and national independence, but also about the struggle of shedding the socialist

Yugoslav identity and replacing it with something at odds with it: a burgeoning socio-political identification with Western style capitalism.

It is fitting that Sarajevo has two centres, for it follows the pattern of cultural adaptation and development that is consistent with its past. While the conflict may have primarily pitted Serb against Bosnian-Muslim, the dual city centres that have developed are not reflective of this *in bello* dichotomy. Rather, it represents the duality of Bosnian identity, and its semi-fragmentation, as it is shaped in the present. In Stari Grad, there is the cultural heritage and legacy of pluralism as seen in the churches, temples, and mosques; though conversely central Sarajevo is home to eighty-five mosques (compared to a much smaller number of other places of religious practice). Many are small-scale, built in the post-war setting, which some commentators see as problematic (Martin 2008). This in itself tells two stories: one where the pluralist ideal has been maintained and one where Bosnian-Muslim identity has come to dominate the identity of Sarajevo almost entirely. In Marindvor, the drive to assert economic vigor is manifest in the burgeoning conceptions of the future path of Sarajevans: one where wealth is accumulated through foreign investment and consumption patterns adapt to neoliberal models.

In pairing these two identities, it would appear that despite evidence suggesting pluralism, the post-war reality is that Bosnian identity, especially as it is expressed in Sarajevo, is largely Muslim. But the Islamic element is of a liberal variety, and it is perhaps not a huge surprise that one of the more prolific sources of investment in Sarajevo and in Bosnia has come from Turkey. This duality is also missing one crucial element as well: the presence of employment opportunities that are needed to actually secure this future consumer vision.

Other dynamics are at play when discussing Sarajevo's dual centres and multiple identities. In terms of its ethnic make-up, considerable shifts have occurred from the pre-war to the post-war context. During the war, internal and external migration changed demographics, while post-war, refugees who have returned are changing these statistics yet again. Prior to the war, a demographic map showing the concentrations of the major ethnicities illustrated a very mixed and heterogeneous population (figure 6-2, page 211). The post-war demographic imaging (figure 6-3, page 211) tells a very different story, one whose narrative was altered by the course of a divisive war, and now presages an uncertain future: as one commentator explains, 'ethnic divisions have become entrenched to the point that Bosnia's future as a multi-ethnic state and the prospects of recurrent conflict are



Figure 6-3 'Shifting Boundaries' Pre-war Populations Demographics
Source: http://www.pbs.org/wnet/women-war-and-peace/features/interactive-map-understanding-the-dayton-accords/



Figure 6-4 'Shifting Boundaries' Post-war Populations Demographics (Estimated)
Source: http://www.pbs.org/wnet/women-war-and-peace/features/interactive-map-understanding-the-dayton-accords/

a pressing concern' (Whitt 2010,2). Currently, there is a dearth of information regarding ethnic distribution in Bosnia and Sarajevo, due to the flux of refugee and IDP return throughout the country following the war, but also because of permanent internal and external migration.

Though Bosnian identity and ethnic identity should not be mutually exclusive, certain trends in demographic shifts and ethnic relations refute this, as Whitt indicated earlier. But in Sarajevo, what this shift also indicates is the sub-narrative of housing issues, where Bosnian families have occupied the former home of Serbs that were forced to flee. Interestingly, such a dramatic shift is not very visible, even in terms of people and buildings (with the exception of the headscarves). The general issue of housing and population shift is a vital and continuously pressing matter in contemporary Bosnia, but in terms of this research it does not have a direct impact on the regeneration and built environment of Sarajevo's city centre. It has however meant that Bosnia, and Sarajevo in particular, has been the recipient of much funding and attention of private investors in Muslim countries, especially Indonesia, Turkey, and Kuwait. This has had a dramatic impact on the built environment as many of new builds and restoration projects have been funded in this way. Whether or not this is in directly related to the existence of an increased Bosnian Muslim population in the city is unclear, though one might speculate such a relationship exists more so because there is a Muslim population.

In terms of the greater story of identity, it has more to do with the larger question of what it means to be Bosnian in the post-war and post-Yugoslav state. The break-up of Yugoslavia, the declaration of independence by Croat and Bosnian Muslim members of Bosnia, and the Serb desire to remain part of what remained of the SFRY is what led to the fighting. For Bosnians today, the notion of Bosnian identity is double, for not only is it about the continual evolution of ethnicity and pluralism in Bosnia (is it truly plural or dominantly Muslim?), it is about breaking free and developing an identity separate from the Yugoslav legacy. This legacy has persisted in miring Bosnians in a variety of cultural and political stagnant viewpoints, which is seen by the respondent I interviewed as a major struggle in ensuring Bosnia has a future that is dynamic and progressive:

> 'People are very apathetic . . . I think after the war there was much more influence from the government, but now because. . . they think they cannot change anything. . . we have a socialism is very strong . . and you go to school and you know you get job, and you get social security, but then. . . now there is a lot of people who expect the government to take care of social issues. . . they don't do anything. . .' (SJ1)

The prevailing sense of apathy amongst the populace is purportedly because in the Yugoslav era, one did not have to worry about a job, healthcare, or education. The state provided much of that for the individual, and while it may have been restrictive, there was not much need for want. In the post-conflict state, there is a huge amount of uncertainty as joblessness has increased, and access to healthcare and education is more difficult or it is substandard. These situations are not unique to Bosnia, but because many are/were used to the Yugoslav system, they have not developed the capacity to advocate for themselves, nor is the system really set up for that.

Bosnia is also continually struggling socially with not just its identity, but also of fostering inter-ethnic relationships. Pickering (2007) explored the meaning of networks, both personal and voluntary, in Bosnia through a comparison of individual accounts in Sarajevo and another Bosnian city finding that people were apprehensive about building relationships with people from other ethnic groups in the personal sphere and that when they occur, they are done out of necessity rather personal and intimate knowledge. On the other hand, she found that Sarajevan's in particular were more comfortable than their counterparts in generally interacting and bonding with other ethnic groups because of the fact that there is little choice about who one's co-workers are: since jobs are harder to come by, anyone could be a work colleague. There was an across the board weakened tendency to join voluntary associations, whether single ethnicity or mixed, because there is a prevailing attitude that the group has to prove how they can help a person or a community before one will join. Pickering's findings support the idea of Sarajevo's dual centres and of the necessity of such space as it would appear the public sphere is a much more accessible way to relate to other ethnic groups.

In addition, Markowitz (2007) looked at contrasting notions of identity on a spectrum that ranged from statistics presented in the last (1991) Bosnian census to how people see themselves in the post-conflict and post-Dayton era. One aspect of her findings was that 'people's spontaneous identity stories . . . often disregard, dismiss or mock state imperatives' (2007, 45) important when considering that one of the ways Dayton tried fix the ethno-political strife that was central to the war was through the creation of three distinct groups, divided into two entities: Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bosniaks and Croats) and Repulika Srpska. What this says is that socially, there remains tension within Bosnian society regarding what can acceptably be defined by the state and on paper (case in point being the difficulty of doing a census) versus how people actually see themselves. This

points to the importance of the public sphere, generated in the Sarajevan case by private enterprise (Marin Dvor) and historic space (Baščaršija), to provide a sort of catalyst for identity creation that is separate from still-contested idea of what being Bosnian is.

What does this mean for the built environment and Bosnia's dual centres? In a country where the specters of the past are still at home in the present, it has meant that change and reconstruction in Sarajevo has been slow to happen, but that perhaps its legacy of plurality will survive because of the acceptance and integration of different identities into the built environment. Just as the newness of Marindvor beckons a glittering cosmopolitan future, Stari Grad retains a hold on the past and the emotional centre of Bosnian identity. Future development is problematic however as there are more consumption opportunities than income, potentially threatening the future economic health. This then, as will be discussed, goes on to impact individual and group identity. The impermeability of the centres will also only serve to potentially further alienate the rest of the city from the prospects of and rewards potentially availed by using the new services and facilities available in the city centre. There is also a chance that local communities could benefit through the use shared space created by the shopping malls and other complexes, but this will only work if they are accessible.

6.2.3 The New Developments and their Relation to Peace

In Sarajevo, the regeneration that has occurred, mainly shopping malls and other key buildings, and the relationship between them and the post-conflict context conveys several messages. The development of a university sector in the far suburbs is fostering a new sub-economy in Sarajevo, and the regeneration renaissance brought on by the relocation of the banking sector brought money and investment to the infrastructure and quality of space in Stari Grad. It is, however, the burgeoning and semi-unrestricted growth of Marindvor that is where the critical mass of building is occurring. While anonymous and slightly unattractive large blue-glass business complexes dot the main road way through Sarajevo, displaying new investment in certain services (mainly large 'hyper' markets or isolated hotels and parking structures), the growth that is occurring is centralized in this area. The buildings here that were damaged during the war have only recently been refinished in the last three to five years. This meant that structures such as the Bosnian Parliament and the UNITIC towers remained in their war-torn state for nearly ten years

after the siege of Sarajevo was lifted, which given the impact that would have on the general feeling of a place, is quite stark.

In Marindvor perhaps what is missing is a centralized vision for development. Sarajevo does not appear to commit any resources to guiding or regulating what is being built. Those who I spoke to attribute this to a financially unstable government, but also a government that for better or for worse must place all of its energies into more central reforms, such as those specified in Dayton. So in that sense, the regeneration of Sarajevo through the development of retail and commercial centres is part of the organic unfolding of urban change. This is not necessarily negative. As respondent SJ2 argued, central planning frameworks are not favourable and organic regeneration produces a better sense of place.

Whatever the case may be, there is a sense that on the most basic level, the new building and construction boom is a visual reminder that there is a peace dividend for the people of Sarajevo, and one of the ways it is manifest is through these projects (though of course other issues such as lack of influx in jobs and other vital built environment issues are also a challenge to that).

One contentious large-scale project is 'Sarajevo City Centar', a mixed-use development that is under the auspices of the Saudi investment group Al-Shiddi and is estimated to be over 100,000m^2 upon completion[104]. According to interview participants (SJ3-6), the site was at first promised to be a cultural civic centre for the city—an opera house, theatre, and museum. It was to boast green space and public areas for outdoor activities. However, the project was aborted as the municipality lost financial control of the project and it was taken over by the foreign investors who wanted to change the scope of the project. It is now nearing completion and is expected to open later in 2011; it will have a hypermarket, a shopping mall, a hotel, private residences, and office space. The result here is negative, in that there will not be a civic centre, but also positive, in that something is being built and if private capital had not stepped in, the space would likely have remained an empty pit.

The larger issue dominating the trends in urban regeneration and reconstruction, both as it is present in the city and not present in the residential areas, is funding. Where does the money come from for the majority of Sarajevo's property development? In some cases, it comes from foreign (mainly Saudi and Malaysian) banks; in others, it is through local business and construction agencies. In terms of other development projects, money from Turkish International Development Corporation (TIKA) and the United States Agency

for International Development (USAID) was instrumental in the refurbishing and reconstruction of more historic and culturally significant landmarks (and falls in line with Dayton's instruction to preserve national monuments). As such it is fitting that new construction goes into central, capital generating developments, and not residential renewal projects, as the private investors want to develop projects that will earn a profit, and that is more likely to happen on centrally-located and commercial endeavours. But government involvement in this is limited to processing and approving paperwork for new building sites. In terms of assessing the importance of the development of the city centre, the fact that so much foreign investment is present is both a blessing and a curse. Without the foreign investment and the currency to back up the projects, the risk taken in developing in Sarajevo (especially initially) just wouldn't have happened. In other respects however, it means that some of the intentionality and character of the area could be lost and that the interests of the local community are not considered when deciding what kind of project to develop, which is certainly the case in Sarajevo.

Sarajevo's regeneration both detracts from and supports the peace process—the unregulated nature of the city's planning and the lack of financial and public support to instigate changes that would improve the quality of the city its inhabitants all combine to make it a difficult regeneration context. This reflects an uncertain environment for peacebuilding to prosper. However, Sarajevo as a city has proven to be an adaptable space, one that can successfully syncretize new power structures with existing representations of the past. While the government is focusing most of its resources on maintaining its stability and legitimacy, many other aspects of peacebuilding are left to the wayside. The organic and unregulated development of the city centre illustrates the neoliberalizing development, including the positive effects it can have.

In general, it appears there is very little engagement in terms of revitalizing life on the ground for Bosnians, and Sarajevans, in a direct manner. This is not to say that progress hasn't been made, in fact the property development and urban regeneration examples discussed here are the more visible and tangible ways that peace and progress in the post-conflict context are manifest. Representing growth and a nascent vision of the future, the private development of various parcels of land and the reconstruction and refurbishment of key buildings and sites has been paramount. With the burgeoning university sector and increased tourism dollars[105], it will inevitably be shaped by outside forces.

The problem with Bosnia's peace, and the problem that is mirrored in the regeneration process, is the ineffectiveness of the government in instituting policy and

legislation that would lead regulation and positive change in this sector. Not that the government isn't working—but it is in fact struggling to simply maintain its identity in the face of continued ethnic and cultural divisions and internal political instability. This has put responsibility for the visual on the ground evidence of peace and stability in the hands of the private sector, though the residential and housing sector is desperately lacking in the equation. The regeneration of Marindvor and the continued centrality of Stari Grad represent this duality and potential way for measuring the future success of peace in and through the city.

6.3 Beirut: Forgetting the Past? The Case of the Roman Ruins

In Beirut, most Roman ruins found when excavating sites for building foundations are not preserved. Full archaeological excavations must be performed and all artifacts removed, but after that, one is free to build. The city has been built - and rebuilt - on top of itself for centuries, and the presence of a ruin under a building site, be it a Roman or an even older Phoenician one, is not unusual. Preservation and conservation of the archaeological sites leaves the material *in situ*, with minimal direct restoration, save for minor reconstruction of columns or other features. It appears to embody a curatorial philosophy that leaves the 'ruined' look of the site intact without sprucing it up, but also making it inaccessible to viewers whilst protecting it. Preservation of ancient historic sites is ultimately influenced by pragmatic concerns, and the limited land on which to build in Beirut dictates that many of these sites are built over. The ruins located outside the Grand Serail and Mohammed Al Amin mosque are good examples of this kind of preservation (see image set XIV, 218). For some, this is the price of progress, but for others, it betrays an even darker accusation of contemporary Beirut that perhaps it is forgetting its past.

The use of historic site preservation in the post-conflict context as part of a larger project of reconciliation is important, and has been shown to be an effective part of engaging the larger community in discussion and debate over the merits of how to preserve something and why, thus opening greater channels of communication (Thomson 2008). Taken even further, the conflict between change and preservation, in any context, is always highly contested, and thus in the post-conflict setting where negotiating the conflict past with a non-conflict future is paramount, the discussion of whether Beirutis are in fact forgetting is imbued with significance (Fairclough 2003; Low 2003).

Image 6-85 Roman ruins outside the Grand Serail

Image 6-86 Roman ruins outside the Grand Serail

Image 6-87 Roman ruins outside the Al Amine Mosque

Image 6-88 Roman ruins outside the Al Amine Mosque

Image 6-89 Roman ruins outside the Al Amine Mosque

In discussing the patterns of post-war development in Beirut, Sawalha comments that 'in establishing collective memory and preserving harmony among rival communities, these groups (consciously or unconsciously) collectively silence particular episodes of the past in what can be named "collective amnesia"' (Sawalha 2007, 187). In respect to much of Beirut's built environment, as we shall see, this contention is ever-present. But does this treatment of Roman ruins imply a level of collective amnesia as well, or simply a necessary step towards progress? Or is it part of the larger issue of rapid development being a panacea for dealing with a conflict past as opposed to addressing deeper issues, perhaps as Lefebvre suggests when talking about the rapidity with which 'countries in the throes of rapid development blithely destroy historic spaces. . . if advantage or profit is to be found in it, then the old is swept away' (Lefebvre 1991, 360)? This activity Lefebvre speaks of rings true when looking at the process of building and reconstruction of the BCD over the past twenty years, though whether it has had a deeply negative impact on society is still up for debate. On one hand, Kaplan argues that the reconstruction of Beirut shows the world that 'rather than reform or soul-searching' it has 'sunk into collective amnesia and rampant consumerism' (Kaplan 2000, 166). This begs the question of whether the regeneration of Beirut is irrevocably changing the capacity to reflect on the past, or providing a means for building a future that is based on changing notions for what post-conflict Beirut represents?

In observing and experiencing Beirut, the city provides ample opportunity to marvel at the massive intersections of decay and renewal, of open scars and brand new bandages, and an almost irreconcilable need to maintain a Lebanese identity that is amenable to cultural and inward reconciliation, but also indicative of outward looking desires for international investment. Contemplating the role of the built environment and what it means in the post-conflict context is not limited simply to issues relating to physical reconstruction. In Beirut, the presence of Solidere, whose ambitious vision of the city is both highly criticized and praised, has been a source of renewal but also social contention. There are many voices expressing concern over how this vision is played out and what values are represented in the process[106], all of which are at the heart of what makes Beirut's transformation logically connected to the overall development of peace and stability in the post-conflict context. The relationship of Solidere to the city and the people's relationship to Solidere *through* the city play a large role making any conception of 'peace' work.

Solidere, for better or worse, has had an indelible impact on the city. Beirut as a city is obviously more than Solidere, but in observing the relationship between post-conflict regeneration and peacebuilding, Solidere is the central character in the ever-evolving production that is politics and property development in Beirut. When observing and analyzing it this must be taken into account. But how is this relationship manifest? In what ways does the city exist beyond Solidere, and how is Solidere also at the heart of what is happening? What does this mean for how the city is felt and experienced, and how peace is perceived of in the city? In the following section, Beirut is explored and observed in an attempt to look for answers to these questions, as well as seek additional insights into the relationship of the built environment and regeneration to the stability of peace in the city.

6.3.1 Walking Beirut

Situated on a rocky promontory in the Mediterranean, Beirut's orientation and borders point one towards or away from the ocean. In Hamra, one of the western-most neighbourhoods in the city that both looks over the water and the sea of buildings of Beirut from atop the built canopy of its own, a maze of streets are shaded by medium-height apartment buildings made to appear all the taller because of the streets' narrowness (image set XV, page 221). Colourful striped awnings cover most balconies—their purpose not only to shade but to protect from the dark particulate matter from the congested streets that could blacken their exterior. All ventures into the city follow one of the three routes out of Hamra into Central Beirut and provide ample opportunity for viewing deep craters where new apartment buildings are being built, political graffiti, posters for 'Save Beirut's Heritage', and criss-crossing webs of wires connect the telephonic communication of the city. Sidewalks are of polished stone embossed with a geometric design, looking like design aesthetic from the late 1960s or early 1970s. This indicates that this was the last time any real renewal of the city took place, aside from the present. This theme is continuously reiterated throughout the city but also stands in stark contrast to the Solidere area (see AIII-2 for walking map).

The city and the people exuded constancy and stasis (image set XVI, page 222). Rubbish, vacant lots, independently owned shops with a random array of goods and service, were found on every street and appeared unchanging since the period when the civil war began. The main street in Hamra (Hamra Street) was in a slow process of updating its look and feel, with new shops interspersed between older and more seemingly inaccessible ones.

Image 6-90 Colourful awnings protecting from pollution

Image 6-91 Save Beirut Heritage poster

Image 6-92 Criss-crossing telephone wires

Image 6-93 Postering and graffiti in Hamra

Image 6-94 A Costa coffee in a distinctly 1970s or 1960s building

Image 6-95 Sidewalk scene in Hara with polished geometric tiles

Image 6-96 American University Beirut

Image 6-97 Vista blocking apartment towers

Image 6-98 Older shopping mall on Hamra Street

Image 6-99 A coming Starbucks, to compete with Costa Coffee, Gloria Jeans, and Dunkin Donuts

Image 6-100 Another Hamra Street building

Image 6-101 Newer shopping on Hamra Street

More familiar brands of shops and cafes were present. This includes a shiny new Vero Moda clothing store sitting on the corner of Hamra Street and Omar bin Abdul Aziz Street that was formerly the site of a Wimpy's café which served as unofficial militant headquarters during the war; it frequently hosted Yasser Arafat as well as provided the setting for Syrian Socialist National Party (SSNP) member Khaled Alwan to shoot two Israeli soldiers 1982[107]. Hamra Street and the district itself are busy with students, tourists, and locals walking, window shopping, sipping coffee, or otherwise participating in daily life. It is very much an accessible and diverse area, once dubbed as the 'Champs Elysees' of Beirut, as it hosted many members of the local intelligentsia and artistic scene of the city in the 1960s and 70s. The American University of Beirut (AUB) forms the northern border between the district and the Mediterranean and the vista-blocking high rise apartment buildings to the west buffer views of the sea. The streets between them also lead down to the Corniche.

In terms of design, much of Beirut looks as it probably did in the 1970s when the civil war started, giving the sense that the city was lost in time. This was reflected in the design elements in public space, as well as in many of the residential buildings whose fronts reflected a period of growth in the late 1950s and 1960s, though many buildings were also still caught in the decaying splendor of the French mandate period (image set XVII, page 224). The built environment, in general, expresses rather heavy-handedly how life in Beirut has evolved over the last century and a half. From Ottoman designs that express a classic Islamic aesthetic, French art deco, mid-century apartment buildings, modern high-rise complexes, and the even more modern luxury housing that evokes the look and feel 'old Beirut' grandeur, evidence of change and adaptation abounds. In some ways, as much as the fear of Beirut 'forgetting its past' may be at risk with the potential loss of historically significant sites, the everyday experience of housing in the neighbourhoods still clearly expresses a multitude of identities. Heritage protection groups (discussed below) are working to save examples of this written into the everyday elements of the non BCD area buildings. Meanwhile, examples of French art deco buildings are quietly being bulldozed without public consultation.

Walking from Hamra in an easterly direction towards central Beirut is all downhill (image set XVIII, page 225). Outside the core of Hamra, the streets are increasingly large and congested, and pedestrian activity decreases as the transition from major road to highway happens instantly when turning a corner. Views of some of the key buildings from

Image 6-102 Derelict French Mandate structure

Image 6-103 Derelict French Mandate structure

Image 6-104 Refurbished French mandate structure

Image 6-105 c1920 French mandate period building; sold for $2m though was valued at only $200,00 only teo years prior

Image 6-106 Derelict French Mandate structure

Image 6-107 Well-maintained French mandate period buildings in BCD

Image 6-108 Well-maintained French mandate period facade

Image 6-109 Still functioning French mandate era corner shop

Image 6-110 The Holiday Inn, traffic, and terrain

Image 6-111 Murr Tower

Image 6-112 Sloping terrain

Image 6-113 Example of terrain

during the war are unmissable: the Holiday Inn and the Murr Tower are visible from many streets, reminding one that snipers' telescope was always watching. Both having been opened in 1975 just before the beginning of the war, they were usurped for war interests, never to be reopened. The division of the city into east and west, though it was marked by the green line located closer to the actual city centre, feels like it starts here. The topography and streetscape almost imperceptibly communicates that another territory is being entered, emphasized by the two aforementioned towers. The hills of Beirut are of deceptive size, hidden away by the concrete landscape, and also adding to the ability for the built environment of the city to be used as a materiel for the war in the way they concentrate and variegate the physical geography of the city, making for a variety of perspectives and views depending on where one was situated. It also illustrates that maps can only help one navigate so much, and that actual walking is the only way to really confirm the accessibility and feel of a city.

(Image set XIX, page 227-228) Descending down further into the Solidere-reconstructed area first takes one through Bad Idriss, where the Jewish Quarter of the city, Wadi Abu Jamil, is located[108]. Masses of near-completed high-end apartment housing dominates every square inch of land; with street facing wall advertisements that boast well-appointed features such as gyms, shops, and other services, in addition to the highest standard of interior luxury, the promise of an idyllic, and very wealthy, neighborhood awaits. To the north of the area, really just across the road, is the area known as Minet el Hosn, a steadily growing formation of modern high rise buildings constructed on new land formed by treating and stabilizing what was the dumping ground in the harbor for the city's rubbish throughout the war. All of the developments, with the exception of the sites that have not been purchased from their owners, are developed by Solidere or by other private foreign investors from elsewhere in the Middle East as well as the US[109]. They are brand new and seemingly untouched, feeling much like the model homes of new suburban tract housing in the US—perfect and pristine

Moving further into the BCD and following the purposefully placed pavements, Solidere's famed Souks emerge from the surrounding high rise and commercial buildings (image set XX, page 229). The reconstructed souks have been transformed into an architecturally striking interpretation of covered middle-eastern markets, though they do not trade in the same traditional goods as before. They are home to Burberry, Louis Vuitton, and Christian Laboutin as well as typical high street brands such as Zara, H&M, and Accessorize. They invite the consumption patterns of wealthy Lebanese and tourists, or those wishing to

XIX (continued on following page)

Image 6-114 Entering the Jewish Quarter and Bad Idriss from West; construction company is called 'Green Line'

Image 6-115 Example of the Jewish Quarter with old buildings in foreground and newer builds in the back
Source: http://bloggingbeirut.com/archives/1593-Beiruts-Jewish-Quarter-Magen-Abraham-Synagogue.html

Image 6-116 The last area before entering the Jewish Quarter one could take photos; canes behind are in the Quarter

Image 6-117 Example of signage and semi-completed luxury housing in Bad Idriss

Image 6-118 Example of signage for luxury development in Bad Idriss

Image 6-119 Example of signage for luxury business suites

XIX (continued)

Image 6-120 View a of Bad Idriss (part of Solidere)

Image 6-121 View b of Bad Idriss (part of Solidere)

Image 6-122 Entering Minet el Hosn from the north; St. George's Hotel is in the foreground

Image 6-123 A view of Mient el Hosn from the distance; note the conglometeratiopn of highrises in the back as this area was part of the former landfill



Image 6-124 Aerial view of Minet el Hosn
Source: http://www.panoramio.com/photo/17263213

XX

Image 6-125 Entering the Souks

Image 6-126 Entering the Souks

Image 6-127 Exploring the Souks; note very little furniture or other interactive elements

Image 6-128 Exploring the Souks

Image 6-129 Exploring the Souks

Image 6-130 Exploring the Souks

emulate this lifestyle. With an average income $9,110 (in 2011)[110], many of these brands are out of the reach of locals. While the former souks did in fact house boutique and high-end shops too, they also were accessible, and central, to daily life and trade for many Beirutis. The souks are still very new on the scene in Beirut , having only opened in October 2009, and the adaptation into life for many locals I think is still developing, accounting for the feeling of emptiness I encountered whilst there.

Shopping and strolling the corridors of the Souks one is struck by the loneliness of the place. It feels empty, and the variety of people enjoying the space does not belie the same sense of buzz and activity that other shopping malls do. Sure enough there are visitors, but the feel ultimately was one of isolation. Benches and other outdoor seating and spaces were not present, adding to the solitary nature. For myself, I was reminded of all I cannot afford and the fact that I am not welcome to even enjoy the view. That said, the space boasted artist displays and other eye-catching elements and the views from the souks lead to impressive vistas of the Mediterranean or the other parts of the reconstructed city centre. Despite this, it felt like a place to pass through, and not to engage in. This is problematic considering the historic nature of the souks as a central space of congregation, raising questions of the true intention of the place. As much as Solidere claims that it is staying true to the historic design of the souks, it has seemingly written off the actual purpose of them in their reconstruction so that they 'fit' in better with the social and design agenda of the majority of newly remade space.

In light of the newness of the Souks, it is perhaps to be expected that the place did not seem as populated in comparison to other similar public spaces in Beirut. Additionally, the areas around the souks are not yet fully completed, and considering that Solidere estimates that just over half of its entire buildings project will be dedicated to residential space, one can assume that over the years as the population of the area increases, so will the usefulness and character of the souks. For now, it still appears to inhabit a liminal realm in terms of city space, due in no small part to the kind of goods on offer that cannot be consumed by most Beirutis. As for its contribution to public space in Beirut, it is a notable presence, but one that I think cannot be used quite as well as other spaces in the city, as well as being problematic in terms of its 'traditional' character versus what has been recreated.

The architecture of the rest of the BCD, based primarily (now) around Nejmeh Square, capitalizes on the pre-existing styles of the government buildings that were constructed in the 1920s (image set XXI, page 231). The colors are warm, the pathways are

XXI

Image 6-131 Looking into Nejmeh Square with it Rolex-clock centre

Image 6-132 Looking down a 'spoke' radiating from the clock with many cafes



Image 6-133 Looking into the streets of the Solidere BCD



Image 6-134 Landscaping in the BCD

Image 6-135 Another view down a spoke from the clock



Image 6-136 The ever-present view of the Al Amine Mosque



Image 6-137 A symbol of the centre: corporate coffee, security, and cranes

Image 6-138 An example of the BCD French-mandate design aesthetic and building style; view is looking towards the ocean

textured and inviting for both pedestrians and motorists, and the landscaping keeps with the natural vegetation of the surrounding environment. That said, the restaurants are expensive, and the shops appealing only to tourists or more well-heeled members of society. There is an overwhelming sense that nothing else happens here—you come to walk through or to sit and spend. The area did however possess many shady and inviting avenues with trees and benches and the occasional water feature to make sitting outside an inviting and casual affair. The lack of buzz is perhaps due to the fact that much of what is there is new and investment and business opportunities are slowly trickling in.

Overall, the city centre felt somewhat like Downtown Disney on a slow day: new, with lots of pretty and inviting architecture and good space for public use and access, but ultimately kind of empty and lonely. I know that the space is very new and will be constantly evolving, but I couldn't help but feel that it also felt very divorced from the rest of the city. A local might go to this place to escape from what they see normally, or they might go and feel like they don't belong. It's hard to predict how it will change and adapt over the years as well. The space that is finished and occupied represents only a minor portion of a much longer and larger project for development and as that continues and business moves in, so the quality and interest of this current space will also grow.

Moving through the Solidere centre and further east into the areas of Gemmayzeh and Bashoura, both neighbourhoods that border the Solidere area, accessibility becomes increasingly restricted by large flyovers and massive intersections, especially around Martyr's Square (image set XXII, page 233). The regeneration of the Solidere territory ends abruptly at Martyr's Square, whose extreme vacancy is in stark contrast to the pristine Nejmeh Square. This area is however part of the Solidere's remit, though has obviously not been touched. The Square provides one of the few unobstructed views of Beirut's harbor, which is hidden from view elsewhere in the city. Though leaving the Solidere area is difficult, once in the other neighbourhoods, walking is easy even though the streets and pavements are congested. However, in seeking out Beirut's other shopping malls and areas of new development that are not Solidere driven, walking routes were non-existent in that it did not appear anyone really sought out these places on foot. This was forgivable in some regards considering how hilly the city actually is, but also brought a sense of both disconnect and intimacy with the city and its uneven regeneration.

While the Solidere souks are the new, there are other shopping centres located throughout the city, all of which were built in the post-civil war context. The seven largest ones are highlighted on the walking map of Beirut (see map in Appendix III, figure AIII-2).

Image 6-139 The distant buildings are separated from Nejmeh Square by the emptiness of Martyr's Square

Image 6-140 On the periphery of Martyr's Square

Image 6-141 Standing in Martyr's Square looking south

Image 6-142 Another view of Martyr's Square looking north to harbour

Image 6-143 At the north end of Martyr's Square looking south, it appears to be all parking lot

Image 6-144 At the south end of Martyr's Square faced by a confusing, large, busy, and unmarked intersection

Image 6-145 Martyr's Square circa 1920s

The majority of these malls are new (built in the last five years) and reflect a change in the general culture of consumption in the city. Though as one local resident reported (BR2), much of what is on offer is too expensive and simply not accessible.

The most appealing and seemingly successful of all the sites visited was the ABC shopping mall in Ashrafieh that was at the top of a steep hill (image set XXIII, page 235). Built in 2003, it blends the shopping and consumption experience with a busy, buzzy, and protected atmosphere, where the creation of activity and interaction with displays, exhibits, and other features gives one sense that there is an air of engineered community spirit. It was heavily secured when entering—all bags were searched and armed private security guards stood at the entrances, something not encountered anywhere else in the city—a stark contrast to being out on the city streets. It felt safe and protected, though also somewhat sheltered for the same reasons. It was one of the few places outside of Hamra that there was a sense of general activity and engagement with relations and strangers in a public space. Those using the space appeared very middle class, which would seem the purpose for such a space like this—it is somewhere that is safe and where interactions with less well-off members of society are not likely to happen. This is done by having only two entrances. One is through the car park guarded by the gates that surround it, and the other from off the street which is guarded by security personnel. One can freely walk around without the hassle of traffic, or even deal with the weather. It is kind of a bubble, a seeming all-ages day camp. It is apparent that space like this is necessary to maintain a middle-class in Beirut, where the risk of being overwhelmed by lower-classes and outspent by the upper ones is always a risk.

Downhill from the ABC, densely populated neighbourhoods with both derelict buildings and brand-new smaller private development characterize the large majority of the city space. Moving westwards again, the pathways taken were hard to find and pedestrian traffic was almost non-existent. Along the way, the other two main central shopping malls, the Sodeco Centre and Verdun, were difficult to locate, though that itself was a telling factor in understanding how the city is used and why regeneration has unfolded the way it has. Sodeco is a run-down and half-leased box-like structure bound by two large automobile thoroughfares. Despite its lack of air-conditioning and sense of dereliction, the café in the centre was clearly a favourite hang-out spot for local young people during the day and obviously provided public social space in this part of the city. Verdun and the other shopping areas around it were much newer developments in relatively non-descript areas. Bordering mainly large intersections and thoroughfares, they

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Image 6-146 Approaching the ABC mall up a steep hill

Image 6-147 Top floor of ABC; it is open and allows one to see the tops of other builds around

Image 6-148 Inside the Sodeco Centre

Image 6-149 Inside the Sodeco Centre; cafe is in the centre foreground

Image 6-150 Looking into Verdun

Image 6-151 Looking into Verdun

did not seem really integrated into a particular neighborhood. They were obviously newer—built in the last five years, and adopted an aesthetic that was more open and accessible than Sodeco and more democratic than ABC. It was obvious that they provided small oases of shared space and life that seemed so hard to come by in a city that is in many ways hostile and non-navigable, with very little green space or other public amenities (other than the Corniche and the city centre). Parts of Beirut still held on to a smaller village-like ideal with cafes, shops, and restaurants easily accessible or a short walk away from housing. Other parts of the city though seemed more dystopic in their extreme disconnection; with large towering buildings, busy car thoroughfares, and very little inviting or safe and accessible about the street life. It was in these contexts that these shopping malls appeared to serve their best function—as surrogate public space that had not been provided for in the building boom of the 1960-70s and in the post-civil war era. The geography of regeneration in Beirut seemed to indicate a solar system of sites, where Solidere is the sun and the other isolated developments smaller planets that revolve around it.

Aside from the malls, open public space is generally at a premium. Sloping steeply downhill from both the location of Verdun and Hamra, the Corniche is an example of this and is an important part of city life (image set XXIV, page 237). In many ways, outside of Solidere's area, it is one of the few areas of the city that are open and accessible to pedestrians without the interference of vehicular traffic. During weekdays, the Corniche, while not crowded, is populated by a vast cross-section of young and old people walking along its boardwalk, fishermen casting lines into the water, and vendors renting nargile pipes or selling cheap trinkets to the interested passersby. Cafés are located on the water, with people sunning on the rocks and skating up and down the pathways. There is even a permanent carnival with rusted old rides and a large Ferris wheel to mark the coastline. In all, it was a public beachfront thoroughfare comparable to many others in the world, and not necessarily exceptional in and of itself, but most certainly vital in a city like Beirut. The Corniche is particularly popular in the evenings for local youth and university students and on the weekends for the rest of the city, where Beirutis come out in the hundreds for a casual stroll.

Reentering the city from the Corniche involves navigating steep uphill and meandering streets, or following along a majorly trafficked thoroughfare that takes you along the as-of-yet unopened luxury harbor and the site where Hariri was assassinated; in addition to this, the walking routes taken into the BCD point to one overwhelming issue

Image 6-152 Descending to the Corniche meant walking through densely packed high rise buildings

Image 6-153 The carnival-esque Beirut Luna Park

Image 6-154 Along the Corniche, examples of seaside cafe and restaurant

Image 6-155 The Corniche stretches out in front heading east

Image 6-156 Bathing in the Mediterranean off the Corniche and private sun bathing areas

Image 6-157 The Corniche also is home to smaller private enterprises such as fishing

with the city centre: accessibility (image set XXV, page 239). There is a large flyover skirting the southern periphery creating a hostile and almost impermeable margin that is dangerous to cross. On the western border is a car-dominated crossing that pens in the area making it a harrowing journey to cross over and descend into, as well as the additional empty and desert-like space of Martyrs' Square to the east. In many ways, it replicates the disconnectedness and impermeability of space for a pedestrian in Los Angeles, and in that way felt oddly familiar. The Martyr's Square space, a vital area both in terms of history and contemporary politics, appears to cut off the BCD from the rest of east Beirut. In the not-so-distant past, the square was ringed with buildings, busy with the outdoor wandering and commuting of workers and visitors of all classes and types, congested not only with vehicular traffic but also a tram line, and landscaped with palm trees and other vegetation. It is now, quite literally, a parking lot, dusty and liminal, with the solitary monument to the martyrs of the square's namesake standing alone in the centre, punched through with bullet holes and acting a sort of sundial in both the metaphor and function. In this sense, it is a void in the city, exceptionally valuable simply in terms of land-value in the city, but dissonant in its vacancy. In term of the city's accessibility, the combination of the square and the large impasse created by the General Foaad Chebab motorway severely carve up the landscape in a manner that makes entrance to the BCD a challenge not only physically but psychologically as a seemingly vast and deserted space stretches between the margin and the glittering buildings within.

Gaining access to the city centre is difficult; it is done with intention, and not because pathways naturally lead to the centre. Walking great distances is Beirut did not appear common, perhaps contributing to the car-oriented layout of the streets. The city has quite a hilly terrain as well, and coupled with general congestion and pollution, does not encourage pedestrian traffic. Walking is done in the context of one's neighborhood and there is very little crossing-over to other parts of the city on foot; one would more likely take a bus or car. It would appear that there is plenty of room for simple but effective changes to walking routes and streets that would make the city centre more accessible, but all this points to a larger critique: does Solidere even want 'the masses' in its territory? There is ample opportunity for Solidere to serve as a catalyst for such changes, even perhaps encouraging a renaissance in approaches to transportation, as revitalizing and making pedestrian friendly key routes into the city centre from the three main sectors of the city (west, south, and east) would encourage people to take to the street and converge on the city centre.

Image 6-158 The flyover at the southern periphery of Solidere's territory

Image 6-159 The flyover

Image 6-160 Another view of the flyover; in the foreground are the remains of a Catholic church

Image 6-161 View of the flyover taken from the 'Egg' an important modernist building from the late 1960s heavily damaged in war. In the background on the left is the newly refurbished Orthodox cathedral

Image 6-162 The signage along the under-development yacht harbour: 'Reviving the soul of Beirut: Beirut is back and its beautiful'

Image 6-163 Same signage featuring Beirut's glamorous past

6.3.2 Property and People: Perceptions of Regeneration and Peace

In Solidere promotional material, one area that is under their remit is the hotel district. It was an area of the city that in its pre-war form represented the cosmopolitan, east-meets-west nature of the city. From the 1950s until the war, the area around Minet el Hosn was the epicenter of business, banking, and upper-end tourism. The old school glamour of the era and the hotels that went up in the period in order to accommodate a growing jet-setting crowd of Europeans and Middle Easterners are now being recapitalized in the redevelopment of the harbor by Solidere (images 6-162 and 6-163). Ironically, it was here that the 'battle of the hotels' from 1975-1976 that resulted in the most dramatic and symbolic transformation of Beirut during the war. According to Fregonese (2009), the hotel district 'constituted the emblem of architectural modernism in Beirut during the 1960s, symbolized the post-independence era, with Lebanon's financial growth and Beirut's transformation from a small coastal town into a Mediterranean metropolis . . . However, in a matter of weeks in October 1975, this site transformed into the main battleground implicated in Beirut's territorial reconfiguration' (Fregonese 2009, 314).

The way the built environment was manipulated and used in the first year of the war is a testament to the important role it still must play in the post-conflict context. The battle of the hotels is just the beginning of the extent to which Beirut itself was the provider of both motivation and materiel for the war. One major part of how the conflict has been subverted into another form is through the issue of property ownership in the city, forming another avenue for how the fabric of the city continues to provide the subterfuge for continued contention. For instance, a large hole in the ground where an under building car park will be placed, the demolition of an old building, or the near completion of a new one belied a larger narrative: such activities are indicative of a larger set of processes, actors, and agents than the immediacy of the situation suggests. There was lots of it—photo evidence on page 241 (image set XXVI) illustrates only a tiny portion of the amount of demolition and construction occurring in Beirut. This implies that property and construction is a very important activity in post-war Beirut, even as it augments the work that Solidere has done and continues to do. In examining the potential relationship between Beirut's regeneration and maintenance of peace, understanding the multiplicity of actors and agents involved is part of this process.

If Beirut is accused of forgetting its past, then Solidere is at the heart of the forgetfulness. Being cited by multiple critics as the leader in this 'collective amnesia' (Makdisi

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Image 6-164 Examples of the myriad of sites under construction in Beirut

Image 6-165 Examples of the residential buildings under construction in central Beirut

1997b; Nagel 2002; Sawalha 2007), Solidere plays an interesting role in the dynamics that have shaped the city. The work of Solidere has transformed the historic centre of Beirut into a clean, safe, and well-designed space with high-end retail and food shops, space that pays homage to the architectural influences of the city, and the promise of it being the 'model in post-war reconstruction, urban regeneration, and waterfront development' (Solidere 2004, 3) – in other words mainstream neoliberal urban regeneration. Despite this, it has been to the ire of many, 'wiping out its heritage and driving its original residents and merchants out', according to the *Agence France Presse* on June 27, 2011.

As the 'post-conflict' phase wore on, and new kinds of conflict were born from the contested presence of Syria in Lebanese politics, approval of the city centre dwindled. Solidere was also under fire for its questionable practices towards land acquisition, which was the first phase of the ever-increasing scrutiny they would face. Most notably, the old souks, of which many remained standing and habitable, were bulldozed, causing a general stir among local observers. According to Makdisi, writing in 1997 before the bulk of the construction of the new souks and central district took place, 'in the months since construction finally began in earnest (summer 1994), more buildings have been demolished than in almost twenty years of artillery bombardment and house-to-house combat' (Makdisi 1997b, 662). Additionally, the issue of Law 117 also made Solidere's tactics questionable, for it was this amendment that permitted Solidere to 'expropriate the property of existing [land]owners' who in return received Solidere stock' (Fricke 2005, 5). Law 117 amended legislative decree number five, which is what had created the CDR in 1977, the first incarnation of a post-war reconstruction agenda. According to the Beirut *Daily Star*, this amendment, approved in 1991, gave the CDR the mandate to execute 'either directly or through other entities, including a real-estate company, formed or to be formed under Article 21 of the civil organization law - any project that the council of ministers delegates to the CDR' (August 6 2007[111]). Through this, Solidere was able to acquire vast tracks of land. This law however is the basis for the accusation that what Solidere has done is unconstitutional, as it goes against Article 15 of the Lebanese constitution which guarantees the protection of private property under the law[112]. However, Solidere is considered an 'agent of the government' (*Daily Star*) whose purpose is to do what the CDR was originally set up to do in 1977 and is considered an appropriate body for the work (Stewart 1996, 500).

The rights and privileges that come from property ownership are valuable assets in Lebanese society, and the way property changes hands is also important in this process.

When looking at the amount of construction projects in Beirut as well as the work of Solidere, the politics of land ownership become a vital component in understanding the narratives that emerge in each individual building site, as well as across the whole city. These narratives are linked to a complex interplay between politics, culture, money, and power, all of which dominate in different ways to create the evolving face of Beirut. Examining these also provides insight into the larger issues at stake in Lebanese society and in the changing landscape and the way it links to the reading of peacebuilding and its relationship to regeneration.

Looking at the complicated legacy of property ownership and transference, one can see how the almost unregulated nature of building projects appears to be at odds with the traditional character of a neighborhood. This whole process also plays into notions of power and politics that underscores much of Beirut's redevelopment. However, there are other issues that complicate this. In terms of property ownership, one can surmise that the issue of absentee-owners is problematic in a place like Beirut, where so many patches of unclaimed housing lay dormant. Because property is automatically inherited, presumably all plots belong to someone, and therefore legal acquisition requires an official transfer of title, no matter how long a site has lain 'in state'. This had much to do with the vast amount of people who emigrated during the war, and the large diasporic community outside Lebanon[113].

6.3.3 Identity and Change: Heritage and Solidere

There is a solid contingent of Lebanese, embodied by the group Save Beirut Heritage[114] (SBH), that see the demolition and destruction of some of Beirut's classic architecture as an affront to their heritage. Having papered the city with flyers (image 6-91), the group was brought to my attention as I walked the streets. They appeared to be appealing to a younger, more politicized crowd as well as to interested tourists (as the signs were in English), and the Facebook page where the group posts photos and organizes itself has loads of evidence of the imminent destruction of some iconic and distinctly Beirut architecture. Members post statements amounting to alarm and anger and the author/moderator of the discussion thread often tries to find out and reveal who the investor of the development project is (as a building is invariably being demolished so something new can go in). While it would appear the intentions and general vocalized

outrage of the group would grant them some power or maneuverability in saving of these sites, it is also apparent that they can do very little when faced with the wealthy developer's deep pockets. That said, since the group's inception in 2009, they have been able to stall the demolition of many buildings while advocacy for their protection is sought[115].

However, in spite of the vehement opposition to the work of the Solidère (and other development firms) there is also a belief that in order for progress to be made, buildings must be torn down to make room for the new. Critics say that there are many buildings in Beirut, such as the ones the SBH advocates for, that are unsafe and structurally unsound and should be pulled down regardless[116]. While these are all arguable points, it would appear that the necessities of land ownership and profit are the bottom-line in most of these cases, and that destruction of an unsafe building almost invariably means something very tall and out of character with the surrounding area will take its place, thus eliminating any sense of connection to the surrounding architecture. That said, Lebanon and Beirut suffer from an extremely complex and politicized system of property rights and heritage and preservation law which makes it is easy to see how the property developers and community leaders dealing with heritage sites are often plagued by pragmatic issues concerning the expense and cost of saving 'heritage' buildings[117].

In relation to this debate is of course Solidere. As a private share-holder owned corporation, it has to prioritize a variety of issues in order move forward. This is true of any company. For Beirut, this has meant that in some ways preservation has suffered at the expense of what is the most efficient use of space. In many ways, the behavior of Solidere reflects that of governmental organizations, where appealing to the desire of the people and adhering to a financial bottom-line aren't necessarily mutually achievable. As the efforts to save Beirut's heritage convey, there is an urgency to create a groundswell of common opinion that challenges the power of the developers and Solidere. But Solidere isn't the only party culpable in the property, heritage preservation, and regeneration puzzle. There are many actors and agents who drive these processes, and government bodies as well as members of society itself are also part of how this unfolds. Solidere has, in its role as proprietor of all that is good and bad about Beirut, become the scapegoat for a litany of frustrations centering on the reconstruction and regeneration of Beirut.

But Solidere could not be entirely to blame, and in fact, the land they occupy is a tiny percentage of the whole of Beirut. Could Solidere not have been reflecting a more historical tendency to just rebuild over the old? Like the Roman ruins, so much of Beirut's past lies

underground, and layer upon layer of history exists as the literal foundation to the visible city. So in a way, Solidere is doing what has been done for millennia.

The problem with this is that never before has the issue of identity been as much at stake in the modern era. From 19th century ethno-religious riots to the modern day, what it means to be Lebanese has been a tug-of-war between confessional identity and a more generic state-based one, with Beirut being the epicenter of a struggle to maintain legitimacy as a religious group while sharing in the overarching label of being 'Lebanese'. In this context, the city centre represents something more than the traditional and historic market place and centre of the city; it is where the diverse and heterogeneous population that comprises the city would converge for common daily-life activities. By taking away the customary right (as it is both legal and traditional) for landownership to be passed down generationally or else given up officially by the current owner, this takes away from the central tenant that identity and individuality is protected and valued. These are core issues for the civil war, and are still reflected in current politics to this day.

Identity, especially 'confessional' identity, is at the heart of modern Lebanon. Likewise, someone's claim to the land and their greater Lebanese identity is tied in with the strength and validity of the Lebanese state and identity, especially when there is a large proportion of Lebanese who live in the greater diaspora. This has made the issue of land ownership, and how developers have gotten hold of plots, a contentious one that reflects the continued struggle between private development, individual rights and identity, and the state (Makdisi 1997, Khalaf 2006)

Ethno-religious tensions have contributed to the violent subterfuge that rumbled and at times erupted throughout the 20th century. In many ways, these tensions are still present, but they are ingrained into the confessional system and thus into the government structure. For Saadeh (1992) the confessional identity that Lebanese society is based on is likened to a caste system, which helps to explain the high propensity for ethnic conflict and civil war as castes attempt to raise their social status with violence sometimes resulting.

Today, Lebanese society, while still demarcated by confessional identity, is also further demarcated by ones pro- or anti-Syrian stance. In the Cedar Revolution of 2005 following the assassination of Rafik Hariri, protests at Martyr's Square on March 8th (supported by Hezbollah) and March 14th resulted in the creation of two main divisions in Lebanese society: pro-Syria (March 8) and anti-Syria (March 14)[118]. These groups are not necessarily claimed by one confessional group or political party, and in recent history the

March 8 group had successfully integrated into the cabinet with commentators generally agreeing that the March 14 group has shown little capacity to 'mobilize beyond rhetoric'[119].

In the post-Ta'if and civil war context, the shifting of nodes of identification through the March 8/14 groups has created space for new identities to emerge. Considering as well the high level of poverty and a low average income, it becomes apparent that political identification, whether through confession or organized around opinions on Syrian involvement, is one of the few vehicles all Lebanese share in civic expression (citation for this?). How this relates to the presence of Solidere and its relationship to identity and heritage can be illustrated by Young's (2007) article on the BCDs emerging role as the centre of socio-political division in Lebanon:

> It doesn't take much to capture the symbolism of the moment—on either side of the political spectrum. For the majority, a part of town that for a long time embodied Lebanon's ability to transgress war, has again become a front line in a domestic crisis. Where the late Rafik Hariri sought, perhaps excessively, to banish war from the downtown area (recall that a war memorial planned for the city centre was, instead, trucked off to the Defense Ministry in Yarzeh), those contesting Hariri's legacy have never brought Lebanon closer to civil war[120].

Again, the key issue of identity as manifest through land ownership is thematic of the struggle to remake Beirut. It would appear as if the corporate world—the world where attracting foreign investment and remaking and rebranding something as safe, acceptable and neutral—were to work, then not only would the identity of people and place be reshaped, but so would the legacy of the civil war. As Young (2007) again points out, 'If Lebanon is to thrive, then it's different political forces will have to agree to a common vision for the country's economic future. The Lebanese are not there yet. The downtown area may have epitomized post-war peace, but not everyone bought into this, and that's a failing that can be put at the door of the policymakers[121].

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What does all of this say about the legitimating capacity of the city centre for the peace process? What connections can be made through this description? In the Ta'if Accords, much of the language focused on inclusiveness of all confessions in the affairs of the Lebanese state. Confessional identity was both maintained by the Accords, but also seen as something that eventually would have to be taken away. In this sense, the built

environment of central Beirut, which is most strongly characterized by luxury housing, re-imagining of the hotel district, and the Solidere development, lay claim to different narratives of Lebanese, and Beiruti, identity. Many in the city, and beyond, are critical of this development. Seeing it as a way to forget the past, there is a sense that purveyors of the central space perceive of it as an anathema to why the conflict was sustained for as long as it was[122]. It was not so that it could all be erased, the conflict happened because it meant that individual and group identity could be fully realized while allowing one to fully participate and equally reap the benefits of living in the Lebanese state. The city centre now appears to be a place that emulates the socio-political situation of Lebanon prior to the war—nice to look at, but scratch below the surface you'll find vast inequalities. However true this may be, there is more to this critique that contemporary Lebanese and Beirutis also need to recognize—that transformations of these spaces will inevitably be shaped by its users. Unless as a city community and as a society the space is used by the diversity of groups and individuals there, then it will continue to be a space shaped only by outside interests. In other words, while wealthy multi-national corporations and private investors can make something, they can't keep it a certain way. And while these forces can't necessarily be stopped (though plenty try) there is a sense of agency that needs to be capitalized on and harnessed. Change can happen at any point in a development cycle.

6.4 Belfast: If You Build It, They Will Come

> *'Belfast city centre is the shop front, not only for our city, but for the entire region of Northern Ireland' (Belfast City Council 2006, 2).*

The metaphor of the shop front is fitting for a city centre that can attribute 47% of its annual footfall to retail alone (Belfast City Council 2006, 13). Belfast has undergone a dramatic transformation from a dying industrial town beleaguered with sectarian conflict to having tourism and retail rates on par with many other major European cities: having gone from an annual tourism rate of 1.6 million visitors in 2000 to 7.1 million in 2008, the implications of a 77% increase are seen and felt on many levels of life in the city. Not only that, the increase in revenue just from 2007 to 2008 was 39% at £436.6 million, making a marked impact on the local economy (Belfast City Council 2008, 4). Having a winning combination of the allure of the conflict past in conjunction with massive regeneration and

rebuilding projects, Belfast is certainly not the place anyone at the height of the Troubles could have imagined. It is this intersection of 'accessible danger' (the proximity both in time and place to conflict) that drive tourism numbers, but also the accessibility of culture and language (Western and English-speaking) that have in part driven this massive increase.

The energy and effort that has gone into marketing and selling Belfast as a place separate from the conflict and interesting in its own right is paying off. The point of this, however, is not to comment on the massive influx of tourists, so much as to point to the impact such efforts can have on the built environment. That said, tourism on the whole can say some interesting things about how the perceptions of foreign visitors influence the way things are built and why, and how touristic attention can fatally alter the patterns of regeneration in a city. In a city that is post-conflict, the implications can have a massive knock-on effect on how the local community perceives their role and sense of ownership of a city. It is from this vantage point that the exploration of the city takes place.

Observing phenomenon such as the massive amount of private development and extreme focus on retail space in development projects means looking not only at what is there, but also what is not, and making sense of the implications. The following exploration discloses observations and analysis of Belfast while aiming to understand the city and its regeneration.

6.4.1 Belfast Observed

Arriving in Belfast, one is delivered to the heart of the city: Donegall Square (image set XXVII, page 249). This central point is not only the administrative centre, but also the space where most initial transactions and negotiation with the city originate. The staging and terminus of most bus routes, the area where the visitor is dropped off if arriving from either of the airports, the ranks of black cabs waiting for regular charges (and also offering mural tours), and the entrance to the retail core of the city just to its north, Donegall Square and the gleaming Belfast City Hall are a fixed point in the changing city landscape (see map in Appendix III, figure AIII-3).

From here, the major arteries that lead through and out of the city are also the gateways to the sectarian divided neighbourhoods. Pedestrian traffic out of the city centre is focused on one main thoroughfare, which is the only truly walkable route into and out of it. This is along Great Victoria Street and Bedford Road, both of which merge into Lisburn

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Image 6-166 Donegall Square and Belfast City Hall are central to the city

Image 6-167 Bus traffic around the Square
Source: http://www.superstock.co.uk/stock-photos-images/1566-376137

Image 6-168 Ranks of taxi cabs on the north side of the Square
Source: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:Donegall_Square_North,_Belfast,_November_2010_%2802%29.JPG

Road (image set XXVIII, page 250). Other routes were more or less impenetrable on foot and accessed mainly by bus. In understanding how the city is used and accessed, the sense is that the city centre is the only thing the city really wants you to see; by limiting access to other parts of the city (except by car or bus), there is a sense that the only thing worth seeing and doing is here, and this is reflected in the various neighbourhoods.

While pedestrian movement from Donegall Square sweeps one naturally onto Donegall Place and Royal Avenue where the new and constantly improving retail areas are found, it was another pedestrian route into south Belfast that also required attention. Great Victoria Street leads the pedestrian and the motor traffic southward; it appeared somewhat blighted and possessed a sense of disconnection with the city centre. While sidewalks were wide with plenty of space for pedestrian traffic, the building fronts were impersonal, with heavily tinted or mirrored 'floor to ceiling' windows facing onto the street. Buildings also looked quite dated, probably from the 1980s, and did very little to complement the older structures that were interspersed throughout the area. Along this route is the noteworthy Europa hotel, 'the most bombed hotel in Europe'[123], perched over the disintegrating Great Northern Mall, an arcade of half vacant shops that leads to the concourse inside the bus terminal behind the hotel. There were also quite a few derelict structures and empty lots breaking up the blocks of small store fronts.

The business of the area is mixed with small independent restaurants and anonymous commercial services and offices. For having come out of the city centre, with its high concentration of medium height buildings of 19th century provenance, active frontages, and busy street life, the blandness of Great Victoria street was a stark contrast. Walking along the route one feels visible and exposed as the street itself is quite wide, aided by the openness of the sky view to the west. This was due in no small part to the low height of the buildings and the open and empty plots of land as well as the train tracks just beyond which made the area seem like the bordering territory fronting on some hostile wilderness. Along this route, one is also struck quite suddenly with one of Belfast's more iconic scenes—just when the street is about to end and converge with Dublin Road, a casual glance to the right confronts one with the mural 'You are now entering Loyalist Sandy Row, heartland of South Belfast Ulster Freedom Fighters' and the image of a man in a balaclava holding an AK-47.

Crossing the street was an ordeal as the intersection of four streets made the gated off 'crossing islands' inconvenient and inefficient; this was fitting as in many parts of the

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Image 6-169 Walking along Great Victoria Street, the Europa Hotel
Source: http://graham_mckenzie.typepad.com/thecopyboys/2010/01/index.html

Image 6-170 Entrance to city centre through the 'Great Northern Mall'

Image 6-171 Along Great Victoria Street a peek at this mural

Image 6-172 The intersection at Great Victoria, Bedford Road, University Road, and Botanic Avenue

Image 6-173 Dereliction and boarded up windows

Image 6-174 Extreme window security off the Ormeau Road

city there is a visceral sense that borders and 'liminal' space are created by streets and serve as buffer zones between well-defined areas where one belongs or not. Wide arterial routes are vital to creating 'natural' borders between different parts of the city and in the case of Belfast, between sectarian divides (especially in the case of the Falls and Shankhill Roads), and thus are part of the way zones of territoriality are spatially expressed. However, it is a much more intensive experience to see and feel the effects of such separation, not only in types of space, but in perceptions of group identity, class values, and security on such a concrete level. Separation and disconnection of the neighbourhoods in relation to the city centre was very palpable. The built environment reinforced beliefs in ones safety from and proximity to (yet continued threat from) the other. Geographic association implied a certain identity was extremely evident in how the city centre and other parts of the city were made accessible and welcoming (or inaccessible and unwelcoming) to anyone who was not supposed to be there.

Continuing along, the pedestrian route diverged upwards along Lisburn Road as well as into the Queen's University neighbourhood. Drawn onto Botanic Street, the remarkable difference in neighbourhood quality is welcome. Botanic has an overground train stop which has of course contributed to its centrality and growth as a good neighbourhood but as a major pedestrian route. In comparison to many other parts of the city, it has a very organic and spontaneous feel to it as there is the sense that the various businesses were built according to locally derived needs and entrepreneurial efforts. This is in contrast to much of the newly regenerated parts of the city that are more engineered. There is very little sense that this was planned to have the energy that it does, but it is more the growth as the result of a community and not the other way around. In many ways, this is what other parts of the city that are currently being planned wish to achieve. As Botanic peters off as it ends at the Queen's University Belfast campus, the other walking route (Lisburn Road, which is now to the north) that had diverged also becomes less accessible; it is from around this area that pedestrian footfall begins to lessen.

Leaving the favoured pathway back into the city and instead walking up the Ormeau Road to the south of Botanic Avenue served as a lesson in what visions of the city have been left at the wayside (image set XXIX, page 253). While a general state of dereliction was suggested by a number of abandoned and burnt out houses or extreme securing of windows and doors, several important phenomena were witnessed. One is the presence of well-manicured private, street-facing gardens. In the suburban context, yards, and gardens by extension, are visual representations of the owner's identity (Girling and

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Image 6-175 Ormeau Road looking over into the Short Strand; street is wide and vacant

Image 6-176 Ormeau Road looking north

Image 6-177 The Gasworks

Image 6-178 Victorian red-brick buildings

Image 6-179 The Department for Social Development regeneration sign

Helphand 1996; Ginn 2010). In the urban setting, especially one where space, territory, and identity are intricately linked, the choice to create an elaborate garden implies a sense of identity that deviates from what is normally viewed as spatial identity in Belfast. The positioning of the garden as well is of interest—it is a wholly private space, as it is within the confines of the walls that mark the property boundaries and thus are only for the enjoyment of the home dwellers. However, they are on view for the public and can be examined closely by the pedestrian walking by. Just as clothing choice can imply a certain set of values about the wearer, the visible but private garden is also a non-verbal communicator of the values of the owners. In these cases, they were apolitical and tended towards whimsical.

The second phenomenon of the note is the presence of the Gasworks, the first major brownsite regeneration in Belfast that took place in the 1980s-1990s. Having been the site of the city's gas and electricity production for over a hundred years, the site became part of Laganside's long-term regeneration and development scheme. It is on this site, along with the creation of weirs and cleanup of the Lagan, that the first real effort to start regenerating Belfast even in the midst of the conflict began. The Gasworks regeneration project was initiated when the plant discontinued operations in 1985, at a time when the violence and instability of the Troubles remained constant. While Belfast City Council and Laganside hired out specialists for the remediation, it was the property development group Cusp that took the lead in developing property and leasing it out, and in 1998 the site won the Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors (RICS) Award for Reclamation (BF9, BF10)[124]. This was aided by the Gasworks apparent neutrality in the landscape of the conflict, both in its geographical placement in Belfast as well as its historic use, but is also noteworthy for its development in parallel to the development of the peace process.

Continuing up Ormeau Road, with the widening river Lagan separating Protestant east Belfast from the south (and The Small Strand, an isolated enclave of Catholic housing along the river), the lack of people out or even of heavy vehicular traffic and vacant city blocks meant the area felt isolated and alienated. While there are a mass of seemingly sound and attractive Victorian red-brick buildings lining the streets, there is very little life save for the promise of future regeneration indicated by signage put up by the DSD (a promise made often through the city). However, the grid of streets that portends the re-entry into Donegall Square and filters one back into the central hub is soon encountered and activity is once more visible.

Delving into the main draw of the city and its use, Donegall Place and Royal Avenue were lined with shops and crowded with shoppers; though the pedestrian population is at its peak only during business hours, and footfall decreases dramatically at night and Sunday mornings (image set XXX, page 256). A quick turn to the right reveals the presence of Victoria Square, the newly opened shopping mall that has help to transform the city centre, and which is an important site in the regeneration of Belfast. It has become central to the city's identity as well: in a recent study, Victoria Mall was identified as a safe non-sectarian space for teenagers to go on the weekends and be separate from parents, important when considering the role of the city centre in Belfast (Leonard and McKnight 2011). This, juxtaposed with the Castle Court shopping mall, creates a central shopping core that is ringed by examples of dereliction and decay just on the margins indicating that manifestations of the conflict are still close at hand. Though these are not sites that have been bombed, they are buildings and businesses whose demise surely was due to the struggling economic conditions of late 20th century Northern Ireland, due in no small part to the Troubles.

The streets that surround the shopping area are difficult to navigate; there is still plenty of activity and life as this is the concentration of the commercial and retail activity of the city. However, the even sense of development is augmented by the areas of seemingly permanent dereliction. One can transition quickly from a view of the gleaming new Victoria Square to the facade of a burned out boarded up structure covered in graffiti. An example of this is the North Street Arcade; an art deco shopping arcade built in 1936, it was burned down in April 2004 and has been source of contention in the community as it was considered one of the last non-corporate shopping and consumer spaces in the city.

It is not surprising then to learn that the North Street Arcade, along with eleven acres surrounding it (and Victoria Square), is where the newest phase of Belfast city centre's regeneration will take place: the construction of the Royal Exchange (see image 6-186, page 256). Despite the continued weakness in the economy and consumer practices, the Royal Exchange will occupy what has been called central Belfast's' most 'derelict' quarter[125]. It will be a mixed use development, of retail, commercial and residential sites and incorporating public space and other elements of landscaping and design. It is supposed to rejuvenate the existing architecture when it can, and integrate new architecture when necessary.

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Image 6-180 Walking up Donegall Street from the city hall

Image 6-181 Looking down a side street

Image 6-182 Victoria Square shopping mall

Image 6-183 Castle Court shopping mall

Image 6-185 Dereliction in the vicinity of Victoria Square; will be part of the Royal Exchange

Image 6-184 The burnt out North Street Arcade; will be part of Royal Exchange

Image 6-186 The plans for the Royal Exchange; Victoria Sq. is off the lower right corner and Castle Court the off the middle top

The maze of streets that make up the central core of Belfast have been divided up into themed quarters in a bid to structure the overall regeneration of the city centre. The original quarter that was created is the Cathedral Quarter, a planned area of regeneration that was also a product of the Laganside Development group's work and is named for St. Anne's Cathedral which lies at the heart of the area (image set XXXI, page 258). In walking through the area and seeking out the uses and accessibility of the space, the Cathedral Quarter, like many spaces and places in Belfast, was disarmingly void of life in the evenings. This is something perhaps attributable to the existence of a mainly day-time economy, meaning that offices close up in the evenings, and therefore other shops in the area, such as cafes, lunch counters, and convenience shops, also lock their doors after business hours. There is a night-time economy present as there are a number of pubs, restaurants and music venues, though the general vacancy after dark is still palpable.

Leaving the area, the mass of land that belongs to the Titanic Quarter across the river naturally pens in the eastern border. But it is the impermeable buffer of flyovers and highways created by the Westlink that creates a void space to the north and west of the Cathedral Quarter, and of the city centre. The Westlink was initially designed in 1964 and was to completely encircle the city centre, though only part of this has ever been constructed. Over the years it has gone through several spates of upgrades, most recently in 2008, but always with public opposition. In addition to the bottlenecks and traffic jams that residents complain of, it also has completely dislocated, isolated, and rendered the city centre virtually unreachable by anything other than a vehicle for areas to the north and west. It has succeeded in further articulating the tendency in Belfast for roads to serve buffers and void spaces between territories, with the roads themselves being as equally as hostile as the contending groups on either side. This is all part of the ever-evolving relationship that has developed between the city centre and the rest of Belfast. It is notable that people still have trouble accessing the city centre, as was mentioned in interviews with local community leaders (BF4, BF5); while transportation is often the issue, the psychological buffer of the motorways also does not aid in conceptually making the city centre an accessible shared space. For instance, crossing the Westlink along York Street from the Cathedral Quarter, one must contend with the aggressive presence of articulated lorries idling noxiously at the intersection. If one wanted to walk anywhere out of the main city centre, crossing the Westlink would be done by using precipitous over-highway

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Image 6-187 St. Anne's Cathedral

Image 6-188 The square facing St. Anne's Cathedral

Image 6-189 St. Anne's Square luxury apartment home development

Image 6-190 Part of the Cathedral Quarter

Image 6-191 The intimidating crossing of the Westlink to access north Belfast

Image 6-192 Crossing of the Westlink in front of idling lorries

pedestrian bridges or under-highway walkways. It is quite successful as a barrier into and out of the city centre.

Movement beyond the city centre is almost exclusively limited to cars, a reality that will continue to have great consequences for any attempt at successful regeneration of the city centre. It was clear that use of the city centre was almost strictly relegated to the areas immediately surrounding the shopping areas, as well as the space eastward towards the regenerated riverside walkway and Waterfront Hall.

When non-city centre areas were accessed, life appeared as normal, and use and availability of goods and services on par with similar cities. Like so many things though, the insight comes from what can't be seen, and what perhaps only exists in the minds of those who live there. In my time interviewing a community relations representative with the Belfast government, I was aware that issues such a service provisions (like recycling, rubbish pickup, and other infrastructural matters) are problematic because it costs the city much more to provide these services in a way that works around the sectarian divides. Likewise, the building and maintaining of community health centres was also problematic as they were maintaining more than necessary for the population as whole. Additionally, even the development of services such as doctor's surgeries and grocery stores had to be designed with the perceptions of the safety of the users in mind. In light of this, one can see that the so-called normalcy of the neighbourhoods all possess an undercurrent and knock-on effect of dealing with community division. This is well-illustrated by Brand's study of the Stewartstown Road regeneration project in West Belfast, where parts of the redesigned building had to have two exits/entrances to appease both sides of the community, but had to be installed after the building was finished when it was observed that no one was using the space (Brand 2009).

Each neighbourhood possesses its own character that summed up the general identity of those that lived there. West Belfast with its Irish language school, Irish-themed decor on signage, and Cultúrlann Centre was very clear about whom this area belonged to. South Belfast was known as being more the enclave of the middle-class, who separated themselves from the conflict, and the housing is grander, older, and the habitat of those affiliated with the university. The East was fairly non-descript, but being a strong Protestant community that enjoys a fair amount of isolation from the city seemed to fit with this sense of comfort. It is North and West Belfast where the vast majority of interface zones exist and where evidence of the tensions is most obvious in the form of the peace walls, memorials to victims of the Troubles (on either side) and murals of political solidarity with causes in

other parts of the world. While UDP (Ulster Democratic Party) signs and Union Jacks were hung in shop windows, the political stance felt more dutiful than essential to existence, or what Estlund might call an expression of 'civility', rather than 'politeness', as a formal assertion of political expression that is markedly different from the 'vigorous, disruptive, disturbing, embarrassing, or even illegal expressive activity' (Estlund 2004, 1), which is actively engaged in Belfast by some.

Other than from south Belfast along Great Victoria Street/Bedford Road, accessing the city centre was done by car or bus. One car journey took me by the Crumlin Road Gaol, an imposing old Victorian prison whose fate is still being decided. It too is nestled right on an interface zone as well as in close proximity to the city centre, and even before it was closed down in 1996, it provided a buffer between the conflicting parties. The neighbourhoods that face onto it are bleak and unpromising. Having spent much time in a city centre that reflects renewal and rejuvenation, the poverty and greyness of this still occupied housing provided a stark contrast. Not only is it minutes away from the redevelopments of the city centre, but it also become radically apparent that there is a more fundamental problem in the non-city centre areas that needs to be addressed. The city centre is still vital, but like many things, it must be addressed in parallel to other issues so that at some point everything comes together. Looking at the neighbourhoods reminds one that a culture of poverty, resistance, and hopeless can easily pervade neighbourhoods and people from one generation to the next, and is at the heart of understanding the dilemma that a regenerated city centre presents in the face of relatively ignored residential space.

6.4.2 'City Centre Living'?

While Belfast itself is a large community, the city centre lacks any really definitive population[126]. In this sense, it has mostly been a no-man's land for many years. What are the implications of this? Why is this, and how has this manifest itself on how the city centre has been perceived and how people are adjusting to using it now? In terms of statistics, Belfast's population has been gradually declining (Plöger 2007, 41), and it is the city centre that exemplifies this. Hardly anyone lives there, or at least they didn't, but the emphasis now is on changing this. Creating a continuously habited and active city centre is a top priority for city administration, property developers, and other interested parties. This, in

many ways, is the most ambitious plan of all the development and changes taking place in Belfast. Making the city centre be something it never has been (lived in and continuously active) will involve not just the financial backing of developers and administrative support of the government, but also the more complex process of winning the 'hearts and minds' of the very people the city centre is for and getting the bodies in that are required to make the space successful. All of this points to a complex, but potentially game-changing, future for Belfast. Below, the difficulties encountered in achieving the 24-hour and accessible city centre are discussed, as well as the implication of such a change.

The rhetoric of city centre living in Belfast paints a utopian image of sophistication and convenience. The message of the brochures and promotional material put out by agencies marketing these properties is that the new middle-class dream is not a split-level house in a commuter town, but a central and accessible apartment in the city centre. This is in marked contrast to what is the norm in Belfast, and also represents a slate of values that are at odds with the working-class image of the city. Some might call it gentrification, others might see it as the only way the city centre will really become a place for everyone in the city, and not just those that would be living there. In any case, the imagery is powerful and speaks to an ideal Belfast that is cosmopolitan, exciting and in no way riven by sectarian conflict:

> *Imagine if you could live each moment according to your mood. At the Arc you can enjoy the ultimate city centre lifestyle or chill by the waterside, absorb a rich heritage or embrace a dazzling future. Why choose when you can have it all? (The Arc: Abercorn Basin Apartment Homes Brochure)*

This notion of the city centre identity is at great odds with many other images of the city[127]. Also, while the potential is there for the city to become a more lively and habited place, additional emphasis needs to be placed on nurturing a wide-range of groups, services, and activities that will engender this level of activity. There are many issues though in achieving this peaceful urban lifestyle described above, and it is most certainly an idealized version of what could be. However, this notion of increasing the population and activity level of the city centre is a very real agenda for private property developers and the city administration alike. While it presents many opportunities for change and growth, it will require participation on the part of everyone in the city, not just future apartment and home owners in the centre.

In observing Belfast, it was clear that there was a distinct lack of activity that pervaded the city centre. The buildings and public spaces were 'mono-chronic' in nature,

where activity was centered on one element, limiting the human use and interaction of it to one primary time of day (Kreitzman 1999, 146). Repeatedly frustrated with the sense of isolation there, it was this very element that provided the best indication of the future challenges for Belfast, and the way around this problem: the creation of a 24-hour city centre. In a 24-hour city, space and building use is 'poly-chronic 'as it is used in a variety of ways, by a wide array of groups and individuals (Kreitzman 1999, 146). This is distinctly missing in Belfast.

If Belfast city centre is to house the cosmopolitan city dwellers, then it must also allow room for other streams of urban use to develop. While this will ultimately adapt and change over time, it is already underway: the relocation of the University of Ulster[128] campus to the Cathedral Quarter will provide a base of human activity that is both varied in day and nighttime use, as well as varied in the demographics it will attract. Part-time students, those studying exclusively in the evenings, day-time and full-time students, support staff, and other community education classes will create a natural flow of people into the city centre. This will also encourage a growth in services that will cater to these populations such as an increase in cafes, eateries, book shops, and other forms of business, with such services staying open later to provide for the longer hours of potential operation.

Developers and local government want people in the city centre. They think it is a good thing and that it is one of the only ways that Belfast will continue to shape itself into a dynamic city, move away from the conflict, and build a healthy and robust economy (BF3, BF6, BF14).This would be a dramatic break from the past however, and it will take time for the local populace to buy into it and trust the developments. There is already some proof that this will work and be successful, one example being the Odyssey Arena. First opening its doors in 2000, it was part of the larger Laganside regeneration scheme. The challenge was to create a new shared entertainment complex that was as neutral as possible. One of the ways this was done was by the creation of Northern Ireland's only ice hockey team, the Belfast Giants. The Odyssey is considered a success in its ability to provide shared and neutral public space for the city. It has slowly been joined by other ventures, such as Victoria Square and the area surrounding it.

Despite this apparent confidence that the city centre will be a thriving, 24-hour place in the future, the message I received was 'people don't want to live in the city centre'. Even developers who were building residential buildings in the centre thought that it was kind of 'mad' to live in a small flat in the city when you could have 'a nice semi in the suburbs'. They rendered city centre living so inconvenient that 'you may as well be living in

Bangor' (BF9, BF10). Another developer (BF8) recounted the difficulty there was in selling modern townhouses in the Bridge End area in the mid-1990s that were located just adjacent to the city centre on the other side of the Lagan.

To get people into the city centre, to live there, would mean that certain cultural assumptions borne out of the conflict regarding the city centre would have to be eliminated, and that in doing that, the new city centre would represent something different than it does today or has in the past. But getting people to live there is the only way that the amenities already provided for in the city centre will continue to succeed, and how further improvements, such as walkable access and better activity on the street level, will grow. The 24-hour city is something that is important not only in Belfast, but is a current trend in city centre revitalization around the UK. This indicates that there is likelihood that the project will succeed as it is taking place in a wider policy agenda that supports and encourages such planning. There is of course the continued dimension of getting people to trust and buy into the idea that the city centre is somewhere to live and enjoy, and it is not just enclave of the young moneyed or at odds with working-class values.

6.4.3 Accessibility: A Problem on Many Levels

Accessibility of the city centre works on two levels of understanding in Belfast: the physical and the social. If city centre-living and a 24-hour city centre are to work, accessibility issues are at the helm.

In terms of the physical, Belfast is continually beset by issues concerning pedestrian ease of access, poorly designed arterial routes, and issues of blank and derelict space, which inhibit human flow throughout the city[129]. Permeability is a major risk factor as well, for even though the city centre does possess a variety of streetcapes, the wide and unbroken roads around and out of it deter increased use (Montgomery 1998, 108). Walking is generally hindered by poor access to non-city centre space and while cycling is a moderately growing form of transport, it is greatly set back by inadequate funding for safe urban cycle paths and other necessary infrastructure[130]. This was an overwhelming observation of Belfast throughout the research. There is awareness of the physical accessibility of Belfast as problematic: The Forum for Alternative Belfast (FAB) is a group of urban designers and architects whose goal is to educate the public and policy-makers of the potential for transforming centre Belfast in regards to design and accessibility[131]. While

they are actively pursuing ways to improve this aspect of Belfast, they indicate that despite all the new development taking place, there is very little regard given to how to make the place easier to use and get to, as opposed to just making new things for people use, visit, and consume:

> The Belfast we now live in has been shaped by a relatively unconstrained development market that has largely failed to create a thriving and vibrant city environment. . . Significantly, Belfast is 'nobody's project'; the city council does not have planning or regeneration powers and those government departments that do, have no particular coordinated interest in the declining city (FAB website).

The analysis offered through FABs project, 'The Divis Street Pathfinder', is one that highlights the plight of the pedestrian in Belfast, and is supported overwhelmingly in the research. Divis Street is described as 'one of five city arterial routes cut by the massive infrastructure of the Westlink during the 1970s. The arteries are now empty and inhibiting places to walk and cycle, the road acts as a de-facto zone separating the entire West and North of the city, some 40% of the entire city population'[132]. This indicates the need for attention to these areas, and not just commercial and privately led regeneration projects, which is the most successful and obvious form of regeneration in the city.

Though FAB is working to improve awareness of this issue, there is a sense that those in charge of 'Planning' lack any real ability to 'plan'. While it looks like Belfast is transforming, there is actually a large part missing from this formula of private/public partnerships for the development of residential, commercial, and retail space, and that is the consideration of how public space is used and accessed. This same disdain was also encountered in an interview with a local MP, who said that 'Belfast's planners lack any vision and do not have the power to make effective decisions' (BF12). This means that pressure must be applied by independent groups.

In a very similar way, the social accessibility of Belfast city centre is also a complex issue that reflects a tense relationship between it and the local population. The type of regeneration of the city centre that has taken place, the future vision of the city, and the way the people of Belfast view it has resulted in a sense of potential loss, disenfranchisement, and lack of belonging to the future. There is a strong narrative of resistance to anything that undermines the working class values that Belfast is perceived to embody. Respondents who were representatives of the local community were very vocal in their concern over what new buildings and apartments meant to their identity. In fact, the

term ‘yuppie’ was bandied about with a fair amount of scorn. This position was strengthened by graffiti on the fencing surrounding a site off the Shankhill Road where new apartments were to go up (see images 6-195 and 196 on page266). With the emphasis on need for social housing and a dislike of yuppies, there is a sense that resistance to such projects is strong.

Accessibility, both in terms of physical and social, are issues that are recognized as problematic in Belfast. It was also stated that ‘access to city centre is easy enough with busses if you’re willing to wait so . . . not great. Not really a centre’ (BF4, BF5). It was fairly plain, even in my own experience, that the farther out into Belfast one goes, the less frequent the bus service and the longer it takes. This issue and other like it are important for understanding how, on the whole, the city centre can be better used. One respondent, commenting on the priorities of the city council, summarized this:

> ‘one of the key these in all of this is that of connectivity, how do you connect people across the city to each other and how do you create spaces that are shared . . . ultimately you can create a lovely place, you can build a lovely high quality facility, but if no one is going to use it, then it is useless. So how do we connect people? That’s about transport, it’s about cycle routs, pedestrian walking, it’s actually about access through interfaces. I know people who would travel 5 miles that way when they could go 200 yards that way, and they go that way to access a service. I know people who would walk to the safe bus stop. . .’ (BF3).

While FAB’s perspective discussed previously might appear bleak, this does indicate that there is a level of recognition that issues of connectivity and accessibility are important for social and physical reasons, but especially so in the post-conflict context. Though the from the community and government, is perhaps best summed up by the notion that ‘we need to be sure that we bring the people with us, and people have to step up to the challenge as well, we can’t sit here and whinge’ (BF3). It is the responsibility of the city leadership as well as citizens groups and private developers to ensure this is the case, and that is the most pressing challenge of the developing city centre. Additionally, the issue of resistance to the city centre as a shared space is dominated by the ingrained need to associate one’s identity with physical place. Belfast is a city where the location where one lives determines who one is, and to relocate would threaten one’s security (physically and psychologically). To suggest that people might want to live in a part of the city that seemingly has no ‘definition’ seems anathema to life in the city.

Image 6-193 Aerial view of Titanic Quarter; Belfast city centre is in lower left corner
Source: http://www.culturenorthernireland.org/article/803/titanic-quarter

Image 6-194 Drawing of Titanic Quarter; the filled in area is partially completed and the other colours are future developments
Source: http://www.titanic-quarter.com/tqlive/

Image 6-195 Graffiti in a development in west Belfast: 'Local needs over profit'



Image 6-196 Graffiti in a development in west Belfast: 'We need social housing not yuppie apartments'

The Titanic Quarter sees itself as instrumental in this process of revitalizing this idea of Belfast city centre identity as being shared for the future of the city, as it will offer modern facilities in the context of a historic location in a space that is part of a non-conflict identity (see images 6-193 and 6-194 on page 266). The Titanic Quarter administration also sees its role in the city as extremely valuable for aiding in the delivery of the peace dividend, as well as fostering continued community support of their work and the problem lies not with intention and desire, but with the ability to act and make decisions in the planning and policy context.

The attitude of the local population, as well as the developers and local leaders perception that they are playing a positive role in the peacebuilding process. Through their creation of the 'Memorandum of Understanding', which outlines the commitment to the community that the Titanic Quarter will strive to uphold as it continues to develop the site, as well as the chairman Mike Smith's active involvement in local community groups, they hope to continuously engage the local population in the process. By purposely seeking out the input of the local community, the success of the Titanic Quarter ultimately rests on the acceptance of it by the community as a whole. The Titantic Quarter seems to represent a solid example of how a large dominating force can work to actively get the local community on board, and it would appear that other city centre developments need to do the same. The Titanic Quarter is not without its critics however, and there is a tendency to want to vilify what they do.

6.4.4 Exclusion and Inclusion

One of the underlying elements of Belfast's long-standing social issues is that of social exclusion. Kilmurray (1995) argues that the term is not just a 'posh' way of talking about poverty: 'the 'poor', if not invisible, are often viewed as a homogeneous, and dehumanized, mass. Yet a more sympathetic picture would present a wide diversity of experiences of social exclusion. It would also demand greater sensitivity to the variety of mechanisms at work'. She defines social exclusion by four measures: unemployment, poverty, personal and public rejection, and exclusion from politics (Kilmurray 1995, 36)[133].

The role of social exclusion and inclusion must be taken into account when approaching the regeneration of Belfast city centre. Statistically speaking, Northern Ireland has a 20% poverty rate, meaning that these people live on 60% or less of the average income in the UK [134], but taking it step further (according to Kilmurray's assessment of what

this means above), social exclusion is not just about income levels, but rather about an individual and group's capacity for self-advocacy and access. This means that the idea of 'social exclusion' and social exclusion' is an important debate in Northern Ireland and has been taken on by both municipal (Belfast City Council) and state policy makers (the Northern Ireland Executive)[135]. As a result, the emphasis on social inclusion is extremely important in framing the all levels of policy in Northern Ireland. From access to housing, medical care, benefits, and even public space, the degree to which something inclusive or exclusive will always play a major role.

When it comes to reading the social exclusion/inclusion issue through the built environment, in this case it is the legacy of inaccessible or poor quality housing stock as well as the quality of space provided by the regenerating city centre that are important. The issue of housing is a key component and something that has contributed the history of the Troubles (Bryan 2003; Murtagh 2008). When applied to the city centre, the questions then raised are how exclusive/inclusive is it? Is it a place that is easily accessible by all and that is a safe and neutral space? These are big concerns of course, and part of assessing their degree of exclusivity vs. inclusivity is to see how it naturally is used over time.

In a commentary that was published three years before the Belfast Agreement was ratified, Wilson (1995) commented that

> 'whatever progress may or may not be made towards a political settlement in Northern Ireland, there must be tangible changes in people's lives, particularly for those living in areas which have been the seat of military conflict, if those who have suffered most are to feel hope for the future. Otherwise, they may feel scepticism at best, and cynicism at worst, as to the long-term impact of the paramilitary ceasefires. It is far more evident that business has benefited from the new context - particularly tourism - than that disadvantaged areas have experienced any real improvement (Wilson 1995, 5).

The question is then raised: what happened? Did these areas get the improvement they needed? In this research, the goal has been to examine the relationship of city centre regeneration to peacebuilding—in the case of Belfast, and along the lines of the point presented above about inclusion/exclusion, has the city centre contributed to this dynamic in a positive way? The hope is that by helping to redefine and create a new 'neutral' territory, it would logically be an inclusive space. On the basis of my research, a tentative conclusion would be that the city centre is in fact a place that is neutral and can be shared

by the city, but that the problem is getting to it and being able to participate financially in what it has to offer.

6.5 A Comparison of Major Themes

6.5.1 Walking and Watching in Each City

Over the course of the above ethnographic material, the significance that I was walking as a means of gathering data was both liberating and alienating. It was extremely apparent that intra-city transportation in all three cases is mainly confined to vehicular or public transport schemes and very seldom done on foot, and if so, only along limited areas or routes. This meant that as an outsider, I literally remained in many ways 'outside' the realm of everyday experience, but at the same time I was able to observe elements normally rendered less visible when not walking, for instance the experience of large motorways blocking passages or the extent of dereliction in a given area. On the other hand, walking is also an integral part of life in the accessing, using, and experiencing the more confined public spaces, such as the malls and pedestrianized areas that formed the core of city centre space and shared experience. Being able to tread both sides of the experiential divide was vital to the ethnographic process. But what did the observations gained from walking as well as interviews mean in a comparative sense? How did underlying experience of each city, in addition to the contextual knowledge, add to this observational process?

Each city posed its own challenges to research, interviewing and observation. The cities were at once engaging and dynamic, but also alienating to the outsider as a result of elements of physical inaccessibility. Despite this, the insights and information gathered allowed for a broad but insightful look into how the experience of post-conflict regeneration has worked in each context. In a broad sense, how did the cases compare? What did the ethnographic data reveal about how each city has been regenerated and rebuilt in the post-conflict context? In terms of being outside and inside the experiential process of the city, what did this say about the nature of post-conflict regeneration? Following is a brief overview of comparative themes that serve to background the subsequent analytical chapter.

6.5.1.1 Problematizing the Tourist Gaze

Commenting on the general problem of observation, the role of playing the outsider varied in each place, and can be related to Urry's conception of tourist gaze, where one seeks out new experiences and 'views' based around the image of the daily life experience of cultures foreign to one's own (Urry 2002, 3). This functioned in Sarajevo and Belfast, though care was taken to theoretically and experientially work through that. Because and perhaps in spite of it, observing the cities was dynamic and engaging, generally speaking. The issue was with Belfast; it was problematic as I was not a completely foreign person—many elements and attributes of the city were familiar because I too live in a British city that shares the same general design conventions, shops, and services. Like other UK cities, it has similar shops and restaurants, and the pubs and bars ply the same drinks. If you didn't know Belfast was the centre of the Troubles, you wouldn't know where to look for evidence of a concealed past, let alone what to look for. I suppose what makes Belfast unique is that it *does* feel like any other place, except for the fact that it has a legacy of division and violence unparalleled by any other city in the country. Despite its history, it manages to parade as any other post-industrial British city, with a mix of new developments and refurbished historical sites, as well as a preponderance of large motorways and private passenger vehicles. In opposition, Sarajevo and Beirut did feel distinctly different in how they were used, designed, and approached, and I could more readily read into these differences.

In Belfast, the irony is that within this is a sub-narrative of identity and change in the face of a conflict past. 'Normalities' are in fact a long sought after states of being simply because normality was for so long unachievable. Of course evidence is there, and is in fact a major draw in the 'war tourism' niche that has settled on Belfast in the form of black cab tours of the murals. On the other hand, the conflict is easily read in the urban fabric of Sarajevo and Beirut, though there is considerable newness and regeneration, there is no doubt that these were the scenes of intensive battle. At the same time, the narrative change from conflict past to economically robust future was visible.

In Belfast, the presence of a conflict past is only visible in the form of murals and peace walls. Typically the remit of the black cab[136] driver, 'war tourism' has now been taken on by City Sightseeing Belfast, that takes tourists not only to popular landmarks, but also to the Peace Wall as well as murals found near the Shankill and Falls Road areas. In Beirut and Sarajevo, this was completely lacking; this is not to say that tourists to the cities are not

also driven by a curiosity to witness some of the effects of the conflict, but it certainly hasn't been marketed in such a way. Erasure of war evidence in Sarajevo and Beirut is not part of an agenda; development does not occur in an effort to cover it up or highlight it. In contrast, in Belfast it represents a sub-economy in the city. This is problematic considering there is a strong movement to paint over mural with more positive messages[137].

All three cities were used as the means and material of their respective conflicts, though the way this has been played out is different in each place. In examining what it means to view the city both as a researcher and as tourist, this fundamental element of the conflict past was the main device for creating comparison and analysis of viewing, especially as comparisons were made to photographic evidence reviewed before the visits. The significance of city centre regeneration and its relationship to the past conflict is understood through the way in which the conflict was, and is, manifest on the fabric of the city. This means that in all cases, the newness and regeneration is an attempt to separate it from this former conflict identity.

6.5.2 Walking Observations in Relation to Legitimation and the ISIS

In chapter two, the principals of Habermasian legitimation were outlined through the use of the ISIS (the identity-securing interpretive system). It was argued that the city offered a rich resource for looking at and applying these concepts as a means of connecting how cities could potentially aid in the stability of peace in a post-conflict society. By helping to formulate group and individual identity, provide physical and social security, and also function as the structure through which to perform everyday events, cities have the capacity to be sources of stability as well as needed growth for the post-conflict society.

By walking and observing Sarajevo, Beirut, and Belfast with the goal of drawing out the expressions of legitimation (see figure 3-1), the task was to actively seek out connections between what I observed in the built environment, how I saw other people using it, and how I was also inspired to use and interact with it. By taking these levels of engagement and further analyzing them for what they might mean when applied to what elements could help or hinder social and economic development of a city (and in turn, it's peace), the individual analyzes presented at the end of each city-section emerged.

The question then is raised: how do these elements take back up the conversation on legitimation? In order to move back from the detailed observations to the bigger picture

in this thesis, how might the observations in each city support the elements of the ISIS? This is answered by looking at how the concepts of 'the city as identity', 'the city as security', and the 'city as system and structure' all correspond to examples from the walking observations are illustrated in the walking observations.

City as identity. In each case, the cities provided spaces for creating and maintain group and individual identity. This is especially important in the post-conflict context, where an identity that moves beyond the conflict both in terms of past and future perspective is vital to the sustainability of peace. In the case of Sarajevo, the Baščaršija provides a central focus for the formation and support of a distinct Bosnian identity. It is something associated with a pluralist past that was if not entirely peaceful, at least a more tolerant version of Bosnian character. It is also the centre of a future identity of the city, where the old is still at the heart of the new, exemplified by the dual centres. This is also part of the future-looking identity as it is able to reconcile past identities with future ones.

In Beirut, notion of identity is more problematic. The BCD is arguably where many people see their identity as Beirutis and Lebanese as emanating from (see arguments in chapter five on the role of the Solidere BCD in potentially erasing Lebanese identity). However, because of the nature of its reconstruction, it is a highly contested identity that has become increasing politicized. The fact remains however that it remains the centre of Lebanese identity, the problem being that many do not agree with what this new identity represents: newness, wealth, sterilization, and inaccessibility.

Belfast occupies another varied context for asserting identity through the city. Historically, the city centre was cut off and considered an unsafe space during the Troubles and was also the recipient of many car bombs. As a result of it being perceived as an unsafe place by all sides of the conflict, in the contemporary world it occupies the territory of 'neutral', or at least non-sectarian. The question still remains whether the people of Belfast consider their regenerating city centre part of a new identity—challenging when considering the geography of Belfast still places people firmly within the boundaries of sectarian and class divides, which might arguably offer a safer alternative for identification, and one which those encouraging city centre regeneration must actively seek to change.

City as Security. In the ISIS, the notion of 'security' is attached to the idea of identity in that there are a variety of things in an 'interpretive system' that help provide this. While this is certainly part of understanding legitimation, there is another aspect that emerges especially when applying it to the city and that is a more literal reading: as in, how does the city physically create, or detract, from a sense of security. The physical

manifestations of this are equally important in understanding the role the city plays in the stability of post-conflict peace. In each case examined here, the physical and tangible elements of the city have contributed to the safety or insecurity of its inhabitants during the conflict, as well as after. In both cases, the built environment has been purposefully altered (or forgotten) in a way that has contributed to the feeling of security.

How was a sense of security perceived and felt in each place? How did I read this onto the research goals? In each place, there was a common theme in how I as a walker and observer felt unsecure: unsafe to simply non-existent sidewalks and pedestrian areas. Likewise, the places that felt the most secure were those that invited footfall and pedestrian traffic and where people were free to congregate in public space. This is an observation that is twofold however: as I walked in ways that many people normally do not often, it was clear that this was not issue for many. That said, one has to wonder how things might change if pedestrian accessibility into and through the city was improved.

Sarajevo, Beirut, and Belfast all were rife with examples of unsafe or poorly designed pedestrian areas with large, heavily trafficked roads blocking accessibility for anyone not in a vehicle (for example, see photos 6-72, 6-73, 6-113, 6-158, 6-159, 6-191, and 6-192). On the contrary, the each also reflected a similar sense of security in the successful public spaces where people were able to converge on foot. The Baščaršija and Ferhadijah Street in Sarajevo, the ABC Mall, the Corniche, and parts of the BCD in Beirut, and Donegal Square and the shopping district surrounding it provided a counterbalance to the impermeability of other parts.

City as System and Structure. In chapter two the city on this level was seen as embodying 'structure', or the built and natural environment (including infrastructure, transportation, utilities, etc.) and 'system' or the more theoretical, intangible levels of globalization and networks (as developed through a theoretical discussion in chapter two). In the case of the cities examined here, there are a variety ways each fulfilled these two dimensions.

In each case, all cities fulfilled the structural dimension—in fact, it is a city by its very nature is a place that possesses physical structure. Therefore Sarajevo, Beirut, and Belfast are obvious examples of this. However, also embodied by each city were systemic elements, observable in a distinct number of ways. Looking back on the discussion of globalization in chapter two, it is the role cities play as part of a network connecting local practices to more distant processes. Castells (2002) vision of the city as occupying a spatial-temporal realm means that they are physical manifestations of where the intangible

(money, power, communication technology) meets the tangible (buildings, shops, cars, etc.) in a concentrated manner that serves and centralized, catalyzing force to the surrounding locality. Cities in the globalization discourse are challenging the power of states in the sense that they play key roles in legitimizing changes in the ways of doing things (Beaverstock et al. 2000). Additionally, the cities studied here are also special in that they are not major hubs of power (London, New York, Tokyo, etc.), nor are they easily defined as ordinary cities due to their post-conflict nature. Because of this, they possess a capacity for being both ordinary and special as a result of their conflict past.

When looking at how these theoretical ideas might be expressed on the ground, and when examining the observational period of the locations, perhaps the strongest indicator of this was the extent of regeneration actually taking place. This is because the regeneration that is most visible is in the form of large building and construction projects that typically have foreign money behind them, indicating a certain kind of connection to global networks and information flows. This is especially true in Sarajevo and Beirut, though slightly different in Belfast.

However, adding the element of post-conflict to the mix creates an unusual confluence of conditions making these cities both ordinary and extraordinary. While each city has suffered due to the economic crisis in the last few years, there has been the added weight of continuing to deal with the history of the conflict. While the conflict in and of itself might make investment in business and infrastructure riskier, it also makes it a potentially high-yield market due to the fact that one might be able to invest cheaply but gain high rewards if stability persists over the years. There is also the attractiveness of being post-conflict that adds to each city's identity in the global realm: there is a romanticism and in-built type of tourism that results from this. This was evident in each city in different ways: from the Sarajevo roses, to the decaying, bullet-riddled buildings still standing in Sarajevo and Beirut, to the murals, peace walls, and black cab tours of Belfast, each city was seen as embodying the conflict in a way that could be marketed and consumed as an attraction (though this would not take away from the social benefits of such practices as well).

The walking and observation participation of the three cities provided me with a wealth of information and insight into the research question at hand. It also successfully allowed me to see how such theoretical concepts as legitimation and the ISIS can be made physically manifest. The city represents also the lifeworld which according to Habermas is the background or structure through which communicative action takes place (Habermas

1979, 1987) and as such means it plays an important role in helping to support the post-conflict peace building that occurs in these places.

6.5.3 Core Comparative Themes

Drawing out the main themes of the ethnographic data was done through the production of the matrix presented at the end of the chapter (table 6-1). The matrix shows four columns: themes, expression, operationalization, and manifestation. 'Themes' is the broadest category; 'expression' shows the form the themes take on in the analysis of the cities; 'operationalization' describes how it functions and/or is made active; and finally 'manifestation' briefly describes the specific way this thematic expression and operationlization is illustrated in each city. What follows is not an expanded version of the graph, rather is it a synthesis of how these elements took on various forms of meaning in examining and comparing each city.

6.5.3.1 Surrogate and Shared Space

In each city, the shopping malls served as a kind of surrogate public space. Meaning, that in cases such as Belfast where there has been, and remains, a lack of shared space that is equally accessed as used, shopping malls and the various 'quarters' provide this for the city. In Sarajevo, where there is a severe lack of access to the outdoors as well as a disconnect between people's homes and the old city centre (in terms of transport difficulties and geographical layout of the city), shopping malls now provide a space for interaction that is mixed and safe and that also incorporates the growth of more Western-style consumption. In Beirut, the combination of high urban density and very little outdoor public shared space means that places such as Solidere's BCD and other shopping malls provide an opportunity for casual interaction, removed from pollution and adverse weather, as well as participation in community life that is an extension of the typical market place.

Surrogate space also provides, in all three contexts, shared, and mostly neutral, space. In places that are post-conflict, and where the conflict was sectarian or ethnopolitical in nature, opportunities such as these are vital to engaging the local

community in participating in life and activities that are separate from conflict association. That it is done in an environment of consumption adds a level of complexity that is expressed through a neoliberal critique of regeneration in these post-conflict cities.

6.5.3.2 Large-Scale Development with a Retail and Commercial Focus

Beirut and Belfast are both home to large-scale and centrally planned regeneration and development projects. Solidere, while not the only development project in the city, is by far the most important in terms of changing not only the built environment, but also altering economic productivity, increasing tourism, and providing a source for critique and contestation of their political, business, and design practices. In Belfast, there are three main forces that provide a similar role to that of Solidere: the Titanic Quarter, the previous Laganside development project, and the planned Royal Exchange are examples of large-scale projects that have, are, or will continue to shape multiple levels of experience in Belfast. It is noteworthy that while Titanic Quarter is entirely a private development, Laganside and Royal Exchange were/are done in partnership with city planners, meaning that the drive to bring more retail to the city (in the case of the Royal Exchange) is supported by the local government. In Sarajevo, the same scale of development does not exist. The ad-hoc development of Marindvor provides a similar sense, although the space is not driven or designed by a central agency. On the other hand, the construction of Sarajevo City Centre is a similar source of development because in the scale of the city, it is large, and the contention over its original purpose and current planning has been as source of conflict in public opinion. These qualities make it akin to the developments in the other cities.

6.5.3.3 Private Sector as Leader in Development

As indicated previously, all three cities have multiple sources, both public and private, that drive development and regeneration of the city. In Sarajevo, there is very little involvement by the local planning authorities in what happens and it is driven by small to medium investors (excluding of course the interests of agencies such as the World Bank, TIKA, and the EU). The private regeneration is usually a partnership of an Islamic funder or

bank from the Middle East or Malaysia with a local agent—either a construction company or other interested individual. In Beirut, the special relationship between the government and Solidere presents a unique relationship, however for all practical purposes, Solidere holds the reins on planning as policy was moulded to fit the future needs of the company just prior to Hariri leaving office. In Belfast, there is a relatively equal power-share between government and private interests. Though the private sector funds and drives the projects, there is a lot of participation in terms of regeneration in planning in getting projects going, though at the same time these same planning offices seem disinterested and/or powerless in other activities such as heritage preservation activities (BR1).

6.5.3.4 Local Community: Passivity and Engagement

In each case, the voice of the local community was present in varying degrees. In Sarajevo, it was almost non-existent. The cultural tendency towards apathy, on the one hand, with the municipal and state government ill-equipped from a personnel and financial standpoint to lead such ventures, on the other, means that the ability and opportunity for the local community to be involved is stunted. Though grass-roots options for protest and communication are possible, it is not taken on board perhaps due to cultural and social reasons based on the slow disassociation with a socialist identity. There is a presence online in the form of discussion forums commenting on the development of building projects in the city (though this exposure is limited due to language). In Beirut, the local community has a voice—though they may present themselves as powerless, they are nonetheless vocal. Presence in social media and on the streets is palpable and while these advocacy groups might leave one with the impression that they get nowhere with their work, the fact is they are featured in international publications, such as the New York Times, illustrating the effective marketing and reach of their message. It is also fitting as culturally there is a strong acceptance and value for public protest. In Belfast, the local community is organized through a well-structured system of local partnership representation and local/political party governance. They have a voice as well—present prolifically of course on social networking sites and other e-communication. But there is a very strong ethic of listening and responding to the concerns of the local community in these projects, although this in and of itself is a contested project. The research revealed that this very issue is what drives developers to work in the city centre versus outside of it;

because the city centre is still considered unpopular and unwanted space they do not have to work within the local communities. On the other side of the local community issue in Belfast is the reverse issue of political representation being problematic in the way it can manipulate public sympathies for or against a development project.

6.6 Conclusion

The ethnographies presented above represent only a fraction of the experience of observing and understanding the city. In exploring each city on foot following walking patterns that both replicated and deviated from the normal footfall of the inhabitants of the cities, observations of the everyday spaces, in addition to those that are perhaps missed and less observed, created ample opportunity for comparison. The goal was to seek out ways that the built environment, through the regeneration of the city centre, somehow expressed elements of the peace treaty through various means. Further to this, looking for ways elements of the root causes of conflict as well as other conditions vital to the peace treaty were manifest was also a key concern. In addition, looking for other emergent themes not yet seen in the analysis was part of the process.

In Sarajevo, this meant that the dual-centres of the city represented the cultural tendency to add to historical epochs instead of build over them, highlighting the need to foster the identity of Bosnia as a multi-ethnic and pluralistic state that is open to new, capitalist investment (in the new city centre) but also embracing a shared common heritage (in Stari Grad). In Beirut, the newly reconstructed BCD represents the general pre-occupation on the part of the ruling elite to recreate a Beirut that harkens to an almost mythical past of colonial grandeur and modern sophistication. On the other hand, the BCD's inaccessibility both physically as well as culturally represents a disconnect with the rest of the city. The people of the city mirror this physical separation, feeling disconnected to the economic impact the regeneration is having on the city and the country. In Belfast, the attempt has been to create a city centre that reflects a shared economic future represented through the creation of new shopping and retail ventures as well as residential and commercial space. As the city centre was once a void, the new life present in it is a sea-change from its past. However, though the success of the newly redesigned space would indicate it was a successful space, the continued development of the city centre without regards to other regeneration issues outside of it is potentially damaging. These elements

help to bring the results of the field research in line with the goal of seeing how the city functions as an ISIS.

In the following chapter, these elements are further analyzed through the interview material and additional emergent themes. Issues are discussed that deal with the relationship between actors and agents from the local community to local leadership to property developers. The impact of government restructuration, the role of private property development, and issues of identity and class are also considered.

Table 6-1 Matrix of Comparative Themes: Observation and Analysis

Theme	Expression	Operation			Manifestation		
		Sarajevo	Beirut	Belfast	Sarajevo	Beirut	Belfast
Actors	Government	*Passive*	*Passive*	*Engaged*	Government, both municipal and state, do not have resources to fully manage regeneration and investment strategies. They are present in terms of processing paperwork and general planning permission, but their regulatory role is limited.	Government is generally not involved in the regeneration to the extent that Solidere is partnered with it; they do not heavily regulate the new buildings outside of Solidere, though by extension property ownership laws are an expression of a certain level of engagement	Local planning authorities tender for small and large-scale regeneration schemes. They regulate building use, land permits, etc, but also have shown much interest in developing retail, regenerating derelict areas in the city centre.
	Local Community	*Passive*	*Engaged*	*Engaged through representation*	The local community does not have noticeable presence in involvement with how development is taking place; there is a presence in social networking and blogs, but even that is limited	The local community is very vocal in the city in regards to the built environment. Though groups generally take a defensive line, they have also been strategic in using social networking as well and physical tactics to express viewpoints.	The local community is engaged in the development of the city centre in three ways: through local leadership and representation, through private developers doing outreach and partnering with them.
	Private sector/ development	*Engaged*	*Engaged*	*Engaged*	Private sector is driving all new development visible in the city	Private sector is driving all new development visible in the city	Private sector funds majority of work, though there is often subsidizing by local government and lottery grants.
	Public sector/ int'l community	*Engaged, limited*	*Engaged, not sustained*	*Engaged, limited*	The international community was instrumental in rebuilding infrastructure and underwriting early reconstruction projects; they currently are involved in areas such as monuments, religious centres, and refugee housing	After war, there was a considerable amount of funding from international and third party agencies. Currently, this investment has shifted primarily to the private sector, though there is still an international presence.	The EU dedicated considerable funding in the form the various Peace I,II, and III projects. These had impact on built environment, but city centre work is not directly impacted by this work.
Activity	Reconstructing	*Rebuilding buildings and places damaged in war*	*Smaller scale reconstruction of heritage sites according to Solidere*		In Sarajevo, there has been a considerable of reconstructing buildings that were damaged in war and restoring to their pre-war state	Solidere claims to have reconstructed nearly 250 heritage buildings in the BCD	Very little wide-scale damage of physical environment occurred during conflict, so reconstruction was a non-issue.
	Replacing		*Destroying old and replacing it with something new*			In Beirut, all developments, excluding the reclaimed land extending from Minet el Hosn, are replacing old structures that were either damaged or derelict	
	New development	*Brand new developments with no previous significance for site*	*Brand new developments with no previous significance for site*	*Brand new developments with no previous significance for site*	Aside from the reconstructed buildings, most development in Sarajevo is new	In the BCD, including Minet el Hosn, many buildings are brand new, usually in the form of modern high rises	There are a significant number of new building projects on a small scale in the city centre; Titanic Quarter is a large-scale example of this.

Function	Retail	*Multiple examples*	*Multiple examples*	*Multiple examples*	Retail, residential, commercial, and service space is prominent in many sites as new areas of development are often mixed use. Where there is single-use development, it dedicated to retail and commercial space. Other forms of regeneration, however, have been based around a growing university sector as well as previously in the relocation of the banking and finance sector.	Solidere has been very purposeful in ensuring that the majority of the site is mixed use, with retail, residential commercial, and service sectors as well as cultural sites as part of the development. On the other hand, there is very little noticeable new industry brought into the area; in many ways it is trying to recapture what it was before. However, the rise of the service industry has been exponential in the post-conflict era. The impact this has had on the	Many new developments in Belfast city centre are typically single-use though there is a marked movement towards creating an increasing amount of mixed use facilities. The Titanic Quarter is also branding itself as mixed-use. Other sectors that have been part of the new buildings is the movement of the University of Ulster and the creation of 'quarters'.
	Residential	*Somewhat, much planned for future, might be financially non-viable*	*Multiple examples, though only high-end*	*Multiple examples, though resisted because seen gentrifying*			
	Commercial	*Multiple examples*	*Multiple examples*	*Multiple examples*			
	New Industry	*University and banking sectors*		*University, cultural 'quarters'*			
	Service Sector	*Moderate increase*	*Major increase*	*Major increase*			
Location	City-centre	*Majority*	*Majority*	*Majority*	The location of the development of new buildings and sites has been for the majority in Marindvor, the new city centre, though some projects have developed in the suburbs of Ilidza.	In Beirut, Solidere, through the BCD and vicinity (also in their remit) has located all of their efforts of the city centre. In the residential neighbourhoods is where small-scale developments are being built on smaller parcels of land.	In Belfast, the majority of new building development has occurred in the city centre or in the Titanic Quarter. Development does occur in the residential areas, but it is more difficult to manage due to contentions within the local communities.
	New space		*Present in Minet el Hosn*	*Present in Titanic Quarter*			
	Non city-centre/ residential	*Very little to none*	*Throughout city, but small scale and only on a private basis*	*Very little; what does exist is difficult to gain approval for*			
Accessibility	Geography	*Majorly influences how the city centre is used and accessed*			In Sarajevo, the particular geography of the city has made the city-centre less accessible in many ways		
	Roads/motorways	*Does not make accessing city-centre difficult*	*Makes accessing city-centre difficult*	*Makes accessing city-centre difficult*	The main road(s) that runs through the city do not hinder accessibility, though on the other hand they are not suitable for pedestrians.	The BCD is hemmed in by several large highways and by-passes, making access limited by foot and difficult even with a car, though that is the preferred method.	Belfast city-centre is also hemmed in the Westlink and other major thoroughfares that have cut off or limited access to the city centre regardless of form of transport.
	Public Transport	*Tram system; high-level of use*	*Taxis and unofficial bus system*	*Busses*	Sarajevo has a tram, bus, and trolley system system that runs the length of the city	Busses, mini-busses, and collective taxis	Belfast has en extensive bus system as well as overground system that has several major stops in the city
	Personal Automobile use	*High*	*Moderate to high*	*High*	High amount of private automobile use has made the main streets congested; also, prior to the war, not as many people drove cars but in the post-war context, they do.	While there are not as many cars a people in the city, there is still a large amount of private automobile use in the city	Private automobile use is high in Belfast.
	Walkability of city	*Difficult outside city-centre*	*Poor walkways make accessing city-centre on foot difficult*	*Poor walkways make accessing city-centre on foot difficult*	The city centre is relatively easy to access, and is itself walkable, but the rest of the city is not	Beirut city centre is not easily accessed on foot due to terrain and large roads	Belfast is not walkable outside the city centre; streets are long and large roads inhibit movement

CHAPTER SEVEN

Thematic Analysis of Sarajevo, Beirut, and Belfast: The Production of Neoliberal Space

7.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, a narrative account of walking and observing the city centres of Sarajevo, Beirut, and Belfast looked at how the issues of identity, government authority, and changing notions of capital and consumption were expressions of the peace treaties as well as manifest in the built environment generally and urban regeneration specifically. Through walking and observation understanding the urban experience from the street level helped form an interactive framework both for situating context and making observations of the cities.

The peace treaties and the impact they had on the built environment are manifest in a variety of complex and subtle ways. Looking at the ethnographic data, including the interview material, revealed that the effects of the peace agreement and peacebuilding on the built environment is not just about how structures within a society were altered but also (even more importantly) about how people within a culture then deal with these changes in their relationship to each other as well with the city. This can take many forms and is often influenced by other cultural and contextual issues. These concepts feed directly into a Habermasian understanding of the city that sees it as a space for communicative action where peacebuilding, legitimation, and urban regeneration can occur in a way that supports social and political structures (Fetherston 2000, Habermas 1984, Bridge 2005, Cheng and Jacobson 2010). This is turn is part of what makes the city an expression of the ISIS.

As urban regeneration is a phenomenon that has multiple levels of manifestations (i.e. physical experience, impact on perceptions of group and self-identity, space for development of culture) in this discussion it has been compared to the structure of legitimation through the ISIS as well as the structures of violence and peace (explored in

chapter two). Throughout the exploration of the historic and social context of each city and conflict, the city played an important role in the conflict. However, the analysis of the peace treaties and their implementation and impact showed that urban concerns were not seen as relevant to the creation and implementation of peace treaties, though the built environment was impacted by aspects of the peace agreements. Where the built environment was explicitly mentioned in the peace treaties, it was not on the level of advocating for measures that would improve the regeneration of the cities: rather the focus was on refugee housing and national monuments (in the case of Sarajevo), only tangentially effected by other provisions (in the case of Beirut), or mentioned as a vague directive for future government organization (in the case of Belfast). Nevertheless, it is my contention that the built environment was effected by the peace treaties.

In continuing to understand how peacebuilding and urban regeneration relate and what the implications are of such a relationship, analyses of the themes that have emerged from the material are explored below. Taking the concepts drawn out in chapters four and five regarding the root causes of conflict, the intention of the peace treaty, and the actual effect these had on the physical environment of the city, these are looked at for common and contrasting elements that in turn converge into a broader analysis of the research outcomes as a whole.

Section 7.2 presents summaries of the analysis developed for each city. This is followed by section 7.3 where the broad themes that were discussed at the end of chapter six are brought into greater focus by drawing on interview material. Sections 7.4 and 7.5 serve to open back up the overall analysis and present some further themes that are important for comparing and contrasting the cases. Subsequently, in 7.6 the relationship between peacebuilding and the built environment is explored and readdressed in the context of the research, drawing on a graphical representation of the relational dynamic between them. Section 7.7 concludes the chapter.

7.2 Walking and Observation Synopses

7.2.1 Sarajevo

Sarajevo illustrates what happens when an unregulated planning system, combined with economic liberalization policies, a financially challenged central government, and a

history of adaptability is left to its own devices. The legacy of Ottoman pluralism and Socialist ideology created a culture that was at once multi-ethnic but bound together by a state-enforced disregard for ethno-religious identity. This had deeply negative effects in the Bosnian War as simmering ethnopolitical tensions were used by national leaders in order to mobilize violence and atrocity. In the post-conflict setting, the Dayton Accords ushered in the basic formation of the nascent Bosnian state. While many war-time grievances as well as root causes of conflict were addressed, the liberalization of economic structures combined with little to no urban planning initiatives meant the private sector shaped the regeneration and reconstruction of the city centre. However, instead of building over the old centre, the Bosnian tendency to add the new to the old was maintained, resulting in two centres. While the development of the city centre that has occurred has been a mixture of reconstruction of older war damaged buildings and the construction of new regeneration projects, the building projects have been approached in an isolated and independent manner. The people who use the city still represent a multi-ethnic country, through the increase in the Muslim population identification as Muslim is evidenced through an increased number of headscarves as well as the construction of many additional mosques in the post-war years.

7.2.2 Beirut

If Beirut's city centre were the only example of the country's post-conflict state, the new buildings, exuding charm and Mediterranean elegance would certain lead one to believe that all was well. The city centre however is not emblematic of the stability of the city as a whole or the country. Rather, when seen in juxtaposition with the rest of the city, the centre exemplifies the intensive focus on economic growth and development at the sacrifice of improving living conditions elsewhere in the city. Solidere has master-minded a new Lebanese and Beiruti identity through the design of a slick new city centre that appears to have no connection with the conflict or the complexity of Lebanese identity. Space in the city is at a premium, so the physical openness that is offered by the Solidere development as well as other shopping malls represents opportunities for individuals to use the city and interact with their local communities. However, there is a vastly unequal distribution of power and wealth in the city that is exclusionary, although not along confessional lines. In the Beiruti context, most people are priced out of the new city centre,

and even out of housing, regardless of religious identification, as the regeneration of the city centre and other key sites is accessible only to the super-wealthy—people already part of the ruling economic class, or not even Lebanese.

7.2.3 Belfast

In a city that is still broadly characterized by sectarian division, Belfast's city centre is the one part of the urban environment that is attempting to be part of the future vision of the city. While the city still suffers from uneven development and investment, the centre is growing a shared and neutral space that is separate from the conflict past and that is visual reminder of the 'peace dividend' for the people of Northern Ireland. In some ways, the regeneration and environmental mitigation of the river Lagan aided in establishing the economic prosperity that bolstered the effectiveness of the Belfast Agreement. However after this project, the continuing form of the regeneration process that has been designed by the Belfast City Council has focused almost solely on commercial and retail development, which potentially is alienating the local community. Other private sector developers are working in the city centre, but they too are limited in where they can build and what they can do. The Titanic Quarter is a large-scale development project that also aims to contribute to overall creation of a neutral and successful city centre. While it is not part of the city centre geographically speaking, it sits alongside it and thus has a recursive relationship with the centre. Overall, the city centre is still a burgeoning area of growth, but its use by the local community needs to be increased if future projects are to be successful.

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The overarching themes suggested by the observations were concepts of surrogate and shared space, large-scale development with a retail and commercial focus, the private sector as the leader in the development and regeneration process, and varying degrees of either passivity or engagement by the local community in addition to how they applied to the initial theoretical research aim of seeking out the expressions of legitimation through the ISIS. The above summaries also presented in a quick format the underlying issues at stake as well as a brief exposition of what had happened in each city after the peace agreements were implemented. The following section looks more closely at these themes

in an attempt to reveal the underlying dynamic and effect of urban regeneration in the post-conflict city and the potential impact on peace.

Throughout the analysis, the goal is to bring the primary data into line with the larger thematic questions at work in the research, such as: what does this mean for peacebuilding and the ISIS? Does the pattern and style of urban regeneration support the idea that the city centre provides security and identity and contributes to general stability of the post-conflict context? While it would appear that the regeneration that has occurred in the city centre does in fact aid in addressing aspects of the roots of the conflict as well as the post-conflict stability, there are also other phenomena at work. These points are articulated in the more detailed analysis of suggested themes in the following section (section 7.3).

7.3 Structures, Agents, and Peace Treaties: Implications for the Built Environment

7.3.1 Local Community, Leadership, and Property Developers

In inquiring about the relationships between members of the local community, representatives of the government, and private developers, there was a strong narrative of mistrust and challenge. This is apparent even in the review of social media, news media, and blogging that dealt with these relationships[138]. These opinions of course varied across the three cities, but there was a common underlying sense that each party felt the other wasn't doing enough, couldn't do anything, or was oblivious to the reality of the situation. In the ethnographic material, this came across in the way the space was used and what its function was. For example, the lack of wide-scale use and participation in the newly developing portions of the city centres is partially an expression of this dynamic—but how else was this illustrated?

In Sarajevo, the relational dynamic and mistrust on the part of the developer was leveled at the government and the local community, though there was a strong cultural dimension to this. The idea that there is strong mistrust was cited as a core component of Bosnian culture:

> What you have to understand is that in the Balkans and Bosnia they thrive off of negativity so a . . . favourite local saying is, 'they'd rather kill their neighbour's cow than see their neighbour succeed'. It's like you know, they'd

> rather take away his life then watch him be desolate along with you, yourself, than see somebody else succeed.(SJ1)

This attitude highlights some of the difficulty in even attempting to maintain and work with the local community on the part of the developer, as well as provides little motivation for the government to get involved in the regeneration process. This mistrust and inaction is also fuelled by a tendency in Bosnian culture to expect a lot of social structure to be delivered by the government as it was in Yugoslav times, something Huddleston's (1999) experience illustrated as an American public administration consultant in Bosnia

In Beirut, mistrust on the part of each group appeared to be fuelled by a cultural tendency to see the other always as a hindrance to what is best for the community. Advocacy groups such as Save Beirut Heritage are convinced that Solidere has very little good intention with their work, but are even more adamant about condemning the smaller property and real estate development firms that take over individual houses and businesses seemingly by stealth. The only way they can effectively work is to take their cause to local politicians who can, if pressed, take the issue further. However, the inconsistency here is that Lebanon's government has a policy of low-interference with property development practices, as evidenced through Law 117 (which by amending Decree Number Five of the constitution, effectively created Solidere and eased the legal limitations for acquiring privately held property). Media, academic observers, and social critics alike have also maligned Solidere as well as the government for this practice, especially when it came to questionable practices of gaining property ownership just after the war[139]. Solidere and other private development firms are operating in very favourable conditions for their work; while Solidere necessarily must maintain a positive public image and has to address some of the accusations leveled against it, they are also in a financial and political position to continue on as they, and their shareholders, please.

In Belfast, this dynamic of poor relations is evident in the way that local politicians seemed to manipulate the fears and concerns of their constituencies. Their tactics were measured and careful—they know exactly what they need to do get the communities they represent to support their positions, even if it means encouraging misinformation about the benefits or realities of a potential development and encouraging myopic perspectives. In terms of the private development professional, this means that developing new sites can often get mired in local politics, with the developer vilified in the process:

> Politicians who were representing the communities at that time would meet you off site behind closed doors and say that there's nothing wrong with

> your scheme, but they're gonna oppose it—votes—plain and simple. Stamp on the nasty developer . . . (BF11)

In this way, local communities are very powerful, though the communities themselves probably don't realize the extent to which they are. Conversely, many private developers shy away from working outside the city centre, illustrated by interview subject BF8s comment that 'people think the property developer is out to get them'. For Belfast, much of this is still related to the way things worked during the Troubles. The nature of sectarian politics still controls much of the politicking in the local constituencies, which directly affects the capacity for developers to do work that is independent of government driven projects such as social housing development. The background of twenty to thirty years of divisive and sectarian tactics has left a mark on the way politics works:

> 'I'm Protestant, I'm middle class, therefore I'm UUP' or 'I'm Protestant, I'm working class, and I'm DUP' and that's all I have to do, I don't have to think of anything else, but I can get out and beat the drum every three years and get elected'. Well since the Agreement, that is actually no longer here. It *should* no longer be there. The reasoning is no longer there—they should be looking to grow the community, but they still haven't caught on so they're beating the drum to get the vote . . . (BF11)

The continued sectarian division of the neighborhoods represents a continued mistrust of the other and thus this way of doing politics is slow in vanishing: when interviewee BF8 was asked about some particularly inflammatory graffiti surrounding a new build site concerning the motivation of the developer (see image 6-196), he knew precisely what I was talking about and replied 'oh yeah—that's new housing going and that reaction is all the local politician's doing'.

7.3.2 Restructuring the Government: Peace and Regeneration, Goal and Effect

In all three cases, the peace treaty's main focus was on restructuring or altering the way the government was run, or creating a new government altogether. As a result, most of directives contained in the peace agreements were designed to implement this change. As has been discussed previously, this focus on the government (as well as other institutional changes) meant that urban issues were not at the fore. This has in turn made the impact the peace agreement had on urban regeneration more indirect. However, the

government restructuring did have an effect on the cities and this came across not only in the ethnographic work, but in the interactions and interviews.

Sarajevo's development has been both helped and hindered by the changes in the Bosnian government. While the new democratic administration put in place through the Dayton Accords meant that more representative and egalitarian political processes could form, it also meant that a great amount of energy was, and still is, dedicated to making this system work, and there is seemingly little room for anything else:

> 'The Bosnian government as an institution is very complex . . . the institutions, the divisions, still in place. The municipalities . . . it is very difficult, it is a very new state, and it is not functioning quite well . . . so everything we have problems with affects everything else. Planning, education . . . it is not easy to solve these issues.' (SJ5)

The literature on the Bosnian political process also expresses the intense complication of the political system with its general elections being, according to Lippman (2010) 'the most complicated in the world'[140]. As it is a multi-party system, and being that every ethnic groups has multiple political parties affiliated with it, the end result after elections is a coalition government. This in and of itself means that decisions often take a long time to be made and to be manifest. To make matters more complicated, there is typically intense disagreement between representatives from Republika Srpska and Bosnia which also slows down the political process[141]. In addition, the ethno-political party leadership throughout the country often rely of fear-tactics for garnering support and party allegiance (though this is less the case in major urban centres such as Sarajevo)(Lippman 2010) which further entrenches socio-ethnic tensions beyond the political sphere. Add to that a nation who has been slow to grow apart from aid-dependence (Bieber 2002) to help conduct business and the political process in Bosnia is becomes a prime example of why the government cannot be called upon to address urban regeneration issues.

On another level, the government, and the people who work in it, suffer from inefficient bureaucracy, which is due in part to there being many people in positions of power who had the same jobs before the war. This imparts a lack of urgency in processing paperwork and getting projects off the ground when it comes to urban planning. In the SFRY, there was job security, but now, they can lose their jobs to a more efficient system as they have a different and more competitive environment in post-conflict Bosnia:

> The bureaucracy of this country only works because there are so many people that are connected [to it] and that's their livelihood. The reason they take forever building things because if they didn't take forever then they'd get replaced by another. A lot of these positions in the local government, what we see is, a piece of paper comes to them, they get, and all they do is that *(stacking paper/stamping it/leaving it on desk).* And they get paid a salary to do that every month and their whole family lives off of that salary, and so if they can't do that move anymore *(the stacking),* then they can't feed their kids, and so that's why that still exists. And that's a cultural thing here . . . back in socialist times, you were paid to do kind of these ridiculous tasks, and you knew that you going to get paid to do that, and you comfortable doing that, and it was . . . things are slow at changing . . . (SJ1).

What does this mean for the future? If issues such as regeneration cannot be adequately addressed by the status quo, and if the status quo is at risk of not changing quickly enough, then how can progress be made? While it appears that things might be adapting and changing at a glacial pace, it also is only a matter of time before the current power holders in Bosnian society, due to age if nothing else, fade away:

> The only way it's going to change is when the young guard comes in, the younger generations are slowly being affected by the West and seeing the light, the way I see it. It's so much easier to do business. . . (SJ1).

The Ta'if Accords' only direct concern was with changing the confessional balance of the constitution. But further analysis revealed that the lack of provisions regarding some of the more pressing issues of rebuilding a post-war Lebanon, such as economic restructuring and physical reconstruction, were an intentional omission. It was argued that it was simply a given the Lebanon would seek to achieve the economic stature that it had before the war, and that whatever measures were needed to get there would be permissible (Denoeux and Springborg 1998). This went hand-in-hand with the plans of Hariri. When the Prime Minister Hrawi was in office (just before Hariri) conditions were set that liberated the ability of a private company to work on public infrastructure with the support of the CDR with the help of Law 117, and thus Solidere was born.

In terms of then looking at how the restructuration of the government through the peace agreement effected urban regeneration, in Beirut it was all about what wasn't there, and what was free to develop within such a vacuum. On the ground, this is not a very transparent fact, as the well-presented Solidere centre looks like it must be the product of good and stable governance, when in fact it is attributed to a private corporation allowed to work with a lot of freedom and latitude. In addition, the polemic that has emerged over

the years regarding Solidere's circumspect business and development practices has provided a rallying point for renewed division within society, something that has now come to fruition in the form of the March 14 alliance (pro-Syrian), a title for a variety of political parties and leaders to identify with in Lebanese politics[142]. To support this, the interview subjects both expressed general appreciation for what the BCD was like as opposed to just after the war, with BR2 saying it was 'like an oasis in the city and good place to sit and watch people . . . when before [his entire life in Beirut] it was the centre of the war'. This meant that for him, it was never a useful space and the only way he knows it is in its present state or as a war-space.

In Belfast, the restructuring of the government meant that leadership changed from Westminster to Stormont and became immediately more bureaucratic and somewhat less efficient. In part, this was due to the fact that so many imbalances had to be redressed in Northern Ireland. Government offices were set up to address issues that had developed as a result of the Troubles. Urban regeneration was no exception—however the DSDs remit to develop areas of the city quickly became somewhat limited to projects that would guarantee economic prosperity and development, and that meant consumer developments. Interview subject BF4 recounted seeing 'sidewalk improvement' schemes of the local business areas in the past (the local newsagent, green grocer, and chipper, for instance) where frontages and landscaping were improved, but little to none in the way of creating greater accessibility to the city centre or to bringing more business into the local neighbourhoods. On the other hand, the current economic climate has also limited even further the capacity for the government to aid in resolution of public issues related to housing, jobs, and other regeneration issues related to transportation, training, etc.

This has evolved into a very inefficient system in Belfast. As one respondent said, 'the public sector needs a better business model' (BF6). This comment was in reaction to the how the local community has been conditioned to expect certain things from the government, and how in these times, these expectations must change, as should the way the government does business. There is also a problem with pragmatic issues such as how long it takes to get planning permission to even get projects off the ground : 'why does it take six months in Manchester, six months in London, six months in Dublin to get planning approval through, and why does it take two years in Belfast? That's a real issue . . . that's something that really needs to be dealt with' (BF9). Also, other developers indicated that following government regulation in itself is time consuming and already takes a lot of resources:

> . . . this thing about experience and dealing with government bodies . . . archaeology is a big thing here—we spent about £150,000—there was a lot of kids with toothbrushes, scraping soil for months on end, and eh, planning road service, water service, and so on—there's a lot of value created in getting all those issue resolved, takes a long time, a lot of money. . . (BF10)

A government and community relations representative (BF3) also commented about how there is a fairly simple bottom-line of affordability at stake as well. In Belfast, there has been a tendency to build facilities and service communities so that the perceived safety of the sectarian neighbourhoods is preserved, but that has been increasingly wasteful of resources. However, it was the post-conflict transition of government that allowed such practices to happen while the peace agreement was being implemented, but that now it is no longer feasible.

7.3.3 Private Development, Positive Impact?

The regeneration that has happened in the three cities has made, and is making, a dramatic impact not only on the physical landscape but also on how people perceive and use their city. While in many cases the developments occurring are generally seen as negative, there is undoubtedly a positive side to them. However, this all depends on how these developers handle their work. This is connected to the peace agreements in that the space that was opened for up for private developers to function. On the ground, this was evident in the obvious benefit that the private development was lending the city space: often times, land is cleaned up, landscaping is put in, roads are improved around the site, and jobs are created. However, their work is still met with mixed reactions.

In Sarajevo, the developments are actually generally accepted by members of the community. This assessment is based on the attitudes of interviewees in addition to what emerged from social media outlets. In my discussions with interview participants SJ2, SJ3, and SJ4, there was genuine excitement about the nightclub and restaurant that had opened up in the Bosmal City Center towers. This, along with my observations of the city, confirmed that there is very little that is new and attractive in this way going up, and that businesses and developments such as these will find success in the local community. Seeing the regeneration occurring in Sarajevo as organic and representative of a natural form of development, the new commercial and retail developments are welcome. However, there

is concern that these ventures might draw money away from the Baščaršija and Ferhadijah Street which are seen as important places for consumption and culture in the city. There is also a sense that people are concerned not enough attention is being given to the creation of cultural, civic, and outdoor public space and that this is a large drawback of having a liberal regulatory environment as these are the things that local planning offices usually will provide for, a statement confirmed by every subject interviewed. There is also disdain over the new Sarajevo City Center development and at the time of this research people were still quite shocked that it was no longer going to be public cultural space (SJ3-6).

Beirut, on the other hand, is a prime example of how a constant intellectual critique as well as the rising voices of grass-roots movements have produced a long-standing commentary regarding the work of Solidere and other private developers. The work of Solidere was not considered negatively at first: in fact, it was seen to be the saving project of the nation in 1994 when its work began[143]. However, as issues arose over the manner in which land was acquired, criticisms grew. Today, social media and blogs abound denouncing the erasure of Beirut's identity (see discussions in chapters five and six). Since then it has been accused of aiding in the general trend of cultural amnesia as well as stripping the identity of the city as property owners were priced out of their land holdings (Nagel 2002). That said, Solidere was also instrumental in cleaning up the wartime rubble of city centre—and while it is possible it would have happened anyways had Solidere not been created, chances are any project would have suffered massive setbacks from funding difficulties (Stewart 1996; Makdisi 1997a). People generally seemed accepting of the new city centre, though there was certainly a sense that it was completely inaccessible and only really usable by tourists and the wealthy: as interviewee BR2 told me, 'I come here to watch, it is a nice place for that, but never spend. . . I bring my own food'. This told me that as much as there is discontent with the city centre, there is also a sense that it is just another part of Beirut, and that the city has many other areas that are equally special and significant (BR1, BR2).

Belfast has the advantage of having several examples of developers whose work clearly tries to promote good will and support within communities, although it also has developers who wish to steer clear of dealing with local communities altogether and build almost exclusively in the city centre. There is an underlying sense that the local community see the developers as generally out to do harm, which was explored in a previous example, can be attributed in many ways to the influence of local politicians. Despite such perceptions, developers such as Mike Smith and the Titanic Quarter development work

closely with local community boards to raise money for rebuilding schools and other funding needs (BF1, BF8) in addition to producing a 'Memorandum of Understanding' that outlines the Titanic Quarter's commitment to community development This type of community relations is seen as a necessity, especially with a project as large-scale and long term as the Titanic Quarter. In addition, other private developers, especially those who choose to work within the communities, aim to work directly in consultation with local politicians and community boards to help keep profiles raised and approval of projects high. Also, there is a sense that only developers can change the way people view them:

> 'the context for local communities often see themselves in opposition to developers and because . . . one of the things we would try and challenge is that—not undermine it—there is a reality that local communities can often get pushed out at its worst so areas can be gentrified so the people can't afford to stay there and I suppose part of the role we are trying to take. . . is to try and help local communities see that there is a potential win-win in this, in other words, you can oppose developers, you can shout out at public meetings and things like that, but if you also sit down with them you may find that around the edges, they're not going to suddenly change and build social housing or anything, but around the edges you may find that there may be some gain for the local communities . . .' (BF11)

7.3.4 Identity and Class

Each city shared equally disparate social and class conditions before their respective conflicts. Many of these issues were also part of the conflicts themselves and were played out in a variety of ways. In the post-conflict context, these inequalities were attempted to be redressed through the peace agreements, although their success, at least in terms of the built environment, has shown mixed returns.

In Sarajevo, the issue of class does not have the same meaning as it does in the other two cases. Owing to the socialist background, the idea of 'class' before the war did not exist so much as the division between landholders (before land reforms)/urbanites and agriculturalists /peasants which were in turn based on ethnic affiliation. In post-conflict Sarajevo, these divisions no longer apply in the same way; though the demographics of the city suggest that there is a majority Muslim population, there is still a significant number of other communities, namely Serb and Croat[144]. There is ample secondary evidence to support this claim: the number of mosques, the increased Turkish and Malaysian student presence, and the increased openness of wearing headscarves on women (a result of the

influx of non-Bosnian Muslim women in the city), which interviewee SJ6 noted as a 'a big change from before the war'.

In Beirut, class was tied in with ethnopolitical affiliation. While it was not strictly a class-based system as there was the potential for social mobility, certain professions were often only filled by people of certain religious confessions. Prior to the war, grievances were great in terms of the imbalance of wealth—it was mainly Christian groups who were in favourable positions both financially and politically. After the war, these grievances were addressed initially through the peace agreement. Nowadays, the city centre is a seemingly elite space that is not accessible by anyone but the wealthiest, and identity is now about preserving the 'correct' version of Lebanese identity that does not cling to memories of the civil war[145]Belfast is a city of class and identity distinctions that continue to define its population. Not only is sectarian divisiveness ever-present, but the class distinctions that are being worked through in the post-industrial context also serve as defining features for many people in the city. Several respondents spoke quite disparagingly about 'the yuppie gentrifiers' (BF4 and BF5) and there were multiple cases of graffiti conveying the same message on the fencing of various development sites. In relation to this, interview BF8 stated that 'you probably just need to be aware that the response from the community is more complex. . . there is a level of opposition but sometimes communal relations happen know that whole cities and local communities find it easier to make things black and white and pin down developers and shout at developers.' There is a sense that people see the development of the city centre as something that is at odds with what Belfast means to them, and that is defined by a working-class identity. As one responded said, he is 'proud of Belfast. Please don't make it that the ordinary person can't go into it. . . feels like some history has been lost. The ordinary person ethos. . . don't lose it, don't go off the wall. It's important, it needs to create jobs, needs to be used to Belfast's advantage—it's a shared history' (BF4).

From the government perspective, there is a sense that working with the working class communities, who are important but only part of Belfast's demographics, is important because there is also a need to get these communities to think about and regard their city as more than just a resource for 'collecting bins'. This is important because according to one interviewee 'people in working class communities never engage totally with organizations such as the council, that the council thing is up there . . . but for me the key part of that role is building up a relation with organization and particularly the working class community in the urban areas of the city. When the relationship happened people are

more likely to engage with you. So that's a key element' (BF3). In this sense, the working class identity is something that has to be engaged with and they too have to be engaged in the regeneration processes.

7.3.5 Summary and Analysis of Themes

The above analysis sought to look in more detail at some of the additional themes that were suggested by the ethnographic data, viewing them in conjunction with the interview and observation. Based on what was drawn out of the preceding discussions, a set of sub-themes arose. These are: interagency and inter-actor communication and relations as driving the regeneration process; changing notions of class and how that is shaped by the new developments and is contrasted with what class meant before the war, or during it; establishing a post-conflict identity for individual and group potentially through the reinvention of the city centres; resistance to but also support of the new city centres in terms of class and political identity; accessibility of city centre space in physical and psychological ways; and perceptions of purpose and usefulness of the new city centre spaces. These contradictory elements illustrate the tension between the city centre (which receives the majority of funding and regeneration attention) and the surrounding community.

In the explorations of the cities, there appeared to be a high level of shopping, retail, and housing being built that seems to be relatively unattainable by locals. In Sarajevo, with the state of the regulatory context as it is, this conveys a sense that building projects, and the regeneration they represent, is practiced by people who are perhaps more interested in the opportunity for profit, as opposed to evaluating the needs of the local economic context. Though property developers will openly tell you they are in it for profit, it is also known that profit and good business practice comes from knowing your market and understanding what demands are on the ground. In Sarajevo, there appears to be little attention paid to where the purchasing power will come from to supply the profit in these new consumer environments. While it seems that the examples of property development in the city centre focus almost solely on consumption and low-level gentrification, there is a sense from the local community that it is not being a matched by an increase in employment opportunities or other ways to generate the income necessary to buy into what is being built. For example when SJ3 asked 'why are they building

shopping malls? Why are they not building factories?' a sentiment echoed also by SJ5's assessment of the regeneration in Sarajevo: that because the government makes it so hard to do business with it, the regeneration seen there has had to come from the private sector, but that 'it's not really working' as there is an imbalance of consumer options and not enough income generation.

In Beirut, the emphasis of new developments overall seems to be balanced between new shopping centres and new luxury housing. This is true both of the Solidere BCD and the areas outside of it. Other than this, however, there appears to be very few other improvements happening, and when it does, it is uneven and seemingly at random, dependent entirely upon if a family/person sold their property to a developer. Throughout the city, there are many examples of places where buildings in the middle of quasi-dilapidated neighborhoods were finally sold and refurbished to sell for over a hundred times the selling price (see images 6-105 and 6-106 for visual examples of this), causing in large part this sense of uneven development. In the BCD, this has been taken to the extreme as the whole area has been renovated and regenerated and an almost entirely new city was built out of the rubble of its previous incarnation. The focus however on moneyed and high-end retail as well as housing has meant the space has become potentially exclusionary of the rest of the city and alienating the local population in the process.

In Belfast, similar observations can be leveled. The city centre has experienced a vast amount of regeneration in the post-conflict context, and yet as the focus of the municipal government has been on economic development, the regeneration that has occurred almost exclusively appears to support this through the concentration on retail and commercial developments. Developments outside the city centre are not as noticeable, and there appears to be a great disconnect between the city centre and the neighbourhoods. The local communities see the most important thing as being the construction of social housing and efforts to increase job opportunities, something city centre development does not focus on. Despite this, the attempt to 'grow' the city centre is not misguided, for the reinvention of the city centre as a shared space is a necessary part of any equation that would see a more integrated Belfast as its solution. The desire to make the city centre more '24-hour' with an increased economic output would only benefit the entire city, a sentiment echoed by the property developers interviewed as well as the local government community relations representative. The Titanic Quarter also represents, perhaps in juxtaposition to Solidere, how a large-scale private development project can

make active attempts to integrate and ingratiate itself to the local community. But again, the potential for the alienation of the local community is a great risk in this overall process.Looking at the above summaries, it would appear that there is strong tendency for the private sector to be the leader in the regeneration of the city centres. This is supported by the literature that addressed the valuable role the private sector can play in peacebuilding and post-conflict contexts. Looking at the cases of peace agreement negotiation, drafting, and implementation, the attention given to economic reconstruction was variable, though always present. While not part of any agreement in a strong sense, egalitarian (non-ethnically biased) economic development as a means of ensuring greater social and culture development was an element. Economic matters are intimately connected to the potential for regeneration of the city centre, in terms of attracting investment of both business and retail but also for investing in the construction and refurbishment of damaged structures. Therefore, the potential for the private sector to aid the stability of the post-conflict peacebuilding can be realized through regeneration; though it might still be considered contentious with many pitfalls, the work of groups like Solidere, Sarajevo City Center, and the Titanic Quarter have provided benefits as well to the post-conflict recovery. The following section begins to open up the observations and themes of the preceding section and look at them in the greater context of how they relate to the larger discussion of peacebuilding and urban regeneration process. Two issues are at work in this exploration: the role of the private sector in aiding the success of peace and peacebuilding and also the critique of the 'politics of forgetting'. Both points take the information presented previously and adjust the framework to focus on a broader perspective of what and how the analyses can say about peace and regeneration. This discussion is followed by a further problematization and analysis of the relational dynamics at play in each case study context, noting what the implications are for the research aims.

7.4 Economic Development and the Private Sector: A New Peacebuilding Goal?

The proceeding explorations of the ethnographic and observation material in conjunction with the contextual and thematic analysis need to be assessed in terms of the central issues in the urban regeneration and peacebuilding argument. One of the key areas that emerged from this is the role of the private sector in general in aiding the peace process. The purpose of exploring this discussion further is to broaden the discussion of

peace agreements in relation to city centre regeneration stabilizing the local economy and aiding in multi-level socio-cultural reconciliation. In the following section, a brief look is taken of the role economic reforms, private business, and political economy (otherwise known as the 'peace dividend').

Paris is oft cited for his writing on the 'liberal peace'. Paris's basic argument is that contemporary peace efforts are perhaps best suited to a liberalized market economy approach, where competition for new markets, in both the monetary and political/peacebuilding sense, would open up the capacity for peacebuilding to take root (Paris 1997). This concept has been both lauded and denigrated in subsequent literature, but its influence on the discussion of the role of economic factors in peacebuilding has been valuable.

Stedman heavily critiques Paris's presentation, commenting that a:

> problematic aspect of Paris's critique is his belief that the liberal international strategy of peacebuilding forms a coherent set of directives for international implementers of peace agreements. Paris attributes much operational content to mandates that proclaim the necessity of human rights, truth and accountability, democratic elections, and market economies. But an alternative interpretation of the repeated inclusion of these virtues into mandates can be that this is less of a coherent model that the UN seeks to impose on war-torn countries and more an expression of the basket of virtues that the UN claims to stand for—a basket of virtues that has become more important as NGOs have strengthened their ability to lobby for those goods that they hold dear (Stedman et al. 2002, 18).

Stedman sees the proposed agenda of 'peacebuilding via economic reform' as missing the point of the dynamic and multi-dimensional nature of peacebuilding. However, he admits that the 'liberal package of economics' can most certainly aid any effort at implementing and maintaining a peacebuilding agenda (Stedman et al. 2002, 20). This problematization is helpful in critically assessing the role that a robust economic development agenda can play in the establishment of peace via the implementation of a peace agreement.

Complementing Paris's work is the growing emphasis on the role of the private sector in the creation and implementation of peace agreements and peacebuilding policy. In her study of the peace agreements in El Salvador, Guatemala and Colombia, Rettberg (2007) determined that while the degree of engagement of the private sector in her examples varied, there was an identifiable trend in the perceived (and actual) contribution that private business made to the maintenance and cessation of the conflict. Her findings indicate that 'private sector involvement in peace negotiations varies: Conflict cost

perceptions, degrees of unity of the pro-peace business faction, and varied access to the peace policymaking process account for important differences across the cases' (Rettberg 2007, 463).

Rettberg's findings are important for achieving the over-arching goal of understanding how the built environment and urban regeneration relates to the peacebuilding context. From the negotiations to the process of implementation, the private sector:

> 'plays a fundamental role both in peace negotiations and in the subsequent implementation of peace agreements. It generates and controls many of the resources necessary for building peace, including taxes, investments and production. As a result, even in the absence of explicit political motives, private sector decisions have the capacity to limit, condition and shape the agenda and scope of peace negotiations and the implementation of accords reached. Thus, while the mere inclusion of the private sector in peace negotiations cannot guarantee that viable agreements will be concluded and implemented, the exclusion of the private sector will challenge – if not thwart altogether – the consolidation of peace' (Rettberg 2007, 463–464).

But who, exactly, is the private sector, and what do they do? From local businesses to international corporations, the responsibility and culpability of both are becoming increasingly recognized for their role on the conflict and post-conflict context. Nelson attributes this to a generalized trend to the increased popularity of values relating to corporate social responsibility (Nelson 2000). She also articulates the potential interest that foreign investors see in the 'emerging market' of a post-conflict state, and the ethic of responsibility that should accompany an investment presence. They also represent:

> 'new risks and management challenges such as: weak legal frameworks and governance structures; sizeable populations who are antagonistic to foreign investment; and unfamiliar social challenges such as high levels of poverty, human rights violations, bribery, and corruption. Their state of political and socio-economic transition also creates high potential for instability and violent conflict. The existence of valuable resources, which draws many companies in these challenging markets in the first place, is a further factor contributing to the conflict' (Nelson 2000, 14).

The possible influence on the potential for peace to be secured or spoiled leads Banfield to argue that 'peacebuilding interventions by any actor, be they local or international, need to be informed by a good understanding of the intervening agencies' own relationships to the conflict context and the issues underlying it' (International Alert 2006, 21), a factor which

should inform the presence of economic ventures in a post-conflict context. What this leads to is a re-weighing, as well, of the role of the neoliberal processes. The above examples are indicative, in many ways, that the neoliberal market model is a positive tool in the post-conflict context, which is also a theme of the research. This leads one to consider that even if neoliberal urban regeneration is to be viewed with scepticism in the non-conflict setting, perhaps in the post-conflict is where it can play a valuable role.

7.5 The Politics of Forgetting

In the general discussion of urban regeneration, cities, and 'place', there is a dialogue concerning power relations that has up to this point not emerged. However, it is a vital point to bring in as it shows the degree to which changing centres of capital production are not only the product of a weak or new government in a post-conflict setting, but also an assertion of the dominance of the private sector in shaping the identities of the local and national communities they are placed in. In this way, in a role normally filled by the state, they present and alternative source of identity creation. Lee and Yeoh (2004) argue that 'places are actively forged as products of the politics of inclusion and exclusion and by power struggles played out among global, national and local actors in globalization processes' (2004, 2296). If these 'places' they speak of are shaped by the actions of the private sector in the post-conflict city, then they are operating as a substitute source of identity regulation.

In terms of urban regeneration then, we see a further dynamic play out that was hinted at in the Beirut ethnographic analysis, but that also can be seen emerging from the Sarajevo and Belfast. Part of what is occurring in the process of regeneration in these cities, regardless of how it happens, is that by changing the built environment, they are turn creating 'spaces of forgetting' within the once conflict-imbued central city spaces. According to Routledge (2010) the 'term 'forgotten places' within cities which themselves are the product of a politics of forgetting . . . ranges from being unincorporated in capitalist urban development to being marginalized or, indeed, discarded, by global capital and other actors operating within the discourse of neoliberalism' (2010, 1165). In this process, professionals and private developers make meaningful places lose the potent identity they once had (Markusen 2004), replicating the way that the belligerents who destroyed the space to begin with also ruptured and altered the meaning of the space.

In the post-conflict city, these elements of power as evidenced through the alteration of the built environment signal the changing balances of global power not only between states, but between states and large private agencies, as well as well large non-governmental organizations. However inevitable it might all seem, there is a positive place in the post-conflict city for the private sector (as described above). In many ways this process is emblematic of how spaces change not only relative to local conditions, but global conditions as well. Markusen (2004) summarizes this point when she says 'in contemporary global capitalist market integration, large numbers of relatively isolated places are being rendered 'forgotten' by the decisions of differentially empowered actors as identified above. For many with less power, such places do not deserve to be forgotten—they should be valued for their assets and human meaning' (2004, 2310). This highlights the tenuous nature between change and economic vitality and human and social inclusion, both which are at risk in the post-conflict context as these case-studies illustrate. In addition, this brief discussion also harkens back to the push for aesthetic value inherent in neoliberal regeneration projects presented in chapter two where it can potentially increase marginalization and exclusion in a group, much like 'spaces of forgetting' can impede a group's ability to recover from conflict.

7.6 Habermas, Legitimation, and Case Study Examinations

Reflecting on the summary the themes (section 7.3) and the preceding sections on the role of the economy in the post-conflict context and the politics of forgetting (sections 7.4 and 7.5 respectively), it is apparent that the theoretical discussion in chapter two regarding Habermas and legitimation provides a framework for understanding the dynamics at play. Looking back at Habermas' (1976) statement regarding why a legitimation crisis occurs and how it might be prevented or addressed and applying it to the above analyses (where he says 'missing legitimation must be offset by rewards conforming to the system' and 'A legitimation crisis arises as soon as the demands for such rewards rise faster than the available quantity of value, or when expectations arise that cannot be satisfied with such rewards' (Habermas 1976, 66)) we can connect the case examinations to the greater theoretical discussion.

Legitimation is about maintaining balance in a relationship through need provision. The underlying message of the Habermasian legitimation crisis is that the state has not

adequately met the needs of the society it aims to represent, and as such, loses the compliance of the people and their willingness be a part of maintaining the social, economic, and political structures that create the lifeworld (where lifeworld is the shared experience and understanding that develops through face to face contact and communication over time in various social groups, from families to communities, and in various settings, from personal to public (Baxter 1987)).

Reviewing the themes discussed in section 7.3, there is a narrative of poor or challenged communication between actors in society characterized by mistrust; attempts to re-shape group identity in the post-conflict context from the top down (government restructuring as a means of producing change on lower levels of society); and a tendency for the built environment (in this case, city centre regeneration) to express the continuing tensions and imbalances, but also growth and positive change of the post-conflict society. This illustrates the tensions at play in the maintenance of legitimation, and conversely could cause, if severely out of balance, its crisis.

For example, mistrust between actors (as evidenced in all three cases) is both a help and a hindrance when it comes to legitimation. On the positive side, healthy mistrust is part of maintaining integrity and ensuring that the needs of your subgroup are met. On the other hand, mistrust also could lead to entrenchment and an inability to strike compromises necessary to keep communication (and society) in order. In the case of the government restructuring itself and in turn attempting restructure the identity of its members through a trickle-down effect, the good part of this is that it means the government was willing to make changes and compromises to try and make room for a stable and successful post-conflict setting, while in the negative it showed a lack of holistic vision in terms of how to approach large-scale change in such a setting (where it would have been more appropriate to engage a variety of actors and social levels). Finally, the city centre regeneration tends to reify whoever holds the power in the city as opposed to who is supposed to be using it. In the cases examined here, external third party private sector investors wield great power, while it does vary in intensity and direction in each city (a point discussed further in the section 7.7). This is not to say that the communities who use the city centres do not benefit from the regeneration, but it is apparent from the interview material that the city centre also is part of reimagining what a future post-conflict identity will be. This serves to illustrate legitimation in that the built environment and the city centre is providing a sort of fulcrum for working through communicative and power

imbalances that are endemic to the social and political structure of the post-conflict context.

In examining how peacebuilding has arguably been made more successful through the purposeful involvement of the private sector and business, this expresses the alternative notion that since the government can't always provide the robust economic structure required in the post-conflict context (necessary for need provision of the society) the private sector fills this gap and thus helps avoid relapse in a legitimation crisis (or conflict). The politics of forgetting is illustrative of how a space that is associated with a past conflict is altered in order to artificially create a new group identity through the recreation of that space. This is done in order to maintain the group's belief that the ones in power are improving a place for the sake of the society, when in fact it might be for more monetary gain.

In the following section, how these Habermasian and legitimation dynamics work in each case is examined through visual representation. The aim is to show how each city is illustrative of the relationship between peacebuilding and city centre regeneration, what are the factors going into creating and maintaining that, and what are the extended outcomes.

7.7 Exploring the Dynamics of Peacebuilding and Urban Regeneration

Up to this point, a practical and theoretical exploration of the connection between peacebuilding and urban regeneration has been undertaken. What has emerged is a narrative regarding the role of the changing nature of economic centres of production and power, and the integrative yet potentially problematic role they can have on the post-conflict city, both in terms of physical place and human community. The use of ethnographic research of place aided the process of bringing the connections of the analysis of peace agreements and historical context to bear on the perception and interpretation of urban regeneration on the ground. This dynamic is facilitated by a neoliberal structure, an aspect that has also emerged from the discussion. These elements are discussed in the greater detail in the following sections.

Throughout the research, the overall goal was to identify what kind of relationship is shared between peacebuilding and cities and what the significance and implications of this are. In this process, the theoretical and contextual dimensions were explored through

the historical context and analysis of social, cultural, economic, and political conditions. These findings were then used to analyze the peace agreements for significant traits that addressed the urban environment as well as root causes of conflict. These were then explored through the implementation of peace agreements focusing on how the built environment and urban regeneration were impacted. In the ethnographies, and the ethnographic analysis, the key themes that emerged from the theoretical, contextual, and peace agreement analysis and implementation were sought out in observation and interview. This final exploration presents exactly what kind of relationship has emerged as a result of the analysis and data collection.

What has emerged from the research is a dynamic and relational understanding of how peacebuilding and urban regeneration relate in the post-conflict city. First, the analysis of the theoretical dimensions created a basic structure for understanding how they relate through the function of legitimation. Contextual analysis showed that the relationship in question—in addition to the cities and conflicts—are nested in a series of contexts that influence each other. These contexts helped to shape the events that took place in each city, and likewise, the conflicts that occurred reshaped the context. For instance, global and nation-state affairs played a large role in determining the course of history in each city, but the conflict that occurred also shaped the nation-state and the global dimension. Second, the peace treaties were large-scale attempts at addressing root causes of conflict. The peace treaty implementation mainly effected government structures and through that, other aspects of society were shaped. There are many actors and agents affected by the treaties but the ones most pertinent to this discussion are the local communities and the private sector. It is their relationship, communication style, and perception of each as well as the government that shapes the pattern of urban regeneration in each city. Underneath these actor/agent relationships then, the urban environment is consequently impacted through the decisions and actions of the groups. It is here that peacebuilding occurs through the city.

This dynamic is represented in the below figure (figure 7-1). This generic graph represents the relational dynamic of peacebuilding and urban regeneration by showing the multiple levels of theoretical, contextual, and analytical data explored and how they interact and link up with one another. The basic dynamics of the graph are explained below. This same graph is then presented for each city with an explanation and analysis of the meaning behind each graph. Finally, the implications for the differences in the graphs, as well as the commonalities, are explored in a comparative analysis for the cases.



Figure 7-1 Basic illustration of relational dynamics of peacebuilding and urban regeneration

In the figure, the three concentric circles that are in the background represent the nested contexts in which the relationship between peacebuilding and urban regeneration are explored. These are the global context, the nation-state, and the city/urban context. Second, the conflict in question is represented by the orange circle that is seen to overlap each of the contextual spheres to represent that the conflict examined had global, national, and urban dimensions. Third, the shaded central area in pink represents both peacebuilding and urban regeneration; these are depicted in this way so as to show that the these processes are diffuse throughout the urban environment and can be manifest in a variety of ways. Fourth, the key groups/actors that make urban regeneration work are shown in boxes as the government, the community, and the private developers. These are shown in a purposeful hierarchical manner, where the government is at the top as the determining factor in how peace treaties are implemented, and the community and the private developers are equal but below in terms of how they are affected by the government. These elements here are fixed on this graph and all subsequent versions of it.

The dynamic parts of the graph are the peace treaty and the communication styles between actors/agents. The peace treaty is represented by a triangle that is influenced by all three contextual levels: the global, the nation, and the urban/local context. The triangle illustrates how the peace treaties, in the cases examined here, are primarily focused on changing the structure of government and authority, as most, if not all, additional provisions that come through or as a result of the peace treaty were about how this change would occur. The triangle is dynamic in that the degree to which it overlaps and includes the community and private developers in its structure represents how and to what degree policies and directives influencing these groups are found in the peace treaty. The second dynamic aspect is the lines of communication and relations between the groups. The lines themselves can be either broken or solid; broken lines mean communication between the groups is challenged, weak, or non-existent for some reason. A solid line means that the lines of communication have well-defined and acceptable avenues of expression.

The lines of communication and the peace treaty triangle together represent the third dynamic of the graph. In some cases, the lines of communication are within the triangle, meaning that the communication between the groups was improved or included to some degree within the peace treaty. If lines were not within the triangle, this means that whatever communication does take place is outside the realm of influence of the peace treaty. Following are the explanations of what each graph represents for the city and conflict.

7.7.1 Sarajevo

Figure 7-2: Sarajevo. Sarajevo's relational dynamic shows that the Dayton Accords, through their restructuring of the government through the treaty as well as other provisions, were able to include the local community and property developers in their overall effects. This is illustrated for example in the provisions that liberalized the economy (opening the pathway for private developers) and the addressing of issues related to government and community representation, human rights, an improved legal system, and directives for addressing war-time grievances.

Despite this, communication and relational dynamic between the three groups was seen as weak. This is attributable to the fact that the local community didn't have a discernible advocacy presence and there was a sense that local political leaders were unable to address issues relating to the urban environment, among other things. The developers also do not appear to regard the concerns of the local community as essential to their projects, and they also did not work in a pro-active manner with the government, rather the government simply served a bureaucratic function that could be potentially side-stepped with bribes.

These dynamics mean that the way peacebuilding and urban regeneration occurred in Sarajevo are outside the realm of a positive, relational system between the three groups. Rather, the urban regeneration that has occurred is a result of the private developers working within a liberalized context where there is very little demand for them to be accountable to the local community or the government, and hence they are the ones that have a direct impact on the quality of the built environment; this is represented by the private developer square being pink so that it matches with the regeneration colour underneath it.

Peacebuilding in Sarajevo has occurred in a variety of ways: through the prosecution of war criminals, addressing issues of refugee housing, national monuments, and attempts to inject the economy with new opportunities for development of capital and other resources. In relation to this, the private sector was central to building confidence in the community as a place for increased foreign investment, but also for the people of the city to see in a perceptible and visual manner the positive impact and growth that economic development in the form of urban regeneration could have on the local community.



Figure 7-2 Sarajevo: Relational dynamics of peacebuilding and urban regeneration

The weak relational dynamic however also means that there are inherent weaknesses in how far the success the private sector in regenerating the city will continue to impact perceptions of peace and stability. The risk is that a critical point could be reached where a lack of public consultation will result in an increasingly alienated and excluded population that cannot buy into the new services being offered. On the other hand, the creation of spaces for sharing daily experiences may itself have transformative effects that will take much longer to be visible.

7.7.2 Beirut

Figure 7-3: Beirut. In the diagram on Beirut, the peace treaty triangle is seen to overlap the core groups of interest—the local community and the private sector—very little. The main concern was about recasting the confessional structure of the government with a few phrases that could be applied broadly to other socio-cultural aspects of life in post-conflict Lebanon. As was discussed earlier, there was a sense that the reconstruction of the city and the economy were intentionally left out of the Accords because it was assumed that these issues would be handled without question, which in turn is potentially related to the influence of Hariri before, during, and after the Accords were written.

The lines of communication between the three groups are weak and broken. This is due in large part to the de facto stance the government took to the development of property and the private sector in general, as the relative freedom for investors was seen as essential to recovering the Lebanese post-war economy. In addition, there is breakdown between how much the local leadership can and will advocate for on behalf of the local communities, especially when their grievances centre on issues such as Solidere and other real estate developers' tactics. However, this critique of the communication is not to say that advocacy doesn't exist or that the local communities are not able to create a voice of concern, but there is a sense that the priorities of rich and powerful will obfuscate their efforts.

Regeneration in Beirut has occurred as a result of the unaddressed and laissez-faire nature of the government towards the private sector and the strengthening of the economy. The leadership of Solidere in transforming not only a broad swath of the Beiruti economy but also creating increased space for foreign investment has tremendously shaped the centre of Beirut, casting it as a space that is separate from the conflict and

therefore absolved of issues related to it. The new city centre and the buildings and projects outside of it show growth and confidence in the post-war context.

Peacebuilding in Beirut is more troublesome, though there is evidence of it. In many ways, the only really obvious evidence that 'peacebuilding' in any form has occurred is the relative success and continued expansion of Solidere's work as well as that of other private investors. There is continued tension in the country, however, the confessional rearrangement of the government continues to satisfactorily address root causes of conflict, which can be seen to also maintain a level of stability. That said, there is also increased space within the local communities for protestation and vocalization of issues regarding politics and other matters, which would seem to indicate that while the political system and the inter-regional politics in which Lebanon is embroiled is fraught with challenges, there is not a sense that freedom of speech is challenged, despite the suggested evidence through political leadership's assassinations over the years that this may not be the case.

The bottom-line concern with Beirut is that there will need to be increasing examples of how peacebuilding and stability is continuing to be ensured outside of economic improvements for the country. Considering the continued levels of unequal distribution of wealth and unemployment, the task might be to address how to increase the access to income for more of the Beiruti and Lebanese population.

7.7.3 Belfast

Figure 7-4: Belfast. The Belfast Agreement was also about relocating and restructuring the government of Northern Ireland so that it was capable of addressing localized issues as well as possessed the capacity to contend with a potential future of self-rule, should the people vote in that direction. Due to the duration and extent of the Troubles, the Agreement, through the government restructuration, was able to address other issues that also were affected by the conflict. In doing this, there was a tendency to be inclusive in formulation and there was a responsibility to engage many actors and agents throughout Northern Ireland, therefore the lines of communication are within the triangle. The local communities were of great concern in the Agreement, and the private sector, as well as urban regeneration, was also included, as economic development was a key concern for future growth.



Figure 7-3 Beirut: Relational dynamics of peacebuilding and urban regeneration



7-4 Belfast: Relational dynamics of peacebuilding and urban regeneration

The lines of communication between the groups are seen as generally solid; there is a strong culture of advocacy on the part of local leadership as a means of communicating grievances to the government. There is also strong communication between the private sector and the government as well as the local community. Though these communicative processes may be perceived as difficult and challenging at times, there is still a great deal of structure to how these lines of communication function within Northern Irish society. Regeneration in the 1990s in Belfast had a profound impact on how the city developed after the Belfast Agreement. However, the continued regeneration of the city has appeared to be unbalanced and focused on the extension of retail and commercial sectors. Despite that, these spaces appear to be gaining in success, as the partnership between municipally-led city centre regeneration schemes are complimented by private sector mixed-use development projects in the city centre that aim to bring more a 24-hour capacity to the city. However, regeneration outside the centre moves at a much slower pace and there is a lack of access to the centre. Also, people who live outside of the city centre often perceive the centre negatively.

Peacebuilding is an important part of the post-conflict context in Northern Ireland in a variety of ways. The aspect of peacebuilding that is a central part of the rhetoric when talking about Northern Ireland is the existence of a peace dividend. The regeneration of the city centre is one way the peace dividend is made visual and real and thus it is part of getting people to see and engage in peacebuilding on even more dynamic level.

The problem with this model is that there is a high risk that the self-identified working class members of Belfast society will feel they are excluded from this future city centre vision. There is a great risk that not everyone will feel welcomed or able to fully participate and engage in the promises for shared neutral space and the economically robust future it is to represent.

7.8 Conclusion

The above chapter aimed to draw out a more detailed analysis of key themes that had emerged from the walking and observation which were in turn based on the analytical findings of chapters four and five. Using interview material, observation, and analysis of secondary sources as well as social media, there was a strong element of a relational dynamic present. This was manifested differently in each case, where issues concerning

identity, class, economic robustness, and government restructuration created the environment in and through which private-sector led regeneration took place.

This analysis was broadened to look at the general role the private sector can play in the post-conflict context and peacebuilding, which was used as a means of connecting the importance of private property development in the post-conflict city to its successful regeneration. An additional element of the implications of the private sector led regeneration in the post-conflict city was then expressed through a look at the role of changing centres of power in these settings, where the act of rebuilding was also a political act of forgetting by 'rewriting' urban space. In this, the potential for excluding communities was great and a problematic aspect. It was also shown how these examinations were further illustrative of Habermasian legitimation and thus applicable on the theoretical side of the research.

Finally, the breaking down of the relationship between peacebuilding and urban regeneration was expressed through the graphical representations and their analyses. Through these, it was found that both peacebuilding and urban regeneration are reflexive elements played through the urban context. They are the processes through which the dynamic relationship of peace treaty implementation and change wrought through the structures of the government include to varying the degrees the local community and the private sector. These different actors/agents have different styles and relational dynamics that are either affected by the peace treaties or not at all. The way these groups communicate in turn influenced what kind of regeneration and peace was being built. These dynamics—the peace treaty and the communication structures—happen in the urban context where economic liberalization has empowered the private sector and thus made them more culpable for the changes in the city centres that serve as visual reminders of the kind of peacebuilding taking place.

CHAPTER EIGHT

The Neoliberal Dynamic: Conclusions and Further Analysis

8.1 Introduction

Thus far, the discussion developed throughout this dissertation has presented and analyzed, through a multi-method approach, the relationship between peacebuilding and urban regeneration in the post-conflict city. In chapters one and two, understanding how the relationship was manifest and connected was presented theoretically through the concept of Habermasian legitimation. Legitimation was used as a structural device for connecting the theoretical foundations of both peace and cities and then using that to formulate how peacebuilding and how neoliberal urban regeneration as the practicable expressions of the theoretical dimensions, functioned through this.

Following this, a discussion of methods explored how case-study selection based upon the theoretical dimensions of peace, cities, and legitimation was undertaken. Viewing the research as an attempt to understand a highly intricate series of processes, the choice to employ the exploration of context, content analysis of the peace treaties, examination of the effects of the peace treaties on regeneration, the walking and observational analysis of place, and interviews with local informants was presented as the most rigorous way to engage with multiple levels of understanding and expression of the research question, from the broad and contextual to the experiential and street-level.

Subsequent to this, the case cities were treated individually. Chapter four commenced with a historical and contextual analysis, where social, political, and economic inequalities were found to varying degrees not only to provide the source of grievance for the associated conflicts but also characterize the 19th and 20th century historical developments in general. The development of the cities themselves—Sarajevo, Beirut, and Belfast—were based upon changing structures and sources of power and economic production. As such, the cities were also a strategic part of the conflicts as their physical

space and material was used as the means of war. The Bosnian War, the Lebanese Civil War, and the Troubles all possessed strong and meaningful urban dimensions.

Looking to the peace treaties designed to put an end to the conflicts—The Dayton Accords, The Ta'if Accords, and the Belfast Agreement—the goal of chapter five was to understand how and to what extent the treaties addressed the urban dimension of the conflicts. In doing so, a system of analysis was developed for breaking down the various components of the treaties. This system revealed that while there was a paucity of information regarding the built environment in the treaties, there was a strong degree of government reform through which social and cultural policies were developed, as well as degrees of economic liberalization. This was found to be the determining factor in how the implementation of the treaties in each case progressed. By looking at what had developed in terms of regeneration in the post-conflict context, its connection to the peace treaties was linked to the treatment of government/institutional reform as well as economic policies. However, these were found in varying degrees with varying effects in each case.

The next goal in chapter six was to take the understanding of urban regeneration in each city as an expression of legitimation of the imposed structures of the peace treaty developed above and viewing it in terms of what the city centres were like in an experiential sense. Conducting a walking and observational analysis of place, the city centres were walked through and approached in order to seek out ways the peace treaty elements were manifest, as well as searching out what other dynamics might have developed. By drawing in NRT as a means of justifying the importance of walking and observation in gathering data about the relationship of place and cities to political and social processes such as peacebuilding, observations and interactions with city spaces and with people allowed for a more fine-grained reading of urban regeneration and the post-war context. What emerged were themes of accessibility, large scale private development, and the varying degrees to which the local community participated in the regeneration that was occurring. These themes come together in the form of 'surrogate space', where the physical spaces created by private developments, if accessible, create an alternative to the available or limited public space that is separate from identifications with the conflict. These spaces, while private, are made quasi-public because they are typically spaces of consumption (such as shopping malls), where customers are needed to make the development successful. This was seen in the development of shopping malls, with their adjunct open squares, in Sarajevo (BBI Centar and the Alta Shopping Centar); Beirut (the

Souks, ABC Mall, Verdun); and Belfast (Victoria Square, other upcoming city centre regeneration projects).

Chapter seven aimed to look at additional elements of how local leadership, the local community, and property developers perceived each other; how government restructuration directly impacted the way regeneration took place; how private sector capital aided in the development of the post-conflict city; and how identity and class were still present though in varying forms and were illustrated through people's perceptions of the city centre. These themes were then followed by discussions of the role of the private sector in peacebuilding and the impact of changing power dynamics in the post-conflict city represented by the central role of private developers as well as how the thematic elements helped to illustrate the expressions of legitimation. Further to this, the relational dynamic that lay at the core of each of these cases was explored (summarized by figures 7-1 through 7-4) to understand how the relationships were manifest and activated.

In this concluding chapter, the final layer of analysis regarding the relational dynamic between peacebuilding and urban regeneration in post-conflict cities is explored. This is done through a critical assessment of the neoliberal processes that they represent. In this research, neoliberal peacebuilding and urban regeneration have been observed to be overall organic and positive forces in the transformation and stabilization of a post-conflict society. Identifying the expression of the neoliberal dimension in the post-conflict city makes it possible to see how the new space created through regeneration is helpful in creating 'surrogate space' for identity formation as well as developing economic and social security. However, neoliberal developments, manifest as high-end exclusive semi-public space in these contexts, can be critiqued for their ability to further alienate and exclude many members of the local community. Those who cannot afford (monetarily) to participate in these spaces are likely to perceive them as inequitable, leading them to disengage and withdraw further into their own communities. Thus, if these spaces are not made for everyone, they could add to or aggravate tensions.

Section 8.2 aims to re-examine the concept of neoliberalism as it used in this dissertation and deepen its applicability. Section 8.3 then seeks to take the neoliberal dimension and look at it in conjunction with the relational dynamic between peacebuilding and urban regeneration explored in chapter seven. Following this, in section 8.4, is a further crystallization of the assessment of neoliberalism in relation to the peacebuilding/urban regeneration dynamic. This dissertation concludes through a presentation of potential implications for the research in section 8.5.

8.2 The Neoliberal Structure of Peace and Regeneration

Throughout the argument presented in the preceding chapters there has been an underlying narrative of neoliberal-style development as the way urban regeneration and peacebuilding have been manifest in the post-conflict context. In chapter one, the use of neoliberalism was presented as a way of describing and talking about the effects of liberalization policies and was not used in a pejorative sense. The essence of neoliberalism in this discussion is development that is unguided by central government authority and occurs naturally as a result of decisions made by private investors, and consequently by consumers. In the beginning, the neoliberal theme emerged as part of a critique of how contemporary peacebuilding and urban regeneration are potentially negatively altering the quality of peace being built and cities being made. Further additions to this argument are presented by Ahearn (2009) who argues that the neoliberal economic model of peacebuilding, where structures are put in place to address the socio-economic root causes of conflict, is not adequate; in addition Crighton (1998) using the Belfast Agreement, saw it as another attempt at 'liberal internationalism', where neoliberal economic policies were a substitute for 'reconciliation and social justice' (1998, 75). Lipschutz (1998), on the other hand, sees neoliberal policies in the field of post-conflict peacebuilding as valuable for the stabilization of society but conversely not able to provide the resources for conflict resolution.

Further to this, these critiques were shown to be an important aspect to draw out. The contentious issue facing both peacebuilding and urban regeneration is that these processes are both local and state concerns and are happening in a globalized and networked world, where communication and influence are not isolated but part of a larger system of economic exchange and knowledge transfer Within this context, the notion the 'neoliberal city', or a city whose development has been influenced by an increased amount of private sector funds and a lessening of government regulation, is a label that can be generally applied to the post-conflict city as a result of liberal peacebuilding. But what does this mean? According to Brenner and Theodore (2002), the neoliberal city is not a place that has had neoliberal structures forced upon it from above, but has developed out of a context of convergent regulatory, social, and economic developments on multiple levels. It exists as a result of 'path-dependent, contextually specific interactions between inherited regulatory landscapes and emergent neoliberal, market-oriented restructuring projects at a broad range of geographical scales. These considerations lead to a conceptualization of

contemporary neoliberalization processes as catalysts and expressions of an ongoing creative destruction of political-economic space at multiple geographical scales' (2002, 349). In this research, the naturally weak post-conflict governments, in combination with the forces of globalization and neoliberalism which today has a capacity to cross border, combine to reshape post-war cities. This reshaping is both creative in that it re-envisions the future of the city, but can also contributes to the 'spaces of forgetting'. Some people are opposed to the destruction of certain objects and spaces because they define the conflict, and they see the conflict as essential to their identity. Sarajevo succeeds at striking this balance in their tendency to keep old structures and add new structures around them (the Oslobdjenje newspaper building is a good example of the old structure being retained but a new structure being built around it. Refer to image 6-78); in Beirut, this is less successful, as groups like SBH indicate. Examples such as the Wimpy's Café being turned into a Vero Moda represent an insensitive treatment of the past. This notion is important in that it draws out the multi-faceted nature of the development of neoliberal characteristics in post-conflict cities.

In the observation material, the extent to which the peace treaty's effects, either direct or indirect, could be identified in the use and observation of city space reinforced the idea that the regeneration that had occurred was of an unregulated and neoliberal nature. The research also provided a rich source of observation and further extrapolation of more subtle themes and relationships between the built environment and peace. It also helped bring the neoliberal nature of the relationship to bear in a meaningful and observable way on the experience of the city centres. Fairbanks and Lloyd summarize well the importance of the ethnographic analysis when seeking out an elucidation of these relationships:

> Neoliberal fantasies seek . . . to disembed market forces from the social, a venture bound to fail. The intimate method of ethnographic research demonstrates this encounter of market utopianism with local realities – the point at which regulatory strategies so often exhaust themselves, break down, and splinter into contradiction . . . [by]exposing the sedimentary frictions of the built environment and the sensual apprehension of social space in order to express the lived experience of actually existing neoliberalism . . . critical ethnography emerges as a method attuned to the quotidian rhythms of the city, enriched by a historical imagination that strives to unpack the multiple sites of co-formation comprising the virtual palimpsest of neoliberal urbanism, with all its manifest contradictions (Fairbanks and Lloyd 2011, 9).

In the field of peacebuilding, the neoliberal dilemma is seen as something that is once damning but also necessary. The basic notion of the 'liberal peace' presented by Paris (1997) argues that what has traditionally occurred in post-Cold War peacebuilding is that models of peace are often wrought through the liberalization of economic and market structures. The underlying argument within this is that it represents a democratizing force within the post-conflict society thus bolstering the governmental and political reforms that were also instituted with the peace agreement. Paris (2004; 2010) goes on to argue that, in its neoliberal form, peacebuilding through the liberalized market economy combined with very little regulation of the new economy was a potentially helpful source of stabilization in post-conflict or crisis prone states.

On the other hand, urban regeneration in its neoliberal form when not considered in a non-post-conflict context can be driven by private-sector property development and investment that prizes profitability and does not necessarily work within public consultation efforts. This kind of regeneration is often welcomed by local government authority, or indeed the nation-state, as it is a non-publicly funded way for 'improvement' of an area to occur. However, negative critiques too are common. While there a strong tendency for the term 'neoliberal' to be applied in a pejorative sense, there is also a trend towards seeing that 'neoliberal urban regeneration' is not an imposed set of circumstances but rather the outcome of a complex set of contextual elements (Brenner and Theodore 2002); likewise, Swyngedouw et al. (2002)also recognize through their study of large-scale regeneration projects in Europe that neoliberal approaches offer a mixed bag of results, with positive and negative effects. It is positions such as these that are most helpful in informing and understanding the complex role neoliberal peacebuilding and urban regeneration play in the post-conflict city.

8.3 The Dynamic of Neoliberalism Applied

When the exploration of the research subject began, the overall aim of looking at the relationship between peacebuilding and the city was initially guided by the theoretical concept of legitimation. Through the analysis of the case histories, the peace agreements, and the primary data, the theoretical structure of legitimation and the ISIS was drawn through the argument as that which connected structure of urban experience, the structure of violence and peace, and the structure of economic policies to the changes

imposed through the peace treaties made observable on the ground. In a parallel way, the development of the idea that a neoliberal dynamic is what was driving the relationship between the urban dimension and the peacebuilding dimension was developed. In the previous figures presented in chapter seven which illustrated the relational dynamic between peacebuilding and urban regeneration, it was the peace treaty's degree of effectiveness and inclusiveness of both the private sector and the public that played a role in determining how and why the pattern of urban regeneration occurred as it did. Even though the treaties were often primarily addressing government restructuring it was the relational dynamic between the three areas (government, community, and private sector) that influenced the quality and pattern of regeneration as well as the peace that had been built.

Neoliberalism in this research context can be seen to synthesize the effects of both peacebuilding and urban regeneration in the post-conflict city. As a result of economic liberalization, the type of peace being built in addition to the way patterns of urban regeneration are affected by it, these forces are transformed into a neoliberal format. This means that their desired effects (to build peace and improve the urban environment) reflexively influence each other, but at the same time produce neoliberalizing effects insofar as increased private development in the city centre is unregulated.

Figure 8-1 is used to illustrate this. The new dimensions on the graph illustrate the role of neoliberalism in the central characteristic of creating a permeable boundary (represented by a broken line) around the diffuse effect of peacebuilding and urban regeneration in the urban context. Additionally, the orange ovals at the bottom, 'market and economic liberalization' and 'group and individual identity' are added. These are to illustrate how throughout the research on the cases, these elements were also part of global, national, and local context that were also influenced by the conflict. They are also shown to be part of creating the internal dimension of the city in the post-conflict setting, where the neoliberal development of peace and urban regeneration shares a reflexive relationship with these dimensions through the production of new forms of capital, consumption, and surrogate space as a means of fostering growth of group identity and strengthening the economy in a way that occupies a different context than the conflict, but also shares in the legacy of the conflict.

Finally, the theoretical dynamic of legitimation offers a last layer of insight to the relational dynamic presented above. By seeing the concentric circles of 'global, state, and



Figure 8-1 Generic relational graphic: The identity securing interpretive system applied to the neoliberal development as a manifestation of peace and urban regeneration in the post-conflict city

city' as also 'system and structure, security, and identity' (the lifeworld and the identity securing interpretive system that is based on Habermasian legitimation), then it is possible to see how the elements at play in the preceding chapters are all aspects of the relational dynamic of peacebuilding and the post-conflict city.

8.4 Organic Neoliberal Development

Neoliberal processes are the way peacebuilding and urban regeneration relate in the post-conflict context. Peacebuilding, both in theory and practice (demonstrated through the cases here), tends to be structured so as to create, support, or enhance democratic structure of governance. One of this ways this is done through a liberalization of economic structure in the post-conflict society. As a result, the private sector plays a large role in shaping the peace built. In this research, the private sector was instrumental in the regeneration of the city centres in each case study. This kind of regeneration is characterized as neoliberal, in that the decisions that private sector developers make are done in a regulatory-light environment as well as with varying degrees of public consultation.

This offers a clear link between how, through the peace treaties, economic liberalization policies coupled with the restructured government create the type of environment in which neoliberal-style regeneration served as a link in not only stabilizing the economy but also creating a visual representation of peacebuilding and stability. Through the creation of new spaces that aid in the further creation of individual and group identity, security gained through new and reconstructed buildings and the confidence in both the society and economy that comes along with it, new systems of understanding the conflict and the post-conflict society were developed. This process is at the core of Boutros-Ghali's (1995) definition of peacebuilding as 'actions to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict' as the urban built environment and its regeneration can justifiably be seen as the 'structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace'.

This is not to say that the neoliberal development model that has come to define regeneration in these cities is not without its potential pitfalls, but it is crucial to see that processes generally seen critically (neoliberal peacebuilding and neoliberal regeneration) actually can be responsible for creating physical and political space for the growth and

strengthening of identity and post-conflict notions of security. These processes must be carefully watched though, as there is great risk of creating further isolation and alienation of the local communities at the expense of appearing to be economically robust and 'appealing' to a retinue of global and foreign investors.

The key then is to see neoliberalism as an organic process that emerges from the post-conflict state of weak centralized authority and need for economic growth combined with the maintenance of structures that will help prevent relapse into conflict, such as the state, civil society institutions, or third party agencies. These neoliberal developments must however be guarded by the local community, the government, or even third parties. This would be to prevent the potential for future economic and cultural grievances emerging as a result of disparities developed from increasing economic divisions in society.

8.5 Implications and Discussion

The aims of this research were broadly focused on understanding the relationship between peacebuilding and cities and through that also identifying its implications. In the process of finding an answer to this, many other questions emerged in an attempt to pick apart and understand it. These questions were the emphases throughout the chapters. In conducting the research, three case studies were chosen in an attempt to provide comparative breadth and scope as opposed to boring down deeper into one case. The purpose for this was to allow meaningful and generalizable conclusions to be drawn about the dynamic nature of neoliberal peacebuilding and urban regeneration in the post-conflict city. Based on the preceding discussion, neoliberal development was seen as a potentially positive outcome of post-conflict peace building. However, this dynamic also was assessed as needing to be observed and regulated by non-government and local community actors so that it does not potentially create greater disparities in the local community and society.

The next and final step in the research is to postulate how the findings might influence future peace treaty and peace building policy approaches. As the initial 'problem' presented was that peacebuilding policies had a tendency to not 'stick' and ultimately fail, the goal was to see what could be done to further address this issue. The urban environment was chosen as the framework for understanding this as the vital role cities have historically played in contemporary conflict. In addition, the developing and future-oriented centrality of cities in terms of the globalization and growing urban demographics

means that they are also meaningful and critical spaces for conflict, peace, and development.

In looking at the specific ways this research might potentially contribute to the evolution of peacebuilding approaches and peace treaty policy, the emphasis of these findings is on the peace treaty itself. Treaties continue to be the primary method that lay out how a conflict is to conclude. While the manner in which treaties emerges is changing (i.e. the Ottowa Convention on Landmines was not state-led but was grass-roots led) the fact is that the agreement is still written down in treaty form. This is because in the analysis of the peace treaties in chapter five and through the further treatment of urban regeneration as effected by the treaty in chapter five, six, and seven, it was the peace treaty in each case that greatly determined the context and environment in and through which urban regeneration and its associated processes (class and group identity, economic production, shared spaces of communication and future identification) occurred. In these cases, government reform was the overarching purpose of the treaties, and all other effects were worked through that.

The potential for peace treaties and peacebuilding policy to institute change that is positive and dynamic is great. However, as this research has shown, this is a practice that is constantly evolving as political and cultural situations alter depending on context. Regardless of the relativistic aspects of this sort of critique, the built environment is a fundamental and universally binding human experience that can be shared across conflicts and cultures. Though how the built environment works and is related to each case changes depending on the society, it is still vital to creation of identity and security for both the individual and the group and thus serves a legitimating function. Cities as centres of conflicts possess a unique role in the manifestation of conflicts owing to this central role. In determining and understanding how peace and peacebuilding might be more effectively implemented and adopted, working part of it through a common and shared framework, such as the city centre, has the potential for being an effective tool for delivering this. Furthermore, the vital role of economic vitality to stabilizing the post-conflict society is another part of how the built environment, city centres, and urban regeneration in the post-conflict city are important aspects of peacebuilding. It is through these elements that liberalizing policies, even if they are characterized by neoliberal structures or development, has the potential to aid in future stabilization. The goal beyond this however should not be entirely unregulated development, but a watchful and aware set of actors and agents who can assess the effects of the neoliberal development.

Box 8-1: Concluding Statements

1. In deciding what elements are to be included in a peace treaty, if the conflict in question had a strong urban dimension, then more specific urban-oriented guidance should be included in the treaty. *This is because adding elements of instruction regarding urban issues, even if broad, will provide a basis for future organization and/or agency formation which will serve as an additional (if not the only) mechanism for stewarding the regeneration and reconstruction process.*

2. If economic liberalization is part of the treaty, then measures ought to be taken that create guidance or a framework of operation for how private sector investors and property developers are to work in the post-conflict city. *This is important especially because there is more likely to be less regulation on the part of the government in the post-conflict context and this would provide a legal framework for members of the international community, the local population, and the private sector to work within.*

3. Care should be taken to ensure that there are mechanisms or structures through which dynamic, transparent, and public lines of communication and communication procedures between government, community, and the private sector are prioritized. *This is because alienation of the local community from the processes that shape their lives will only continue to entrench social, cultural, and political tensions that are at risk of reforming or resurfacing; likewise, it is important that the private sector be engaged with the community as the stakeholder for their investments; and finally, the government, both national and local, while perhaps unable to be a strong regulatory force, can still act as a sounding board and legitimate authority in steering and balancing the needs of the local community as well as economic vitality.*

4. Language should be included that recognizes the scope of post-conflict peacebuilding to inform and influence reflexively many aspects of the post-conflict society; of these, it ought to be recognized that the reconstruction of infrastructure and housing and commercial building stock is a priority, as is the development of new avenues of spatial and place-oriented projects that strive to create new areas of future identity. *This is because peacebuilding, as a process that is multifaceted in scope and effect, can be made a more active part of peace treaties in general. More specifically, new shared space ought to be given more credit in helping to transition post-conflict societies.*

5. Attention should be paid to ensuring that there is an even and fair balance of investment in developing new city centre spaces that are attractive to foreign investors, *in addition to* regenerating and developing as well the non-city centre neighbourhoods and areas that are not as visible or as seemingly vital to the development of a robust economy. *This is because there is great risk that communities are left behind in the pursuit of supporting and encouraging investment in the city and the country through a new and inviting city centre. While it is important to ensure that investment in the cities is present, there must be a balance struck between the city centre and the more 'marginal' spaces where the local community lives.*

8.6 Limitations and Future Research

As with any PhD, limitations and setbacks are often the rule and not the exception: the process of formulating, researching, analyzing, and writing this dissertation fit this bill entirely. Aside from usual uphill battles waged and walls walked into when probing theory, ideas, and analysis, it was the completion of the field research that in this case proved to be particularly challenging. Ultimately, the challenges faced in gathering data entirely shaped the outcome and had a dramatic impact on what kinds of conclusions could be drawn.

From the outset, having to personally fund the research process from start to finish made field research and data collection exceptionally difficult: thus while it is true that there were no funding sources to please and cater to, there was also little in the way of institutional support. The field research limitations were also wide-ranging. Leaving the UK for greatly extended periods of time for financial reasons was not possible, thus limiting the amount of time spent on the ground. As a result of this, interviews had to be arranged before getting to a place so that time in the field was maximized. This however led to a very interesting learning experience: with the exception of Belfast (which this system of organization worked well), and moderately so in Sarajevo, the cultural norm for arranging to talk and meet with people is to phone or 'drop in' a day or so before a potential meeting time. Add to that language and networking barriers, and it became nearly impossible (add to that as well that this was not learning until after the fact). This meant that interview subjects were severely limited in Beirut (where general costliness and an Icelandic volcano making matters even more tenuous).

As it went, I was able to shape and draw a set of analysis and conclusions that worked around these barriers, the result of which is documented in this thesis. However, it is clear that had I been able to be in my research locations for a longer period of time, I would have been able to easily build up a research network and would have obtained much more in depth responses from people regarding the assessment of quality of city centre space and its relation to post-conflict stability which would have allowed more incisive conclusions to be drawn.

In this vein, future research that would stem from this thesis would be first and foremost a more comprehensive survey of local key informants in each city, ranging from local developers, politicians, community activists, and residents. This would allow the conclusions reached here regarding neoliberal regeneration in the city centre to be used as

a centre piece for engaging interview subjects and for looking at how such a process is perceived and felt by those who are most directly affected by it.

Next, I would also like to look further at how neoliberal economic policies can actually be monitored, as that is what I suggest would be central to ensuring such development does not routinely disregard the local participants in favour of greater economic development. What would such a program look like? What groups would be responsible for it? What would be the indicators for monitoring?

In addition, one of the one of the other core concerns that has resulted from this thesis is that while processes such as peacebuilding and urban regeneration are in and of themselves dynamic, the policies that represent them remain static. I would like to see future research conducted that looks at how to build flexibility into peacebuilding policy (aka peace treaties) and urban regeneration policy so that they are better suited to withstand social, political, economic, and technological change.

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Dr. Dominique Mulliez, an archaeologist at the French School in Athens, illustrated a fundamental fact about the power and centrality of central urban space in ordering and giving meaning to our lives (Wilson 2011). In the town that surrounded the Oracle of Delphi, in ancient Greece, a slave-owner would officially free a slave by engraving the contract in the stone walls of the city. This ensured the contract was public and honoured by the former owner, and was a device for guaranteeing freedom was ensured to an illiterate former slave as he could see the protocol had been followed.

What this anecdote tells us is that city centres have been part of conducting and forming relations and negotiations for centuries. In this case, it played a regulatory role in the system of granting freedom to slaves through its public display. In some ways, the contract might even be seen as similar to the peace treaty and thus further enhance the idea that treaties, like contracts, must be made visible and thus enforced, through manipulation of the built environment of the city centre. In this way, the potential for peace could be strengthened, and the slave is ensured his freedom.

In this above discussion of the implications of the research, the dynamic role between peace, peacebuilding, economic liberalization, and urban regeneration as an expression of neoliberal policies which in turn serve a legitimating function for the post-conflict context was incorporated into a suggested critique of the implications this might

have for future peace treaty policy. The illustration from Dr. Mulliez provided an opportunity to reflect on the greater and more fundamental relationship that lies at the heart of this modern dynamic: and that is the central force of cities in creating and regulating identity for the individual and the group.

Again, the key item explored in this dissertation has been the link between the city and peacebuilding. This link, what makes them have a relationship, is the process of legitimation. More specifically, it is the identity securing interpretive system. The city has the potential to function as an identity securing system. Thus, as post-war reconstruction reshapes the city, it can simultaneously impact the identity security of the population, reshaping identity or compelling a defence of that identity. A reconstruction that contributes to peacebuilding will be inclusive and thus help build a pluralistic identity. In contrast, an exclusionary reconstruction can cause insecurity, resulting in continued violence.

ENDNOTES

[1] The literature on the global and international city, according to Scott et al. (2001), has its roots in the work of Hall (1966, 1984) and Friedmann and Wolff (1982), reaching increased attention with the Sassen's (1991) work on the 'global city'. Since then, a vast literature on the nuances on the subject has developed and cannot be fully addressed here. In this research, the work of Scott et al. (2001), Sassen (2002; 2001), and Hall and Pfieffer (2000) are the sources drawn upon for development of these ideas.

[2] On a policy level, the importance of cities is evidenced in the existence of agencies such as UN Habitat, UN Population Fund, The World Bank Urban Development unit, as well as other state-level and inter-governmental agencies dedicated to promoting policy relating to cities.

[3] Groups such as Architects Without Frontiers (http://www.asfint.org/) and Architects for Human Rights (http://www.architecture-humanrights.org/) focus on the role of the built environment professional in promoting social justice and human rights, especially in conflict, post-conflict, or conflict prone cities.

[4] For example, see the Conflict in Cities research group at Goldsmiths University (http://www.gold.ac.uk/cucr/events/eventtitle,24393,en.php); the Cities in Conflict and the Contested State research group at Cambridge University. (http://www.arct.cam.ac.uk/conflictincities/); and the Post-War Reconstruction and Development Unit at the University of York (http://www.york.ac.uk/politics/centres/prdu/).

[5] The World Bank states that for the first time ever, over half the world's population lives in an urban setting and according to the UN, the global population is set to hit 7 billion by late 2011 (see http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTURBANDEVELOPMENT/0,,menuPK:337184~pagePK:149018~piPK:149093~theSitePK:337178,00.html and http://www.unfpa.org/swp/, respectively).

[6] A survey of the literature on peacebuilding prior to *An Agenda for Peace*, but more importantly before the end of the Cold War, discuss peacebuilding as a method for thinking about and approaching conflict negotiation in addition to being an adjunct of peacekeeping (Galtung 1985; Weber 1989; Young 1987; Boulding 1988); however, it wasn't until the early 1990s that the idea of peacebuilding began to enter policy language in a way that highlighted its strength on its own merits.

[7] These ideas are worked through in Galtung's following articles: 'A Structural Theory of Aggression' (1964); 'Violence, Peace, and Peace Research' (1969); and 'On the Meaning of Nonviolence' (1965).

[8] United Nations Peacebuilding Commission: http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/index.shtml.

[9] Often called the 'conflict cycle' or 'phases of conflict' and consist of: No conflict, latent conflict, emergence, escalation, hurting stalemate, de-escalation, settlement/resolution, post-conflict peacebuilding and reconciliation. See http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/conflict_stages/ for a more in-depth discussion of this.

[10] For further discussions of this see Owen (1994), Layne (1994), and Rosato (2003).

[11] For example, see the EU Peacebuilding Partnership (http://eeas.europa.eu/ifs/pbp_en.htm); the Organization of American States (OAS) Peace Fund (http://www.oas.org/sap/peacefund/); the African Union's (AU) recent peacebuilding seminar series 'Africa Regional Meeting on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding', September 7-11, 2011 (see http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Generic-Documents/Agenda%20-%20Addis%20-%20English-update%2023%20aug%202011.pdf); and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Political and Security Community (http://www.aseansec.org/18741.htm)(all last accessed August 31, 2012).

[12] See http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/transformation/ for an example (last accessed September 12, 2009).

[13] See the World Bank Urban Development unit at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTURBANDEVELOPMENT/0,,menuPK:337184~pagePK:149018~piPK:149093~theSitePK:337178,00.html (last accessed September 17, 2011).

[14] See Graham (2004): 'violence, war and terror that characterize the post-9/11 periods largely *entail systematic and planned targeting of cities and urban places'* (24).

[15] See Human Security Research and Outreach Program (2006): 'Externally, terrorism has increasingly targeted cities for maximum disruption, while the growth in 'infrastructural wars' —

perpetrated by states against the roads, water, and electricity systems that support the urban centres of enemies, or by insurgent groups who attack urban vitality using urban features like car and truck bombs — has posed a threat to urban civilian life and security. Internally, the implosion of global national politics into the urban world has been exacerbated by the militarization of gangs, police, and other armed groups, rapid urbanization and an urban youth bulge, social polarization in horizontally unequal cities, and resource scarcity/urban unemployment' (6).

[16] Internally displaced persons are 'persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border' (Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, Introduction, para. 2).

[17] The understanding of realism in this research is based on Sayer's [1984] (1992) work on critical realism in the social sciences.

[18] Carmona et al. (2003) and an exploration of the Resource for Urban Design Information (RUDI) website (http://www.rudi.net/) consistently covers and introduces these concepts.

[19] Please see the more in-depth discussion of the cities and globalization literature in chapter two, page 31.

[20] Solidere website: http://www.solidere.com/solidere.html.

[21] It should be noted that there is a difference between 'legitimacy' and 'legitimation'. While something possesses 'legitimacy', something in turn must be made acceptable and right (to be in the state of possessing legitimacy or being legitimate) by outside forces, hence 'legitimation'. In this discussion, 'legitimation' refers to both the generic process of approval but also specifically to the Habermasian construct of it.

[22] *Legitimation Crisis* was originally published in German in 1974 and was translated into English by Thomas McCarthy and published in 1976.

[23] This acronym is the author's own and not found in Habermas's writings.

[24] For a more in-depth discussion, see Craib (1992).

[25] Its Latin root is *legitimatus* which means 'lawful' or 'in line with the law'.

[26] For example, see the work of Jones and Ward (2002) and Mars (2001).

[27] Habermas sees true democracy, also known as discursive democracy, as based on communicative action in the public sphere; where a society might traditionally vote on an issue or policy, Habermas contends that such decisions should be made based on public debate, where ideas are exchanged in a non-coercive environment. The underlying element of communication, and the implication it has for democracy as truly being representative of something nearing a consensus, is what Habermas sees as vital to the continuation of a society (Cohen 1999, Habermas 1996).

[28] System and structure are also evocative of Marx's Superstructure and Habermas's system and lifeworld.

[29] Some claim that network society is rendering historic notions of space and time as obsolete: 'We are continually restructuring our human space(s): information highways are linking people and places virtually instantaneously, transforming and shrinking space to a point where some say that there is no geography' (Gould 1997, 139).

[30] 'Multiplexing' according to Amin and Graham is how the city needs to be considered: 'a set of spaces where diverse ranges of relational webs coalesce, interconnect and fragment . . . The contemporary city is a variegated and multiplex entity – a juxtaposition of contradictions and diversities, the theatre of life itself' (418).

[31] Petrella's (2006) CR-30 consist of the following: Rotterdam/Amsterdam; the Ruhr zone around Dusseldorf; Frankfurt; Stuttgart-Baden-Wurttemberg; Munich-Bavaria; Oresund-Copenhagen-Malmo; London-South East England; Greater Paris; Lyon-Grenoble; the Zurich and Geneva-Lausanne regions; Barcelona-Catalonia' Montreal-Toronto-Chicago; the New York region; Los Angeles-Orange County; Miami; Vancouver; Istanbul; Johannesburg-Cape Town; the Tokyo area; Osaka; Shanghai; Hong Kong; Singapore; Kuala Lumpur; Jakarta; Sydney; and the Sao Paolo area (195).

[32] See http://www.allianceforpeacebuilding.org/?page=aboutpeacebuilding (accessed September 16, 2011).

[33]

[34] As is apparent, not all conflicts that have occurred in the last fifty years have not been listed; the list represents a sampling that aims to represent a geographically and typologically diverse grouping that would demonstrate the usefulness of the criteria.
[35] Lewis Mumford describes cities as 'containers' as a means of describing the function they play in housing social and cultural processes; see Mumford (1961).
[36] This publication entitled *Non-representational theory: space, politics, affect* is mostly a collection of several papers Thrift had produced in the late 90s and early 2000s but also includes original material for the book as well. As such, many of the ideas presented in this book were actually published and critically examined in years prior to its publication.
[37] See http://www.natcen.ac.uk for more information.
[38] Discussed in greater detail in chapter five.
[39] A note on sources: Much of the available historical analysis of Bosnia written in English has been conducted since the early 1990s up through the present day (Stokes et al. 1996), undoubtedly influenced by the dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation in 1991 and the subsequent war in Bosnia that was fought from 1992 to 1996. English language publications that addressed Bosnia prior to the 1990s focused more or less on its role and relation to Yugoslavia and the other federations within it or on its pivotal role in the emergence of World War I. For this reason, much of the available literature focuses on understanding and explaining the history of racial, ethnic, and religious trends that ebbed and flowed through Bosnia's earliest settlement by the Illyrians in the 5th century BCE through to the present day. While this history is an undeniable part of what makes Bosnia a unique nation and worthy of study in its own right, such explorations have been conducted with an element of anxiety, attempting to make sense of the bloodshed and animosity that raged in 1990s. In general, academic analysis is vehemently opposed to the myth of the 'ancient hatreds' thesis that has dominated popular culture and media in the 1990s with many authors setting out with the goal of disproving such a claim (King 1997).
[40] Before the Common Era (BCE).
[41] Yugoslav military doctrine was known as 'Total National Defence' where 'the Yugoslav territory was divided into four military regions, each consisting of several military districts. The policy was to engage the entire Yugoslav population in armed resistance, armament production and civil defense. One key task was to arm more than eight million Yugoslav citizens' (Kauer 2007, 82).
[42] These last two factors are discussed in detail by Susan Woodward (Woodward 1995, 22).
[43] While the success of the joint Croat-Muslim ground forces deserve partial credit for setting the conditions which made the Serbians amenable to a negotiated settlement, this too was made possible by outsiders as the arms embargo had de facto ended. Although never official, the embargo essentially ended in 1994. The ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith was approached by President Tudjman about whether the US would oppose Iranian arms shipments to Sarajevo through Zagreb. Galbraith said he had 'no instruction' (Tanter and Psarouthakis 1999, 27). In addition, the Croat-Muslim Federation was largely made possible through U.S. facilitation with the agreement being signed in Washington D.C. in 1994.
[44] During 1992 Bush also used the analogy, stating that, 'I learned something from Vietnam, I am not going to commit U.S. forces until I know what the mission is, till the military tells me that it can be completed, until I know how they can come out …You have ancient ethnic rivalries that have cropped up as Yugoslavia has dissolved, or getting dissolved, and it isn't going to be solved by sending in the 82nd Airborne' ("The 1992 Campaign; Transcript of First TV Debate Among Bush, Clinton and Perot". (October 12, 1992). *New York Times*. Retrieved from http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F0CE7DA173CF931A25753C1A964958260&pagewanted=12. Last accessed July 12, 2011).
[45] Limited to monitoring ceasefire operations, the UN troops were extremely vulnerable, at one point one hundred of them being held hostage, chained to ammunition storages sites, by Serbian forces in order to prevent NATO airstrikes (Calabresi et al. 1995).
[46] NATO, 'Operation Deliberate Force', November 6, 1995 (updated 16 November 2006). Available at http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2005/08-august/e0830a.htm. (ast Accessed August 29, 2012).
[47] Notes on sources: The historical sources on Beirut and Lebanon available in English are extensive. The country and the city have, for millennia, been an integral core to various stages and phases of world history. However, the literature available on the history of Lebanon tends to, on one hand, focus on its creation as a state in 1948, and the years that preceded that as it emerged from French

and Ottoman rule, and on the other, as an attempt to explain and explore the possible causes for the violent civil war that was fought between 1975 and 1990. In an attempt to gather generic history on Lebanon, it has been necessary to consult historical analyses that focused on a particular phase in Middle East history, as opposed to Lebanon itself. That said, Beirut and Lebanon are characters that have well-established presence on the historical record, and the summary of such information thus does not represent the full extent of what has been written or discovered about its history. Key sources used are Salibi (1990), Traboulsi (2007), and Fisk (1992).

[48] Al Ariss argues that the term 'diaspora' is misleading and homogenizing, as there are a multitude of Lebanese identities living outside Lebanon. See the article at http://iloubnan.info/en/actualite/id/24842 (last accessed September 22, 2011).

[49] For further reading, see "Factbox: Facts on Lebanon's Economy". (June 8, 2009). *Reuters.* [website]. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/06/08/us-lebanon-election-economy-sb-idUSTRE5570SJ20090608. Last accessed September 22, 2011.

[50] See Diffin, Elizabeth. "Why is Beirut still a by-word for Chaos?" (February 20, 2010). *BBC*. [website]. Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/magazine/8524133.stm. Last accessed September 24, 2011.

[51] See "The Development and the Reconstruction of the City Center of Beirut Lebanon" (n.d.). UNESCO Management of Social Transformations. *MOST*. [website]. Retrieved from http://www.unesco.org/most/mideast5.htm. Last accessed September 24, 2011.

[52] Loosely adopted from those presented by Stathis Kalyvas, "Warfare in Civil Wars" in *Rethinking the Nature of War*, edited by Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Jan Angstrom, 88-108, p. 97.

[53] Note on historical sources: The vast amounts of historical analysis of all phases of Irish and British history are well-documented and prolific. This makes research into the history of Northern Ireland as a means of contextualizing forthcoming research a Sisyphean task. Therefore, the historical information drawn on for the following analysis does not represent a thorough review of the body of literature available on the topic; rather, a few key sources have been relied upon to provide the generalized context. Even in terms of the literature available on the multitude of pivotal events that moved the conflict between Republicans and Unionists forward in the 20th century, much attention and analysis has been rendered. Therefore, familiarization with the key actors and events as a means of understanding the critical elements of the Irish Troubles and the ensuing peace process (and the effect of this on Belfast), has been the goal of this section.

[54] A good history of this escalation is provided by Munck (1992).

[55] It should also be noted that separate to the civil rights marches and the resurgence of the IRA, the Ulster Volunteer Force was formed in late 1965/early 1966 in response to what that community saw as the growing IRA threat. They too were instrumental in helping to escalate paramilitary violence.

[56] The Provisional IRA was formed in 1969 in a split with the IRA over differing philosophical bases for activity. The PIRA was responsible for a large portion of the Republican paramilitary terrorism that took place throughout the Troubles. They are often referred that as the IRA in the literature about the Troubles, however the former IRA was openly unsupportive of the PIRAs tactics.

[57] See "Bloody Sunday report Published". (June 15, 2010). *BBC*. [website]. Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/10320609.stm. Last accessed September 28, 2011.

[58] While Sutton published a book that reported deaths from 1969-1993, he has updated the statistical data on the CAIN website. Thus, the data here is published on the website and not in the book.

[59] See McKenna, et al. (2011).

[60] See McKittrick, David. "Loyalists to blame for 30% of the bombings". (June 24, 1994). *The Independent*. [website]. Retrieved from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/loyalists-to-blame-for-30-per-cent-of-bombings-1424691.html. Last accessed October 1, 2011.

[61] Fund for Peace (http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/) publishes the *Failed States Index* every two years and bases the criteria for determining a failed state on a detailed rubric of social, economic, political, and military factors.

[62] Refer back to the discussion on typologies of violence in chapter two.

[63] For the text of the treaty, see http://www.reshafim.org.il/ad/egypt/ramses-hattusili-treaty.htm. Last accessed August 28, 2012.

[64] See *UN Peacemaker* [website]. Retrieved from http://peacemaker.unlb.org/index1.php. Last accessed July 20, 2011.

[65] The Markale Market bombing marked a turning point in the war. Two occurred: the first in February of 1994 where 68 were killed and 144 wounded and the second in August 1995 when 37 were killed and 90 wounded. Markale market was (and is) a main central open-air market; when the second bombing happened it provided the motivation for NATO to resume and scale-up bombing campaigns, a tactic that quickly brought the war to an end.

[66] Holbrooke's success as a negotiator, and one his trademark characteristics, was his 'drive and ingenuity, and his refusal to take no for an answer . . . As Henry Kissinger put it, "If Richard asks you for something, just say yes. If you say no, you'll eventually get to yes, but the journey will be very painful". Cornwell, R. (December 15, 2010). "Richard Holbrooke: Influential and highly effective diplomat whose finest hour was negotiating the Dayton peace accords*. The Independent*. [website]. Last accessed August 30, 2012.

[67] See Annex II for the full results of the coding applied to the agreement.

[68] Refer back to chapter three for the discussion of the framework design and application.

[69] The reason for this, as was indicated earlier, is due to the long segment of Ta'if that was very long and multi-dimensional in scope and seemingly out of place.

[70] These principals are: 'To democratic and exclusively peaceful means of resolving political issues; To the total disarmament of all paramilitary organisations; To agree that such disarmament must be verifiable to the satisfaction of an independent commission; To renounce for themselves, and to oppose any effort by others, to use force, or threaten to use force, to influence the course or the outcome of all-party negotiations; To agree to abide by the terms of any agreement reached in all-party negotiations and to resort to democratic and exclusively peaceful methods in trying to alter any aspect of that outcome with which they may disagree; and, To urge that "punishment" killings and beatings stop and to take effective steps to prevent such actions' (Mitchell 2000, 35-36).

[71] See "Coming back to Life". (November 8, 1982). *Time Magazine*. [online archive]. Retrieved from http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,925835,00.html. Last accessed October 6, 2011.

[72] This represented 80.98 % of the eligible population, meaning those of voting age (18 years old and older) in both the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. The CAIN website gives the following figures at the time of the referendum: Electorate: 1,175,403; Turnout: 953,583; Turnout (percentage): 80.98%; Spoilt votes: 1,738; Total Valid Vote: 951,845. See McKenna, et al. (2011).

[73] Spoilers are defined by Stedman (2000) as 'leaders and parties who believe the emerging peace threatens their power, world view, and interests and who use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it' (5).

[74] See *Architects without Frontiers*: http://www.asfint.org/; *Architects without Borders*: http://www.architectswithoutborders.com/ (note that there are many local chapters of this organization with their own detailed websites); and *Architects/Designers/Planners for Social Responsibility*: http://www.adpsr.org/home (all last accessed August 29, 2012).

[75] For this, see "Rise in NI's 'Peace walls' disappointing says Cameron". (June 9, 2011). *BBC*. [website]. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-13710969. Last accessed August 30, 2012.

[76] See the following articles for additional information: Bleakley, Laura. "Is Belfast ready for the peace lines to be removed?" (September 2, 2011). BBC. [website]. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-14762671. Last Accessed August 30, 2012; O'Hagan, Sean. "Belfast: divided in the name of peace". (January 21, 2012). *The Guardian*. [website]. Retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2012/jan/22/peace-walls-troubles-belfast-feature. Last accessed August 30, 2012; and "Despite peace, Belfast wall are growing in size and number". (May 3, 2008). *USA Today*. [website]. Retrieved from http://www.usatoday.com/news/topstories/2008-05-03-1826820552_x.htm.

[77] See the following articles and documents: "Fifth Report on War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia". (n.d.) *University of the West of England: Britsol*. [website]. Retrieved from http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/documents/sdrpt5.htm. Last accessed August 30, 2012; "Sarajevo Utility Cut-off: A Return to Dark Days". (April 13, 2011). *We Remember the Bosnian Genocide.* [Blog post]. Retrieved from https://bosniagenocide.wordpress.com/2011/04/13/sarajevo-under-siege-witout-power-water-and- gas/. Last accessed August 30, 2012.

[78] This is well documented in many accounts of survival during the war, some examples being: Willsher, K. "Sarajevo, 20 Years On". (August 4, 2012). *The Times*. [online newspaper content]

Retrieved at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/bosnia/9192198/Sarajevo-20-years-on.html. Last accessed August 30, 2012; and Kurspahic, Kemal. "Trees for Sarajevo". (Spring 1998). *American Forests*.

[79] There is ample documentary evidence that the cemeteries in Sarajevo were a direct result of the siege. Recent figures place the siege death toll at 11,541 who were all buried within the city. See "Sarajevo 1992-1995: looking back after 20 years"(April 4, 2012). *BBC Online*. [online news resource]. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-17617775. Last accessed August 30, 2012; and Cooper, Rob. "Bosnia remembers: Empty chairs laid out in Sarajevo in memory of 11,541 killed 20 years after bloody conflict began". (June 4 2012) *Mail Online*. [online news source]. Retrieved from http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2126117/Bosnia-remembers-11-541-chairs-laid-Sarajevo-memory-dead-20-years-bloody-conflict-began.html#ixzz1xbI6Qd2s. Last accessed August 30, 2012.

[80] The presence of foreign aid workers in any post-conflict or post-disaster context will almost always cause inflation which can damage the capacity of locals to make ends meet. See "Tuzla missing out on potential bonanza soldiers' cash". (February 16, 1996). *Agence France Pres.* In addition to "Interference with Local Economies". (n.d*.). The Conflict Management Toolkit: Humanitarian Aid* [page on website]. Retrieved from http://www.sais-jhu.edu/cmtoolkit/issues-in-practice/humanitarian-aid/dilemmas-organizational.htm. Last accessed August 30, 2012.

[81] After the war, the World Bank helped to fund the reconstruction major roads and highways, the Mostar Bridge, the main water sanitation portal in Sarajevo, hospitals, waste management facilities, and the water supply ("15 Years of the World Bank in Bosnia-Herzegovina". (n.d.). *The World Bank.* [pdf]. Retrieved from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTBOSNIAHERZ/Resources/15yBrochureENG.pdf. Last accessed August 30, 2012. In addition, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development have focused on energy and infrastructure, the financial sector, agribusiness, and industry and commerce: "Bosnia Herzegovina: Focus Areas". (1 November 2010). *European Bank for Reconstruction and Development*. [page on website]. Retrieved from http://www.ebrd.com/pages/country/bosniaandherzegovina/focus.shtml. Last accessed August 30, 2012.

[82] See above.

[83] This is evidenced by a variety of factors: for one, Sarajevan respondents generally indicate that any form of urban planning that exists in the city is purely bureaucratic in nature and does not function to create strategic planning policy in place, now, and especially, just after war (interviews SJ1-6).

[84] This is an assessment made by reviewing the types of building and reconstruction projects that have occurred in Sarajevo in the post-war era in addition to the interview subject commentary.

[85] According to Fetahagic (2010) these include 'Sarajevo Canton Development Strategy until 2015' (1999); 'Urban Plan of the City of Sarajevo for Urban Area of Sarajevo for the period from 1996 to 2015' (1999); 'Spatial Plan of Sarajevo Canton for the period from 2003 to 2023'; and 'Canton Environmental Action Plan' (2006) (Fetahagic 2010).

[86] One of the first new developments was the Bosmal Towers (known officially as Bosmal City Center) located in the Hradic area of Sarajevo. The creation of two Bosnian brothers, Erin and Nijaz Šabanović who were sent to live and attend university in Malaysia, Bosmal was the first time a new development of such a scale was constructed in the former siege city. The word Bosmal is a hybrid of Bosnia and Malaysia. Gathering much of their financial backing from Malaysian (Muslim) banks, it was the first example of confidence in building and investment in Sarajevo following the war ("Interview with Mr. Edin Sabanovic and Mr. Nijaz Sabanovic". (February 19, 2002). [interview]. *Winne*. Retrieved from http://www.winne.com/topinterviews/bosmal.htm. Last accessed August 30, 2012).

[87] Almost all major regeneration projects and new building sites in Sarajevo, except for the Alta Shopping Mall, are backed partially or in full by foreign, Muslim banks. This is proven through the simple exercise of searching for the websites of the new buildings in the city and looking at their background information, which is for the most part transparent on their websites. In addition, databases such as www.skyscrapercity.com and www.ba-ca.com have reliable user generated information on new building sites.

[88] This is something that can be stated because in the course of researching the new building projects in the city, this is what I found. These sites are discussed in greater detail in chapter six.
[89] This can be claimed due to the overwhelming documentation available online of the destruction Beirut city centre. Additionally, the city centre was also where the green line was, which served as a geographical and psychological centre to the war, thus also being the site of great destruction (Nardella, B. and Abbas, Y. "Beirut, Lebanon: Conservation and reconstruction in the Beirut Central District". (n.d.). *MIT*. [web page]. Retrieved from http://web.mit.edu/akpia/www/AKPsite/4.239/beruit/beirut.html. Last accessed August 30, 2012.
[90] There is overwhelming evidence that Solidere is on the minds of many people: from news articles, to blogs, and from art to activism, what Solidere has done and is doing is clearly on the minds of many, at least those that have an internet or publication presence.
[91] For a more information on the position of King Fahad of Saudi Arabia, see "King Fahad bin Abdul Aziz: Lebanon". (n.d.) *King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz*. [website]. Retrieved at http://www.kingfahdbinabdulaziz.com/main/l103.htm. Last accessed August 30, 2012.
[92] The information in paragraph was taken from the Solidere website (www.solidere.com) as well as gleaned from field observation.
[93] The following commentary is based on field observation and supported by research.
[94] Though the Laganside Corporation was dissolved in 2007, their basic website is maintained: http://www.laganside.com/.
[95] The Cathedral Quarter has a well-developed website here: http://www.thecathedralquarter.com/default.aspx. Its history and function in the regeneration of Belfast are discussed in Alberini, Riganti, and Longo 2003 and McCarthy 2006.
[96] This argument is supported by other factors: the 1994 IRA cease fire as well as general economic prosperity in Europe and North American lead to increased capacity for the Northern Ireland ecnomy to also prosper, which had a direct link to the regeneration projects. Additionally, Mitchell ensured that economic incentives were part of the Belfast Agreement, thus aiding in its appeal, keeping it in line with the economic boom of the time (Mitchell 10).
[97] From interview BF7.
[98] Supported by interviews BF1, BF3, BF4, BF5, BF6, BF8, BF9, BF11, BF13.
[99] St. Anne's Square opened in 2010 (www.saintannessquare.com/pdf/stannescommercial.pdf) and the Obel Tower opened in April 2011 (http://www.obel.co.uk/).
[100] For additional information see: Potter, G. "The Royal Exchange". (n.d.) *Future Belfast* [website]. Retrieved from http://www.futurebelfast.com/royal-exchange.html; and "Case Study: Royal Exchange, Leaside Properties". (n.d.) *DPP: Planning, Sustainability, Heritage, and Design*. [website]. Retrieved from http://www.dppllp.com/our-services/planning/case-studies/royal-exchange-belfast.aspx. Both last accessed August 30, 2012.
[101] See http://www.titanic-quarter.com/.
[102] See http://www.titanic-quarter.com/about.php?ID=17. Last accessed September 23, 2011.
[103] Interestingly, the Baščaršija was saved from destruction in the mid-1950s when Juraj Neidhardt, a prominent architect responsible for the many Yugoslav era buildings, had proposed to raze the area and put modernist designed space in its place. This had stemmed from a movement in 1945, when the notion that Bosnia's identity needed to be augmented by a separation from past governments. In this case, the presence of the Baščaršija was too heavy of a connection with the Ottoman past. However, it was not approved ten years later as the value of the Baščaršija as a tourist destination was deemed too valuable (Alić and Gusheh 1999).
[104] See the Sarajevo City Centar website: http://www.sarajevocitycenter.com/?jezik=eng as well as this recent article about the site: "Saudi Based Al-Shiddi Group to Build City Center and Hotel in Sarajevo". (n.d.). *The Luxury Hub* [website]. Retrieved from http://theluxuryhub.com/saudi-based-al-shiddi-group-to-build-city-center-and-hotel-in-sarajevo/. Last accessed September 23, 2011.
[105] Sarajevo was named by travel guide Lonely Planet as one of the top ten cities to visit in 2010 ("Lonely Planet's Top Ten Cities 2010". (n.d.).*The Australian.com.* [website]. Retrieved from http://www.theaustralian.com.au/travel/galleries/gallery-fn3025xv-1225794915428?page=1. In addition, it was nominated as one of the Top Eastern European Getaways ("Top Ten Eastern European Getaways". (May 25, 2012). *The Lonely Planet*. [website] . Retrieved from http://www.lonelyplanet.com/bosnia-and-hercegovina/travel-tips-and-articles/67086). Last accessed August 30, 2012).

[106] There are many academic positions on this, many of which are held by those used in this research (Sawalha 2003, 2007, 2010; Khalaf 1993, 1997, 2006; Khalaf and Khoury 1993; Makdisi 1997a, 1997b; Nagel 2002; Nasr 1993). However, there is also a mass of public opinion that can be found on the internet that express anywhere from concern to vehemence on the subject. Likewise, there are also many articles found in print journalism that also tend to view the work of Solidere in a critical light.

[107] For more information, see Totten, M. "Christopher Hitchens and the Battle of Beirut". (February 25, 2009). *Michael J. Totten.* [blog]. Retrieved from http://www.michaeltotten.com/archives/2009/02/christopher-hit.php. Last accessed August 30, 2012; finkploy d. "Wimpys of Hamra has Kicked the Bucket". (February 9, 2007). *Blogging Beirut*. [blog]. Retrieved from http://www.bloggingbeirut.com/archives/1037-wimpys-of-hamra-has-kicked-the-bucket.html. Last accessed August 30, 2012.; and "The new Lebanon can't hide the Bullet holes". (March 21, 2011). *Foreign Policy Association*. [blog]. Retrieved from http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2011/03/21/the-new-lebanon-cant-hide-the-bullet-holes/. Last accessed August 30, 2012..

[108] While it no longer houses a Jewish population (except for one resident), it is home to Lebanon's only synagogue.

[109] See the real estate section of the Solidere website: http://www.solidere.com/solidere.html.

[110] Information found at "GNI Per Capita, Atlas Method (US$)". (n.d.). *The World Bank*. [web page]. Retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD. Last accessed August 30, 2012.

[111] Read more in this article: Ohrstrom, Lysandra. "Solidere: 'Vigilantism under color of law". (August 6, 2007). *The Daily Star.* [online news paper]. Retreived fromhttp://www.dailystar.com.lb/Lebanon-Examiner/Aug/06/Solidere-Vigilantism-under-color-of-law.ashx#ixzz1WzxU3Akg. Last accessed October 10, 2011.

[112] Article 15 states: 'Rights of ownership are protected by law. No one's property may be expropriated except for reasons of public utility in cases established by law and after fair compensation has been paid beforehand' ("Lebanon – Constitution". (n.d.) *International Constitutional Law.* [website]. Retrieved from http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/le00000_.html#A014_. Last accessed August 24, 2011.

[113] Throughout the war, between 1975 and 1989, it is estimated that nearly 990,000 Lebanese emigrated, about 40% of the total population (Tabar 2009, 7). The current population of Lebanon is 4,143,101, which accounts for about one-third of 12,369,400 estimated worldwide as members of the Lebanese diaspora. According to the International Organization on Migration (IOM), US $7,558,000 in remittances is sent back to Lebanon, accounting for approximately one-fifth of Lebanon's economy (all data as of 2009).

[114] The group runs its website through Facebook: http://www.facebook.com/groups/106647959367804/.

[115] There is another heritage preservation society called APSAD (L'Association pour la **P**rotection des **S**ites et **A**nciennes **D**emeures au Liban, or The Association for Protecting Natural Sites and Old Buildings in Lebanon). It is a charitable organization established in 1960, and would appear to have a more effective voice in lobbying to save heritage sites though it seems they are fairly powerless. They have done little in Beirut, and nothing since the end of the war, though it would appear they might have greater facilities for aiding the work of Save Beirut Heritage.

[116] There are many conversation threads (such as this one: http://www.skyscrapercity.com/showthread.php?t=653138&page=4) that illustrate the ongoing debate regarding the tearing-down on many Beiruti buildings.

[117] For a more in-depth discussion of the complexity of these laws and the way it influences the actions of developers and reactions of the activtists, see Byrns, Karah. "Beirut: Under destruction". (April 2, 2011). *Executive*. [online magazine]. Retrieved from http://www.executive-magazine.com/getarticle.php?article=14132. Last accessed august 30, 2012; Alabaster, O, and Gatten, E. "Solidere denies destruction of Beirut's Egg". (July 27, 2011). *The Daily Star*. [online newspaper]. Retrieved from http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Local-News/2011/Jul-27/Solidere-denies-demolition-of-Beiruts-egg.ashx#axzz1yA6OYB6I. Last accessed August 30, 2012.

[118] See multiple sources on this: Simons, Ken. "Lebanon's Democratic Culture Shows its Roots", Peace Magazine, April-June 2005, 6. Retrieved from

http://peacemagazine.org/archive/v21n2p06.htm; Hilal, Kishan. “Saad Hariri’s Moment of Truth”, Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2011, 65-71. Retrieved from http://www.meforum.org/2820/saad-hariri-moment-of-truth; and Saghieh, Hazem. “Lebanon’s 14 March : From Protest to Leadership”. *Open Democracy*, (April 1 2008).[online magazine]. Retrieved from http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/middle_east/lebanon_from_protest_to_leadership.

[119] Read more on this divergent evolution: Al-Amin, Hazem. “Between Edde and Wahhab”. *Lebanon Now*. [online magazine]. (June 12, 2012). Retrieved from http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=409427.

[120] For more information, read more here: Young, Michael. “The battle for downtown: Solidere symbolizes much”. (April 2007). *Executive*. [online magazine]. Retrieved from http://www.executive-magazine.com/getarticle.php?article=9341.

[121] *Ibid*.

[122] For further discussion, see Makdisi, Saree. “Reconstructing History in Central Beirut”. Middle East Research and Information Project. Fall 2012. Retrieved from http://www.merip.org/mer/mer203/reconstructing-history-central-beirut?ip_login_no_cache=6fd8921308b690e2d892e4e49348ed41. Last accessed August 30, 2012.

[123] For more information see Phipps, Anna. “Appeal for stories of the ‘most bombed hotel in Europe’”. *BBC online*. January 31, 2011. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-12322222. Last accessed 18/20/2011.

[124] Information found on the Belfast City Council website: http://www.belfastcity.gov.uk/gasworks/history.asp?menuitem=history.

[125] See “Planning application for major Belfast rebuild scheme”. *BBC online*. October 28, 2010. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-11644929; and “Current Campaigns”. (n.d.). *Ulster Architectural Heritage Society*. [website]. Retrieved from http://www.uahs.org.uk/join-in/campaigns/current_campaigns.php. Last accessed August 30, 2011.

[126] At the time of the 1951 census, Belfast had a population of 443,671; by 2001, it had reduced to 277,391, a drop of nearly 40% (Plöger 2007).

[127] The greatest contender is this idea that Belfast, as a working-class city, will risk losing this quality if the city centre is overrun by yuppies. This is discussed later.

[128] See this website for more information on the relocation: http://www.ulster.ac.uk/greaterbelfastdevelopment/latest-news.html.

[129] Hackett, Mark. Introductory comments. Belfast City of Quarters Conference, March 25-26, 2010. Unpublished.

[130] See “Belfast City Cycle: Vision 2020”. (n.d.) *Friends of the Earth Belfast*. [online pdf] Retrieved from http://www.sustrans.org.uk/assets/files/Ireland/Belfast%20Cycle%20City%20Report.pdf. Last accessed August 30, 2012.

[131] See FAB’s website at http://www.forumbelfast.org/about-fab.php.

[132] See FAB website article on Divis Street: “Divis Link”. (n.d.) *Forum for Alernative Belfast*. [website]. Retrieved from http://www.forumbelfast.org/projects/divis-pathfinder.php. Last accessed August 30,2012.

[133] Kilmurray based this list on the publication Bellerman et al. *Observatory on national policy to combat social exclusion.* Commission of the European Communities Directorate General V. April 1993. Retrieved from http://aei.pitt.edu/35991/1/A2233.pdf. Last accessed August 30, 2012.

[134] A recent report on this is “Poverty in Northern Ireland, 2010/201”. *Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency*. June 14, 2012. Retrieved from http://www.dsdni.gov.uk/ni_poverty_bulletin_2010-11__release_document_.pdf. Last accessed August 30, 2012.

[135] For Belfast City Council’s most recent policy on the issue see “Poverty and Inequalities Framework 2012”. (n.d.) Belfast City Council. [website]. Retrieved from http://www.belfastcity.gov.uk/poverty/. Last accessed August 30, 2012. In the case of Northern Ireland, there is a report released every two years detailing poverty issues and their potential policy guidelines for addressing them. The most recent (2010-2011) can be seen here: “Northern Ireland Poverty Bulletin”. (n.d.) *Department for Social Development*. [website]. Retrieved from http://www.dsdni.gov.uk/poverty_bulletin.htm. Last accessed August 30, 2012.

[136] The black cabs functioned because bus drivers refused to drive into parts of the city notorious for violence in the 1970s, and as a result was the only form of transportation into and out of these areas

for residents (BF1). For this reason, the cab drivers knew the areas well and saw the development of the murals firsthand. This is why in the contemporary setting they have traditionally been the ones to give the tours. The fact that busses are now taking people to these murals seems to speak rather ironically to this historic fact.

[137] See "Re-imaging Communities Project". (n.d.) *Belfast City Council*.[website]. Retrieved from http://www.belfastcity.gov.uk/goodrelations/projects.asp. Last accessed August 30, 2012.

[138] There were a myriad of journalism, social media, blogging, academic and professional sites, conversation threads and discussion forums on various topics that contributed to a greater understanding or 'temperature' reading of what public opinion was like in all three cases. Some, such as Slugger O'Toole (www.sluggerotoole.com) were a portal for news and news commentary on politics and culture in Northern Ireland, England, Scotland, and Wales and had a particularly biting criticism of matters. On the Bosnian side of things, public opinion of the regeneration of Sarajevo was fairly scattered, but there was a lot of insight gained from looking through conversation threads on the Skyscrapercity website. Lastly, commentary on Beirut was (and is) plentiful, with a highly politicized local and diasporic population who are very connected to the city as well as an adoring set of expats, sites such as 'Beirut Spring' and 'This is Beirut' document issues that affect the city.

[139] Many, if not most, of the academic sources used in the research on Beirut reflect this sentiment, and it is also evident in blog posts as well as directly related to the work of Save Beirut Heritage as well as the ongoing strife between Solidere and the St. George's Hotel (see the Agence France Presse, "Beirut's legendary St. George's Hotel aims for comeback". .June 26, 2011.

[140] The Bosnia Institute also says 'Bosnia-Herzegovina has perhaps the most complex, not to say contradictory, political structure of any country in the world, imposed upon it under the terms of the 1995 Dayton Accords' ("About Bosnia: Politics and Government". (n.d.) *Bosnian Institute*. [website]. Retrieved from http://www.bosnia.org.uk/bosnia/politics.cfm. Last accessed June 15, 2012.

[141] See "Let's Stick Together: Out of the Void, a New Government". (January 1, 2012). *The Economist*. [online edition]. Retrieved from http://www.economist.com/node/21542461. Last accessed July 15, 2012.

[142] See section 6.3.3 for more discussion on this,

[143] This statement is based on information I was given in an interview but that I could not corroborate because sources on this topic were in French and Arabic and not translated. But the story goes, as I was told by BT1, that Samir Kassir, a famous Lebanese and Beiruti journalist and academic, was initially hopeful and inspired by the prospect of what Solidere would provide for the reconstruction of Beirut and was very supportive in his weekly writing in the *Daily Star* (the local newspaper). After a time however, he became disillusioned with Solidere, especially as their methods for obtaining land and property along with the expulsion of residents seemed to counter any good they were doing. As a result, he then became a very vocal critic of Solidere. He was always however a favourite in Lebanese society, and a notable public commentator, especially in regards to the opposed Syrian involvement in Lebanon. He was assassinated in 2005 for his strong views against the pro-Syrian regime at the time.

[144] There has been no official census in Bosnia since 1991, though in regards to Sarajevo, movement of IDPs during and after the war suggest that the demographics have altered from their pre-war numbers and that Bosniaks are the majority. That said, there will finally be a census conducted in 2013 (see Jukic, Elvira. "Bosnia ready to conduct 2013 Census". (February 2, 2012). *Balkan Insight*. [website]. Retrieved from http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bosnia-ready-to-conduct-2013-census. Last accessed August 30, 2012; and"Bosnia and Herzegovina Prepare for its First Census in 20 Years". (January 16, 2012). *United Nations Population Fund*. [website]. Retrieved from http://www.unfpa.org/public/cache/offonce/home/news/pid/9804. Last accessed August 30, 2012.

[145] This notion is reiterated throughout the literature on the reconstruction of the city centre regarding how there is an attempt to erase war-memory from urban space, thus altering the pattern of local identity formation (for instance, Legg 2007, Switzer and McDowell 2008, Ferndandes 2004).

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APPENDIX I

Interviews Cited and Interview Schedule

Belfast		**Interview date**
BF1	Community liason for large private property development firm	March 8, 2010
BF2	Sales and leasing for large private property development firm	March 8, 2010
BF3	City council community relations specialist	March 9, 2010
BF4	Local community representative	March 9, 2010
BF5	Local community representative	March 9, 2010
BF6	Private property developer	March 9, 2010
BF7	Local regeneration expert and surveyor	March 9, 2010
BF8	Local community representative and private property developer	March 10, 2010
BF9	Private property developer	March 10, 2010
BF10	Private property developer	March 10, 2010
BF11	Private property developer	March 10, 2010
BF12	Local MP	February 22, 2011
BF13	Local architect/urban designer	March 1, 2010
BF14	Local community representative	March 26, 2010
Sarajevo		
SJ1	Private property developer	April 1, 2010
SJ2	Local architect	April 2, 2010
SJ3	Local architect	April 2, 2010
SJ4	Local architect	April 2, 2010
SJ5	Local consultant on governance and economic issues	April 6, 2010
SJ6	Local business owner	April 7, 2010
Beirut		
BR1	Local business owner	May 25, 2010
BR2	Local journalist	May 26, 2010

APPENDIX II

Tables showing the coding applied to each peace treaty

Dayton Accords

| Dayton Accord: Framework Application | | |

Dayton Accord: Framework Application (cont.)

Component Category	Outline of text
3PB	23
	(Letters of assent from the participants) Agreement between Croatia and NATO
2PB	1
2PB	2
2PB	3
2PB	4
2PB	5
2PB	6
2PB	7
2PB	8
2PB	9
2PB	10
2PB	11
2PB	12
2PB	13
2PB	14
2PB	15
2PB	16
2PB	a
2PB	b
2PB	c
2PB	17
2PB	18
2PB	19
2PB	20
2PB	21
2PB	22
3PB	23
	Agreement between FRY and NATO
2PB	1
2PB	2
2PB	3
2PB	4
2PB	5
2PB	6
2PB	7
2PB	8
2PB	9
2PB	10
2PB	11
2PB	12
2PB	13
2PB	14
2PB	15
2PB	16
2PB	17
2PB	18
2PB	19
3PB	20
	Annex 1-B: Agreement on Regional Stabilization
	1
	Article I: General Obligations
3RC	1
	Article II: Confidence & Security Building Measures in Bosnia & Herzegovina
2RC	1
2RC	a
2RC	b
2RC	c
2RC	d
2RC	e
2RC	f
2RC	g
2RC	h
2RC	i
	Article III: Regional Confidence & Security Building Measures
2RC	1
2RC	a
2RC	b
	Article IV: Measures for Sub-Regional Arms Control
4RC	1
2RC	2
2RC	a
2RC	b
2RC	c
2RC	3
2RC	a
2RC	b
2RC	c
2RC	d
2RC	e
4RC	4
	Article V: Regional Arms Control Armament
3RC	1
	Article VI: Entry into Force
3PB	1
	Annex 2: Agreement on Inter-Entity Boundary Line and Related Issues
3RC	1
	Article I: Inter-Entity Boundary Line
2RC	1
	Article II: Adjustment by the Parties
2RC	1
	Article III: Rivers
2RC	1
2RC	2
	Article IV: Delineation and Marking
2RC	1
2RC	2
2RC	3
	Article V: Arbitration for Brcko Area
3RC	1
2RC	2
2RC	3
2RC	4
2RC	5
	Article VI: Transition
2RC	1
	Article VII: Status of Appendix
2PB	1
	Article VIII: Entry into Force
3PB	1
	Appendix Annex 2
2PB	1
	Annex 3: Agreement on Elections
2PB	1
	Article I: Conditions for Democratic Elections
2RC	1
2RC	2
2RC	3
	Article II: The OSCE Role
4RC	1
4RC	2
4RC	3
4RC	4
	Article III: The Provisional Election Commission
2RC	1
2RC	2
2RC	a
2RC	b
2RC	c
2RC	d
2RC	e
2RC	3
2RC	4
	Article IV: Eligibility
3RC	1
	Article V: Permanent Election Commission
2RC	1
	Article VI: Entry into Force
3PB	1
2PB	1
	Annex 4: Constitution of Bosnia & Herzegovina
3RC/PB	1
	Article I: Bosnia & Herzegovina
3RC/PB	1
2RC/PB	2
3RC/PB	3
3RC/PB	4
2RC/PB	5
3RC/PB	6
3RC/PB	7
3RC/PB	a
3RC/PB	b
3RC/PB	c
2RC/PB	d
2RC/PB	e
	Article II: Human Rights & Fundamental Freedoms
2RC/PB	1
2RC/PB	2
2RC/PB	3
2RC/PB	a
2RC/PB	b
2RC/PB	c

Dayton Accord: Framework Application (cont.)						
Component Category	*Outline of text*		*Component Category*	*Outline of text*	*Component Category*	*Outline of text*
2RC/PB	d		2RC/PB	e	2RC/PB	a
2RC/PB	e		2RC/PB	f	2RC/PB	b
2RC/PB	f		2RC/PB	g	2RC/PB	c
2RC/PB	g		2RC/PB	h		Decisions
2RC/PB	h		2RC/PB	i	2RC/PB	4
2RC/PB	i		2RC/PB	j		*Article VII: Central Bank*
2RC/PB	j			Powers	2RC/PB	1
2RC/PB	k		2RC/PB	4	2RC/PB	1
2RC/PB	l		2RC/PB	a	2RC/PB	2
2RC/PB	m		2RC/PB	b	2RC/PB	3
3RC/PB	4		2RC/PB	c		*Article VIII: Finances*
3RC/PB	5		2RC/PB	d	2RC/PB	1
2RC/PB	6		2RC/PB	e	2RC/PB	2
2RC/PB	7			*Article V: Presidency*	2RC/PB	3
2RC/PB	8		2RC/PB	1		*Article IX: General Provisions*
	Article III: Responsibilities of & Relations Between the Institutions of the Bosnia & Herzegovina & Other Entities			Election and Term	2RC/PB	1
				1	2RC/PB	2
	Responsibilities of the Institutions on Bosnia & Herzegovina		2RC/PB	a	2RC/PB	3
			3RC/PB	b		*Article X: Amendment*
2RC/PB	1			Procedures	2RC/PB	1
2RC/PB	a			2	2RC/PB	2
2RC/PB	b		2RC/PB	a		*Article XI: Transitional Arrengements*
2RC/PB	c		2RC/PB	b	2RC/PB	1
2RC/PB	d		2RC/PB	c		*Article XII: Entry into Force*
2RC/PB	e		2RC/PB	d	3RC/PB	1
2RC/PB	f			Powers	4RC/PB	2
2RC/PB	g			3		*Annex I: Additional Human Rights Agreements to be Applied in Bosnia & Herzegovina*
2RC/PB	h		2RC/PB	a		
2RC/PB	i		2RC/PB	b		
2RC/PB	j		2RC/PB	c	2RC/PB	1
2RC/PB	2		2RC/PB	d	2RC/PB	2
2RC/PB	a		2RC/PB	e	2RC/PB	3
3RC/PB	b		2RC/PB	f	2RC/PB	4
2RC/PB	c		2RC/PB	g	2RC/PB	5
2RC/PB	d		2RC/PB	h	2RC/PB	6
2RC/PB	3		2RC/PB	i	2RC/PB	7
2RC/PB	a			Council of Ministers	2RC/PB	8
2RC/PB	b		2RC/PB	4	2RC/PB	9
2RC/PB	4		2RC/PB	a	2RC/PB	10
	5		2RC/PB	b	2RC/PB	11
2RC/PB	a		2RC/PB	c	2RC/PB	12
4RC/PB	b			Standing Committee	2RC/PB	13
	Article IV: Parliamentary Assembly		2RC/PB	5	2RC/PB	14
	House of Peoples		2RC/PB	a	2RC/PB	15
2RC/PB	1		2RC/PB	b		*Annex II: Transitional Arrangements*
2RC/PB	a			*Article VI: Constitutional Court*		Joint Intermin Commission
2RC/PB	b			Composition		1
	House of Representatives		2RC/PB	1	4RC/PB	a
2RC/PB	2		2RC/PB	a	2RC/PB	b
2RC/PB	a		2RC/PB	b	2RC/PB	c
2RC/PB	b		2RC/PB	c	2RC/PB	2
	Procedures		2RC/PB	d	2RC/PB	3
2RC/PB	3			Procedures	2RC/PB	4
2RC/PB	a		2RC/PB	2	2RC/PB	5
2RC/PB	b		2RC/PB	a		(?) Declaration BiH and RS
2RC/PB	c		2RC/PB	b		Declaration RepSrp
2RC/PB	d			Jurisdiction		**Annex 5: Agreement on Arbitration**
			2RC/PB	3	2PB	1

Dayton Accord: Framework Application (cont.)

Component Category	Outline of text
	Annex 6: Agreement on Human Rights
	Chapter One: Respect for Human Rights
	Article I: Fundamental Rights&Freedom
2PB	1
2PB	2
2PB	3
2PB	4
2PB	5
2PB	6
2PB	7
2PB	8
2PB	9
2PB	10
2PB	11
2PB	12
2PB	13
2PB	14
	Chapter Two: The Commission on Human Rights
	Part A: General
	Article II: Establishment of the Commission
4PB	1
2PB	2
2PB	a
2PB	b
2PB	3
	Article III: Facilities, Staff & Expenses
2PB	1
2PB	2
2PB	3
2PB	4
2PB	5
	Part B: Human Rights Ombudsman
	Article IV: Human Rights Ombuds.
4PB	1
2PB	2
2PB	3
2PB	4
	Article V: Jurisdiction of the Ombuds.
2PB	1
2PB	2
2PB	3
2PB	4
2PB	5
2PB	6
2PB	7
	Article VI: Powers
2PB	1
2PB	2
	Part C: Human Rights Chamber
	Article VII: Human Rights Chamber
2PB	1
2PB	2
2PB	3
2PB	4
	Article VIII: Jurisdiction of Chamber
2PB	1
2PB	2
2PB	a
2PB	b
2PB	c
2PB	d
2PB	e
2PB	f
2PB	2
	Article IX: Friendly Settlement
2PB	1
2PB	2
	Article X: Proceedings Before Chamb.
2PB	1
2PB	2
2PB	3
2PB	4
2PB	5
	Article XI: Decisions
2PB	1
2PB	a
2PB	b
2PB	2
2PB	3
2PB	4
2PB	5
2PB	6
	Article XII: Rules and Regulations
2PB	1
	Chapter Three: General Provisions
	Article XIII: Organizations Concerned with Human Rights
2PB	1
2PB	2
2PB	3
2PB	4
	Article XIV: Transfer
2PB	1
	Article XV: Notice
2PB	1
	Article XVI: Entry into Force
3PB	1
	Appendix: Human Rights Agreements
2PB	1
2PB	2
2PB	3
2PB	4
2PB	5
2PB	6
2PB	7
2PB	8
2PB	9
2PB	10
2PB	11
2PB	12
2PB	13
2PB	14
2PB	15
2PB	16
	Annex 7: Agreement on Refugees & Displaced Persons
3PB	1
	Chapter One: Protection
	Article I: Rights of Refugees & Displaced Persons
2URBE	1
2PB	2
2PB	3
3PB	a
3PB	b
3PB	c
3PB	d
3PB	e
3PB	4
4PB	5
	Article II: Creation of Suitable Conditions for Return
2URBE	1
2PB	2
	Article III: Cooperations with International Organizations & International Monitoring
2PB	1
2PB	2
2PB	3
	Article IV: Repatriation Assistance
2PB	1
	Article V: Persons Unaccounted For
2PB	1
	Article VI: Amnesty
2PB	1
	Chapter 2: Commission for Displaced Persons & Refugees
	Article VII: Est. of Commission
4PB	1
	Article VIII: Cooperation
2PB	1
	Article IX: Composition
2PB	1
2PB	2
2PB	3
2PB	4
	Article X: Facilities Staff & Expenses
2PB	1
2PB	2
2PB	3
2PB	4
2PB	5
	Article XI: Mandate
2URBE	1
	Article XII: Proceedings before the Commission
2URBE	1
2URBE	2
2URBE	3
2URBE	4
2URBE	5

Dayton Accord: Framework Application (cont.)

Component Category	Outline of text
2URBE	6
2URBE	7
2URBE	8
	Article XIII: Use of Vacant Property
2URBE	1
	Article XIV: Refugee and Displaced Persons Property Fund
2URBE	1
2URBE	2
	Article XV: Rules and Regulations
2URBE	1
	Article XVI: Transfer
2PB	1
	Article XVII: Notice
2PB	1
	Article XVIII: Entry into Force
2PB	1
	Annex 8: Agreement on Commission to Preserve National Monuments
	Article I: Est. of the Commission
4URBE	1
	Article II: Composition
2PB	1
2PB	2
	Article III: Facilities, Staff & Expenses
2PB	1
2PB	2
2PB	3
	Article IV: Mandate
2URBE	1
	Article V: Proceedings before the Commission
2URBE	1
2URBE	a
2URBE	b
2URBE	c
2URBE	d
2URBE	e
2URBE	2
2URBE	3
2URBE	4
2URBE	5
	Article VI: Eligibility
2URBE	1
	Article VII: Rules and Regulations
2URBE	1
	Article VIII: Cooperation
2URBE	1
	Article IX: Transfer
2URBE	1
	Article X: Notice
2URBE	1
	Article XI: Entry into Force
3PB	1
	Annex 9: Agreement on Establishment of Bosnia & Herzegovina Public Corporations
3PB	1
	Article I: Commission on Public Co's

Component Category	Outline of text
4PB	1
2PB	2
2PB	3
	Article II: Establishment of a Transportation Corporation
4PB	1
2PB	2
2PB	3
2PB	4
2PB	5
	Article III: Other Public Corporations
4PB	1
	Article IV: Cooperation
2PB	1
	Article V: Ethics
2PB	1
	Article VI: Entry into Force
3PB	1
	Annex 10: Agreement on Civilian Implementation of the Peace Settlement
3PB	1
	Article I: High Representative
4URBE/PB	1
4PB	2
	Article II: Mandate and Methods of Coordination and Liason
2PB	1
2PB	a
2PB	b
2PB	c
2PB	d
2PB	e
2PB	f
2PB	g
2PB	2
2PB	3
2PB	4
2PB	5
2PB	6
2PB	7
2PB	8
2PB	9
	Article III: Staffing
2PB	1
2PB	2
2PB	3
2PB	4
2PB	a
2PB	b
2PB	c
	Article IV: Cooperation
2PB	1
	Article V: Final Authority to Interpret
4PB	1
	Article VI: Entry into Force
3PB	1
	Annex 11: Agreement on International Police Task Force

Component Category	Outline of text
3PB	1
	Article I: Civilian Law Enforcement
2PB	1
2PB	2
	Article II: Establishment of the IPTF
2PB	1
2PB	2
2PB	3
2PB	4
2PB	5
2PB	6
2PB	7
2PB	8
	Article III: IPTF Assistance Program
2PB	1
2PB	a
2PB	b
2PB	c
2PB	d
2PB	e
2PB	f
2PB	g
2PB	2
2PB	3
	Article IV: Specific Resonsbilities of the Parties
2PB	1
2PB	2
2PB	3
2PB	4
2PB	5
	Article V: Failure to Cooperate
2PB	1
2PB	2
	Article VI: Human Rights
2PB	1
2PB	2
	Article VII: Application
4PB	1
	Article VIII: Entry into Force
3PB	1
	Agreement on Initialling
3PB	1
	Article I
3PB	1
	Article II
3PB	1
	Article III
3PB	1
	Article IV
3PB	1
	Letters of Intent Statement of Closure

Total Sections: 649

| Ta'if Agreement: Framework Application | | |

Belfast Agreement: Framework Application					
Component/ Category	*Outline of text*	*Component/ Category*	*Outline of text*	*Component/ Category*	*Outline of text*
Declaration of Support		2PB	8	3PB	x
3PB	1	2PB	9	3PB	x
3PB	2	2PB	10	3PB	x
3PB	3	2PB	11	3PB	x
3PB	4	2PB	12	3PB	x
3PB	5	2PB	13	3PB	x
3PB	6	*Executive Authority*		**Strand 2: North/South Ministerial Counci**	
Constitutional Issues		2PB	14	3PB	1
3RC	1	2PB	15	2PB	2
3RC	i	2PB	16	2PB	3
3RC	ii	2PB	17	2PB	i
3RC	iii	2PB	18	2PB	ii
3RC	iv	2PB	19	2PB	iii
3RC	v	2PB	20	2PB	4
3RC	vi	2PB	21	3PB	5
2PB	2	2PB	22	3PB	i
Annex A: Draft Clauses/Schedules for Incorporation in British Legislation		2PB	23	3PB	ii
		2PB	24	3PB	iii
2RC/PB	1(1)	2RC/PB	25	3PB	iv
2RC/PB	1(2)	*Legislation*		2PB	6
2RC/PB	2	4PB	26	2PB	7
Sched. 1: Polls for the Purpose Sect. 1		2PB	a	4PB	8
2PB	1	2PB	b	2PB	9
2PB	2	2PB	c	2PB	i
2PB	3	2PB	d	2PB	ii
2PB	4	2PB	e	2PB	10
Annex B: Irish Gov't Draft Legislation to Amend the Constitution		2PB	27	2PB	11
		2PB	28	2PB	12
2RC/PB	7	2PB	29	2PB	13
2RC/PB	i	*Relations with other Institutions*		2PB	14
2RC/PB	ii	2PB	30	2PB	15
3RC	Article 2	2PB	31	2PB	16
3RC	Article 3	2PB	32	2PB	17
2PB	1	2PB	a	2PB	18
2PB	2	2PB	b	2PB	19
2PB	iii	2PB	c	**Annex**	
2PB	iv	2PB	d	2PB	1
2PB	4	2PB	33	2PB	2
2PB	5	2PB	a	2PB	3
Strand One: Democratic Institutions in Northern Ireland		2PB	b	2PB	4
		2PB	c	2PB	5
3PB	1	4URBE/PB	34	2PB	6
The Assembly		*Transitional Arrangements*		2PB	7
2PB	2	3PB	35	2PB	8
4PB	3	*Review*		2PB	9
4PB	4	2PB	36	2PB	10
Safeguards		**Annex A: Pledge of Office**		2PB	11
3RC/PB	5	3PB	a	2URBE	12
2RC/PB	a	3PB	b	**Strand Three: British-Irish Council**	
2RC/PB	b	3PB	c	3RC/PB	1
2RC/PB	c	3PB	d	2PB	2
2RC/PB	d	3PB	e	2PB	3
2RC/PB	i	3PB	f	2PB	4
2RC/PB	ii	3PB	g	2PB	5
2RC/PB	e	*Code of Conduct*		2PB	6
Operation of the Assembly		3PB	x	2PB	7
2PB	6	3PB	x	2PB	8
2PB	7	3PB	x	2PB	9

Component/ Category	Outline of text
2PB	10
2PB	11
2PB	12
	British-Irish Governmental Conference
3RC	1
2PB	2
2PB	3
3PB	4
3RC	5
3RC	6
2PB	7
2PB	8
2PB	9
	Rights, Safeguards, & Equality of Opp.
	Human Rights
3RC/PB	1
3RC	x
3RC	x
3RC	x
3RC	x
3RC	x
3RC	x
3RC	x
	United Kingdom Legislation
4PB	2
2PB	3
2PB	4
3PB	x
3PB	x
	New Institutions on Northern Ireland
4PB	5
2PB	6
2PB	7
2PB	8
	Comparable Steps by Irish Governme
4PB	9
2PB	x
2PB	x
2PB	x
2PB	x
2PB	x
	Joint Committee
4PB	10
	Reconciliation & Victims of Violence
3RC/PB	11
3RC/PB	12
3URBE/PB	13
	Rights, Safegurards & Equality of Opp.
	Economic, Social & Cultural Issues
3URBE/PB	1
2PB	2
3URBE	i
3URBE	ii
3RC/PB	iii
3PB	3
2PB	4
2PB	x

Component/ Category	Outline of text
2PB	x
2PB	x
2PB	x
2PB	x
3RC/PB	5
	Decommissioning
2PB	1
2PB	2
3RC/PB	3
2PB	4
2PB	6
	Security
3RC/PB	1
2PB	2
2PB	i
2PB	ii
2PB	iii
2PB	iv
2PB	3
2PB	4
2PB	5
	Policing and Justice
3RC/PB	1
3PB	2
2PB	3
3PB	4
2PB	x
2PB	x
2PB	x
2PB	x
2PB	5
2PB	6
4PB	7
	Annex A: Commission on Policing for N.I.
	Terms of Reference
4RC/PB	1
	Annex B: Review of Criminal Justice Sys.
	Terms of Reference
3PB	1
	Prisoners
3RC/PB	1
3PB	2
2PB	3
2PB	4
2PB	5
	Validation, Implementation and Review
	Validation and Implementation
4PB	1
4PB	2
4PB	3
2PB	4
	Review procedures following imp.
2PB	5
2PB	6
2PB	7

Component/ Category	Outline of text
2PB	8
	Agreement between the Gov't of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Gov't of Ireland
3PB	1
	Article 1
3PB	i
3PB	ii
3PB	iii
3PB	iv
3PB	v
3PB	vi
	Article 2
4PB	i
4PB	ii
4PB	iii
4PB	iv
	Article 3
2PB	1
2PB	2
	Article 4
2PB	1
2PB	a
2PB	b
2PB	c
4PB	2
4PB	3
	Annex 1
2PB	1
	Annex 2: Declaration on Provisions of Para. (vi) of Article 1 in Relationship to Citizenship
3PB	
Total Sections: 269	



Figure 6-6 Belfast: Walking Routes and Key Sites
Scale: 5 cm: 1 km



Legend

Historic Areas
Ottoman
Austro-Hungarian
Yugoslav

Walking Routes

The Two Centres
Marindvor
Stari Grad/Centar

Olympic Sites

Major Sites

1 Airport
2 Oslobojenje Building/ Radon Hotel
3 B osmal
4 Importanne Centar
5 Holiday Inn
6 Bosnian Parliament
7 Sarajevo City Centar
8 Alta Shopping Centar
9 Unitic Towers
10 Avaz Tower
11 BBI Centar
12 Skenderija Centar
13 Papaguy
14 Ferhadijah Street
15 Baščaršija
16 The National Library
17 Surrounding neighbour-

Sarajevo: Walking Routes and Major Sites

Main Map Scale: 5 cm: 1km
Offset Map Scale: 3.25 cm: 1 km

Figure 6-5 Beirut: Walking Routes and Major Sites
Scale: 5 cm: 1 km

Detail of Solidere BCD
Source: http://www.solidere.com/solidere.html